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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY STUDIES 
Submission for the degree of DPhil 
Catching up or Being Dependent: The Growth of Capabilities among Indigenous 
Technological Integrators during Chinese Development  
SUMMARY 
The thesis appraises certain key processes – albeit rather limited in number and scope – widely 
assumed to be associated with assessing the role of technological capability building in 
developing country (DC) firms. The latter are affected by their DC status on both the demand side 
(e.g. by rapid growth of the economy via consumption and trade) and the supply side (of 
technological catch-up etc.). Such broad considerations set the scene for our specific study. In this 
thesis, the component of technological capabilities that we highlight by studying local integrated 
product providers is the capability for systemic product development.  
We argue that the organisational system of industrial firms in DCs plays a fundamental role in 
their technological learning performance. Here, the developmental context is stressed because we 
suggest that the knowledge about how to organise effective learning, termed ―social technology‖ , 
is at least as scarce as the ―physical technology‖ in such contexts, compared with those prevailing 
in the developed countries. Therefore, when DC firms shift into a new domain, the organisational 
systems that they rely on often have to be created rather than simply selected. This may be 
because, as first-movers in their circumstances, even when they are informed by external sources, 
they have very little practical experience of carrying out similar actions successfully within their 
own contexts. Therefore, studying organisational building in their early phase could prove critical 
for understanding their capability building processes. 
Empirical studies of China‘s car-making and telecom-equipment sectors over the past three 
decades are taken to support theoretical exploration in this thesis. Some scholars (e.g. Bell and 
Pavitt, 1992) point out that, in DCs, the growth of production capacity does not automatically lead 
to the building of technological capability. The experiences of China‘s car-making and telecom- 
equipment sectors are exactly in line with this point of view.  
From the mid 1980s, the Chinese government implemented a ―trading market for technology 
(TMFT)‖ policy, encouraging its backbone SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) to establish 
productive joint ventures (JVs) with MNCs (Multinational Corporations). By doing so, 
policy-makers expected backbone SOEs to undergo a bottom-up capability building trajectory via 
learning closely from their JV partners. We term these SOEs and their JVs the ―Group-A firms‖ in 
our research. Contrary to the expectations of policy-makers, Group-A firms were locked into the 
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manufacturing segment even after twenty years of TMFT practices, and seldom had new systemic 
products developed indigenously, prior to 2005 at least.  
On the contrary, the indigenous advance of technological capability building has actually been led 
by some new entrants. Their development has been independent of the advocacy of TMFT. They 
relied on in-house developed products from the very beginning after entering the corresponding 
industries, and succeeded in building sustainable competitiveness. We term them the ―Group-B 
firms‖. 
By comparing these Group-A and Group-B firms, we argue that there are distinctive differences in 
organisational learning systems between them. Four components are developed of the concept of 
organisational learning systems, i.e. the strategic intent, the authority over strategic resource 
allocation, the pattern of organisational mobilisation and learning integration, and the facilities 
and institutions for knowledge accumulation. For the latter three components, we succeed in 
generating a clear contrast between these two groups of firms. We undertake a thorough 
comparison of authority over strategic resource allocation by studying the constitution of their top 
committees. As for the patterns of learning mobilisation and organisational integration, we find 
distinct differences in the scope of knowledge communication of front-line engineers, and 
relevant institutional arrangements to mobilise, integrate and direct the content of communication. 
Regarding the facilities for knowledge accumulation and application, the study of their knowledge 
database building engenders a clear contrast, as well as the institutional arrangements to regulate 
and promote relevant activities within their organisations. 
We also discover significant connections between the organisational systems of Group-B firms 
and their processes of knowledge search, generation and accumulation. Three important 
mechanisms of new knowledge creation in Group-B firms are examined, namely learning through 
recruitment, learning through cooperative projects and learning through interaction with 
customers. Our empirical study reveals that the authority stressing the investment in new product 
and technology development, the cross-boundary inter-departmental platform of knowledge 
conversion, the comprehensive knowledge-accumulating facilities, and the institutions backing 
these components play fundamental roles in shaping these learning mechanisms. 
Therefore, the organisational differences of these two groups of firms are connected with the 
differences of these two subsets of firms‘ technological learning performances. Besides, we 
discuss the social roots of their organisational systems by historically revisiting China‘s industrial 
system.  
By doing so, for the research community that focuses on technological learning in DCs, this thesis 
advocates a shift of research from stressing assimilative processes of firms to giving more 
emphasis to organisational changes as a centrepiece of studies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Aim of this research 
The central topic of this thesis is the impact of the organisational and institutional dimensions of 
firms in developing countries (DCs) upon their technological learning with the aim of 
technological catching-up, with special reference to China. Based on the substantive literature 
associated with this field, the discussion centres on how firms establish their learning systems and 
correspondingly mobilise and integrate knowledge search, along with knowledge generation and 
accumulation. In other words, the focus is on how organisations are built to enable effective 
learning rather than being on the implementation of learning. 
By comparison with the conventional literature related to technological learning in DCs, the 
author stresses that the causes of divergent learning performances among firms lie not only in the 
differences of strategy implementation, but also more significantly in the differences of their 
organisational learning systems. This does not imply overlooking the importance of investment in   
resource-based learning, grasping technological opportunities, training the labour force, etc. 
Rather, the author suggests the organisational learning system frames the learning activities of 
knowledge search, generation and accumulation. Technological learning of the DC firms should 
not be only regarded as a purposeful resource-consuming process, but also as an organisational 
process. The features of their organisational learning systems and their emergence should be 
placed at the very centre of our studies. 
The theoretical contribution of the thesis is supported by its empirical studies of the Chinese 
car-making and telecom-equipment industries. Effective learning to gain the technological 
capabilities that enable DC firms to manage technological and product changes is observed in 
only a subset of firms (later to be called Group-B firms). For this point, the differences from other 
firm types will be examined at length in the course of this study. Detailed case studies are made to 
explore the association between their organisational systems and technological learning. 
Regarding the emergence of different views about technological learning and consequently 
different organisational construction, the author discusses this in a historical context, and 
attributes it to the evolution of Chinese socio-economic evolution. 
1.2 China’s technological learning 
In China, catching up with the frontier countries in terms of the economy is a macro long-term 
mission for all of those who dedicate their efforts to the renaissance of the country. Before the 
First Opium War (1840-1842), China still produced nearly 1/3 of the total world output per year, 
4 
 
ranking No.1 in the world (Maddison/OECD, 2001). However, the old decadent Chinese empire 
was overpowered by the pre-modern and modern western states. China‘s economic growth rate 
dropped from a level above the world average to one that was below it, or even retrogressed. 
China came to be one of the world‘s more backward countries. Thus, for more than a century, 
catching up with frontier countries again became a mission of primary importance for the 
legitimation of any Chinese reformer. 
From 1953 on, when the new China distanced itself from the major wars started from the mid 
19th century, massive industrialisation in a modern sense has been carried out in this country. By 
learning from comparatively advanced countries—first the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics) and other socialist countries, then the capitalist industrialised countries—as well as by 
mobilising internal innovation, industrial systems have been established. More and more people in 
Chinese society have been engaged in this industrial system, and have been carrying out 
technological learning generation by generation. Before they could learn significantly from 
western industrialised countries, China and its people had achieved 5.02% annual growth rates 
during the 1950-1973 period. With the ―43 Arrangements‖ that started in 1972 and the ―78 Plan‖ 
in 1978, China began to open its doors officially for massive international trade and cooperation 
with the industrialised western countries; it maintained a 6.8% annual growth rate during the 
period from 1973 to 1998 (Maddison/OECD, 2001).  
Particularly during the past three decades, China‘s rapid rate of development has been widely 
acknowledged as a new successful example of industrial ―catching-up‖. Large-scale production 
capacities have been established in the country, with the result that China is often termed the 
―world‘s factory‖. During this period, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and the bottom-up model 
of technological learning have been significantly encouraged by the Chinese government. The 
TMFT strategy dominated industrial policies for two decades starting from the mid 1980s. 
Chinese policy-makers had FDI as an important instrument fort reforming SOEs and promoting 
technological learning. In practice, SOEs were encouraged to set up Sino-foreign productive 
joint-ventures (JVs) with MNCs. For the TMFT framework, Chinese government invested in its 
elite resources, and provided a series of special treatments. In this way, Sino-foreign productive 
JVs established a large-scale manufacturing base in China. Additionally, in order to upgrade 
corporate governance, many SOEs passed the dominance of their organisational learning systems 
over to foreign partners, which means they reformed their organisations and underlying 
institutions according to the advice favouring ―advanced models‖ suggested by MNCs. Most of 
them, if not all, began with assembling and manufacturing. They imported product designs and 
equipment from foreign partners and tried to learn from partners in the bottom-up manner of a 
technological life cycle. Some classical terminologies of bottom-up patterns have even become 
the slogan of policies in China. For instance, when the government of Guangdong province 
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wanted Dongguan, i.e. a famous OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) cluster, to upgrade its 
industrial chain, the provincial government claimed that ―…Dongguan shall by 5-10 years of effort 
update its industrial development pattern from a labour- and capital-intensive one to a capital- and 
technology-intensive, or an exclusively technology-intensive one. During this, the mode of business 
should be changed from OEM to ODM (Original Design Manufacturer) and then to OBM (Original 
Brand Manufacturer)…”1  
The TMFT policy contributed significantly to the expansion of China‘s production capacity over 
the past two decades, and enhanced the legitimacy of this pattern in China‘s industrial community. 
According to official statistics,
2
 the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) grew from 365 billion RMB 
(RenMinBi, Chinese currency) in1978 to 24,953 billion RMB at 2007 in terms of current prices. 
Considering fixed prices, compared to that of 1978, the GDP in 2007 is 15 times larger and the 
secondary industry is 24 times larger. Among the outputs of secondary industry, FFEs (Foreign 
Funded Enterprises) make up 31.5% with more than 23.5 million persons employed (data from 
2007). Up to the year 2007, many industrial products manufactured in China ranked No.1 in the 
world. China exports a series of manufactured products, e.g. office and consumer electronics, 
garments, textiles, power equipment and vehicles, etc., of which it is the world‘s largest exporter. 
Moreover, there is another series of products with high global export rankings. The vast body of 
exports has very quickly created the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world.  
However, China also faces less success in meeting all its catching-up targets. The growth of 
production capacity alone does not lead to the growth of technological capabilities. Even after two 
decades‘ practice of implementing TMFT policies, technological capabilities – i.e. the capability 
to ―generate and manage technical change‖ (Bell and Pavitt, 1993 , p159) – have not been obtained 
by these backbone SOEs and relevant Sino-foreign JVs. On the contrary, most of the previous 
capabilities in product development have disappeared from backbone SOEs in a number of 
industries. For many industries, China has obviously played a dependent role in corresponding 
global production networks. Take the TV set sector as an example: Chinese TV set manufacturers 
get core components, namely the IC (Integrated Circuit) chips and the LCD (Liquid Crystal 
Display) panels (there are precisely justthese two subsystems in today‘s TV set system), from 
some international suppliers. However, if the subsystems are updated, Chinese firms cannot get a 
supply of updated components until 4-6 months later. Suppliers provide the new subsystems to 
Japanese producers first because they are affiliated to, or have quasi-permanent technical 
cooperation with these Japanese TV set producers. The lack of in-house development capability 
                                                 
1 This was said by a regional governmental official of Guangdong Province in August, 2008, referring to 21st Century 
Business Herald, 2008-09-05. 
2 The data of this paragraph are from the China Statistical Yearbook (2008), by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
China Statistics Press. 
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has Chinese manufacturers continually being placed in a position of dependency, even though 
they may have larger manufacturing bases with regard to their Japanese competitors. 
At the macro level, being locked into the manufacturing section also creates unexpected outputs. 
The gap between GDP and GNP (Gross National Product) has been continually enlarging since 
1978. By contrast with that in 1980, the GDP in China in 2007 increased by 17.4 times, but the 
GNI per capita only increased by 10.7 times. The remarkably uneven growth of GDP and GNP 
reflects the fact that China‘s economy is still at the lower end of the biological chain globally. 
Relevantly, the problem of income inequality has also become worse and worse. The large base 
and rapid development of manufacturing require a huge amount of rural migrant workers, but they 
are just asked to fill low-paid, Fordist front-line jobs. In 2008, when the global financial crisis led 
to a reduction of demand for Chinese manufactures, hundreds of manufacturing firms were closed 
every month in either the Yangtze River Delta or the Pearl River Delta, i.e. the most important 
manufacturing bases of China. Correspondingly, millions of rural migrant workers lost their jobs 
because their weak manufacturing skills could not protect them from the crisis. According to the 
data published by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the numbers of 
going-back-home workers for the first 11 months in 2008 came to about 4.82 million, involving 
some 5.4% of the total rural migrant workers. 
The delayed development of technological capability fosters a sense of defeat among many 
industrial practitioners and policy-makers, even after two decades of TMFT practice. For example, 
in the car-making sector, in 2003 when the author started investigating the empirical studies 
underlying this thesis, some national experts and consultants kept emphasising that the Chinese 
did not have capability to develop efficiently any engine, gearbox, bodywork or even an ABS 
(antilock braking system) indigenously. These core components were claimed to require huge 
technological investments to develop -- investments much greater than the resources that had been 
obtained at the time. Leaders from backbone SOEs also tried to insist on the lack of preconditions 
of resources for explaining why, legitimately, they could not present any indigenous product or 
critical technology innovation.  
Facing the successful and unsuccessful experiences of this country, the Chinese policy-makers 
unavoidably encountered a series of industrial events that catalysed a controversy. Among these 
events was the intellectual property admission dispute related to DVD (Digital Video Disc) 
players that happened around 2004. The lack of core technologies obliged the Chinese DVD 
manufacturers, which were as prosperous as ever, to hand in huge licence fees, and to be 
confronted with severe global competition. The bankrupting of many domestic firms shook the 
policy-making community and society as a whole. Moreover, what heavily challenged traditional 
policy thinking was the rise of new indigenous firms. By comparison with the backbone SOEs 
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and related JVs, they grew up independently of the central planning economic system, had not 
established Sino-foreign productive JVs, received less governmental support in their early phase, 
and had not followed the bottom-up pattern that emphasised the stretching of manufacturing 
capacity as a primary task. The most important distinction is that Group-B firms have continually 
carried out indigenous product development and constructed their competitiveness on such a 
process of technological capability building, which has not yet been realised by Group-A firms. 
The car-making sector and the telecom-equipment sector are two of the typical cases that facilitate 
a distinct comparison of technological learning between Group-A and Group-B firms. In the 
telecom-equipment sector, new indigenous firms were mostly established from the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s, when on the other side productive Sino-foreign JVs were also actively built by 
backbone SOEs. After the ―price war‖ of PDSS (Public Digital Switching System) during the late 
1990s, new indigenous firms won an overwhelming victory over most domestic firms supported 
by the TMFT policy. Now the representative Group-B firms have become top competitors in the 
global industrial community. In the car-making sector, most Group-B firms were established in 
the mid and late 1990s, have now formed a major challenge to the incumbents in the domestic 
market, and taken a leading role in car exports.  
Around 2004-2005, an important controversy arose among Chinese industrial leaders and 
policy-makers. The emergence and rapid growth of Group-B firms provided another strand of 
thinking regarding the idea of catching up for the society as a whole. In 2005, ―indigenous 
innovation‖ and the ―quality of growth‖ were put forward by the Chinese central government and 
formalised in the ―National Guidelines on Medium- and Long-Term Programs for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020)‖ in 2006. 
However, even though Chinese policy-makers have realised the difference between ―production 
capacity‖ and ―technological capability‖ (Bell and Pavitt, 1993), technological capability does not 
emerge so automatically. The Chinese government has supported a series of projects, such as the 
EVD (Enhanced Versatile Disc) standard in the digital video player sector, the WAPI (Wired 
Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) standard for the wireless LAN (Local Area Network) 
equipment sector, etc; meanwhile, many large SOEs that are involved in the TMFT framework 
have announced projects to develop indigenous systemic products. However, many of them are 
confronted with difficulties in attaining rapid industrialised outputs; few of them have achieved 
their targets of technological innovation until now.  
1.3 Academic explanations 
Many scholars have attempted to explain technological learning in the context of industrial 
development. The new trade and growth theories, including those of Romer (1986) and Lucas 
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(1988), aim to include technological change in modelling economic growth and take on the 
concept of ―learning by doing‖ developed by Arrow (1962). However, this usage presents several 
difficulties. Its strict presumptive conditions make it difficult to interpret the complicated 
empirical dynamics; and for its basic model of knowledge-generation, it is difficult to explain any 
other kind of disruptive technological change in addition to incremental experience-based change. 
Even though scholars go forward to include imperfect competition and R&D (Research and 
Development) in their frameworks (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992), as inspired by Schumpeter (1947), they are still obsessed with explaining ―what if‖ 
questions. Without exploring micro-mechanisms of knowledge searching, generation and 
accumulation, these theories cannot prove their robustness when tested with diversified empirical 
development across countries or even within a single national economic system. Their 
explanations still in essence take innovation or knowledge as the free good or by-product of 
production (Fagerberg, 1994, p1170). For example, they have to deal with the difficulties in 
explaining the convergence or divergence of empirical observations regarding economic 
development (Abramovitz, 1986; Baumol, 1986).  
Other scholars have explored the different industrial patterns among different countries (Chandler, 
1990). The influences of institutions are taken as key factors in shaping the specific patterns of 
different countries (Whitley, 1999, 2002), so are the social conditions (Lazonick, 2010). The 
―embeddedness‖ of microeconomic behaviour within a set of social relationships, rules, and 
institutional constraints can cause firms within the same social context to exhibit some 
commonalities (Granovetter, 1985). Furthermore, embeddedness contributes to determining the 
evolution of organisational structures, competencies, and strategies (Coriat and Dosi, 1999, p104). 
Therefore, it is not difficult to accept that the national patterns of industry are shaped by a 
complex system of social power, governmental policies, and the actions of leading enterprises 
(Lazonick, 1990, 1991; Best, 1990). In the field of technological learning and catching-up 
research, this has been recognised by researchers such as Enos (1991, pp3-4). According to some 
cross-country studies, other scholars again provide empirical evidence that even the same 
industrial policies can lead to different results in different developing economies (Forbes and 
Wield, 2002). Differences in catching-up pathways have also been suggested for countries with 
similar culture in the same region (Lee, 2005). In practice, even academic communities and 
policy-makers prefer different policies for catching up in the face of the different cases they are 
talking about (Forbes and Wield, 2002, p45). Given this and given the empirical studies of 
China‘s rapid development, we accept the argument that the relationships among institutions, 
learning patterns, and catching-up outcomes may be country-specific, and deeply involved in the 
relevant social, institutional and organisational contexts. 
Even with the recognition of diversified patterns of countries, it is also unacceptable to assume 
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that at firm level, DC firms would definitely adopt highly similar patterns of learning unless there 
is empirical evidence that they develop similar views about learning and business operations. A 
reason why the successful experience of catching-up firms could be regarded as generalisable  
may reside in the limited attention that we pay to a particular category of successful firms only, 
rather than all kinds of developmental attempts; or because a similar explanatory framework is 
applied prior to obtaining the empirical facts. Thus, studying the differences among DC firms is 
important for understanding the relations between learning patterns and learning performances, 
which is close to the source of dynamics of their capability growth, and corresponds to the study 
of frontier firms in more industrialised circumstances (Nelson, 1991). 
This thesis is mainly developed based on, and argued with, the literature on technological learning 
at firm level and in the DCs. In the past three decades, a variety of research has been undertaken 
to explore the development process of firms in DCs in terms of technological learning (such as 
Katz, 1987; Lall, 1987; Enos, 1991; Hobday, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Kim, 1997; and 
Figueiredo, 2001), which are termed ―assimilation theories‖ (Nelson and Pack, 1999). Countries, 
industrial clusters, industries and lie at the centre of the above studies. Most of them emphasise 
technological opportunities, enterprise strategies, learning pathways, strategy or project 
implementation or productivity with reference to technological learning. The diversification of 
technological learning at firm level has been highlighted only in recent years in terms of the 
productivity of learning (Hwang, 1998; Ariffin and Bell, 1999; and Figueiredo, 2001). In other 
words, organisations are usually studied only for their different forms of implementation of 
learning; they are put forward as givens or as a bunch of resources, individuals, strategies and 
reactions to policies. It is their methods of implementation rather than themselves as organisations 
that are studied. The former point, usually represented as pathways, opportunities, specific 
programmes, etc., is used to explain the different performances of technological learning and 
catching up.  
Based on given organisations, by and large, the micro-mechanism of knowledge generation and 
accumulation is explained as relying on resource-centred assimilation programmes. For example, 
the programmes of importing technology from advanced countries, employing people from 
outside, continually training employees, and upgrading of equipment are often adopted in the 
conventional literature as methods to analyse the dynamics of obtaining, extending and 
accumulating knowledge. For the rest and non-resource-centred factors, the narrow sense of 
―learning by doing‖ or the DUI (doing, using and interacting) mode of learning/innovation 
(Jensen et al., 2007; Lundvall, 2007) takes on an important role in interpreting continual and 
incremental knowledge growth. However, in practice, when the DUI mode of learning is 
manifested clearly, scholars mostly again adopt the resource, human effort and time investment as 
measures. Or they just base the analysis of non-resource factors taken from narrative description. 
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For example, cultural characteristics, e.g. a tradition of valuing hard work within a particular 
society, are often considered as important in explaining the residual of contingently high 
efficiency of learning in successful countries or even firms. 
In short, the conventional wisdom about technological learning in DCs is mainly based on the 
tradition of the Resource Based View (RBV). This means that the central argument that they focus 
on is the implementation generated by the organisations in question, or the ―service‖ in Penrose‘s 
(1959) term. In particular, knowledge is regarded as the output of relevant investments through 
the ―service‖. 
By contrast, this thesis more persistently focuses on the differences between organisations. This 
does not mean that we overlook the implementation of strategy, resources or learning. However, 
we stress that the conventional assimilation theories derived from (and also limited by) RBV 
cannot explain well the substantial dynamics of technological capability building of DC firms, 
especially in explaining the divergence of technological learning in DCs. Successful technological 
learning cannot be simply regarded as the firms in question making the right decisions, carrying 
out the right projects, or investing sufficiently. Otherwise, we cannot provide any ex ante 
implications for the catching-up of latecomer firms because our theory has to depend primarily on 
particular organisational and institutional settings that are platforms to implement corresponding 
projects and strategies. 
Thus, we aim to develop the analysis from studying the organisations themselves, to gain greater 
understanding of the building of organisations, the resource allocation within firms, the process of 
technological learning and the knowledge management system in the circumstances of developing 
countries. We argue that technological learning, at least that of catching-up firms in DCs, is 
closely influenced by their organisational systems, namely by their strategic intent, authority over 
strategic resource allocations, patterns of organisational mobilisation and learning integration, and 
their facilities and institutions for knowledge accumulation.  
1.4 Implementation of this research 
The empirical studies for this thesis began in 2003 and consisted of a series of research projects. 
Some of the projects were commissioned by the central government of China, which helped to 
open the door to enterprises, and become one part of the policy controversy there during 
2004-2005. 
During the several years‘ worth of empirical studies, five manufacturing industries were involved 
in our studies, including the car-making sector, the telecom-equipment sector, the construction 
machinery sector, the power equipment sector and the consumer electronics sector. For reasons of 
brevity in elaborating case studies at firm level, we only pick two sectors in this thesis. The 
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car-making sector and telecom-equipment sector are selected for their distinctive differences as 
well as their common features. On the one hand, this selection protects our research from being 
distracted by particular industrial characteristics derived from high-tech or traditional 
technologies, or by particular producer-user relations; car-making is broadly regarded as a 
traditional industry for the mass consumption market while telecom-equipment manufacturing is 
usually included as a high-tech industry with outputs of capital goods. In terms of technical 
change, the car-making sector and the telecom-equipment sector also belong to different 
categories, namely the production-intensive and the science-based respectively (Pavitt, 1984). 
Putting them together helps to reduce the bias caused by special industrial patterns. Besides, the 
emergence of new indigenous firms in these two sectors clustered in different time periods. To 
study them together also helps to tell whether highly sector-specific policies in the short term 
determine fundamental patterns of technological learning at the firm level.  
On the other hand, the two sectors share important commonalities. There are successful new 
indigenous firms that emphasize in-house product development in both sectors; and these firms 
manifest sharp contrast with those incumbent backbone SOEs and their productive Sino-foreign 
JVs in terms of technological learning.  
In short, bringing the two sectors together helps us to identify the substantial diversity of 
industrial firms in China at the organisation level, which is regarded by the author as critical in 
understanding the dynamics of capability building of DC firms. 
Assisted with other methods, our empirical studies are carried out mainly by on-site fieldwork at 
the firm level, especially by face-to-face interviews and participatory observation (see the List of 
Interviewees for details). The studied firms are put into two categories according to their 
strategies and performances of technological learning. Comparative study is carried out to analyse 
their organisational learning systems; we also go further and present an in-depth investigation into 
the role played by organisational systems in their knowledge creation processes. 
1.5 Outline of this thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. This first chapter is the introduction to the whole thesis.  
Here we briefly present the empirical background, the most relevant academic discussion and the 
implementation of this research project. 
In the second chapter, conventional research works are reviewed. The literature concerning 
technological learning and catching-up in DCs is the major field of research with which we 
engage. The relevant studies focused on China‘s development are also involved in this chapter.  
The third chapter covers the research methods. In that chapter, the central question and the 
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hypotheses are highlighted. We discuss the methods employed in our empirical study and, in 
detail, the execution of our research plan. 
In the fourth chapter, the institutional and industrial backgrounds for the sectors we study are 
elaborated on. Historical studies about the source of original patterns of Group-A and Group-B 
firms are introduced. 
The fifth chapter carries out comparative studies of the two groups of firms. Strategic intent in 
technological capability building and the activities carried out by these two groups of firms are the 
major perspectives through which we discuss the differences of technological trajectory. 
The sixth chapter is a follow-up of the fifth to continue the comparison between these two groups 
of firms. Chiefly, authority over resource allocation, patterns of organisational mobilisation and 
learning integration and knowledge databases are discussed. 
The theme of the seventh chapter is to explore the in-depth relation between the organisational 
learning system and the process of knowledge creation. All the empirical studies in this chapter 
are based on Group-B firms. 
Chapter 8 revisits the evolution of management patterns of Chinese industrial enterprises. We aim 
to link the differences between organisational learning systems with the revolution of institutions 
in China. By doing so, we argue that organisational systems of firms are closely related to the 
societal development and political evolution in corresponding DCs; then organisational learning 
systems should be taken as primary mediums for the studies of technological learning and 
catching-up in DCs. After that, we reconsider the conventional wisdom, and put forward our 
theoretical arguments. 
Chapter 9 concludes. The hypotheses are tested in the chapter; conclusions and implications for 
policy-makers and academic researchers are put forward. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review:  
technological learning and capability building in DCs 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate the research for this thesis within conventional intellectual 
contexts. By reviewing the classical literature in relevant academic fields, we can highlight the 
research question of this thesis and its potential importance for understanding the development of 
catching-up countries, or at least that of China during the past three decades. 
The discussion will focus gradually toward such a question about how industrial firms in DCs 
build up their technological capabilities. Considering the divergence of technological learning 
performance not only among different countries, but also among industrial firms in the same 
country or the same national innovation system, we place the organisational factors as the central 
inquiry for influencing technological learning when reviewing the relevant literature. Additionally, 
we also aim to find clues from conventional wisdom about how the firms recognise learning, and 
how they construct their organisation for learning. 
We will argue, through the following sections, that scholars have already accumulated much 
knowledge about the historical analysis of catching up at country level or at industry level, and 
have also built some understanding of individual firms or industries about how specifically they 
implement technological learning successfully. Only a few studies have explored why the 
performances in learning could be disparate between different subsets of firms in particular 
industries. If both the success and the failure of learning are attributed to the implementation of 
strategies or projects, it raises a corresponding question for us to answer, of why different subsets 
of firms conduct dissimilar strategies and work differently in learning projects. As an alternative, 
we shall explore how the organisational learning systems of the firms are constructed, and how 
they influence knowledge accumulation.  
In section 2.2, the discussion focuses on the conventional wisdom about technological learning 
and catching up. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on China‘s development at the firm and 
industry levels. Section 2.4 discusses the literature on the role of organisation regarding 
technological learning in DCs. 
2.2 Technological learning in conditions of development 
Technological learning has been generally regarded as the core source of technological 
competences not only in the literature about frontier firms in developed countries but also in 
literature about catch-up firms in DCs. However, in DCs, technological learning is confronted 
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with at least two special realities that are not so pervasive in the developed world. Firstly, in DCs, 
firms are short of technological knowledge, both in terms of absolutely new knowledge, and of 
knowledge existing in the developed world, as would be necessary to generate helpful knowledge 
accumulation. Secondly, the process of catching up entails latecomer firms‘ progressing from a 
low level to a high level in terms of capability. Therefore, the process of technological learning 
must be a dynamic one. In other words, latecomer firms are obliged to demand ―new-new‖ 
technologies continually so that they can progressively enhance their technological capabilities 
and shorten the gap between themselves and frontier firms.  
In this section, the discussion of the relevant literature is organised into three main parts. Firstly, 
we discuss the phenomena and themes that researchers study which are most relevant to the field 
of technological learning in DCs. Secondly, we consider the ―what‖ (to learn) question, the ―who‖ 
(to learn) question, and the ―how‖ (to learn) question of the technological learning process. We 
also place the knowledge about learning itself in the foreground: how firms in DCs recognise 
technological learning, and how they establish their mindset about the relationship between 
learning patterns and learning performance. Thirdly, from considering the various relations among 
knowledge sources, knowledge accumulation and organisational systems, we highlight the 
question of the effectiveness of technological learning. 
Through the three parts of the review, we attempt to develop a perspective regarding the 
relationship between organisations and the mechanisms they adopt for technological learning. 
Such a perspective is to be a central concern of this thesis, namely the capability growth of 
technical integrators in DCs, and the relevant divergences of learning performance among them 
and their local competitors.  
2.2.1 Historical studies of catching-up: rapid industrialisation in latecomer countries 
Catching-up by DCs has been a traditional topic in the field of development research and policy 
controversies. The relevant discussion has already been developed from the new industrialised 
countries, such as Germany and Russia, to the ―new-new‖ industrialised countries such as Japan 
and NICs. Now the discussion has been spread to cover more industrialising or potentially 
industrialising countries. Most theories can be traced back to Veblen (1915 [1974]) and 
Gerschenkron (1962). Veblen argues that technological changes can be transmitted in definite and 
unequivocal shape. The forms of technological transfer which he advocates include the 
immigration of skilled personnel and the purchase of machine tools with new technologies 
embedded (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005). Gerschenkron (1962, p47) agrees: “the existence of the 
more advanced countries as sources of technical assistance, skilled labour, and capital goods” may 
prove crucial for the backward country‘s obtaining prerequisites to industrial development.. The 
creation of latecomer activities, and of substitutions for the ―prerequisites‖ (or the utilisation of 
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existing ―prerequisites‖ from foreign sources), which Gerschenkron regards as specific 
institutional responses to the technological gap, are emphasised as critical for successful 
catching-up. Central to his observations on institutional conditions for catching up are those to 
mobilise resources and to concentrate the resources in large-scale investment in producers‘-goods 
sectors (i.e. capital goods). For this purpose, the role of the banks in the German case and of the 
government for financial accumulation and appropriation in the Russian case are underlined. The 
strategies that Gerschenkron advocates can be summarised (e.g. by Sylla &Toniolo, 1993) as: 
firstly, catching-up countries should target rapidly growing and technologically advanced 
industries; secondly, intensive investment in existing mature technologies/industries is 
recommended, by which catching-up countries can benefit from scale economies in production.  
Regarding the macro-level analysis, Abramovitz (1979 [1989]; 1994) agrees on Gerschenkron‘s 
point about the latecomer‘s advantage and the institutional preconditions for catching-up. Indeed, 
according to his definition of technological congruence, he also prefers the strategy of investing 
heavily in industries with scale-based technologies. In his framework, Abramovitz develops the 
terminology of ―potential‖ for catch-up of latecomer countries by defining the technological/ 
productivity gap as its first component. Technological congruence, as the second, refers to the 
status of being similar and convergent in terms of factor supplies, markets and production scales 
between the developed countries and those catching-up (Abramovitz, 1994, p88). However, he 
stresses that this will not be automatic. Social capability, as a third component of the ―potential‖ , 
refers to the qualitative development of technical competence, including that of education and the 
political, commercial, industrial, and financial institutions (Abramovitz, 1986, p388). The 
realisation factor of catching-up includes the conditions controlling technological diffusion across 
countries, conditions influencing structural change and the stability of macroeconomic 
backgrounds that support relevant investment and technological absorption (Abramovitz, 1994, 
pp88-89). 
Abramovitz‘s framework is mainly criticised for ambiguities in defining ―social capability‖ and 
the causal relations of his approach. As for the former, he includes people‘s basic social attitudes 
and political institutions, education, competence in the organisation and administration of 
large-scale enterprise, capital markets and intermediation, which comprises a broad range of 
quality measures (Abramovitz, 1995). Therefore, as for comparative studies among countries, 
Abramovitz (1986, p388) himself admits ―…the trouble with absorbing social capability into the 
catch-up hypothesis is that no one knows just what it means or how to measure it‖. The ambiguity 
ties this theory more closely to a post hoc framework to interpret the success or failure of 
countries‘ attempts at catching-up. As he mentions, education levels are only a rough proxy (see 
also Baumol, 1986). However, considering the different situations of catching-up (even for just 
the successful cases) it is obviously insufficient when it is applied to other countries, such as 
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Korea (Shin, 1996). Besides, their analyses rely heavily on aggregate data, and particularly on the 
averages across countries. Thus, even if other factors could be all included as ―social capability‖ 
and applied to the analysis of averages, a number of factors will demonstrate different features in 
different countries, such as governmental intervention. Besides, Abramovitz‘s framework is also 
controversial for whether the social capability is developed (or began to develop) earlier and is 
independent of technological/productivity catching-up, or occurs simultaneously. It is not only a 
question related to historical studies (Shin (1996) – but also a question of causality: whether social 
capability is the driving force of catching-up, as it is defined to be one component of the 
―potential‖, or is a force that co-evolves and deeply interacts with the successful catching-up 
process.  
The historical studies of ―catching-up‖ can provide us helpful frameworks, but only as reference 
to consider the ongoing industrialisation process of DCs. As noted by Gerschenkron, each 
latecomer economy may face very different external environments in terms of markets, 
technologies and opportunities. Therefore, it is not acceptable that every catching-up case should 
be based on the same set of preconditions (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hobday, 2003, p294). Therefore, 
the process of industrial development of latecomer countries ought to be regarded according to 
their own circumstances. Accordingly, Shin (1996) explains Gerschenkron‘s substitution of 
prerequisites as the ―functional substitutes‖, rather than the simple transplantation of successful 
countries‘ institutions. By doing so, Gerschenkron‘s approach can be applicable to more general 
cases. Otherwise, if the analysis of institutional transplantation, theoretically or practically, is not 
based on the real specific temporal and spatial conditions, the approach from the above historical 
perspectives is very likely misused. For example, economists with the dependency view, such as 
Cardoso (1978), argue that the practical way of DCs to acquire advanced technologies, namely to 
rely on MNCs and external market, would have the industries of latecomers develop in an 
incomplete form
3
.  
Therefore, in order to generate better understanding of rapid capability-building in DCs, we shall 
focus more on the process of industrial development and technological learning at firm-level and 
industry-level. As pointed out by Teece (2000, p124), considering the relationship between the 
industrial firms and the development of newly industrialising countries, the study of economic 
development cannot take place separately from studying the theory of the growth of the firm. As 
knowledge has been generally regarded as the core of economic development and technological 
learning is taken as the central means to accumulate knowledge, therefore ―…the key to success is, 
rather, rapid learning and forgetting (when old ways of doing things get in the way of learning new 
                                                 
3 Quoted from Warren (1980), p181-182. The original source is ―Cardoso, F.H. ‗Some New Mistaken Theses on Latin 
American Development and Dependency‘, mimeo, October 1973, p. 29, n. 13.‖ 
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ways)‖ (Lundvall and Archibugi, 2001, p1). More attention ought to be paid to technological 
learning at the firm-level and industry-level for generating better understanding about catching-up 
by DCs grounded in both historical and ongoing experience. 
2.2.2 Empirical studies of technological learning in DCs: objectives 
Here by the empirical studies of technological learning in DCs, we refer to those that place 
learning about new technologies and learning to master them as central in the analyses and focus 
on what was involved in this achievement (Kim and Nelson, 2000, p2). 
For at least the past three decades, there have been groups of scholars contributing their insights 
as regards technological learning in latecomer countries. Initiated by Katz and his Latin American 
team (Katz, 1987; Bell, 2006), relevant studies focus on the ―what‖ question (Figueiredo, 2001, 
p2) of technological learning and the relevant change of ―what‖ over time, although the question 
of time scale has not been explicitly discussed yet (Bell, 2006). Among the relevant literature, 
some have concentrated on issues related to the choice of technologies (Enos, 1982); many have 
centred on issues regarding paths of technical change, trajectories of capability accumulation 
(such as Lall, 1987; Enos, 1991; Hobday, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Kim, 1997; Figueiredo, 
2001; and Forbes and Wield, 2008), and external forces shaping these trends (Katz, 1987).  
As mentioned above, the works of Gerschenkron are an important source of technological 
catch-up studies for the academic community. Gerschenkron (1962) emphasises that latecomer 
countries can implement existing mature technologies, thereby immediately initiating economies 
of scale production. Amsden (1989) and Kim (1997, 1999) underline the strategies for adopting 
existing technologies and stress the importance of large-scale firms. But in some cases, 
considering the ―maturity‖ of existing technologies, the technological learning or the inward 
transfer, absorption and assimilation is discussed in the same simple terms as the transfer or 
imitative construction of physical capital, or additionally as implied by Veblen (1915 [1974]) and 
Teece (1977) as the transfer of people for tacit knowledge. This may bring about a simplified 
understanding of technological learning. Amsden, in her study on Korean industries, even defines 
learning in DCs as ―… [these countries industrialized] by borrowing foreign technology rather 
than by generating new products and processes‖ (Amsden, 1989: preface, v), which is generally 
considered the ―late development advantage‖.  
More researchers have opinions opposing Amsden‘s definition of ―technological learning‖ in 
newly industrialising countries (NICs). Firstly, all researchers who adopt the concept of 
―absorptive capacity‖ deny this simplified statement of technological learning. Relevant 
researchers argue that technologies rarely can be embodied in a ―book of blueprints‖, and even 
more rarely transferred as such. International technology transfer, like domestic technology 
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transfer, is a costly, time-intensive, and knowledge-intensive process (Mowery and Oxley, 1995, 
p69). Through empirical studies, Enos and Park (1988) demonstrate that effectiveness of 
incorporation of foreign technology into DCs rests on multiple factors at different stages. They 
argue even the precision of technical terms obtained by the importer would also remarkably 
influence the success of technology absorption. By studying the case that Chinese invested in 
large plant and made use of foreign technologies, W. Liu (1992) demonstrates exactly that 
technology importers have to do more than just acquire physical facilities and the skills associated 
with using these facilities. Bell and Pavitt (1993) point out that it would be difficult for 
catching-up countries to install large plants with foreign technologies because DCs also lack the 
absorptive capacity necessary to transfer the technologies onto the human capital stock. Thus they 
emphasize ―the complementarily between technology imports and local technology accumulation‖ 
for the technological capability building in DCs (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, p193). Freeman and Soete 
(1997, p356) point out that the use of foreign, imported technology is not a straightforward 
―industrialisation‖ shortcut. Radosevic (1999) support the view of Freeman and Soete with regard 
to the experience of Central and Eastern Europe. As for learning by co-operating with MNCs, 
Sölvell and Zander (1999) also introduce mechanisms of MNCs to isolate local innovation 
systems with their mainstream knowledge creation. Considering the technology diffusion from 
foreign sources, by an aggregate data analysis in Venezuela, Aitken et al. (1999) find that although 
foreign equity participation can promote the productivity of small-sized firms, foreign ownership 
negatively affects the productivity of domestic owned firms in the same industry. And the 
technological spillover from foreign firms to local firms has not been found to happen 
automatically. Even scholars (Blalock, 2001; Damijan, et al., 2003) have generally testified 
vertical technological transfer from FDI within the industrial chain involved in DCs; many 
scholars also applaud the opinion that horizontally FDI participation has a regressive effect on 
local firms‘ productivity (Kokko, 1994; Aitken et al., 1996; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Blalock, 
2001). The squeeze effects caused by the FDI capturing local talent and local market reduce the 
economies of scale of local competitors. Such effects are taken as important sources for the 
problems of domestic firms in acquiring technologies through learning from FFEs. Besides, the 
technological gap between FDI firms and domestic firms, and the absorptive capability of the 
latter, as well as the measures adopted by FDI to prevent technological leakage, are also taken into 
account. In fact, even Amsden herself also realises this point later, and adopts the term ―crowd-out‖ 
to describe the squeeze effect caused by FDI over domestic national firms (Amsden, 2001, p191). 
Therefore, even though in theory DC firms can make use of the existing mature technology and 
invest intensively in large scale plants, effective technological learning or successful technological 
inward transfer would not naturally come into being. The supportive institutions of DCs and the 
knowledge accumulation process of latecomer firms will still need to be studied as the central 
19 
 
topics. 
The ―product life cycles‖ model (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) 
provides another very important analytical instrument for studying technological learning. The 
―product life cycles‖ model can be traced back at least to the contribution of Hirsch (1965) and 
Vernon (1966). The model divides the product life cycle into several phases in terms of 
technological maturation. For each phases, there would be different comparative advantages 
between the newcomer and incumbents, and different levels of technological risks. Therefore, it 
entails academic space for researchers to develop specific catching-up strategies for each phase. 
Such an analytical framework is adopted at least by two kinds of approaches related to the 
technological learning in DCs. 
Firstly, scholars develop a framework based on the techno-economic paradigm to understand the 
technological entry barriers for latecomers and the opportunity windows for catching up (Soete, 
1985; Perez and Soete, 1988; Freeman, 1989; and Freeman and Soete, 1997). Apparently 
enlightened by Dosi (1982)‘s analysis of technological paradigm, this framework implies that the 
technological and economic development could be viewed as cumulative and continuous. 
However, as for the shifts from one techno-economic paradigm to another, the technological and 
economic development would be destructive and discontinuous. As for the cumulativeness and 
continuity of technological and economic development, DC firms are advocated to invest heavily 
in manufacturing standard products, making use of the existing mature technologies and 
economies of scale. Besides, more emphasis is placed on the periods of the shifts of the 
techno-economic paradigms. At that moment, theoretically (by this framework), forerunners‘ 
advantage, embodied as their investment and accumulation in the relevant facilities and 
institutions --- which Christensen terms the ―value network‖ (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003) -- cannot act as it does during the stable period. 
On the contrary, the previous accumulation and investment turn out to be burdens to some extent 
on sunk costs. By contrast, latecomers from DCs have no such sunk cost as burden so that they 
can move faster and more efficiently. Available public knowledge, usually carried out by 
universities, is a critical factor to facilitate latecomers‘ catching up in the early stage of paradigm 
shift.  
The advocacy that DC firms can take up the opportunity windows of a techno-economic paradigm 
shift coincides with research in frontier countries about the discontinuous technological change 
and accordingly the advantage of attackers (Utterback and Kim, 1985; Foster, 1986; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Utterback 1994; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 
1995; Utterback and Acee, 2005). 
The catching-up framework based on ―entry barriers‖ and ―product life cycles‘ has been 
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developed continuously. For instance, taking the empirical study of several industries in Korea as 
examples, K. Lee and Lim (2001) outline three major strategies for technological catch-up: 
stage-skipping, path-creating, and path-following. In their research, the two authors extend the 
concepts, comparing with the two opportunity windows put forward by Perez and Soete (1988). 
They highlight that through the active efforts by the government of DCs or the industries/firms, 
latecomers could create disconformities of technological trajectory with those of industries in 
advanced countries. This means latecomers speed up actively along the existing trajectory, or 
create a new trajectory so that they can enter a new emerging stage or a new technological 
trajectory. Hereby, through earlier investing in the new stage, or new techno-economic paradigm, 
latecomers may have chances to obtain advantages by contrast with firms in advanced countries. 
Furthermore, in order to shed light on the transition phase of latecomer firms in developing 
high-level capabilities, J. Lee (2007) generates a model of experienced catching-up that consists 
of imitation, deviation, and generation phases. 
However, the catching-up analytical framework based on ―entry barriers‖ and ―product life cycles‘ 
is also broadly questioned, such as by Kaplinsky (1989) and Ernst and O‘Connor (1989). 
Criticisms usually come from the heuristics of empirical observation that historically the gap 
between advanced countries and DCs would tend to reopen again. Accumulation in the previous 
techno- economic paradigm can be regarded as a burden or sunk cost to some extent; however, it 
could be the foundation for the new techno-economic paradigm for the connection between the 
old and the new industries as well. Flexibility of production systems, economies of scale and 
science intensity are more likely to be the advantage of advanced countries to utilise the coming 
techno-economic paradigm. Therefore, even though opportunity windows could exist during the 
period of paradigm shift in theory, it is often not wide open enough for latecomers to accumulate 
so many industrial infrastructures and social capabilities to realise successful catching-up. Besides, 
the availability of public knowledge to DCs in the early stage of paradigm shift is also broadly 
questioned. 
By his historical perspective of catching-up, Shin (1996) comments that the theoretical framework 
of Perez and Soete does not fit the actual history of catching-up very well. Catching-up is a 
historical phenomenon determined by the combination of characteristics of technologies and 
responses on the part of latecomers so that the emergence of catching-up would not solely rest on 
the technological entry barriers. 
We shall raise another one criticism here. Supposing that the theoretical opportunity windows do 
exist, we still have to interpret the divergence of technological learning among DC firms under the 
same or similar contextual environments. We shall question why some firms (or countries) seize 
the opportunity while others are unable to do so, especially considering the fact that the winners 
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are always exceptions compared with the vast number of firms in similar circumstances. The 
stress of divergence moves the determinism of technology away from the centre stage of 
catching-up inquiry, and replaces it with the institutional and organisational conditions for 
effective learning. It is the firms that are ready to seize the opportunities which would finally do 
so. The point here is that it is not the entry barriers or opportunity windows that make these 
firms/countries ready. 
Another important application of the ―product life cycles‖ is developed in a step-wise explanation 
of the technological capability ladder. In general, the adoption of this kind of explanation is not 
really based on the ―product life cycles‖ at the unit/technology level, but is extended to the 
firm-level, industry-level and country-level. The ―product life cycles‖ framework is adopted to 
achieve a clear comparable connection between developed countries and DCs (J. Lee, Bae and 
Choi, 1988). In fact, it is set up to describe the evolutionary process of capability-building in DCs: 
technology learning starts with labour-intensive assembly, and reaches the level of assimilation, 
improvement, and product design only at a much later stage, and finally arrives at a stage of 
knowledge creation based on in-house R&D. 
The different capabilities in a step-wise mood are summarized by Fransman (1984, p10) as ―the 
search for available alternative technologies and the selection of the most appropriate technology; 
the mastering of the technology, that is its successful use in the transforming of inputs into outputs; 
the adaptation of the technology in order to suit specific production conditions: the further 
development of the technology as the result of minor innovations; the institutionalised search for 
more important innovations with the development of R&D facilities; the conducting of basic 
research‖. 
As an early attempt of this kind, J. Lee et al. (1988) review relevant research during 1960s-1980s, 
and demonstrate many of them by adopting the bottom-up stage-wise models. Based on the above 
work, J. Lee et al. develop a three stages model for understanding the capability-building of DCs, 
namely the ―initiation – internalisation – generation‖ sequencing stages, corresponding in reverse 
to the ―fluid --  transitional – specific‖ sequencing stages in Abernathy and Utterback‘s model. 
This framework is adopted and developed by Kim (1997, p86-90, p210) in his classical studies of 
the industrial catching-up of Korea, in which Kim advocates the ―acquisition – assimilation – 
improvement‖ model. At the acquisition stage, with the foreign technological assistance, 
latecomer firms learn to assemble foreign standard, undifferentiated goods. By doing so, 
latecomers aim to implement the technological transfer from foreign partners for manufacturing 
operations. At the assimilation stage, production and product design technologies are supposed to 
diffuse quickly within the latecomer firms and latecomer countries. Then latecomer firms are able 
to develop related products through imitative reverse engineering without the direct transfer of 
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foreign technologies. The third stage, namely the improvement stage, is based on the successful 
development of the previous two stages, and the increased capability of domestic scientific and 
engineering personnel. Scholars suppose latecomers can gradually improve the technologies; 
imported technologies can be applied to different product lines through domestic efforts of R&D 
and engineering. And the third stage if the study is at country level, where latecomers are believed 
to develop into industrially developed countries (J. Lee et al., 1988, p242-243; Kim, 1997, 
p89-90). 
As demonstrated above, by contrast with Abernathy and Utterback‘s terms in describing the 
technological evolution, the terms of acquisition, assimilation and improvement are also 
meaningful for understanding the evolution of capability-building at different levels. Besides, this 
framework includes latecomer learning that takes place not only in mature technology in the 
specific stage but also in growing technologies in the transition and fluid stages (Kim, 1997, p90). 
It extends the temporal coverage of bottom-up stage-wise models. Therefore, this framework is 
successfully applied to different firms, industries, and even countries. Besides, it brings an 
intuitive embodiment of the strategy advocated by Gerschenkron, his followers and relevant 
historical experiences that DCs (can) invest in foreign existing mature technologies, and secure 
development through incremental progress. 
Bottom-up patterns are broadly adopted by scholars (Enos, 1991; Kim 1997; Leonard-Barton, 
1995; and Figueiredo, 2001). One of the core topics for bottom-up research is the ladder of 
technological capability building. These ladders have two strands: one stresses the level of 
capability, usually associated with the analysis of each stage; the other is developed based on 
functions, namely the sets of activities learning firms are able to implement. For brevity, we only 
mentioned some of them here. Two of them are very much worth mentioning for their 
representativeness. One is Lall‘s capability-building matrix of manufacturing industry in DCs, 
which combines both lines (Lall, 1987, 1992, 1994). With this matrix, similar to what Kim and 
Lee et al. do, Lall describes a process of latecomer firms develop gradually from simple capability 
to complex capability. For each stage, Lall points out six major functional segments, namely the 
project preparation/pre-investment, project execution, process engineering, product engineering, 
industrial engineering and technology transfer/linkage within economy. His matrix is supported by 
his empirical studies on a series of Indian industries, including cement, steel, textile and some 
special case studies in other industries. Even Lall points out that for different industries, the real 
paths can be divergent, particularly considering specific stages. However, Lall insists, ―mastery 
would proceed from simpler to more difficult activities, different firms and different technologies 
adopt different sequences‖ (Lall, 1994, p267) – he still implies that different paths of firms will 
follow the general ladder from the low level to the high level. Since his framework includes two 
dimensions: the dimension of capability complexity and the dimension of functions. The 
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dimension of capability complexity is also in effect a time sequence dimension since relevant 
scholars advocate the bottom-up mode. Therefore, this matrix depicts a spiral growing trajectory 
of latecomers‘ capability-building in DCs. Lall‘s matrix is broadly adopted such as by Bell and 
Pavitt (1995, p83-84). Figueiredo (2001) also modifies and improves Lall‘s ladder by adjusting 
the definition of functions and categorising the complexity (time) dimension into routine level 
capability and innovative level capability.  
Hobday (1994, 1995, 2000, and 2003) combines studies of technological transition and industrial 
opportunities with empirical studies of the electronics industries in East Asian countries and South 
East Asian countries. His research focuses on inter-firm relationships during fast industrial 
development in an export-oriented environment. The relation of local firms with foreign 
technological sources and with the supply chains are the key of his research. In these studies, 
Hobday summarises an ―OEM -- ODM -- OBM‖ ladder of latecomers‘ strategies and activit ies 
(see Hobday, 1994 or Hobday, 2003, p298). This well-recognised framework successfully 
connects the technological learning of DCs with industrial globalisation in the past few decades, 
and depicts the macro-change of relevant countries. 
The studies based on bottom-up stage-wise models have already provided prolific empirical 
analyses of firms and industries in DCs, particularly those from Korea, Taiwan area, East Asia as 
an analysed area, South East Asia, South America and some countries in Africa. These studies 
enrich our understanding of the processes of latecomers in DCs gradually building their 
capabilities incrementally. However, for the sake of theory generality of these models in studying 
the empirical cases of DCs, we still have to emphasize several points, especially considering the 
popularity of these models, as follows: 
First, we should consider the spatial generality of the bottom-up stage-wise models. Following 
Gerschenkron‘s statement that different countries would follow divergent paths of catching-up, 
some scholars also claim that this ladder is only suitable for a specific industry and catching-up 
stages would be different across countries (Hobday, 2003, p299-300). In fact, J. Lee et al. (1998) 
also identify four types of national patterns of technology development. Among the four types, 
their framework is appropriate in describing the imitative-learning type of development process 
such those in Korea and Taiwan only (J. Lee et al., 1988, p239-240). Therefore, to extend the 
generality of models to different countries and industries or to study the divergence of catching-up 
remains an academically important task. 
Second, the temporal generality of these models should be thought over. The patterns of catching- 
up not only vary with different countries, but also vary with different temporal global industrial 
environments. For example, with rapid technical change, globalization and policy liberalization, 
the context for industrial development is changing radically. So it is becoming imperative for DC 
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firms (whether they serve domestic or foreign markets) to be internationally competitive (Lall and 
Pietrobelli, 2002), which may represent a difference from the catching-up experiences of Japan 
and Korea. Even for particular cases, the continuous progress and relevant change of industrial 
positioning of learning subjects may also bring about different situations than observers ever 
studied and built their theoretical framework on. For example, the ―strategic dilemma‖ put forth 
by Hobday, Rush and Bessant (2004) in studying the catching-up process of Korea reflects both 
the dilemma of industrial practitioners and the dilemma of observers in developing theoretical 
explanation: Korean firms face prominent difficulties when they aim to move from ODM to OBM; 
for observers, the micro-mechanism in stage models is difficult to generate to explain such a 
jump.  
Third, the divergence of firms should also be regarded as a necessary part of our studies. 
Divergence of learning performance in general exists among latecomer firms even if they 
implement similar strategies. However, there is only limited research involving any discussion 
about such divergences. Huang (1998) argues, through case studies of several Korean Chaebols , 
that during the catching-up process firms do respond to the same external challenges 
(governmental policies, market structures and technological changes, etc.) with different strategies. 
The difference is deeply rooted in their organisations so that she adopts the term ―rigidity‖ from 
Leonard-Barton (1992). Figueiredo (2001) criticises Kim (1997)‘s study for taking the successful 
adaptation of firms for granted only if the external environment works effectively. Certainly, what 
Kim presents are only the successful cases in Korea. However, he also suggests, ―successful 
technological learning requires an effective national innovation system to force firms to expedite 
that learning” (Kim 1997, p219) and gives more significance to the external conditions than to 
the in-house learning processes. Hobday (2003, p307), although he stresses the divergences at 
country, region and sector level, postulates that observed divergences are determined by the initial 
starting conditions, the timing of entry and the nature and extent of international opportunity open 
to latecomer countries. Little stress on the in-house efforts and on the organisational and 
institutional process is made by the above scholars in interpreting the divergences. By contrast, 
Figueiredo insists that even within the same industry firms could respond differently to the same 
government policy and follow different technological capability building pathways associated 
with different learning processes and different performances (Figueiredo, 2001, p15). In 
Figueiredo‘s empirical studies of two Brazilian steel-making firms, he argues some key features of 
the learning processes (i.e. the external and internal knowledge-acquisition, the 
knowledge-socialisation and the knowledge-codification) of these two firms differed over time. 
These differences are associated with the difference of the performances of learning firms, 
including the rate, the consistency over time and the trajectory of technological capability 
building. Therefore, it is the in-house learning processes rather than the external factors that 
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determine significantly the inter-firm difference in paths of technological capability accumulation 
(Figueiredo, 2001). Ariffin and Bell (1999) also demonstrate uneven trajectories, paces and 
strategies among foreign-invested Malaysian firms, and their dissimilar linkage to foreign parent 
firms. 
Before the research listed above, there were also some scholars who recognised the importance of 
organisation, namely the carrier of technological learning, as the factor leading to learning 
divergence. However, they take the organisation to be a factor intimately influenced by exogenous 
events (Fransman, 1984, p9-p10). However, in his explanation, market competition, which 
Fransman stresses as a set of external events, would not inherently lead to appropriate ways of 
learning. Otherwise, the market-oriented reform would automatically lead to technological 
catching up (but this has not been witnessed in the experiences of Asian Tigers or especially in the 
case of Korea). Nevertheless, our question is, if we assume that external events could influence 
firms in searching for appropriate ways of learning, then where does the knowledge about 
methods of technological learning comes from? We cannot assume that the knowledge about 
methods has already existed in the circumstances of DCs, or that the learning firms obtain the 
relevant knowledge through unconstrained trial and error, neither of which coincides with the 
empirically documented experiences of DCs, particularly considering those countries still far 
away from successful or potential catching-up. 
However, for many studies about technological learning in DCs, particularly for those at 
firm-level, the organisations of firms are broadly taken as given facts. This partly explains why 
these empirical studies at firm-level are regarded as contingent. The logics provided by these 
empirical studies as explanations for the successful/unsuccessful experiences of learning depend 
on many special settings embedded in the given organisations and in the particular contextual 
circumstances. Therefore, in these explanations, all of the invisible factors, including the original 
organisational settings, are taken as exogenous or independent factors affecting the learning 
process. Thereby, we lack knowledge about where the organisations of learning firms come from, 
and about how they mobilise their resources and employees to implement learning strategies. In 
other words, the emerging, building and evolution of organisations have not been included as the 
centre of learning practices. 
The last but not the least point for our re-consideration is that these bottom-up stage-wise models 
often mix up the discussion of technological maturity and the discussion of relevant 
capability-building. Usually, the technological maturity is embodied as the artefacts that firms 
produce and the methods they implement. For example, the acquisition of assembly technologies, 
the implementation of product engineering or product design, and the R&D activities are 
categorised into different stages that represent different levels of capability-building. Alternatively, 
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the achievements representing as providing the manufacturing service, providing the design 
service and doing the self-owned design are regarded as the series of steps on the ladder of 
capability- building. Bell and Pavitt (1993) highlight the difference between production capacity 
and technological capability. It reminds us an issue further related to the debate against 
neo-classical growth theory that the innovation or knowledge creation could not be regarded as 
free good or by-product of production, unless the logic is built up to couple the activities with the 
specific knowledge creation. 
Therefore, we must distinguish carefully the products, technologies, organisation and relevant 
capability-building which are included in our case studies. As implied by Pavitt (1998, p441), 
when discussing about the technological discontinuities, analysts usually treat them instead with 
the product discontinuities. It is similar that in describing the upgrading of capability-building, 
what analysts present are usually the discontinuities of products of learning firms. Therefore, 
―greater care and attention needs to be devoted to the distinctions between the artefacts (products, 
etc.) that the firm develops and produces, the firm-specific technological knowledge that underlies 
its ability to do so, and the organisational forms and procedures that it uses to transform one into 
the other (Pavitt, 1998, p434)‖. If we do not make clear distinction among these concepts, below 
can be an example question to ask: does making use of the mature technologies or doing the 
product assembly absolutely means low-level capability-building? For example, as regards the 
most mature part of nanotechnology or VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated) circuit technology 
(artefacts dimension), it is still difficult for a starting-up latecomer firms to start their 
capability-building with (technology/knowledge dimension), unless there have already been 
knowledge or knowledge creation mechanism in their organisation or contexts they can mobile 
(organisation dimension). Similarly, the capability for product development is generally regarded 
to belong to a medium or even higher level capability stage, referring to the ladders of Kim (1997) 
and Lall (1992). Nevertheless, can we compare the capability of designing comparative low-end 
product and the capability of manufacturing existing frontier products? If not, should the 
capability for developing products in-house be developed definitely after the completion or 
maturity of capability-building for manufacturing? 
In fact, even in the early stage that latecomers make use of the existing foreign technologies, the 
role of in-house technological learning cannot be peripheralised in order to undertake effective 
capability-building. Bell and Pavitt (1995) point out that even in the later stages of the product life 
cycle there is often little technological stability. Gomory (1992) also describes the later stages as 
the ―cyclic process‖, which embodies with repeated, continuous, incremental improvement , by 
comparison with the ―ladder process‖ based on scientific knowledge in the early stage. In the 
―cyclic process‖, the competitiveness of firms cannot be merely attributed to the ir manufacturing 
operations; rather it is based on cooperation between design and manufacturing. Therefore, we 
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cannot assume that it is unnecessary for latecomer firms , which are making use of mature foreign 
technologies, to develop their own capabilities for generating and managing technical change. 
―Consequently, DC firms in supposedly mature industries may need to develop substantial 
capabilities for generating change in order to achieve or sustain competitiveness…Developing 
these capabilities requires constantly improving techniques through actively engineered technical 
and organisational change, not just the kind of passive "learning by doing" that yields increased 
proficiency in operating given techniques as a result of increased production experience (Bell and 
Pavitt, 1995, p78-79)‖  
The fact that latecomer firms grow their capabilities through relevant technological development 
activities is not our point to argue. Rather, we stress that, we must bring up the correct casual 
relations between the capability-building processes with the activities implemented, the 
technologies employed and the organisational systems that carry out learning. Considering that, 
latecomer firms should be regarded as platforms of ―product/activities – technology/knowledge -- 
organisation‖. Our central question here is by what activities (product producing, R&D, or other 
activities), by what means (technology or knowledge obtained) and by whom (organisation), what 
capabilities are built? For this purpose, our empirical studies should trace the growth of 
capabilities based on the ―product – technology – organisation‖ platform rather than only 
depicting the trajectory of product or activities change. Otherwise, a typical example question 
could be asked as whether the capability of the higher stage (such as designing product) could be 
brought up simply by the activities that belong to a lower stage (such as assembling product).  
To generate a summary here, behind the question about divergences of technological learning is 
the question of the effectiveness of learning, which should be presented by clear analyses based 
on the ―product – technology -- organisation‖ platform. Regarding the bottom-up stage-wise 
models, as relevant scholars construct technological learning in discrete stages, and require 
‗jumps‘ of objectives when upgrading their capabilities from one stage to a higher one, the 
capability-building should be studied at the real locus that relevant technological learning occurs 
continuously to make sure that the corresponding knowledge is generated as we argue. This is the 
fundamental method to promote the generality of our theories. Organisation should be taken as a 
key objective of observation in the process of learning.  
2.2.3 Knowledge accumulation 
Generally speaking, knowledge is the instrument to produce further new knowledge, and also the 
measure of capability-building. Knowledge is also a good agent to connect the product, 
technology and organisation in theory into an integrative platform. 
DC firms are short of two kinds of knowledge: the knowledge for producing complex products or 
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services, which should be regarded as for the capability-building in a static sense, and the 
knowledge as guidance for learning itself, which should be regarded as for the organisational 
capability building in a dynamic sense. 
2.2.3.1 Knowledge as objects of learning 
Learning in its essence is definitely carried out by individuals. As Simon (1996) points out, 
organisations learn in only two ways: through the learning of their members or by ingesting new 
members who have knowledge the organisation has not previously had. However, in practicality, 
the learning of individuals must obey the boundary of organisational institutions. As Simon (1991, 
p125) points out that what an individual learns in an organisation is very much dependent on what 
is already known to (or believed by) other members of the organisation and dependent on what 
kinds of information are present in the organisational environment. On the other hand, learning 
leads to both the development of insights and the restructuring of organisational problems (Simon, 
1969). Technically, individuals learn together through interactions and share the process with each 
other, which leads to the argument that organisational learning is not the cumulative result of the 
individual learning of its members (Hedberg, 1981, p6). Furthermore, particularly in a catching-up 
firm with articulated common developmental goals, individual learning must be organised 
according to organisational arrangements for catching-up purposes. That is to say, issues related to 
what kinds of problems are to be dealt with
4
 by using what kinds of methods, who are arranged to 
confront with these problems and on what support they can rely are closely connected to the 
organisational settings. Therefore, organisational learning is directed by the corresponding 
institutional arrangements. The gap of theoretical development between the individual learning 
and the organisational learning in literature is recognised by some researchers when they carry out 
studies in DCs. For instance, Dutrénit (2000, p39) points out ―the literature on innovation has 
approached learning mechanisms at the firm-level without taking into account the extent to which 
and by what means individual learning is converted into organisational learning.‖ We still have 
not grasped the full picture of the process of knowledge creation in the empirical studies of 
latecomer firms if we consider it as an organisational process in addition to individual learning. 
For some empirical studies about technological learning in DCs, and particularly for some early 
literature, the process of knowledge creation is not placed at the centre of study. Researchers take 
the process of knowledge creation as implicit when they discuss the trajectories or the ―what‖ 
question of knowledge creation (Enos, 1982, 1991). ―Learning by doing‖, initiated by Arrow 
(1962) through his study on the U.S. aircraft industry before and during World War II, is broadly 
adopted in relevant conventional literature to interpret incremental technological progress. This 
                                                 
4 According to Argyris and Schön (1978), organisational learning involves the detection and correction of error.  
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concept is also implicitly adopted by relevant literature, which leads to a series of discoveries in 
studying technological progress within industries, such as Rosenberg (1969), David (1975) and 
Silverberg et al (1988). Considering the reality that DCs usually do not have strong scientific 
foundation during their period of industrialisation, ―learning by doing‖ is generally emphasized by 
scholars, by comparison with the STI mode of innovation (Lundvall, 2007), namely learning 
based on promoting R&D, utilising and creating access to explicit codified knowledge.  
However, the effects and the mechanisms of ―learning by doing‖ should be cautiously treated. 
Bell, Scott-Kemmis et al. (Bell, Scott-Kemmis and Satyarakwit, 1982; Scott-Kemmis and Bell, 
1986) argue that ―learning by doing‖ usually comes to be seen as a kind of costless by-product of 
production activity, since the followers of this concept often simplify its relevant qualification 
conditions. For example, Hartley (1965) takes the learning (efficiencies) as the linear effects of 
activity repeated by practitioners
5
. Through a series of surveys on a steel plant in Thailand, as well 
as the studies of airframe and shipbuilding industries during World War II, Bell, Scott-Kemmis 
and their colleague stress that ―learning by doing‖ in its narrow sense cannot explain the 
productivity development curves for infant industries. Namely, neither the improvements of 
productivity in DCs (their paper in 1982) nor those under a broader circumstance (their paper in 
1986) actually simply follow the growth of experience at all, or at least the causal relationship is 
not significant. Therefore, Bell and his colleagues and other researchers (such as Dahlman, 
Ross-Lason and Westphal, 1987) emphasise that technological learning is a purposive process that 
requires conscious efforts and explicit resource allocation. This has been advocated by many 
scholars in recent decades, such as Lall (1987, p1), Malerba (1992), Fagerberg (1994) and 
UNIDO (2002).  
Since the purpose of technological learning for firms in DCs is to catch up with frontier firms or 
to shorten the capability gap between them and the firms in developed countries, the knowledge 
new to their previous possession that was generated through activities they previously undertook 
is important. The learning mechanisms, including ―learning by searching‖ , ―learning by hiring‖ 
and ―learning by training‖ , are stressed by Bell (1984). These thoughts include the features and 
mechanisms buttressed by Bell and his colleagues, which are summarized with the term ‗dynamic 
learning‘ (Hobday, 2007). For example, Dahlman and Westphal (1983), Westphal, Kim and 
Dahlman (1985), and Amsden (2001) highlight the process of importing technologies as an 
influential source of knowledge; Bell, Ross-Larson and Westphal (1984) underline ―learning by 
hiring‖; Scott-Kemmis (1988) emphasises the training, collaborative knowledge development and 
openness to external knowledge and so on that are important for knowledge acquisition. Enos and 
Park (1988) also highlight the external training. They elaborate the different stages of technology 
                                                 
5 It is quoted from Scott-Kemmis and Bell (1986, p5) 
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importation among Korean industrial firms as organised by Korean government, and demonstrate 
the process of knowledge acquisition undertaken by Korean firms through technological transfer 
from advanced countries. Malerba (1992) points out that the specific directions of incremental 
technical change are closely related to specific types of learning processes. Ariffin and Bell (1999) 
stress the external training and different kinds of ‗learning by doing‘. 
However, even acknowledging the purposive and resource-intensive features of technological 
learning activities, the process of knowledge creation is still overlooked in many case studies 
when scholars discuss knowledge-conversion, products upgrading, etc. Some still take the R&D 
expenditures or the labour hours invested as the centre of studies; this is the same in essence as 
Arrow‘s conversion from the time or investment that learners expend on effective experience 
accumulation. They pay insufficient attention to the conditions of knowledge conversion from the 
―measure‖ of learning they adopt to the real learning effects they speculate. Others neglect the 
―what‖ question while they stress the conversion process. For example, in Kim (1997, 1999)‘s 
empirical studies, he uses an integrative model based on the spiral SECI (Socialization – 
Externalization – Combination - Internalization) model of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) to explain 
the knowledge creation process of Korean firms. However, Kim has not explored from where the 
original knowledge sources are accessed, or he has not explained the process of learners about the 
recognition and selection of knowledge source, i.e. the question of ―what to learn‖. In analysing 
the shift of these firms from one stage to a higher stage, Kim introduces mainly the ―absorptive 
capacity‖ and ―constructed crisis‖ to explain the capability growth of firms (Kim, 1995, 1997, 
1998). Without doubt, the hardworking spirits, the in-house tacit knowledge base and the 
resources invested in learning are important for generating new knowledge; and crisis 
construction could be well understood as a method to mobilise organisational members for new 
learning. However, Kim seldom mentions what kinds of activities, and based on what institutions 
of resource allocation, specifically corresponding to the target of learning, are carried out to 
generate the new knowledge that is able to push the learning firms developing onto a higher stage. 
In other words, the question about what knowledge can be obtained by individuals through their 
activities of SECI process should be studied as equally important with the study of relevant 
knowledge conversion process.  
As for the ―what‖ question, as some scholars indicate, outcomes of organisational learning may be 
negative (such as Dodgson, 1993, p377). As for the ‗how‘ question, the research of Dutrénit (2000) 
implies that the SECI process needs deliberate organisational coordination; otherwise, there can 
be lack of effective mechanism for the codification process. That is to say, the ―myopia of 
learning‖ should be considered (Levinthal and March, 1993), which indeed is connected to our 
concern of ―effectiveness‖ of learning. 
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To discuss the ―what‖ question and ―how‖ question in a more concrete way, if we take the ―water‖ 
as a metaphor of ―knowledge‖ and ―looking for water‖ as ―technological learning‖, then the 
technological learning of DC firms at early stage of catching-up can be compared as a community 
looking for water in a desert. Only having efforts (hardworking commitments and practices), 
resources invested and slogan for mobilising people are not sufficient, which does not mean they 
are not important. People would still need to know what water they should look for (i.e. water 
from underground, water from air, water from ―hydrogen+oxygen‖ chemistry process or water 
from a pipe/canal), and how to get the water (i.e. how to carry out the construction project to dig a 
well/canal, how to collect the water from air, how to generate and supply energy to realise the 
physical-chemical ―hydrogen+oxygen‖ process). Only with the right questions are put into the 
discussion held by the corresponding organisation, could output the right answers. Continuing 
digging sand, although it could be associated with heavy resource investment or great efforts, is 
not guaranteed with success of finding water. 
Therefore, if we adopt the SECI process in explaining the knowledge conversion process, we 
must provide sufficient analysis on the search of knowledge and the knowledge creation based on 
a ―product - technology - organisation‖ platform. Otherwise, the mainstream activities in previous 
stages in bottom-up stage-wise theoretical ladders do not support the interpretation of new 
knowledge acquisition and conversion for capability-building in a later stages. 
Dutrénit (2000) also adopts the SECI model for elaborating the process of knowledge acquisition 
and conversion. Possibly acknowledging such a weakness above, she terms the development 
process across stages the ―transition process‖, and argues that there is no simple linear progression 
along capability-building. Dutrénit pays her major attention to the external sources of knowledge 
and the conversion process within the uneven organisational structure.  
Furthermore, as for the deliberate search of knowledge, namely the mechanisms of learning from 
hiring, learning from personal training, etc., we do agree that those mechanisms are important. 
However, it should be noticed that in literature the knowledge-obtaining process is usually 
measured by the investments made in relevant projects, such as the time, human resources, 
finances invested. These measurements can provide ex post facto tests of whether their choices -- 
the knowledge sources and patterns of knowledge creation -- are effective. However, the 
implication should not be treated as that successful learning happens just as decision-makers of 
learning firms do the right decisions to carry out the right projects, and to make the right resource 
investment. The explanation of this kind would be difficult to generate any ex ante or 
non-contingent implications about learning effectiveness. 
Regarding the effectiveness of technological learning, some scholars discuss this topic from other 
perspectives. Using the global value chain approach, scholars study how non-core members 
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capture key competences of the whole chain (Kishimoto, 2004; Schmitz, 2007). Additionally, in 
the global production system approach, scholars focus on how network flagships transfer both 
explicit and tacit knowledge to local suppliers through formal and informal mechanisms (Ernst 
and Kim, 2002; Ernst, 2005, 2007). However, without in-depth investigation of the firms, readers 
would still be confused regarding which firms in DCs could be the ―lucky ones‖ in comparison to 
other local counterparts. Readers would also be confused as regards whether it is the shift of these 
global value chains or the emergence of local innovative capability that primarily drives this 
change. 
Besides, the literature about knowledge management of frontier firms, such as those that consider 
―learning by using‖ (Rosenberg, 1982), ―learning through R&D‖ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), 
―learning from customers and through the cooperation with rivals‖ (von Hippel, 1988), ―learning 
via user-producer interaction‖ (Lundvall, 1985, 1988, 2007), ―learning through strategic alliances‖ 
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994) etc., certainly can provide insights. Malerba (1992) and von 
Tunzelmann and Wang (2007) have generated a summary, presented in the following table (Table 
2.1). However, the summary has not been tested for its validity by detailed empirical studies in the 
context of DCs. For example, in Lundvall‘s research, he stresses the ―user-producer interaction‖ 
as the micro-foundation of technological learning (and the concept of national system of 
innovation). However, what he emphasizes is the early users and early producers (competitors). 
Then, how shall we consider the situation in the national innovation systems of DCs? Can DC 
firms generate important knowledge or develop innovation through their interaction with local 
customers who would not be regarded as the early users in the global contexts? How can DC 
firms balance, assimilate, and integrate the knowledge from foreign source, the knowledge from 
market through reverse-engineering and the knowledge from interaction with customers? 
Thus, questions still exist regarding how DC firms, as the latecomers in the global modern 
industrial community, can recognise appropriate patterns of learning and enable their 
organisations to be effective, in view of their deficiency of relevant knowledge or prior 
experience. 
Table 2.1 Taxonomy of Learning Mechanisms  
Source: von Tunzelmann and Wang (2007, p201), also see Malerba (1992) 
2.2.3.2 Knowledge as guidance for learning 
Following the above discussion, in DCs, technological catching-up in a particular industry is 
always some experience new to the relevant practitioners. Entrepreneurs, managers and engineers 
Source Internal External 
From production Learning by doing Learning by spillover  
From consumption Learning by using Learning by interacting 
From ‗search‘ (supply) Learning by training/R&D Learning by education/S&T 
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do have not experience before they really carry out the corresponding activities. Apparently, 
repetition of the low-stage activities or routine operations cannot bring out significant new 
knowledge to support firms grow fast toward a new stage. As Cohen and Levinthal (1990, 
p149-150) point out, by their statement about the absorptive capacity, ―…absorptive capacity is 
more likely to be developed and maintained as a by-product of routine activity when the knowledge 
domain that the firm wishes to exploit is closely related to its current knowledge base. When, 
however, a firm wishes to acquire and use knowledge that is unrelated to its ongoing activity, then 
the firm must dedicate effort exclusively to creating absorptive capacity (i.e., absorptive capacity is 
not a by-product).‖ As the absorptive capacity for knowledge in new domains is not an automatic 
by-product of the ongoing activity, the learning firms must build up their understanding about 
what to learn and how to learn. 
In fact, even only considering general tactics, latecomers also have to explore their own paths and 
patterns under the external equivocality. It is because they do not ever have corresponding 
experience, and they very possibly may face different external contexts by comparison with their 
forerunners did (Gerschenkron, 1962). Therefore, the cognition about what to learn and how to 
learn lies in exact the heart of successful catching-up. Take the trade-off between technological 
importing and local technological accumulation as an example. Q. Lu and Lazonick (2001, p73) 
and Bell and Pavitt (1993, p193) both take the complementarity between technological importing 
and indigenous innovation as a central concern of industrial development in DCs, and describe it 
as a balance that must be dealt with deliberately. In other words, it is a question of cognition about 
the developmental trajectory relevant to the contexts of learning subjects. Similar questions could 
be asked at more micro levels for all kinds of trade-offs about learning. Langlois (1997) presents 
exactly such a historical study of the computer industry in United States, in which the 
organisational perception and market perception matter much in developing the learning trajectory 
of firms. Since the answers to these questions reside in-depth in the complex economic 
configurations of learners, the cognition should be regarded as one kind of intrinsic knowledge 
developed in a learning process, other than something just simply obtained from any textbook or 
other external sources. 
Thereby, at least two assumptions should not be taken for granted in our study. First is the 
assumption about perfect effectiveness of organisations regarding technological learning, 
including the perfect efficiency of learning itself and the perfect efficiency of organisational 
change in order to implement proposed learning activities. Second is the assumption that the 
organisation of DC firms is ready and set up properly for the proposed learning activities. DC 
firms are not situated in an atmosphere full of knowledge that is precisely needed, although they 
are very likely in an atmosphere full of information (about learning patterns) advocated by all 
kinds of forces (such as the advocacy of Washington Consensus, etc.). There is no practical 
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blueprint for building a learning organisation (Pedler, Boydell and Burgoyne, 1989, p4). For the 
complexity of organising technological catching-up during a long process and under the global 
competition circumstance, relevant knowledge about learning pattern itself is very difficult to gain 
through technological transfer or copying other‘s strategy. Organising, which is the mechanism to 
reduce the number of potential interpretations for the equivocality of environment (Weick, 1979), 
is the only way to decipher and develop the complexity of knowledge. In Kogut and Zander (1992, 
p390-391)‘s discussion, they stress by a metaphor of computer hardware and software technology 
that being taught technology (employing software) is separated from being able to create 
capability (understanding hardware and to create software). The translation from understanding 
hardware to exploiting its functions by using software means, through the process of codification, 
the needs of substantive technologies are reduced to some extent. During such a ―learning to 
organise‖ process, the organisational hierarchy plays critical role by steering the direction (Gavetti, 
2005). In contrast with the abstracted information that is imported from external sources, the tacit 
knowledge at multi-dimensions that is held and developed by learners is the core of such a 
process (Nightingale, 1998). Therefore, our arguments lead to Rosenberg‘s (1976) opinion that 
reliance on borrowed technology (by DCs) perpetuates a posture of dependency and passivity, 
other than fast- development.  
The above discussions are also suitable for the effective learning patterns of DC firms. During the 
dynamic process to shorten the gap with advanced country firms, DC firms shall accumulate new 
knowledge continuously. Therefore, to develop their own cognition for guiding their own learning, 
and to solidify the cognition by institutionalised organisational arrangements, are necessities and 
non-stopping tasks for them during their journey of catching-up – whether such tasks could be 
completed intentionally or unintentionally. Simply borrowing learning strategies or organisational 
designs, if lacking substantive social conditions to support, is barely enough to ensure the 
capability to generate the ―new-new‖ knowledge dynamically according to its evolving 
environment.  
That is to say, we shall anchor our investigation from the cognition development, the trajectory 
adoption, and the organisational construction or transformation of DC firms, rather than only 
starting from the learning behaviours based on well-set organisational frameworks. 
At the firm level, cognition is regarded as an important factor in the studies of technical 
innovation. Gavetti and his colleagues (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) 
stress the cognition of firms in understanding inconsistent changes of technology and organisation. 
The cognitive development is based on historical experience (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982), and 
there are dynamical connections of cognitive development between individual firms and the social 
shared realities (Garud and Rappa, 1994).  
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Other scholars also employ different but relevant concepts to interpret corresponding influences 
on the firm‘s technological learning. Moorman and Miner (1996) suggest that the patterns by 
which organisations deal with incoming information is influenced by their memory, so that the 
process of product development is impacted. Higher-level learning
6
 is also worth noting, which is 
close connected to the non-routine change. The upper level learning engenders the development of 
differentiated structures, rules, and so on. Furthermore, it also generates insights, heuristics, and 
collective consciousness (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). For the DC firms, especially those in their early 
phases, there must be an evolutionary process through which decision-makers accumulate 
knowledge and build their organisational learning system. During this process, the organisational 
structure, rules, norms, and so on, work as the platform for technological learning for the whole 
organisation, which certainly influence the learning at a lower level, directing what organisation 
members should learn and how they should learn. 
The cognitive development certainly is based on the memory of organisation or decision-makers 
in early stages. Experiences owned by firms define the locus of their searching for knowledge 
generating (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Generally, experience reflects an organisation‘s 
successes and failures over time (Nelson and Winter, 1982). They are generated through practical 
operations of firms, namely learning by doing, learning by using, learning by interacting, as 
discussed previously. Besides, experience can also be obtained through environmental scanning 
including learning from competitors (Fahey, 1999), through benchmarking (Garvin, 1993), and so 
on. Specific to DC firms, they are deficient in relevant experience for high stage 
capability-building. Therefore, the governmental policy, relevant value network, information 
about learning generated by close customers and partners, the backgrounds of high-level 
organisational members, the experiences in their initial phase when they transfer into a new stage 
(Feng and Zhang, 2007; Kaplan, 2008) may influence the development of latecomer firms‘ 
cognition about learning.  
On the other hand, the cognitive development also presents its intrinsic inertia. Once formed, the 
cognitive frame tends to resistance against changes (Walsh, 1995), especially if we consider it 
with a connection to the trajectory adoption and organisational construction or transformation. As 
pointed out by Tyre and Hauptman (1992, p302), using the new technology may also bring about 
the systemic shift in production approaches and underlying organizing principles. Normann (1971) 
points out that considering the tasks and knowledge changes caused by innovations to internal 
subsystems, groups involved in interdepartmental projects must develop and adopt a new set of 
organisational relationships and communication structure. Then in case study of technological 
                                                 
6 It is in comparison to the lower-level learning that is defined as to dealing with routine change under the existing rules, 
institutions and norms. It could also be referred to Argyris and Schön (1978). 
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learning of latecomers, their cognition about learning is something to develop and exploit with 
either institutionalised organisational setting, or can be something to adjust with organisational 
reform for strategic shift. 
In addition to the cognition of patterns for technological learning, absorptive capacity is another 
well-known concept involved with knowledge accumulation that can direct the further knowledge 
generating of latecomer firms. Absorptive capacity refers to the acquisition or assimilation of 
information by an organisation and also the organisational ability to exploit relevant information 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). This concept is rooted in the research of relation between the 
memory with the facility of knowledge acquisition (Bower and Hilgard, 1981), concerning a 
central question of ―learning to learn‖ (Ellis, 1965; Estes, 1970) 7. Primarily, absorptive capacity is 
defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p149) as a part of a firm‘s calculus in allocating resources 
for innovative activity. In doing so, Cohen and Levinthal stress the structure of communication 
between the external environment and the organisation, the communication among different 
subunits of the organisation, and also the distribution of expertise and its role in the organisation.  
However, when absorptive capacity is to be measured, R&D intensity is adopted as the input 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In fact, on discussing absorptive capacity, especially considering the 
capability-building of latecomer firms in DCs, it is quite frequently measured or even indirectly 
defined by the resources invested in technological development and management activities. 
Mowery and Oxley (1995) measure it at country level by the investment in S&T (Science and 
Technology) training and governmental policies supporting the industrial competition. Also at 
country level, Keller (1996) measures the absorptive capacity by the density of engineering 
students, scientists and engineers, scientists and engineers in R&D in different subset of 
population. X. Liu and White (1997) define it as the investments in R&D personnel. Kim (1995, 
1997) measures the absorptive capacity by the existing knowledge base especially existing 
knowledge tacit base, and the intensity of effort or commitment. Regarding the first element, 
because the knowledge in question is tacit, the analysis has to be based on narrative description. 
As to the intensity of efforts, Kim in fact employs the hardworking spirit and tradition, resources 
invested and crisis construction to describe the commitments. At the firm level, Boynton, Zmud 
and Jacobs (1994) explain this concept by the managerial IT knowledge (actually the investment 
in managerial IT knowledge). Veugelers (1997) measures it by the internal R&D expenditure, 
governmental sponsored R&D, and so on.  
As implied by Cohen and Levinthal, the capability of absorption shall be considered not only by 
the quantity of resources (and human force) invested in in-house R&D, but also rest on the 
                                                 
7 It is quoted from Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p130). 
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communication mechanism and expertise system --- in my view, it is also connected to the power 
distribution. By such a concept, in addition to influence by the efforts and the previous knowledge 
base at the individual level, technological learning is directed by the internal political distribution. 
As well, the learning performance is determined by the resource allocation and the structure of 
existing knowledge distribution -- as the platform to process learning. All these factors, many of 
which are related to the organisation dimension, should be considered systemically rather than 
being measured merely by resources invested. However, for practical application of this concept, 
the limitation of these measurements that we elaborate above and are based on resources (finance, 
human force and time) invested mainly, constrains this concept from incorporating the analysis of 
the patterns that resources are utilised, and the patterns that prior knowledge enhances the 
exploitation of relevant new knowledge by firms. Moreover, such a limitation can likely bring 
about misunderstanding for readers that there is a linear model between the R&D investment and 
absorptive capacity, and then the performance of technological learning. Therefore, we comment 
that the concept of absorptive capacity has a significant theoretical background, but has not so 
good practical application, which in fact turns it to the RBV. Indeed, the pattern of simply utilising 
previous in-house R&D to analyse absorptive capacity or innovative capability has been doubted. 
For example, Gomory (1992, p393) argues with his prolific industrial practical experiences that it 
is the industrial success which causes the R&D spending, not the other way around. 
Zahra and George (2002) extend the concept of absorptive capacity, and develop a heuristics by 
defining the ―potential absorptive capacity‖ and ―realised absorptive capacity‖, including 
acquisition, assimilation (for the potential part), transformation and exploitation (for the realised 
part) segments. They take the social integration as the critical mechanism to bridge the potential 
absorptive capacity and realised absorptive capacity, which do echo the primarily concept 
construction of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) and generate an important implication for 
studying the performance divergence among latecomer firms within the same national innovation 
systems. However, we still have to solidify the theoretical framework with comprehensive 
empirical studies, such as Lazonick does for a similar concept at the country level (Lazonick, 
1990).  
2.2.4 Organisation and technological learning in DCs 
The relation between the organisation and the technological learning has been well explored by 
scholars involved in the study of organisational learning from varied domains of academy, such as 
Argyris and Schön (1978), Hedberg (1981), Fiol and Lyles (1985), Senge (1990), Kogut and 
Zander (1992), Dodgson (1993), and so on. The relevant literature provides us many insights 
related to our study here. For example, technological learning has its own trajectory (Dosi, 1982), 
but also has path-dependency (David, 1985; Dosi, 1988) which means the firm‘s possible choices 
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of learning depends on its accumulated competences (Pavitt, 1991). Conflicts exist between the 
technological exploitation and technological exploration, according to the organisational intent to 
refine and extend the existing competences, technologies and paradigms, or to developed new 
alternatives (March, 1991).  
However, as in the literature about the technological learning of DC firms, only a few scholars 
have placed the relationship between organisation and knowledge accumulation as their central 
topics. Tiralap (1990) studies the electronics industry in Thailand, and discovers that the 
perceptions of owners or managers regarding the effect of technological change on business 
growth, as well as their perceptions about the effect of workers‘ skills on technological change, 
and how both play a positive role in technical and business performance. Studying a small 
learning firm in the welding market, Jamaica, Girvan and Marcelle (1990) stress the perceptions 
of entrepreneurship and management are important in realising ―active technology acquisition‖ 
through overseas training, foreign technical assistance and so on. Tremblay (1994) studies the 
firms based on the Likert framework (Likert and Gibson-Likert, 1976), including namely the type 
of hierarchy, supportive relationship, motivation, decision-making, control, channel of 
communication, information flow, interaction-influence, organisational slack, and management 
attitude regarding human resources development. By comparing the pulp and paper industry in 
Canada and India, Tremblay points out strong positive relationships between productivities and 
resources committed to ―improvement-type‖ technical change. Even though Tremblay also studies 
the resources committed to ―improvement-type‖ projects that are not recorded as capital 
expenditure, his research is based on a survey and on an improved version of Likert framework. 
Not enough attention has been paid to the causal relation between the organisational dimension 
and technological learning performance. Additionally, what he compares are firms in 
industrialised country with firms in industrialising country, which represents an obvious 
contribution to the academic community‘s understanding of the issue. However, considering the 
complicated industrial circumstances at work in different countries, especially countries in 
different phases of industrialisation, it is still a bit difficult to develop a true understanding of the 
dynamics of DC firms‘ learning, or to identify the dynamics of the diversification of firms in DCs.  
Dutrénit (2000) also stresses the role of organisation structure in technological learning in her 
research of DC firms‘ acquisition of knowledge from external sources. She studies the unevenness 
of knowledge accumulation in different parts of organisations. On the centre stage of her study is 
a couple of technological unevenness and organisational unevenness. Knowledge sharing and 
codifying are her major concerns when discussing the couple of unevenness. Coordination and 
integration across organisational boundaries are the focuses of her studying, rather than the 
organisational (or political) dimension that leads to the particular uneven structure and then the 
unstable knowledge-creation process. As Dutrénit (2000, p300) herself admits that the unevenness 
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itself may exactly be the consequence of the transition process. In fact, according to my opinion 
and on the other hand, the discontinuously technological learning, rather than the repetition-based 
―learning by doing‖ in narrow sense, is an uneven process in essence, by which the unevenness 
works as the endogenous source of dynamics for the growth of the system. However, by 
comparison with Dutrénit‘s case study, in successful capability-building processes, one kind of 
unevenness should be compensated by another kind of unevenness to realise the dynamic 
equilibrium of the system. Therefore, the institutions to compensate or failed to compensate the 
unevenness should be treated as a crucial part to investigate. As mentioned by Dodgson (1993, 
p380), the conflict (caused, for example, by error or contrary evidence) is an essential condition 
for learning, which acts as a motor driving the learning process. Coriat and Dosi (1999) also point 
out that the routine is not only about coordination and problem-solving but is also a locus of 
conflict and governance and a way of codifying microeconomic incentives and constraints. 
Therefore, the evolution of routines is related to how the organisations respond to the conflicts 
and constraints. 
Q. Lu‘s study (Q. Lu, 2000; Q. Lu and Lazonick, 2001) aims to explore the inside of organisations 
directly by studying the catching-up efforts of Chinese computer manufacturing firms. Lu adopts 
and further develops a framework put forth by Lazonick and O‘Sullivan (Lazonick 1990, 1991, 
2003, 2004; Lazonick and O‘Sullivan, 1996), for analysing the institutional conditions that 
support the innovation processes of firms. Focusing on corporate governance, the framework 
includes three important questions, taking ―resource allocation‖ as the central issue: (i) who 
makes investment decisions, (ii) what types of investments are made, and (iii) how returns are 
distributed. In his case study of four firms in the Chinese computer industry, Q. Lu investigates 
managerial autonomy, commitment to technological learning and incentive systems in firms that 
are new to those under the demanding economic system. He explains why a unique top-down 
mode of technological learning can happen in China is that the firms in question have made 
progresses on the above three aspects of corporate governance
8
 that can make use of the R&D 
resources accumulated from the central planned age. However, Q. Lu‘s research does not 
underline the differences between organisations. If the three conditions were sufficient for 
effective learning, well-transformed domestic firms should be able to make proper use of the 
existing accumulated knowledge resources for in-house capability building. However, this 
supposition is apparently not observable to researchers. Along with the deepening of the economic 
restructuring, more and more Chinese firms have gradually won management autonomy, made a 
sufficient financial commitment to innovation, been able to allocate technological resources on 
                                                 
8 Lu (2000) adopts the definition of corporate governance developed by Lazonick and O‘Sullivan, that it is defined as a 
set of social institutions that influences the strategic allocation of resources and returns in business enterprises, which is 
different from the conventional definition. We follow this definit ion of corporate governance in this paper. 
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their own, and even in some cases been named innovative enterprises for their remarkable 
inventions, when they still cannot successfully present an effective learning trajectory. Even 
among the leading firms, learning patterns and the performance remain remarkably divergent. 
Some innovative firms, including all of the firms Q. Lu examined in his case studies in the 1990s, 
have met difficulties in terms of continuing technological capability building and transferred 
themselves to being mainly manufacturing-oriented. 
Hence, even though there have been limited literature dedicated to understanding the role of 
organisation in technological learning of latecomer firms, it is still very demanding to develop 
further empirical studies on this topic. The central issues should be how the organisations are built 
and how they influence and interact with technological learning.  
2.3 Studies of China’s capability growth at firm and industry levels 
Regarding the studies on China‘s growth, as the Chinese industrial economy is a large system and 
China implements a gradualist strategy of reform in the past decades, this creates difficulties for 
scholars to understand its dynamic changes, especially when some changes are still in their 
rudimentary stage.  
Taking the works of Nolan as representative, he has maintained his interest in Chinese industrial 
competitiveness in the past two decades (e.g. Nolan, 1996; Nolan and Yeung, 2001a, 2001b). 
Through comparing some large industrial firms with the giant firms in developed countries, Nolan 
concluded that the capability gap between Chinese firms and international giant firms had 
continuously enlarged during these past two decades. He postulates, if confronted with open 
global competition, Chinese large firms would perish or at best would become the branch plants 
of globalised big business (Nolan and Wang, 1999). Nolan‘s assertion may be right for some of 
the giant SOEs that he observes. However, Nolan focuses his eyes only on the large industrial 
SOEs, namely the orthodox stream of China‘s reform inherited from the previous central planning 
system. His neglect of the growing forces outside the orthodox system makes him insensitive to 
the dynamics caused by newly emerging firms and the social conditions that support such a 
change. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand his pessimistic and invalid estimation. The 
bottom-up growth forces, which gradually dominate indigenous technological advance in some 
industries today, not only have brought new elements into the Chinese industrial system, but also 
changed the structure of this system. 
In their research on changes in global production networks, Ernst and Naughton (2007) reveal 
different behaviours of Chinese domestic firms during the transition process, and develop a 
three-tier analytical framework for studying the divergence of Chinese domestic firms. However, 
as their study focuses on the linkages between the Chinese industrial economy and the continent 
(such as the greater China) or the global industrial economy, they put the export-oriented 
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industrial section of China in the centre of their research, while overlooking the other growing 
industrial forces, which is also reflected in Naughton (1997, 2007). Therefore, limited by their 
perspective, they take the transition of relevant global production networks and the growth of 
Chinese market demands as the major dynamics of the rise of Chinese technology-oriented firms 
(Ernst, 2005). When discussing Chinese innovation, many other scholars also centre their research 
on the spillover of foreign technologies, and make the indigenous innovation peripheral to their 
study of Chinese technological capability growth (Ho, 1997; Young and Lan 1997). As they have 
not placed the transitional innovation system of China at the centre of their research, these 
scholars are quite indifferent to Chinese indigenous innovation, which has been criticised by Q. 
Lu and Lazonick (2001, p72-73). However, the fact is, at the time of their writing, some important 
indigenous innovative firms had been emerging, as demonstrated by the work of X. Shen (1999), 
Q.Lu (2000), F. Lu (2006), etc. 
As a large system, the transition of Chinese industrial economy does not only include the changes 
of internal factors and the external linkages, but also includes the changes of dynamics, internal 
relations and growth patterns. If taking a horse-cart full of cargo as the metaphor for Chinese 
reform and growth of the industrial system, the objects changed not only involve the cargo, but 
also involve the way to transport it : the horse may be replaced with a motor, or by a hybrid power 
system, i.e. horse and motor. Therefore, it is important to go inside the Chinese industrial system 
and even the firms, and to identify the emerging forces and relevant changes that possibly cause 
upgrades of the whole system. In consequence, a longitudinal study of the domestic divergence of 
industrial development is important to generate a better understanding. 
A series of scholars have provided excellent studies of the transition of the Chinese industrial 
system, such as Naughton (1996), Gu (1996, 1999), X. Liu and White (2001), Lieberthal (1995), 
etc. Naughton (1996), from the perspective of polit ical transition, demonstrates the detailed 
process of China‘s transition during 1978 to 1993 that was exactly the reform period before 
China‘s fundamental ownership reformation of SOEs9. In her book, Gu (1999) takes the reform 
within organisations and between them (firms and institutes in particular) to be interactive with 
the success of market-oriented reform in China since the late 1970s. Organisational change, 
mainly as related to the budget system and managerial autonomy, is taken as a core issue in the 
emergence of new knowledge-based firms, both for spin-off firms and for those that were 
transformed from research institutes. The research of Gu clearly demonstrates a specific period of 
institutional change as part of China‘s economic reform. X. Liu and White (2001) adopt a similar 
perspective; they make a comparative study of Chinese innovation systems along with the 
                                                 
9 A fundamental reformation of state enterprises was started in 1993, by which the state operated enterprises were 
changed to state owned enterprises. 
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institutional reform. The above studies provide important institutional backgrounds for our 
understanding of technological learning of Chinese domestic firms, and explain the rise of some 
technology-oriented firms --- especially those spinning off from universities, research institutes 
and those supported by governmental S&T projects, such as in Gu (1996). They point out the 
sources of some newly domestic firms to advocate S&T intensive strategies, but have not 
explored the organisational patterns of technological learning of these new firms in longitudinal 
research. 
However, as regards the mainstream of Chinese policy-making and academic thinking, the theory 
of comparative advantage and the advocacy of ―late development advantage‖ by borrowing and/or 
copying existing and mature foreign technology are still prevalent among Chinese scholars in 
recent decades, especially among those scholars who have close relations with policy-makers. For 
the sake of brevity, we just enumerate a few representative works of theirs here. Jin (1997) 
develops his framework based on comparative advantage to study the industrial competitiveness 
of Chinese domestic firms. Lin (Lin, 2002; Lin, Cai, and Li, 2000) stresses the promotion of 
factor endowments rather than the emphasis on industrial upgrading and technological exploration. 
Being backward is treated as the advantage of Chinese development, so that to make use of 
existing technologies and to focus on large-scale production is taken by them as the sources of 
Chinese industrial competitiveness and dynamics, rather than investing in technological capability 
(Lin, 2003). Taking foreign technologies as the primary sources of Chinese domestic 
technological advances, Jiang and Li (2002) provide an evaluation of FDI in Chinese domestic 
technological capability building. Their arguments describe well the mainstream idea about 
development held by many Chinese industrial firms that were supported by the government in the 
1980s and the 1990s. However, the indigenous capability growth has not happened automatically 
for most of these firms along with the upgrading of factor endowments. On the contrary, these 
scholars cannot interpret the growth of emerging indigenous industrial forces outside the 
―mainstream‖ they studied in recent decades, which bring about new patterns of learning and 
cause changes of the entire domestic industrial community.  
Take the automobile industry as an example. The stress on economies of scale in production has 
deep roots in the policy-making and mainstream academic thinking of China. The work of Maxcy 
and Silberston (1959) had significant impacts among policy-makers and relevant scholars. The 
research of Xia et al. (2002) and Z. Zhang (2004), among the contemporary academic works, can 
represent the orthodox thinking in analysing the technological progress of the Chinese 
Automobile industry; views which are held by scholars closely relevant to policy-making. They 
take scale economies as the foundation of technological capability building so that to use existing 
advanced foreign technologies is regarded as a precondition of long-term development of 
indigenous capability, which coincides with the advocacy based on ―comparative advantage‖ 
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theory. Such thinking in practice advocates establishing JVs with MNCs. J. Lu (1999) provides a 
series of case studies about how Chinese local producers learn the processing technologies and the 
operational management skills from the cooperation with MNCs, and how these firms finally get 
qualified as component providers for the production localisation of the Santana model of 
Volkswagen vehicles. Xie and Wu (2001) have disclosed the limited spillover effect of foreign 
technology from establishing Sino-foreign JVs. However, they still suggest that the Chinese 
supply chain could establish technological capabilities through participating in the global 
production systems; thereby, it may be a feasible trajectory for Chinese indigenous automobile 
industry to grow from components into systemic products. However, they have not presented 
tenable empirical evidence for their advocacy, and they neglect that the core domains of 
component development also require significant technological capability. We can see, even today 
when Chinese have already been able to develop systemic car models, that it is still difficult for 
the domestic community to enter some critical domains of components because the relevant 
undertaking requires the support of basic scientific research as well as long-term accumulation of 
engineering skills.  
In the face of the prevalent thinking of policy-making, the Chinese neo-Schumpeterian views 
challenge the prevalent opinions. W. Liu (1992) investigates the technological transfer from 
Volkswagen to its JV with Shanghai Auto. He argues against the simple deduction based on the 
―product life cycles‖ theory that entering the mature phase of an industry would be an appropriate 
choice for catching up. W. Liu concludes that the technological importers have to do more than 
acquire the physical facilities and the operational skills. The efforts of domestic firms to acquire 
technologies through importation, the extent to which they put in place indigenous capability 
building and the rate of technological change all affect the chances of success of technological 
importation. However, his study concentrates only on learning about processing technology in 
Shanghai-Volkswagen in the early phase. The learning of product technologies which was 
expected to happen subsequently has not been included in his study. F. Lu and Feng (2005) 
provide a systemic explanation about why relying on Sino-foreign JVs has not brought about 
significant growth of indigenous technological capability. They find that new indigenous firms, 
which demonstrate well-recognised effects of technological capability building today, have begun 
to carry out product development from their very early phase onwards. Only with the strategic 
intent to develop products and with the full set of developmental activities in-house can new 
indigenous firms effectively accumulate capability for product development, which represents a 
striking contrast with Sino-foreign JVs. As for the organisational reasons that generate these 
differences, we will explore them further in this thesis.  
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Regarding the telecom-equipment industry, X. Shen (1999) conducts detailed studies on the early 
years of Shanghai-Bell
10
 and the emergence of the HJD-04 model. However, she has not 
systemically studied the organisation and institutions related to technological learning when she 
provides a contingent analysis of two firms. She suggests a two-way model for understanding the 
strategy of Chinese government in this industry. In this two-way model, there is the initiation of 
Sino-foreign JVs on the one hand, and the indigenous innovation derived from domestic S&T 
entrepreneurship on the other hand. X. Shen concludes that the Chinese government bridges the 
two approaches, and deliberately accelerates the knowledge transfer from MNCs through 
Sino-foreign JVs to newly emerging indigenous firms. The later research of Mu and K. Lee (2005) 
on the Chinese telecom-equipment industry heavily depends on the empirical details of X. Shen 
(1999). Mu and Lee push the opinion of Shen further, even though they are short of direct proof, 
and argue that the technological diffusion from FDI is crucial to the growth of indigenous 
capability. As to the significance of direct technological transfer from MNCs or Sino-foreign JVs 
to new indigenous firms, both X. Shen (1999) and Mu and K. Lee (2005) have presented very 
limited tenable direct evidence.  
Fan (2004) presents a different view from the above authors. By regression analysis and 
interviews at firm level, Fan finds that the contribution of cooperation with foreign companies is 
only conditional to the capability-building of new indigenous firms when the new indigenous 
firms are becoming the leaders of technological advance in domestic community, which coincides 
with the views of Hu et al. (2005). Fan even finds that differently from the conventional thinking 
of policy-making, the leading indigenous firms, namely Huawei, ZTE, GDT (Great Dragon 
Telecom Tech.) and DTT, did begin to invest in technological capability building from an early 
stage. However, since she has not opened up the black box of organisations, and has not explored 
the process of knowledge acquisition and the relevant institutional backgrounds, readers cannot 
know how the capabilities are built and how the domestic divergence emerges through her 
research. In the work of Zeng and Williamson (2007), they argue that it is the intensive R&D 
investment of Huawei in potential disruptive technological innovation that brings it successful 
technological catching-up. It is important for understanding the features of product innovation 
strategies of Huawei today, since Huawei has already become one of the leading 
telecom-equipment providers in the world. However, it cannot explain properly how Huawei 
came to be competitive since only several years before it started investing intensively in some 
                                                 
10 Shanghai-Bell was established in 1983 by the Chinese side and the Belgium BTM (Bell Telephone Manufacturing Co.). 
In 2001, Alcatel had 50% plus 1 unit share and dominated this JV. Thereby, Shanghai-Bell was re-named as the 
Alcatel-Shanghai- Bell (ASB), and became the production localisation and manufacturing base for Alcatel in China; after 
2006, Alcatel merged Lucent. Shanghai-Bell was actually renamed as the Alcatel-Lucent-Shanghai-Bell, acting as the 
division of Alcatel-Lucent in China. However, in Chinese, it still keeps its reputable name ―Shanghai-Bell‖. On the other 
hand, it was also a SOE owned by China‘s central government (50% -1 share), listed by the SASAC. In this thesis, we 
term it ‗Shanghai-Bell‘ all the time for clarity. 
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technological fields as described by these two authors, Huawei was still a very small start-up 
company without any advanced technology and with only 21,000 RMB as the registered capital 
on hand. 
By comparison with the above authors, F. Lu and his colleagues (2006, chapter 4) provide another 
case of top-down innovation in the Chinese telecom-equipment industry. They argue that, by 
comparison with the policies grounded on comparative advantage theory, indigenous firms in 
China can develop technological capability successfully, and the initial market is a necessary 
locus for innovators to improve their products and accumulate more knowledge for technological 
development and industrialisation.  
As for the manufacturing industries in general, Sun (2002) discovers through an aggregate data 
analysis of Chinese medium and large sized enterprises that even though imported technologies 
can bring market success in the domestic market, in-house R&D efforts are the primary source of 
technological creativity, namely the patents applied for by Chinese industrial firms. Recently, their 
research based on the Chinese ICT industry (Sun and Du, 2009) reveals that even though the 
technological linkages with foreign technological sources are important for the innovation 
performance of domestic firms, nevertheless indigenous firms show higher R&D intensity and 
more motivation in product innovation. Concentrating on high-tech industries, X. Liu and Buck 
(2007) discover by a regression data analysis that the contribution of MNCs‘ R&D activities in 
China to Chinese indigenous technological progress is conditional. Absorptive capability is 
claimed to be the crucial factor influencing the effect of foreign technology spillover. However, 
lacking the exploration of organisations, the absorptive capability is defined only by in-house 
R&D in their research. Xie and Wu (2003) carry out case studies in the TV set manufacturing 
industry in China. They attribute the success of capability-building of two domestic firms to a 
series of external factors, including the linkage with MNCs, the tough competition, the scale and 
the deregulation of the domestic market and risk-taking entrepreneurship. Again, except in 
considering entrepreneurship, we do not have explanation from inside the organisation to outline 
the divergence of domestic firms that head technological capability building. Thus, we are still far 
from having a real picture about their valuable mechanisms of technological learning.  
Following Q. Lu (2000), X. Gao and his colleagues (X. Gao, 2003; X. Gao, P. Zhang and X. Liu, 
2007) also develop a top-down model and argue that strong manufacturing capabilities will not 
necessarily enable local firms to develop innovation capability. They deny the applicability of the 
―late development advantage‖ in the case of China, because they reveal a series of failure cases 
related to learning through technology importation. They stress the following factors as important 
in their empirical studies of China‘s TV set manufacturing industry: early timing of 
implementation of in-house R&D, intensive investment in in-house R&D, a large workforce for 
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research, coordination with research institutes and the choice of particular technology. 
Organisational conditions, including urgency, confidence and resources in developing proprietary 
technology, are emphasised. 
The case studies conducted by S. Gao and Xu (2001) explore the VCD (Video Compact Disc) and 
agricultural vehicle sectors. The researchers suggest a new techno-economic paradigm focusing 
on niche markets that would allow indigenous firms to catch up by combining existing 
technologies using a variety of different strategies. F. Lu and Mu (2004) also stress the domestic 
market. They term it a strategic factor for indigenous technological learning in DCs. Moreover, 
they establish the concept of ―learning (gradually) by innovating (products)‖ that domestic firms 
in DCs also have the possibility to create a top-down pattern. However, they mainly implement an 
industrial chain development perspective. In another piece of his research, F. Lu tries to open the 
black box of organisations for analysing Chinese industrial development. He takes managerial 
control as the central concept to study the situation of capability-building of Chinese SOEs (F. Lu, 
2000), and provides a comprehensive historical study on this topic (F. Lu, 1999). He argues that it 
is not the property-rights reform but it is the reform of managerial structure and organisational 
form that leads to the birth of successful reforming SOEs. The reconstruction of social relations 
within enterprises is a necessary process for the shaping of the effective managerial structure and 
organisational form. In the case study of BaoSteel
11
, F. Lu (2002) applies this framework to 
explore internal sources of Chinese firms‘ capability-building. He attributes BaoSteel‘s success to 
its aspiration levels, the persistence in learning by doing and the close interaction with customers. 
However, regarding the studies of Chinese industrial capability building, except for just a few 
works we mention above, there is still little research to take organisation as the central object of 
analysis to study the capability-building of Chinese industrial firms. 
2.4 Summary 
In reference to studying the technological learning and relevant capability-building in DCs, the 
conventional wisdom has already provided us with rich insights. By providing a wealth of 
empirical studies, the existing literature presents the readers with a sense of how historically 
technological catching-up processes have been successfully implemented at country level and 
industry level, how catching-up firms implement specific learning strategies, and follow specific 
stepwise bottom-up trajectories, and how they progress upstream from one stage to another. 
Topics such as technological transfers, external influences, interaction with early users or 
competitors and interaction with suppliers have been explored.  
However, in general, the relevant literature about technological learning in DCs has paid 
                                                 
11 BaoSteel is the largest steel-maker in China, and one of top-10 in the world. 
47 
 
inadequate attention to the organisational and managerial aspects of the learning process (Dutrénit, 
2000, p297), and to the construction of organisations. Many conventional works on technological 
learning at industrial or firm level begin with given substantial settings of organisations. The 
knowledge about learning patterns, namely the process that firms undergo to build up 
organisational systems and supportive institutions in pursuing technological learning, has not been 
so well cultivated. To be more specific at a micro-level, the resource allocation and the 
organisational platform for learning of firms are included in this subset, needing to be explored. 
Only with adequate knowledge in these fields can we understand better how DC firms respond to 
the environments when they have technological opportunities to exploit, have niche market to 
explore, or have specific trajectory to pass through. 
In fact, in the early phase of this academic area‘s development, scholars have already noticed the 
differences between learning activities. Based on the RBV framework initiated by Penrose (1959), 
Bell (1982) distinguishes two kinds of resources, namely the resources needed to operate existing 
production systems and the resources needed to change the existing production system. This is in 
fact developed into their definition of technological capability (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, p159), and 
can be regarded as a predecessor of their distinction between ―production capacity‖ and 
―technological capability‖ (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). It provides a theoretical source for thinking 
about the organisational process to respond to or predominate over the passive or active changes. 
However, possibly attached to the RBV framework, relevant scholars have not gone deeper into 
the differences between organisations; instead, they focus more on resource-based projects and 
investment capability. Their stage models are mainly based on the analysis of successful stories of 
investment and learning projects, rather than based on the analysis of continuous knowledge 
accumulation associated with organisational evolution.  
If we stress only the investment, pathway-choosing and trajectory-taking of resources, it cannot 
help us substantially to study the ubiquitous divergence of technological learning of DC firms at 
all kinds of levels. As mentioned by some researchers, the same strategy or policy may lead to 
different performances of firms or industries in different circumstances. According to the 
empirical studies of China, it seems that in many cases the Chinese government and entrepreneurs 
are aware of the pathways, trajectories and ―late development advantages‖, particularly when they 
aim to follow bottom-up patterns, as our study of the Group-A firms will demonstrate. Or at least 
they think they are aware of the relevant knowledge. They also know different tactics of 
knowledge acquisition, namely to train personnel with the aid of external expertise, to import 
technologies as assistance for in-house capability building, etc. However, the point is whether 
they are able to mobilise their organisational members and build up effective organisational 
systems to achieve their strategies. More enterprises fail at technological learning than are 
successful in the several industries we study empirically, for many of which defeat obviously 
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comes not because firms have not adopted one particular trajectory or make one particular 
investment. The knowing-doing gap (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000) between ―knowing the strategy‖ 
and ―realising the strategy‖ works, with a series of organisational questions located there. 
Turning back to the theoretical consideration, we cannot presume that relevant knowledge about 
effective learning has existed or has been obtained generally by firms in DCs. Very distinctly, the 
lack of social technologies
12
 in DCs is as important as the absence of physical technologies in 
leading to their backward status. Thereby, more than just considering the successful or failed cases, 
our study will go beyond the implementation of technological learning, and explore the evolution 
of the organisations, including their recognition of appropriate learning patterns, the translation 
into organisational building, and the resource allocation and application, as well as the knowledge 
accumulation process based on such the organisational systems. This does not mean we neglect 
the impact of strategy and project implementation on the underlying organisational settings, such 
as through the double-loop learning and deutero-learning mentioned by Argyris and Schön (1978) 
and Argyris (1976, 2005), or the valid learning process put forth by March, Sproull and Tamuz 
(1991).  
In sum, the organisational learning systems of DC firms and the mechanisms they work with to 
support technological learning are the focuses of our study in this thesis. The target is to deepen 
our understanding of their catching-up, and identify the source of their divergences. Certainly, this 
thesis is not able to cover all relevant questions. We cannot even answer all the questions we 
address in this chapter. To build up an organisational theory for understanding the technological 
learning process of DC firms, more research is needed to erect a systemic explanation. After all, 
this thesis has been developed as an initial attempt on part of the author. Through the empirical 
studies of the Chinese car-making sector and telecom-equipment sector, we primarily aim to point 
out the basic framework of an organisational learning system, and its significant role in directing 
and facilitating or obstructing technological learning.  
In the next chapter, we discuss the research design. A basic theoretical framework will be 
developed, which will be the foundation of our empirical study in later chapters. 
                                                 
12 It is a term from Nelson (Nelson and Sampat, 2001; Nelson, 2008), which is also put forth by North and Wallis (1994), 
Boserup (1996), and Day and Walter (1987) as noted by Nelson and Sampat (2001, p40). It refers to the broad sense 
patterned human interaction, or institutions at the cooperative level.  
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Chapter 3. Research design: concepts, frameworks and methods 
3.1 Research design 
The core of this thesis is to consider the differences in organisation of DC firms and the 
corresponding influence upon technological learning in the course of their catching-up. Therefore, 
it in fact comprises two steps. In the first step, the differences between organisational learning 
systems of two groups of firms are put centre-stage. In the second step, the role of organisational 
learning systems is studied, particularly the differences highlighted by the preceding comparison. 
Throughout this research, the divergence among domestic firms in DCs during their technological 
learning will be explored, as well as the dynamics of capability growth of local integrators.  
The study is carried out mainly through qualitative research methods based on intensive 
interviews and on-site participations. Domestic firms from China‘s car-making and 
telecom-equipment manufacturing sectors are the objects to be investigated. By comparing the 
two groups of firms, we can see how the differences between organisational learning systems 
stand out. 
The structure of this chapter in fact follows the underlying logics applied to the studies hereafter 
(see Figure 3.3 below), by looking first at ―diagnosis‖ of the issues (in this section 3.1, on 
research design), then passes to ―selection‖ of the case studies (in section 3.2), followed by 
―implementation‖ of the research strategy (in section 3.3). 
3.1.1 Questions and hypotheses 
The major purpose of this research is to explore the following question: 
“How can local firms in DCs like China change their organisational systems to 
develop product technologies?” 
Raises two isues: : i)  nottudfying iondku8vfirjsd thi tho ookimnfg at induvfrmdara, 
i) Insewdlookig t mesiscrityrol leel of groups if fgirksd 
To answer this research question, two hypotheses are put forth to examine it: 
(1) There are distinctive organisational differences between Group-A firms and Group-B firms, 
which exhibit different levels of performance in building the technological capabilities for systemic 
product development. 
Alternative: The performance of capability-building mainly relies on strategic resource-based 
investments. Organisational differences are only marginal factors contributing to learning 
performance. 
(2) The organisational differences observed are deeply involved in the processes of knowledge 
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search, generation and accumulation. 
Alternative: Differences in organisational learning systems exist between these two groups of 
firms. However, they just reflect the differences in strategy of these firms and are not involved 
closely in knowledge searching and creation. 
3.1.2 Analytical framework 
The research analytical framework could be demonstrated as Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. 
Among these three figures, Figure 3.1 presents our roadmap of analysis; the Figure 3.2 manifests 
the components of the ―organisational learning system‖, namely a framework we adopt to explore 
the differences of firms; and Figure 3.3 is a simple model of the process of the organisational 
learning system construction in the time dimension.  
Figure 3.1 Analytical framework: the reasoning roadmap 
1- strategic intent;
2- authorities
3- mobilisation & integration pattern
4- knowledge accumulation 
facilities & institutions
Org. of Group-A 
firms
Org. of Group-B 
firms
Knowledge 
creation process of 
Group-B firms
1- learning via recruiting
2- learning via cooperative projects
3- learning via interaction with 
customers
Difference
Comparison
Hypothesis 1: whether 
there are differences Examination
Hypothesis 2: whether the differences 
matter in technological learning
Yes
 
Figure 3.1 presents our reasoning to test our hypotheses and to answer the central question. For 
the first hypothesis, we study the organisational learning systems of these two groups of firms. 
Four components are developed to construct the concept of organisational learning system, 
namely the strategic intent, the authority over strategic resource allocation, the patterns of learning 
mobilisation and integration and the facilities and institutions for knowledge accumulation. This 
task is to be completed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. As for the second hypothesis, we carry out a 
detailed study of Group-B firms‘ knowledge creation processes in their early phase of shifting into 
a new domain. Chapter 7 is arranged to present the analysis for this task. 
Therefore, by investigating whether there are organisational differences, and whether the 
differences in question are importantly associated with the technological learning process, we 
bridge the organisational differences with the differences of learning performances of these two 
subsets of firms.  
The framework of the ―organisational learning system‖ is demonstrated as Figure 3.2. The 
framework is designed by mainly focusing on the organisational process of resource allocation 
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and application. Strategic intent, authority over resource allocation, organisation integration and 
organisational facility for supporting knowledge accumulation are the three dimensions we study.  
Figure 3.2 Analytical framework: the organisational learning system 
Authority over resource allocation
Organisation Integration: patterns of firms to 
mobilise & integrate members' learning
Organisational facility to support learning: 
knowledge database
Technology 
Learning patterns, 
and trajectories, 
pathways and 
ladders of 
capability-building
Strategic Intent
 
The strategic intent can be regarded as an obsession with advancement that encompasses the 
entire organisation, assuming such an approach is sustainable over a certain length of time (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1989; Prahalad, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p156). It is usually embodied as 
the vision of the organisation, the shared competitive or learning agenda, and so on. In particular, 
it concerns not only the quantity of resources deployed for technological learning but also the 
organisational pattern of cultural emphasis through which they are used to achieve consolidation.  
The authority over resource allocation is a concept meant to answer two questions: who controls 
the allocation and through what kind of governance patterns the authority over decision-making is 
practised. To ensure effective managerial control over strategic resource allocation, two factors 
are critical. The first is an understanding of who controls the allocation, namely the 
intra-organisation power distributions (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985, p 175); the second is an 
assessment of the governance patterns that control how this authority is used. These two elements 
are significant for understanding the strategic intent through which capability can lead to action.  
The organisation integration includes two parts: the institutional arrangement of organisational 
mobilisation and the learning integration. It reflects how people are engaged in technological 
learning within the organisation and how the resources are actually employed. Organisational 
integration enables capability-building firms to ―socialise participants in a complex division of 
labour to apply their skills and efforts to the achievement of common goals‖ (Lazonick and West, 
1995, p 231). In order to achieve an appropriate degree of efficiency of technological learning, 
indigenous firms should improve their organisational integration as much as possible. 
As for the facilities and institutions for knowledge accumulation, we investigate the equity and 
the role of the knowledge database and underlying supportive institutions. On the one hand, the 
knowledge databases are the outcome of learning and platforms for collective accumulation, 
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diffusion and application of knowledge. On the other hand, the research about relevant institutions 
and executions also shed light on the connections between the resource investment for learning 
and the process of knowledge accumulation, and shed light on the connections between the 
organisation integration and the knowledge sharing. What kind of knowledge dedication can be 
recorded, how knowledge is recorded, who has the rights to access it, and how other members 
apply the accumulated knowledge are questions highlighted for this topic. If (i) the database is 
built upon an integrated organisation system to which members are effectively mobilised to 
contribute, and (ii) it can be accessed and applied using a set of rules rather than being retained by 
departments or by a very limited group of people, we call it a comprehensive knowledge database. 
This means that either input or output is connected to a broad range of organisational members.  
However, in DCs, organisations with high learning performance will not emerge and grow 
automatically. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the time dimension model of the construction of 
organisational learning systems of firms in their early phase. Major features of organisations are 
built up in their early phase along the evolutionary interaction between higher-level learning and 
lower-level learning. To be specific, the building of organisational learning systems is based on 
the perceptions of higher-level organisation (decision-makers) about the interaction between the 
organisational configuration and the learning performance that is produced by the activities of 
front-line managers, engineers and workers. Therefore, for new entrants or firms undergoing 
significant reformation heading technological learning in DCs, the cognition of higher-level 
leaders regarding ―what and how learning should be‖ plays an important role in shaping the 
organisation and, then, the selection of organisational systems and learning patterns. Consequently, 
with the pattern selection, the organisation is practically built or transformed. Only after that can 
strategic resource-based projects be implemented based on the organisational system. Here we 
develop a framework from Thomas (1994). In his book, Thomas establishes a framework of 
―identification – selection – implementation‖ for studying the process of technological change, 
advocating the comparison of stages among different organisations (Thomas, 1994, p13-16). Here, 
we develop this framework further and employ it to study organisational development, as shown 
in Figure 3.3. We certainly do not deny the double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) and 
valid learning (March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991) that occur based on internal tensions and 
conflicts and change the fundamental norms and rules of organisation, which demonstrates the 
impacts of organisational implementation on the selection and cognition about organisational 
configuration. Our framework aims to present a normal sequence of organisational construction or 
transformation. It is about how the platform for organisational implementation comes, particularly 
for the DC firms in their early stages of organisational change. 
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Figure 3.3 Analytical framework: the time dimension of organisation constructing 
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3.1.3 Definition of terms 
In this thesis, we define ―technological capability‖ based on the viewpoint of Bell and Pavitt 
(1993, p159) as the capability to generate and manage technological change. 
Particularly, we stress the technological capability of local product integrators. The term 
―technological integration‖ is employed in this thesis, but is not part of the main theme to discuss. 
We take integrators in DCs as our object of analysis for two reasons:  
(1) It helps us to identify strategic technological capability. Technological capability is of 
universal existence, but with a question of degree involved. For the question of degree, consider 
the situation in global value chains as example. Information-intensive relationships are established 
within the global chains (Schmitz, 2007, p156). With these relationships , DC firms may have 
opportunities to participate in relevant global value networks, and even can achieve incremental 
capability progress with the assistance of global leading firms, or from the ―network flagships‖ 
(Ernst and Kim, 2002). However, it is difficult for these DC firms to generate and manage 
technical change beyond the modular interface set by global leading firms. Thus, only the 
―knowledge-integrating firms … relying on their wide in-house scientific and technological 
capabilities, have the “authority” to identify, propose and implement solutions to complex 
problems‖ (Brusoni, 2005, p1885). Hereby, the term ―local integrator‖ implies the firms we study 
are firms that provide integrative end-products, and have or had the strategic intent to integrate the 
knowledge creation.  
(2) The concept of the integrator is adopted based on its significant policy implications. Forbes 
and Wield (2002, p3) ―…contemplate what catching up is all about: increasing value-added 
through production of goods and services per employee‖. In our empirical studies of China‘s 
industries, many local industrial enterprises are locked at the assembling and manufacturing ends. 
What these firms can provide are mainly job vacancies on production lines, or engineer posts for 
testing or post-sale service, etc, since what support the competitiveness of these firms is the 
advantage of labour cost. By contrast, the emerging indigenous integrators clearly provide more 
opportunities for well-paid and comparatively high-standard engineering jobs, and cultivate the 
local supply chains, since they obviously involve more high value-added activities domestically. 
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For example, Huawei -- the No.1 Chinese indigenous telecom-equipment provider -- hires about 
40,000 engineers engaged in R&D activities, which is much more than the amount of engineers 
hired by any Sino-foreign JV in this sector. We can roughly estimate that the number of engineers 
hired by Huawei for product development is larger than the sum hired by all Sino-foreign JVs in 
this sector. Chery, namely the leading indigenous integrator in the car-making sector, has 
established a full-set indigenous core components supply chain, many of which had not been 
achieved by the Chinese industrial community through the TMFT practices in more than two 
decades. 
3.2 Objects of analysis 
This thesis is a firm-level study mainly with the support of industry-level analysis. In order to 
generate persuasive understanding, we go through most of the representative firms in the sectors 
that we study. In the interest of broader explanation, two sectors that share both common features 
and distinguished features are selected to carry out the empirical studies. 
3.2.1 Sectors selected 
Firms in the car-making sector and the telecom-equipment sector in China are the major objects to 
study. In fact, this research is developed based on empirical studies of a series of sectors, 
including such as the construction machinery sector, the power equipment sector, the 
electricity-transmitting equipment sector, the consumer electronics sector and the machine tools 
sector. In the interest of brevity, only two sectors are included for detailed elaboration. Additional 
empirical support from other sectors will be applied when necessary for the analysis in this thesis.  
In this thesis, the car-making sector and the telecom-equipment sector are selected to provide 
empirical support for our theoretical argument for the following reasons: 
3.2.1.1 Feature of complexity 
Knowledge integration is both required for systemic product developers in the two sectors. As to 
these two sectors, telecom-equipment is broadly categorised as one of the CoPS (complex 
products and systems) industry, as most telecom-equipment products are high cost and 
engineering-intensive. These products include a number of customised components, require 
breadth of knowledge and skills , and require high degree of new knowledge during the processes 
of being developed and produced (Hobday, 1998; Hobday and Rush, 1999)
13
. 
                                                 
13 In fact, even the telecom-equipment does not follow the strict definition of prevalent CoPS, since the complexity would 
evolve. Yes, in this industry customised service and producer-customer interaction are important even today. But as the 
capabilities of producers grow, they have transferred some complexity of the market, presenting the customer demands, to 
the product in some mature segments, as implied by Wang and von Tunzelmann (2000, p808), say, producers can have 
more and more technological features packaged in their delivered products beyond most of the ‗customised‘ demands they 
55 
 
As regards the automobile-making, the prevalent CoPS view has termed it a traditional industry 
based on standard products and mass production. But in our view, the automobile industry 
involves frontier technologies of control, thermodynamics, aerodynamics, energy, materials, 
electronics, etc., which indicates the depth of technological complexity. Besides, 
automobile-making involves a wide range of technologies as pointed above, and is confronted 
with different market demands and new processing technologies, i.e. the complexity in breadth 
(Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000). To deal with the ―internal complexity‖ and ―interface 
complexity‖ (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, p10) drives the developers to build corresponding 
technological capabilities to master the complexities. Such kinds of capabilities, since they are 
based on interconnected but different disciplinary knowledge in breadth or based on in-depth 
technical exploration, are not easily obtained through transfer of technology. Therefore, it is easier 
for us to distinguish among firms whether they have built up such capabilities in-house or they 
just have developed marginal technological capability but do the manufacturing integration 
instead.  
For example, in the current TV set manufacturing industry, internal complexity has been highly 
encapsulated into only two assemblies, namely the IC motherboard and the display subsystems, 
by which the corresponding complexities have been internalised by their suppliers. Therefore, the 
―integrated product providers‖ can finish the ―product development‖ only by assembling and 
executing some marginal technical tasks if they can access the international suppliers of these two 
assemblies. This is the general situation for many Chinese TV set makers today, and it does not 
mean they have many abilities to cause or manage technological changes. 
3.2.1.2 Different industrial categories 
According to the taxonomy developed by Pavitt (1984), the automobile making sector is one of 
the ―scale-intensive‖ industries, while the telecommunication equipment sector is a ―specialized 
supplier‖. To be more precise, most automobile producers in China target a mass consumer 
market, whereas the producers of telecom-equipment in many cases should deal with consumer- 
specific demands. 
The difference between these two sectors in terms of the type of technology adds to the 
difficulties of the research to some extent. However, it also helps to keep our study from being 
obsessed or diverted by the sector-specific characteristics, which is important for us to generate a 
more general understanding about the growth of local integrators in DCs that is applicable to 
                                                                                                                                                  
had ever met. In some segments, telecom-equipment even gradually becomes massively produced as standard products. 
The router is a typical case, which was strictly a capital good for the giant telecom operators, but now people can buy 
standardised router products and build family or company wireless/wired computer network. Therefore, we have an 
opinion of CoPS different from the taxonomy of the prevalent CoPS school. 
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industries producing complex products from different categories. 
3.2.2 Categories of firms 
A comparison of organisational learning systems will be implemented between the two groups of 
firms. They are termed Group-A firms and Group-B firms in this thesis. The firms with which 
interviews are undertaken for this research are categorized in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Categories of firms investigated 
Note: DTT: Datang Telecom Tech Co.; GDT: Great Dragon Telecom Tech Co. 
A key feature that distinguishes the two groups includes the strategy in technological learning. 
The firms of Group-A follow a bottom-up learning pattern by introducing one or several 
multinational partners, while the firms of Group-B take a path with which they dominate their 
product design from their beginning. We can indicate the difference in the technological learning 
strategy in Figure 3.4: 
Figure 3.4 Strategies of technological learning 
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component production
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In order to illuminate the differences of learning strategy between these two groups of firms, we 
can outline the major products around 10 years
14
 after their setup (i.e. the establishment of firms, 
JVs or cooperation) in Table 3.2. 
                                                 
14 Usually, according to the level of international mainstream producers, one new product development costs not more 
than 2-3 years in the automobile making sector; and in the telecom-equipment sector, it is also not more than 5 years from 
the 1980s. Therefore, 10 years should be sufficient for firms to develop at least one new product if they take the strategy t o 
develop new products. 
 Car-making sector Telecom-equipment sector 
Group-A FAW (First Auto Works Group), DongFeng, 
SAIC (Shanghai Auto Industry Co.) 
Shanghai-Bell 
Group-B Chery, Geely, HaFei Huawei, ZTE, DTT, Xinwei 
Others Brilliant GDT 
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Table 3.2 Major products in their first 10 years  
Note: the time referred is for the first import of Group-A firms or for the first product invented of 
Group-B firms; *the RedFlag is a self-owned brand of FAW. But after FAW setting up a JV with 
Volkswagen, the RedFlag had been transplanted onto the Audi-100 platform for economic car models, 
and onto the Lincoln-TownCar platform for luxury car models; **SaiMa is developed based on the 
Dingo model of Mitsubishi; HaFei imported this model and developed the left-drive version. 
Term: MPV: Multi-Purpose Vehicle; SCDMA: Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access; 
TD-SCDMA: Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access  
The sources of differences of their technological learning strategies were related to politics and 
history. The Group-A firms referred to large SOEs and their JVs with MNCs. Since the large 
SOEs were the backbone of the industrial economy of China during its era of the command 
economy, and were under the charge of relevant industrial governmental ministries, they attracted 
the privilege of political attention, and were influenced by the national strategy of TMFT. The 
Sino-foreign JVs were exactly established under the TMFT framework during the 1980s and 
1990s. To boost the backbone SOEs to establish Sino-foreign JVs, a series of favourable policies, 
such as special tax treatments guaranteed by the ―Sino-foreign joint venture enterprise bill‖ from 
1979 on, were carried out by the government. 
As for Group-B firms, most of them were newly established firms or they were SOEs not under 
the charge of industrial ministries that exactly supervised the industries we study. Therefore, by 
comparison with Group-A firms, they were not significant enough in terms of scale, investment, 
human resources or market share when entering the corresponding industries. Moreover, 
Group Firms Time Major products 
Car-making  
G-A SAIC  1983 (with Volkswagen via JV) Santana (Passat-B2) 
 FAW 1988 (with Audi via cooperative 
production) 
1991 (with Volkswagen via JV) 
Audi 100,  
RedFlag*,  
Jetta (Vento of Volkswagen) 
 DongFeng 1992 (with Citroën via JV) FuKang (Citroen ZX) 
G-B Chery 1996 Fulwin, QQ, Eastar, Cowin, A5, etc. 
 Geely 1998 HQ and MR series, Mybo, Maple series, etc. 
 HaFei 1983 (for minibus-making); 
2000 (for car-making) 
Minibus (since 1983): SHJ series,  
ZhongYi, MinYi; Cars (since 2000):  
Lubo, Saibao and SaiMa**  
Other Brilliant 1997 ZhongHua Series, Haice series (MPV***). 
Telecom-equipment 
G-A Shanghai-Bell 1984 (with Belgium BTM via JV) SSU12 PBX (Private Branch Exchange),  
S1240 PDSS (Belgium BTM)  
 Beijing International 1990 (with Siemens via JV) EWSD (Siemens) 
G-B Huawei 1987 PBX, PDSS, generally full set equipment for 
telecom 
 ZTE 1985 As above 
 DTT 1995 SP-30, TD-SCDMA standard 
and generally full set of equipment*** 
 Xinwei 1995 SCDMA (R3) standard, and generally  
full set equipment; McWill (R4, R5)  
standard & generally full set equipment*** 
Other GDT 1984 HJD-03, HJD-04 and complementary devices 
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regulations in some industries (such as automobile-making) have also been unfavourable to new 
entrants, especially to new entrants without government support. Thus, MNCs were not interested 
in co-operating with Group-B firms during the early phase of the latter. 
3.3 Research strategy 
The research methods chosen are particularly conditioned by the objects and the central question 
of research. Our central question is highly related to history and learning processes of firms. Since 
the case study methodology is more appropriate when ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions are asked 
about the phenomena drawing on multiple source of evidence (Yin, 2003), the qualitative method, 
in particular the case study method, is considered essential to this project. 
A second reason for us to choose the case study method is that a key point of this research is to 
explore the capability growth of local integrators in DCs for developing systemic products. There 
is no systemic index of quantitative measurement for such a subject for us to follow, especially 
considering its historical and dynamic contexts. In order to achieve the purpose of the theoretical 
propositions, an analytical framework of case studies is implemented (Yin, 2003). 
In addition to case studies, quantitative means are engaged to support time series or contrast 
studies among firms, which could help to provide a clearer analysis of capability evolution.  
We have to admit the qualitative method has its own limitations, especially in terms of ability to 
represent a broader population of firms. As a result, we cannot claim that the findings we obtain 
here can be applied to the whole population of Chinese firms or firms in other DCs. Nevertheless, 
we still look forward to some implications from this thesis for the research community.  
3.3.1 Sources of information 
There are two major kinds of information sources for this project.  
First, there is the information from documents and references, including quantitative and 
qualitative information. The documentary information is collected as follows : 
(i) archives of firms, (ii) press reports, (iii) internal newsletters, (iv) special collections on each 
enterprise (for example published books or papers), (v) collections of governmental policies and 
regulations, (vi) special reports on the firm‘s general and financial situations (especially the public 
for the listed companies), and (vii) news reports related to the sectors and firms.  
Secondly, information from interviews is collected, and can be sorted into two groups, namely 
from interviews with related academic researchers and from interviews with industrial 
practitioners during the fieldwork. Besides, on-site participations are employed when 
investigating two firms since there are convenient conditions to do so. 
The interviews that have been done are listed in Table 3.3; and a detailed name list of interviewees 
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is attached as an appendix by following the main text. 
Table 3.3 interviews during the fieldwork  
Term: TDIA: TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance 
3.3.2 Implementation of fieldwork 
3.3.2.1. Accessibility of interviews 
The fieldwork can be sorted into two stages. In the first stage, I mainly followed several research 
projects associated with governmental ministries. 
The reasons for me to take part in these governmental projects were as follows. (i) It was for cost- 
efficiency. The firms studied are located in different parts of China so that the travelling for 
fieldwork generated huge expenditures for traffic and accommodation. To participate in these 
projects could have a large part of my expenditures covered, though not for all. (ii) Very 
importantly, governmental projects could make interviews easier to arrange. In most cases, firms 
are not willing to accept requests for on-site investigation or interviews. However, as China is a 
society with long tradition of centralisation, most firms are happy to open the door to government 
research teams in order to have their own voices heard by the policy-makers. 
Through governmental projects, I got support from object firms to some extent, especially from 
those Group-B firms. The phrase ―in-depth investigations with official support‖ that is used in 
Firms Interviews 
Car-making sector 
Chery 4 rounds of in-depth investigation with official support 
1 month of close investigation as an internal observer supported by the firm 
Geely 2 rounds of in-depth investigation on Geely with official support 
HaFei 1st round: in-depth investigation with official support 
2nd round: iterative interviews with key persons, which lasted two months 
Brilliant  2 rounds of in-depth investigation with official support 
FAW  1 round of visiting and interviews with official support 
2 rounds of personal interviews with engineers 
1 round of investigation with two of its research institutes 
2 rounds of interviews with ex-employees 
DongFeng  2 rounds of interviews with some employees and ex-employees 
SAIC interviews with researchers 
Telecom-equipment sector 
GDT Interviews with academic researchers; 
In-depth investigation achieved by colleagues  
DTT (& TDIA) 2 rounds of in-depth investigation with official support 
Xinwei 3 rounds of in-depth investigation with official support;  
1 month of close investigation as an internal observer supported by the firm 
ZTE 1st round: in-depth investigation with official support 
2nd – 3rd rounds: personal interviews 
Huawei 2 rounds of visiting with official support; 
2 rounds of personal interviews 
Shanghai-Bell Interviews with academic researchers; 
1 round of personal interviews with employees 
POTEVIO 1 round of interviews with relevant researchers 
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Table 3.3 signifies that I could make a list of interviewees as I liked to a high degree, and in most 
cases the object firms would accept my requests. Usually, on the list of interviewees I included the 
engineers on the shop-floor and in the research centre, the managers of different departments and 
the decision-makers for the firms. Chery and Xinwei ever provided me with their uniforms so that 
I could carry out investigation as a fake colleague within their factories and departments, in their 
conferences with customers, or even at the site of engineering field operations. It provided very 
good conditions to obtain trustworthy information from their employees. 
For most cases, each round of investigation for each firm would last 4-7 days. For every meeting, 
the common interview periods ranged from 1 hour to half of a working day.  
For most of the cases, as referred to in Table 3.3, a second or further rounds of interviews would 
be carried out in order (i) to diminish the bias created in the information collected when the 
interviewees were receiving a governmental research team; (ii) to refine the questions according 
to my needs as the research developed, and to obtain further information.  
To achieve these purposes, we attempted to arrange the second and further round of interviews 
through unofficial personal contacts. In this way, the interviewees could often be more relaxed. 
3.3.2.2. Collection of information 
For different types of investigation, various tactics were implemented. Regarding the officially 
supported investigation, a comprehensive list of open questions was used to carry out the 
conversation. However, the list of questions varied to suit the situations relevant to the posts that 
interviewers played in their organisations and information that they potentially hold. After that, 
according to the information that the interviewees had provided, really open questions were put 
forward to explore more details. Notes and interview records were made during the interviews. 
When the meeting was arranged based on personal relations, interviews were arranged usually 
off-company and casually, and in many cases no records were taken to make the interviewee fully 
relaxed. This type of interview could help to furnish further details, corroborate other people‘s 
words, comment on other departments and firms, and even register complaints. If notes and 
records had not been made on the spot, they were made after the interviews were finished. 
As Table 3.3 shows, the investigation of Group-A firms at large was not as thorough as the 
investigation of Group-B firms in terms of rounds of investigation and official support. That is 
mainly because since January 2005, the Chinese central government has asserted a new policy 
that is obviously different from the TMFT policy prevalent before, to stress indigenous innovative 
capabilities. Under the political pressure and criticism of social opinions, the Group-A firms that 
do not feature themselves with indigenous product development capabilities became unreceptive 
to visitors. Particularly when the research team I had been taking part in was recognised as a 
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supportive driving force for the policy change, Group-A firms became not so willing to welcome 
our on-site investigation. 
In order to enrich our knowledge about Group-A firms, we implemented a series of interviews 
with the ex-employees of Group-A firms, including retired employees and those who had quit 
(many of whom work for Group-B firms now). Again, to diminish the bias of information, the 
differences between statements were researched carefully and cross-verified. 
3.3.3 Analysis and writing up 
The interviews, relevant references, published governmental documents, data and documents from 
industrial associations and company documents are the basis on which the behaviours of firms 
were identified; then the comparison between the two groups of firms and the analysis of the 
process of building technological capabilities as integrators was developed. 
The analytical strategy was to develop a historical narrative for organising the case study. The 
narrative as well as the data of firms has helped us to identify the causal relations visible from our 
analysis. As Huber and Van de Ven (1995, p xii) pointed out, ―Change processes are themselves 
composed of events with antecedents and consequences, and when these are understood and 
connected in the form of a story or historical narrative, an understanding of the process is often the 
result‖. 
Based on the historical narrative, we build the explanation by stipulating a series of casual 
relations about the cases, including the explanation of differences existing between the two groups 
of firms, as well as how the integrators search for, generate and accumulate new knowledge. 
Iterations are developed to strengthen the important causal relations. Because the relations are 
complex and difficult to measure in any precise manner, the building of explanation is developed 
in a narrative form (Yin, 1994) 
The information associated with the case study is presented in two main ways: 
(i) Firstly, case studies are presented as ―an analytic chronology‖, which is the historical narrative 
of evolution of institutions and policies. It is adopted in Chapter 4 and 8 to demonstrate how the 
institution influences the learning strategies of firms in China. 
(ii) Secondly, the case studies are organised according to ―a theory-building structure‖, which 
aims at interpreting the stories by comparison with the generation of a theoretical framework, and 
which also seeks to demonstrate the relevant cases supporting the process through which the 
capabilities of the integrator are built up. This kind of pattern is adopted in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4. Background: institutions, industries and firms 
4.1 Introduction 
The two groups of firms we study in this thesis did not emerge naturally from the market-oriented 
reformation of China. In this chapter, the national and sectoral backgrounds are explored. The 
mechanisms through which national and sectoral institutions inf luence the learning strategy and 
organisational systems of firms are the focuses. The emergence of these two groups of firms is 
here regarded as the outcome of an evolution of a governmental pattern of industrial governance. 
The Group-A firms were encouraged to build up JVs with MNCs by the government. The 
Group-B firms were built by their founders independently from the central planning system, and 
being confronted with the unfavourable treatment of the governmental industrial administration 
they had to find niche markets for survival in their infancy stages. So why did the institutions 
work in this way? To explain the institutional backgrounds is important for understanding the 
emergence and underlying organisational features of these two groups of firms. 
The backgrounds are explained in two parts, namely the role of the government and that of the 
industrial ministerial system during the reform, as presented in section 4.2. We analyse the 
emergence and general learning patterns of these two groups in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
The performances of these firms share commonalities in terms of the expansion of production 
capacity in general but with different roles for incumbents and newcomers especially in terms of 
the technological capability growth. We present such a comparison in section 4.5.  
4.2 National industrial governance system 
China operates a transitional economy. It has developed a gradual reform instead of the shock 
therapy from the late 1970s on towards a market-oriented economy. Even the previous institutions 
of central planning system continue to be reformed. Their legacies still have impacts on its 
industrial system during the course of reform, although the impacts are uneven in different fields 
and followed evolutionary trajectories. 
In its over 60 years of history, the government, especially the central government, played a 
leading role in the industrial economy of the PRC (People‘s Republic of China), either during the 
command economy era or the reform era after 1978, which differed just in extent. This 
phenomenon goes beyond the specificity of socialism ideology, but is a complex outcome for 
socio-cultural, political and path-dependent reasons. China is a country with traditions of 
centralisation over a thousand years or more. Centralisation is respected as the orthodoxy in its 
social culture. After becoming a socialist country in 1949, the Chinese had opportunities to learn 
from their political allies, and built up their industrial administrative system by imitating the 
USSR system of the 1950s. Importantly, the first round of massive industrialisation in China in a 
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truly modern sense was practised as a top-down governmentally organised movement. It was 
raised in the 1950s being similar to a Gerschenkronian strategy as stressing the capital goods 
heavy industries and scale economies of production. The ―156 projects‖ executed in the 1st FYP 
(Five-Year Plan) with the assistance of USSR and other socialist countries and the projects of this 
kind in the 2
nd
 FYP were the historical foundations of Chinese modern industries. Meanwhile, 
Chinese government built up a series of indigenous supportive projects
15
. In a word, the skeleton 
of Chinese modern industrialisation was realised by top-down governmental forces rather than by 
the private sector or other decentralised forces. This industrialisation with the following efforts 
during 1960s-1970s gradually brought China partly into a modern industry-based society
16
. Such 
a framework of an industrial system still works significantly today. 
Our analysis below is developed through two connected topics. Firstly, we introduce briefly how 
much the Chinese government is directly involved in the industrial economy. Secondly, we 
introduce the means and institutions by which the government realises its impacts on industries. 
These analyses are helpful for our understanding of the emergence of the firms we study.  
4.2.1 Role of central government: holding economic units 
There are many ways for governments to impose their influence on industries. In China, holding 
economic units directly was an important way of this kind. The categories of units that the 
government owns include industrial firms, research institutes and universities. During the reform, 
the situation had been changed but not eliminated. The practices performed by the government on 
units it directly held led to the emergence of Group-A firms, and shaped the inducements for that 
of Group-B firms indirectly. 
Chinese reform in the industrial sector, starting in 1978, is in essence a decentralisation of central 
planning. It can be divided into two phases (Qian, 2001). (i) The first phase was represented by 
the expansion of managerial autonomy. As for SOEs, instead of the governmental direct 
coordination for corporate management, the ―factory director responsibility system‖ was 
encouraged after 1982, and the ―contract responsibility system‖ after 1986. By 1988, 83.2% of 
                                                 
15 The cooperative projects with USSR were initiated from 1950, and were stopped in 1960 by Khrushchev. During the 1st 
FYP (1953 – 1957), 156 cooperative projects were initiated mostly in the field of military -related, resource and heavy 
industries. And after the 1st FYP, a series of consequent cooperative projects were signed by USSR and China. In the entire 
1950s, there were 304 full set equipment projects and 64 single workshop or equipment projects agreed between the two 
countries. Among them, 149 of full set equipment projects had been fully or partly established before the Sino-Soviet 
Split, while 89 of them were cancelled; 66 projects were continued by Chinese on their own. As for the independent 
workshops or equipment projects, the corresponding numbers were 29, 35 and 0 (Zhang, B., F. Yao, et al., 2004). Several  
East European communist countries also provided China cooperative projects. By these projects, China got blueprints, 
equipment, technical advisers and some loans from these communist countries. 
16 For the crucial role of the projects built by the central government, we can see from the contribution of the ―156 
projects‖ in the 1950s. At the end of the 1st FYP, the contribution of these 156 projects to the entire outcome of 
corresponding industries ranged from 72.9% to 100% in the steel-making, iron-making, steel-rolling, aluminium-making, 
automobile manufacturing and electricity -generating industries.  
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SOEs had adapted the ―factory director responsibility system‖ (Shan, 1991) and obtained the 
autonomy regarding operational managements. (ii) The second phase was marked as the 
―modernisation‖ of corporate governance. This phase could be represented by three changes. First 
was the privatisation in a practical sense, by which the public shares of SOEs were sold to the 
private sector or employees. Second, as for the rest of the public shares, the market-oriented 
ownership relations between government and firms took the place of the previous governmental 
direct imperatives. Third, the contract-based industrial relations came instead of political relations 
and lifetime employment within SOEs. By this reform, the term ―State Operated Enterprise‖ was 
replaced by the ―State Owned Enterprise‖ officially in 1993. It meant in theory that the 
government changed its role to be a share-holder instead of an imperative commander. Besides, 
after another round of reform starting from 1998, the ownership of SOEs held by the government 
were taken away from industrial ministries to a new special governmental agent which was later 
named as SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision & Administration commission of the State 
Council) in 2003. The SASAC was designed to preserve and increase state assets. That was to say, 
in theory only the asset-supervision relation was left to the industrial administration. During this 
course, most medium and small sized SOEs were given up from the direct control of central 
government, but transferred to the private sector, or controlled by the regional governments or 
other large state-owned industrial groups. By 2009, only 136 large SOEs and industrial research 
institutes were directly held by SASAC (this number varied with time). In theory, the scale and 
scope of the governmental direct intervention in industrial firms has been largely reduced, 
especially that of the central government. The below Table 4.1 presents a comparison among the 
situations in 1978 – the starting point of reform, in 1997 – the point when all firms studied in this 
thesis had been established, and in 2005 – the point when Chinese policy-makers began to stress 
the indigenous innovative capability. 
Table 4.1 Shares of GDP  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2002) and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. 
In the two sectors of our study, there are several firms in the list of SASAC, including FAW, 
DongFeng and China National Auto Joint Company in the car-making sector, and POTEVIO, 
China Academy of Telecom Tech. (CATT), Shanghai-Bell, Wuhan Research Institute of Post & 
Telecoms (WRI), China Post & Telecom Appliances, and China Information Tech. Designing & 
 GDP, % share 
Year 1978 1997 2005 
Gross 100 100 100 
-1.Public ownership economy 99.1 75.8 35 
--1.1 State-ownership economy 56.2 41.9  
------- mixed ownership included __ 6.5  
--1.2 Collective-ownership economy 42.9 33.9  
------- mixed ownership included __ 2.2  
- 2. Non-public ownership economy 0.9 24.2 65 
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Consulting Institute in the telecom-equipment sector. 
However, we cannot simply conclude that the government has decided to give away its influence 
on industries. The top decision-makers in SOEs, if they are appointed by governmental agents or 
SOE investors, are still somehow connected with the human resource system of corresponding 
governmental departments. Therefore, only if the government wants to impose its influence on 
these firms, it does have the potential. As for those mixed-ownership firms when the public share 
does not dominate, the government still has possibilities to persuade the other decision-makers by 
its agents; the extent of the governmental efforts in doing this depends on the kinship and 
significance of firms to the government. Besides, the government owns other policy instruments 
to exert its strategies. It maintains a regulation of large investment for the sake of economic 
security against overheated investment and industrial security. By this instrument, barriers to entry 
in some pillar industries are kept to actualise the governmental schemes. Indirectly, most domestic 
giant commercial banks are SOEs, which also can be mobilised if needed. 
4.2.2 Industrial ministries: branch-based industrial administrative systems 
Regarding the industrial-specific activities, the governmental role was realised by a series of 
governmental departments and agents. Among these agents, the industrial ministerial systems 
must be stressed. They worked as the front-line strategic headquarters within the corresponding 
industrial domains, and implemented highly specialised administration, while keeping arm‘s 
length coordination with other ministries horizontally.  
The ministry-level departments of Chinese central government during most of the 1950s-1990s 
periods could be categorised into four groups. Only a few of them, working as the command 
ministries or commissions, had the superpower to make gross schemes both for industrial sectors 
and regional sectors, and to mobilise relevant resources. The settings of this kind varied with the 
phases of reform. Only the State Planning Commission (SPC) was always kept as a leader, 
although its name was also changed from period to period for the reconstruction of ministries. The 
second group included functional ministries to take care of specialised governmental functions, 
e.g. the affairs related to finance, labour and personnel, customs, etc. A third group included some 
special ministries and agents, such as the SASAC, which were set to take the responsibility for 
some special needs. 
A fourth group comprised a series of branch-based industrial ministries. Following the directives 
and suggestions of command ministries, being associated with functional ministries, and keeping 
arm‘s length cooperation with other industrial ministries, industrial ministries were the practical 
front-line strategy-makers and commanders representing the central planning. They owned the 
SOEs (MOEs hereafter, ministry-owned-enterprises), research institutes and universities held by 
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the central government in their respective industrial domains, which were all backbone entities at 
country-level
17
; as for other economic units they did not directly own, they played a 
industry-specific regulative and advisory role. In sum, industrial ministries worked as the hub of 
information-collecting and policy-making of industries (see Figure 4.1). This situation had not 
been ended until approximately the reform in 1998. 
Figure 4.1 Roles of Industrial Ministries in the Central Planning Economic System  
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Industrial ministries constructed systems with high-specialisation, which included endogenous 
specialisation and exogenous specialisation. The exogenous specialisation was based on the 
specialised coupling of particular ministry and corresponding industrial sector, which meant that 
these ministries were industrially branch-based, as described by von Tunzelmann (1995) about the 
USSR case. During the 1950s-1980s, the extent of exogenous specialisation grew as the Chinese 
industrial system developed, by which we refer to the growth in the number of industrial 
ministries. More and more industrial ministries were established to cope with the expansion of 
industrial scope, and to promote the specialisation of administration. In the machinery-related 
fields, the number of industrial ministries grew from only 1 in 1949 to 7 in the early 1960s and 13 
by the end of the 1970s. Even after a simplification reform in 1982, there were still 8 specialised 
industrial ministries in the machinery-related fields. Such an arrangement separated the industries 
with arm‘s length coordination. For example, in the domains relating to machinery, the industries 
of agriculture machinery, automobiles, aviation manufacturing, electronics and computers, 
broadcast and televisions, etc., were governed by separate industrial ministries in the early 1980s.  
The endogenous specialisation came from their governance pattern. Firstly, within each ministry, 
science and technology development activities were put into one or several divisions 
independently from those for manufacturing and other activities. It was set to follow the tradition 
                                                 
17 The backbone SOEs, institutes and universities owned by industrial ministries were large in number. For example, in 
the reform starting from 1998, there were still 270 research institutes that were reformed away from the direct supervision 
of ministries, even if we did not count those having been reformed during previous rounds. 
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of the USSR (Berliner, 1976; Gu, 1999), and aimed at the scale economies of science and 
technology development, and avoiding the waste of resources in theory. However, it caused the 
horizontal disconnection of S&T from production in practice (Z. Zhao, 1985
18
; Gu and Lundvall, 
2006). Secondly, the administration was meanwhile categorised into different segments based on 
technical or sectoral dimensions, which could be regarded as further specialisation following the 
exogenous specialisation. X. Shen (1999, p20) describes the internal specialisation of the MPT 
(Ministry of Posts & Telecoms) in 1995, by which not only the administrations for different 
regulation functions but also the administrations for the activities and directly-owned entities in 
equipment manufacturing, plant scheming, network construction, broadcasting and satellite were 
under the charge of different division.  
Therefore, industrial ministries were built into not only the supervisors of corresponding industrial 
systems, but also one part of the real industrial practices: they exactly acted as the integrators of 
information and knowledge, as well as the planners of resources, production and distribution. Not 
only for the information and resource flows among different sub-industries, but also for the flows 
between corresponding industries and other external industries, industrial ministries indeed were 
the only platforms to play the integrative role. The command ministries or the state council, 
although ranked higher in the bureaucratic system, did not control the industry-based information 
directly; as for the lower level bureaus or economic units, they did not have channels to connect 
and mobilise relevant information and resource forwardly.  
A question can be raised here: if the most important changes in corresponding industrial domains 
were made by industrial ministries, how could the central government deal with so much 
information? In fact, regarding incremental changes and routine cooperation among economic 
units, administrations were achieved through the ―GuiKou management‖ system, which was an 
important governance component for the central planning system. 
The ―GuiKou management‖ was the practical pattern that ministries governed MOEs, 
subordinated research institutes and universities. ―Gui‖ means ―belonging‖ literally; ―Kou‖ means 
the department, division or branch. Therefore, ―GuiKou management‖ meant the state-owned 
entity must comply with the appointment to carry out its duties in a particular branch set by the 
ministry. More specifically, it meant that entities (i) were put under the supervision of a specific 
division of industrial ministry, (ii) were located at an appointed geographical site, and (iii) were 
designed to produce particular products or carry out appointed activities. The latter two points 
were usually applied with another phrase, namely the ―designate firm/ institute‖ (―Dingdian‖ in 
Chinese), which referred to the firm/institute under such a system. The product that industrial 
                                                 
18 ZiYang Zhao was the Premier of China at that time. 
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firms were appointed to produce could be very specific according to the requirements of a central 
planning system, such as ―kinescope production‖ or ―circuit production and TV set assembling‖. 
The ―GuiKou management‖ system also defined the particular routine linkage among economic 
units. Take a ministry-owned industrial research institute as an example. Such a system indicated 
the field the institute worked in and with whom it should regularly cooperate. By this, factories 
and institutes were coupled to develop and produce appointed products in appointed time in 
appointed place and in appointed amounts. 
Certainly, the situations and the relevant influence of industrial ministries changed gradually 
during the reform. Most industrial ministries had been reformed away in or prior to 1998, except 
for the MII (Ministry of Information Industry). However, the removal of influence of the former 
central planning system lagged behind the physical reform of bureaucracies. The legacy of the 
central planning system and industrial ministries still had obvious influence, as the industrial 
relations formed in that era had been embedded and influenced the decision-making of firms 
informally. In the early phase of reform, it was usually still the ministries working as organisers to 
facilitate the cooperation among economic units. The influence of ministries over state-owned 
entities made sense, but we also could not ignore that the inertia of these economic units made 
them deficient in terms of abilities (embodied as experience or even personal skills) to mobilise 
information and resources from a broader scope. In a word, the market-oriented reform could not 
change them into competitive units under market competition in just one day (F. Lu, 2000). In 
many cases, SOEs and former SOEs were likely to listen to the government as they were formally 
bound by the institutional arrangements. Such an environment explained the fast diffusion of 
TMFT practices among firms during the 1980s-1990s. 
4.3 Emergence of Group-A firms 
In the early 1980s, in order to speed up the technological catching-up, China began to adopt the 
TMFT policy, which was taken as a national primary strategy until 2004, and directly led to the 
emergence of Group-A firms. 
The TMFT should not be understood straightforwardly as introducing foreign firms to occupy the 
domestic market if these foreign firms were willing to help the domestic industrial community to 
promote technological capability. Endowed by its birth process, the TMFT policy in practice 
entailed a preference in learning patterns and trajectories. In short, under the TMFT framework: 
(i) SOEs were encouraged to set up productive JVs with MNCs;  
(ii) Group-A firms were encouraged to learn ―closely‖ and day by day from their foreign partners; 
(iii) Following the above two points, Group-A firms were in practice encouraged to learn through 
a reverse sequence of the normal product life cycle, which was typically similar to the bottom-up 
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model described in the relevant literature (e.g. Kim, 1997, p89).  
The TMFT policy was invented based on its victory over other competitive policies from 1972 
onward. Its policy components, as listed above, were developed through a policy controversy. 
4.3.1 Contemporary policies for importing foreign technologies 
Before the TMFT framework, there were several other policies implemented by China to import 
foreign technologies to promote indigenous technological learning. The Sino-Soviet cooperation 
in the 1950s was exactly a success of this kind. After the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, 
Chinese policy-makers began to look for technological cooperation with foreign countries. Before 
the 1972, only a few instances of international technological cooperation were carried on
19
. Only 
after the visit of Nixon to China in 1972 could the Chinese establish official and large-scale 
technological connections with the western world. 
From 1972 on, the SPC proposed a program to import complete equipment sets from abroad. 
Many heavy industries were involved, namely metallurgy, fertilizer and petrochemicals. This 
program was carried out during 1973-1978, with a total budget of 4.3 billion USD, and was 
named as the ―43 Arrangements‖ in China‘s governmental documents 20 . With domestic 
complementary investment at around 20 billion RMB, 27 large-scale industrial projects were 
finally set up (for details, see Naughton, 1996, p67-74). 
In 1977, a second national-wide plan for foreign technology importation was put forth with 120 
large industrial projects, which were begun to practise from 1978 on and then called the ―78 Plan‖. 
The Chinese central government decided to adopt more methods of technological importation. 
Diversified patterns, including compensatory trade, OEM, process materials supplied by clients , 
commission sales and cooperative production were employed. Besides, Chinese delegations were 
sent abroad to looked for successful experience for rapid industrialisation. As the consequence of 
the ―open-door‖ shift, foreign capital was introduced in the form of loans. To establish 
Sino-foreign JVs with investments from capitalist countries, as a highly sensitive area connected 
to the ownership that was regarded as the heartland of the socialist economy, was also relaxed at 
least nominally. The ―experience‖ brought back by the delegations to Yugoslavia and the United 
States (led by Deng) worked critically for the shift entailing ownership. In fact, during the ―78 
Plan‖, the negotiation of several JVs projects that were later formally supported by the TMFT 
                                                 
19 For instance, the LT Memorandum (Liao-Takasaki Memorandum) which was signed by China and Japan in 1962 was a 
quasi-official agreement for international trade (the formal diplomatic relation was established in 1972). However, in this 
agreement, only minerals, agriculture products and other goods (China side), and steel, fertilizer, pesticides, agricultural 
implement and machinery, some complete equipment, and other goods (Japan side) were involved.  
20 With extra supplement projects, the total expenditure of ―43 Arrangements‖ was exactly 5.14 billion USD. 
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framework had already been started, such as the Shanghai-Volkswagen project. 
Along with the development of ―78 Plan‖, the method of importing complete equipment sets that 
prevailed from the ―43 Arrangement‖ was criticised for its significant cost of financial resources. 
The 22 large-scale projects initiated in 1978 alone cost 13 billion USD as importation fees and 
more than 20 billion RMB as investment to domestic complementary projects. The value of those 
contracts signed in the last two months of 1978 only had reached 7.8 billion USD, which was 
equal to 89.2% of the total technological importation fee during 1950-1977. By contrast, the forex 
reserves of China in 1977 and 1978 were only 0.952 and 0.167 billion USD respectively. After the 
policy-makers were warned of the severe unbalance of international trade and shortage of forex in 
1979, a sharp decrease of importation in 1980 had to be made. Only 67 contracts were signed in 
1980 while there were 346 contracts in 1979 (Li and Huang, 2001, p648). 
As a result, intensive controversies were raised among policy-makers. The method of importing 
complete equipment sets was forcefully criticized for the reasons claimed as follows (Li and 
Huang, 2001): 
 The strategy of importing complete equipment sets depressed the domestic sector of capital 
equipment production. 
 The Neglect of the importation of complementary process technologies and capital equipment 
making technologies had the manufacturing capacity not been improved as expected. 
 For the limited domestic absorptive capacity, without effective organisation of relevant firms 
and institutes to study the imported equipment, the absorption, acquisition and re-invention of 
imported technologies had not occurred as expected. 
 The average cost of imported equipment during 1973 -1982 was found to be higher than in 
international markets, especially when taking the cost of Japan’s equipment imports dur ing 
1970 – 1979 as a bench-mark. 
 The equipment imports during 1973 -1982 were out of control, which had destroyed the forex 
balance and the macro-balance of the planning industrial system. 
As indicated, problems were pointed out for the method of carrying out importation of complete 
equipment sets, which were in practice related to the weakness of China in finance, absorptive 
capacity, and managerial capability of that time. Accordingly, the opponents suggested 
implementing methods characterized by higher packaged technological transfer (Radosevic, 
1999).The experience gained by Chinese delegations from the visits to Yugoslavia and Romania 
recommended the patterns of technological importation by using technical licensing, turnkey 
engineering projects, cooperative production and JVs (Li and Huang, 2001, p649). The opinions 
of the returned delegations unbalanced the controversy of that time, and strengthened the 
inclination to look for ―low cost‖ and ―high efficiency‖ patterns. More importantly, Deng‘s visit to 
the United States speeded up the pace of economic reform. He decided to establish ―China‘s 
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characteristic way of modernisation‖21 . To make use of international resources of western 
countries and to learn from foreign partners was regarded as a primary method to realise such a 
target
22
. After a series of discussions, policy- makers sent out the message that ownership was no 
longer a forbidden topic. The controversies finally led to the emergence of the TMFT policy as a 
national strategy of industrial development. The political change, the leading policy-makers‘ view 
about the market-oriented economy and relevant economic reform, the practical shortage of forex 
and the lack of satisfaction afforded by other patterns jointly engendered such an outcome. 
We must state that even with the prevalence of the TMFT policy, other patterns were still 
applicable. Nevertheless, without doubt, TMFT played the leading role in China‘s industrial 
development policy from the mid 1980s to 2004. 
4.3.2 Policy of “Trading Market for Technology” 
As a policy package with practical action plans, the TMFT policy was firstly put forth by 
policy-makers in the automobile industry, and stressed import substitution and technological 
catching-up together as strategic targets. 
In practice, a report to the State Council in 1983 submitted by Bin Rao
23
, namely the director of 
CNAJC (China National Automobile Joint Company)
24
 at that time, was broadly taken as the 
origin of TMFT thinking. The report advocated introducing foreign technologies by carrying out 
cooperative production not only in the automobile industry, but also in the entire industrial sector. 
The report took the acceleration of indigenous technological capability building and the import 
substitution as its targets. 
At the time, the Chinese domestic automobile industry was confronted with severe challenges. 
Since China began to open its market to western countries, the amount of imports was increasing 
at an unusually high rate. Particularly in the car sector, imports exceeded the entire production 
capacity of the domestic industry in a very short time (see Table 4.2). In 1985, the amount of 
imports was 20 times the domestic production capacity. 
Table 4.2 Tendency of cars imported in early half of 1980s (unit: set)  
                                                 
21 Documented in his speech in March 1979. 
22 Documented in his speech in Dec. 1979.  
23 Rao was the leading founder of FAW, SAW (now DongFeng), and the Shanghai–Volkswagen project. He acted as the 
director of Bureau of Automobile Industry and the Minister of No.1 MMI from 1979. Therefore, Rao was an influential 
person, physically and mentally for all machinery relevant industries in China.  
24 CNAJC was transferred from the automobile division of No.1 MMI, and acted as the practical administrative agent of 
the automobile industry at the ministerial level at that time. 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Cars imported 1401 1101 5806 21651 105775 
Cars imported / all vehicles imported 3.37% 6.85% 23.08% 24.40% 29.88% 
Cars imported / Cars produced domestically  40.87% 27.32% 96.03% 360.25% 2031.40% 
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Data source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2003, p26 
The fast growth of imports exposed the forex reserves to continuous pressure, and depressed the 
domestic production. Therefore, in his report, Rao, as practically principal officer of China‘s 
automobile industry at the ministerial level at that time, described that (Teng, 2003): 
“[I]n the past ten years, about 272 thousand sets of automobiles were imported… and the 
expense reached 11.2 billion RMB (the import expense for parts and components was not figured 
yet), which was 12 times the historical accumulated investment of FAW…” 
“(Therefore) we should combine the technology trade and product trade together, as well as 
stressing the future export capacity. China’s automobile industry should take the path of importing 
foreign advanced technologies and carrying out cooperative design and production...” 
   --Rao, Proposal for Stressing the Technology Trade in the Product Importation o
f Automotive Sector (Oct, 1983) 
Later, the thinking of Rao was intentionally stressed by SOE practitioners as ―introducing foreign 
investment and technology/product design, and increasing the manufacturing localisation of parts 
and components (Rao, ibid)‖, when they were criticized for not cultivating indigenous 
technological capabilities. However, the following speeches testified that the initial target of 
TMFT was to promote indigenous technological capability in addition to import substitution. In 
the ―National Planning Conference of the automotive industry‖ organised by CNAJC in the 
December of 1985, the vice premier of China at that time, namely Peng Li, insisted, ―[regarding 
the aims]…we should not keep producing car models designed by foreign partners. Our strategy 
should address importing foreign advanced technologies, building up in-house product designs and 
developing the indigenous automobile industry…‖ 
In the same conference, Rao outlined his thinking by discussing the specific case of Beijing-AMC, 
namely the first Sino-foreign productive JV in the car-making sector: ―I do not stress how many 
cars you can produce in a year, or how much profit you can earn. I care about how fast you can 
launch your own new car designs….I expect you to launch in-house new car models in 3 years…. It 
is the primary request I have.‖25 
Thus, the TMFT policy was indeed designed with double targets by its initiators, namely to realise 
the import substitution and efficient technological learning. For these purposes, the Chinese 
government took on the cost of rendering the domestic market share for potential foreign partners, 
in order to expedite the bilateral cooperation and the technology learning on the Chinese side.  
                                                 
25 The two speeches are provided by BoLe Teng (RAO‘s secretary in the 1980s) in a interview by the 21st Century 
Economic Report (2008-09-24, title: ZhongWai HeZi DiYiDan: ―ShiChang Huan JiShu‖ Shi ZheYang Bei YiWang De 
(The First Sino-foreign Productive JV: How original targets of TMFT were getting forgotten). 
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In fact, several Sino-foreign cooperative projects had already been under negotiation before 1983. 
Rao himself had already proposed to import a production line of automobiles and to cooperate 
with the foreign side in production in 1978. For this proposal, the negotiation of Chinese 
government with Volkswagen had begun from 1978, which finally led to the JV between SAIC 
and Volkswagen from 1985 on
26
. The Beijing (Beijing Auto) – AMC (United States) was the first 
JV project in the Chinese automobile industry. The relevant contract was signed in 1983. 
Meanwhile , the JV contract for Shanghai-Bell was signed in 1983 and was the first in the sectors 
related to electronics and telecommunication.  
For those policy-makers who were occupied in a controversy and looked for better patterns, Rao‘s 
idea of introducing foreign technologies by carrying out cooperative production was quickly 
accepted. Such a consensus speeded up the above negotiation processes of existing projects. Other 
ministries all followed this pattern so that to establish Sino-foreign JVs became widely 
encouraged in China‘s industrial community.  
In the automobile industry, 71 productive JV projects and 5 technical cooperation projects were 
signed during 1983-2000. Among these 76 projects, 58 introduced foreign technologies in the 
form of equipment, blueprints, licences and training. If counting in the projects concentrating on 
parts and components, 557 JVs had been established before the end of 1998. 
In the car-making sector, the backbone SOEs embodied a ―6+3‖ skeletal structure (see the 
following section 4.4.2.1). These SOEs were those supported by government in the central 
planning system, since policy-makers believed that large-scale production capacity was necessary 
for efficient technological learning. All of them had established JVs with MNCs except for HaFei 
Auto (see Table 4.3) 
Table 4.3 Sino-foreign JVs established by “6+3” SO Es in the car-making sector 
Note: * other than the JVs, there is no production line for passenger cars in the DongFeng Group 
                                                 
26 The contract was signed in 1984, and the JV was built in 1985.  
SOEs First partner Current partners (2009) 
FAW 1988 with Audi (CKD)  Volkswagen (JV, including Audi); Toyota (JV), 
Mazda (CKD), Daewoo (JV) 
DongFeng* 1992 with Citroën (JV) PSA (JV, including Citroën), Nissan (JV), Honda 
(JV), Kia (JV) 
SAIC 1983 with Volkswagen (CKD) Volkswagen (JV), GM (JV) 
Beijing 1983 with AMC (JV) DaimlerChrysler (JV, including AMC), 
Mercedes-Benz (JV), Hyundai (JV) 
Guangzhou 1985 with Peugeot (JV) Toyota (JV), Honda (JV) 
Tianjin** 1986 with DAFA (Japan) and 
Toyota (model procurement) 
Toyota (JV) 
ChangAn 1993 with Suzuki (JV) Suzuki (JV), Ford (JV), Mazda (CKD)  
ChangHe 1994 with Isuzu (JV)  Suzuki 
HaFei NA NA 
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now;*** Tianjin automobile was acquired by FAW in 2002 
Policy-makers in the telecom-equipment sector were also early advocators of TMFT thought. In 
discussing the proposal to set up the Shanghai-Bell, JinFu Zhang, a State Councillor representing 
the highest governmental authority in the development of this industry, gave guidance as follows: 
“(Our) strategy is to exchange the market for technologies. We should import, assimilate and 
absorb high technologies from foreign partners. The aim is to promote our design capability and 
manufacturing capacity….Cooperative efforts are the goal. Chinese and foreign experts should 
design and build each department of the JV together… Assimilation, absorption and re-innovation 
should be preserved continuously based on the imported technologies.” 
     --Zhang, Speech in the conference of ―The feasibility study of the Sino-Belgian 
cooperation of digital PDSS”, 198327 
In this sector, Sino-foreign JVs were also set up quickly, as shown in the following Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4. Sino-foreign JVs established by MOEs in the telecom-equipment sector 
Note: *the PDSS model imported at the very beginning 
It is worth noting that the TMFT policy was not elaborated by any formal official document until 
1993. However, it still became a popular and respectable political term. For the support from the 
highest authority and the in name of catching-up, it received active response from industrial 
ministries. The fast spread of TMFT practices could be testified by the share of FFEs in Chinese 
industries, which included the Sino-foreign JVs as the outcome of the TMFT policy
28
. Table 4.5 is 
based on the 3
rd
 national general investigation of industries, and it manifests the rapid growth of 
the significance of FFEs. By the end of 1995, 27 sectors were dominated by FFEs with over 60% 
market share. 
                                                 
27 In, page24, Wu, J. and G. Xi, Eds. (2008). GaiGe KaiFang ChuangXin: Shanghai BeiEr FaZhan Zhi Lu (Reforming, 
opening and Innovating: the pathway of Shanghai-Bell). Beijing, People's Press. 
28 Before 1993, TMFT was the only policy nominally encouraging the entity -relevant investment of FDI. 
PDSS 
Models* 
JVs 
Foreign 
nationality 
Chinese 
share 
Time of 
founding 
contracted production 
capacity (unit: lines/year) 
1240 Shanghai-Bell Belgium 54% 1984 2000,000 
F-150 Jiangsu-Fujitsu Japan 35% 1987 500,000 
DMS-100 Guangdong-Nortel Canada 60% 1988 1000,000 
NEAX-61 Tianjin-NEC Japan 60% 1989 1000,000 
EWSD Beijing international 
Germany 
(Siemens) 
60% 1990 1000,000 
AXE10 Nanjing-Ericsson Sweden 43% 1992 500,000 
5ESS Qingdao-Lucent United States 49% 1993 1000,000 
75 
 
Table 4.5 Industri es with over 30% market share occupied by FFEs (end of 1995 29) 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Note: there was no FFE with 100% foreign share in the car-making sector, which was ruled by industrial 
regulation 
4.3.3 Supportive policies  
In order to facilitate the TMFT practices, Chinese government implemented a series of favourable 
treatments, especially in the domains of taxation and import tariffs. These policies constructed the 
TMFT framework into a likely profitable business model to both the domestic and foreign sides 
so as to promote the attractiveness of the TMFT policy. 
(1) Favourable taxation treatment 
In 1991, the special tax treatment was offered to FFEs by the ―Income Tax Law of PRC for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises‖. After that, China tried to unify the 
income tax rate for all investment in the country by a bill named as the ―Provisional Income Tax 
Regulations‖ which was put into effect in 1994. The later was aimed to unify the nominal income 
tax for all enterprises to 33%. However, in order to attract FDI, the 1991 law was still applicable. 
Therefore, with all kind of incentive arrangements, the virtual income tax rate for FFEs was only 
11%-15%. Meanwhile, the virtual income tax rate for domestic investment was 23% in general. 
Nevertheless, for large SOEs, the rate was still kept above 30%. By counting in the residual taken 
away by the government, the practical tax rate for SOEs was much higher which in many cases 
could reach 55% (H. Zhang, 2004).  
In addition, there was a ―two-year exemption and three-year reduction by half‖ treatment granted 
to FFEs. It meant that those FFEs that satisfied certain requirements were entitled to tax 
exemption for the first two years of profit-making and reduction by 50% for the following three 
years. Import duties and VAT for machinery and equipment were also exempted for FFEs. 
Therefore, special tax treatment attracted foreign investors since by comparison with domestic 
investors and SOEs they apparently had advantage in terms of taxation. The situation was not 
changed until 2008, when a new ―Enterprise Income Tax Law” came to unify the nominal income 
tax rate for all firms to 25%, and to abolish both the 1991 law and 1994 law. 
                                                 
29 The year 1995 was a special year, since Group-B telecom-equipment firms would challenge incumbents soon through a 
price war of PDSS. And several Group-B car-making firms were also preparing to establish themselves.  
Share Amount of sectors Sectors 
30% -- 40% 50 minibus, motorcycle, , consumer chemical, etc. 
40% -- 50% 26 semiconductor, clothing, motorcycle, etc. 
50% -- 60% 30 telecom-equipment, electron device & component, etc. 
60% -- 27 cars, telecom terminal, computer, ICs, radio and recorder, etc. 
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(2) Favourable import tariff treatment 
Import tariffs were also adjusted to support Sino-foreign JVs. In the automobile industry, 
government lifted the import tariffs from 1985 for completed products and lowered those for 
components, which led to the popularity of the CKD and SKD (Semi-Knocked Down) production 
patterns in China from the mid 1980s. Table 4.2 and Table 4.7 demonstrate the effects of tariff 
adjustment and Table 4.6 exhibits the detailed tariff settings.  
Table 4.6 Import tariffs for the importation of cars  
Data source: Xia et al (2002) 
Meanwhile, by production localisation, the share of FFEs grew very fast. More and more 
backbone SOEs joined in manufacturing imported car models by setting up JVs with MNCs. The 
share of FEEs in Chinese car market exceeded 60% in 1995 (see Table 4.5), while the share of 
direct imports decreased to under 40%. In the last ten years, the share of imports was definitely 
lower than 10%, usually below 5%, even though the absolute quantity still increased as in 2008 
were 154,500 sets. 
Table 4.7 Imports of completed car in China 
Data source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook, various years 
The telecom-equipment sector was one of the industries that China had opened to international 
competition early. By doing so, policy-makers aimed to foster the building of telecom 
infrastructure, in pursuit of the relevant positive impact on the entire economy. For this reason, 
tariffs were kept low to promote the equipment imports. During 1980s -1990s, the import tariff 
was 12%, below that of most other imported products. As for deals entailing credits or loans from 
foreign governments or cross-country organisations, e.g. World Bank, Asia Development Bank, a 
special clause was offered to free the custom duties. 
The low level tariff and the fast growing demands made China a hot market for MNCs to sell their 
products to. In order to encourage inward technological transfer and manufacturing localisation, at 
the end of the 1980s, China implemented an ―infant industry protection‖ policy to protect the 
early stage Sino-foreign productive JVs against the dumping sales initiated by Japanese 
competitors. The protection policies included the special subsidies provided by the Chinese 
government for Group-A firms. As for import tariffs, a ―tariff free for the first two years and 
Year For integrated cars For components 
1985 From 120% -- 150% 60% 
1985.6 80% adjustment tax were added to the tariff above  
1986 180% - 220%  
1994 110% - 150% 50% - 80% 
1996 110% - 120% 35% - 60% 
Year 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1996 
Amount, set 105775 30536 45000 54409 181156 129196 57942 
Market share, % 95.3 59.4 75.1 57 60.5 37 14.3 
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deduction by half for the subsequent three years‖ treatment was offered for the component 
imports of productive JVs. Furthermore, in 1999, a bill named ―Interim Measures about Reducing 
and Exempting the Enterprise Income Tax for the Investment in Technological Renovation of 
Domestically Made Equipment‖ was announced. This bill approved a reduction of the newly 
added income tax by the amount equal to 40% of the corresponding investment. 
After 2001, China had to give up the above special treatments related to tariffs as response to the 
requirements of the WTO (World Trade Organisation). The import tariff of the automobile 
industry was cut down to 25% for integrated cars and 10% for components after 2001; as regards 
most telecom equipment products, the import tariff was almost zero. 
(3) Other favourable treatments 
Finally yet importantly, the Chinese government implemented a number of other favourable 
treatments in order to encourage SOEs to set up productive JVs with MNCs. Most of these 
treatments were based on case by case considerations and without any written rules to follow. 
However, these activities still shaped up some conventions.  
First, in order to increase the success ratio, the government was inclined to encourage excellently 
performing SOEs to be partners of MNCs. Therefore, backbone SOEs, or regional backbone 
SOEs were preferred candidates for governments. Further, the governments would also allow 
SOEs to peel off non-performing assets to set up new entities to attract foreign partners. Good 
human resources, factory buildings, valued equipment and best business lines were allocated to 
JVs. Retired, old and weak personnel, debts and backward business lines were kept in old entities. 
From another perspective, it in practice added to the extensive difficulties of SOEs after the mid 
1990s. 
For many cases, good-performing resources were not only collected from local SOEs, but also 
mobilised by industrial ministries or state owned industrial groups from other places or other 
divisions. For example, regarding the case of Shanghai-Volkswagen, the major Chinese entity was 
appointed as the Shanghai Auto that had the largest domestic car production line at that time
30
. 
Additionally, the entire automobile industrial community in Shanghai was mobilised to listen to 
the demands for building up this JV. Regarding the case of Shanghai-Bell, MPT sent notices to all 
its affiliated firms
31
, institutes and universities, and finally called on 150 S&T elites around its 
country-wide system to participate in the building of Shanghai-Bell. MPT even set up a bureau 
specially named the ―1240 Bureau” to activate resources and provide support.  
                                                 
30 The ―Shanghai‖ (―Phoenix‖ before 1964) model was produced by Shanghai Auto at that time with an output of 7000 
sets per year, which was a local design developed in the 1950s that targeted Benz-170. Its production was stopped in 1991, 
because the factory facilities and human forces were asked to transfer to the building of Shanghai-Volkswagen.  
31 At that time, MPT directly and indirectly supervised more than 100 factories and over 65,000 personnel.  
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The especially favourable treatment that happened more frequently was the direct allocation of 
resources at free or very low cost to the JVs. The rights of using lands were often offered at very 
low fees or even freely to the JVs during appointed time periods (usually in decades). 
Low-interest loans were offered by local banks under the coordination of government. The 
services of training personnel and constructing infrastructure (facilities for road, harbour, other 
public transportation, water, energy, living-care, etc.) were also generally offered by governments 
for important JV projects, in addition to the governmental purchases made to support the business 
of JVs. 
4.3.4 Summary 
The birth and prevalence of the TMFT policy did not come from pure theoretical discussion, but 
from policy controversies based on developmental practices. The shortage of forex, the (seeming) 
shortcomings of other patterns and the transition of ideology worked jointly to generate a policy 
change of introducing foreign technologies inwards. The policy-makers was looking after a more 
―efficient‖, ―low cost‖ and in fact highly packaged pattern of technological inward transfer. The 
TMFT emerged for its potential for bringing about something seemingly therapeutic, as follows: 
to set up JVs with MNCs that had advanced technologies
32
 on hand could make use of foreign 
capital and import advanced technologies; the cooperation based on high packaged technological 
transfer could bring advanced product models; the problems about complementary capabilities 
were expected to be solved by introducing international suppliers of MNCs or by establishing 
complementary JVs locally; to have foreign collaborators was expected to enable domestic firms 
to learn from foreign collaborators closely, and to replace Chinese ―backward‖ and rigid socialist 
corporate governance with advanced governance patterns. These expectations developed into the 
initial cognition of Group-A firms (see Table 4.8). 
The TMFT framework in practice was buttressed by a series of favourable policy treatments. 
These treatments built the TMFT policy into a profitable business model to both the domestic side 
and the foreign side. Many SOEs looked forward to be involved in it, especially when they met 
difficulties in facing market competition. Moreover, rapid expansion of production capacities of 
most Group-A firms after setting up JVs also made it seem to be an ―effective‖ model of 
―technological learning‖, and attracted more domestic followers to take the initiatives. For 
example, the negotiation to establish the FAW-Volkswagen JV was carried out spontaneously by 
the executives of FAW, which was not part of the plan of Chinese policy-makers at the time (Hahn, 
                                                 
32 During the transitional process, ―advanced technology‖ was an obscure concept for policy -makers because of their 
cognitive limitation. For their lack of experience in developing complex products and systems, mistakes were often made. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, ―importing outdated equipment/designs‖ was often found on newspaper and governmental 
documents as criticism. In the power-equipment sector, China had the major part of XiYi, the former largest instrument 
factory in Asia, to set up a JV with Yokogawa of Japan. Only after that, Yokogawa was found to have no specific product 
of the digital control system for electricity equipment as what Chinese had assumed. 
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2005).  
Table 4.8 Learning model of Group-A firms  
4.4 Emergence of Group-B firms 
The emergence of Group-B firms was the other side of the coin against TMFT framework. They 
grew independently from the orthodox governmental industrial administration -- none of them 
belonged to the governmental GuiKou management system to produce car or telecom- equipment 
before. In fact, the emergence or growth of Group-B firms was unexpected by the central planners. 
So Group-B firms were not supported by the government at least in their early stages. Relevantly, 
in their early stages, they were not welcomed by MNCs as TMFT partners too, since Group-B 
firms could not bring about those benefits for the JVs as mentioned above. For a long time, 
industrial policies had negative impacts on these new entrants since the policy-makers tried to 
protect the advantage of Group-A firms. That was to say, Group-B firms had to depend on 
themselves, which contributed to the shaping of their initial cognition and strategy. 
Compared with Group-A firms, Group-B firms carried out a different pattern of technological 
learning. Their learning was not implemented through establishing JVs with MNCs, but through 
in-house product development and industrialisation. Group-B firms did not rely on specific JV 
partners, but they also made use of technological resources globally. Group-B firms started their 
businesses under tough market competition, which was not only by foreign rivals but also 
domestic incumbents, including Group-A firms. 
4.4.1 Origins of Group-B firms 
4.4.1.1 Telecom-equipment sector 
Most of the telecom-equipment Group-B firms were established during the second half of 1980s 
and the first half of 1990s, as listed in Table 4.9. 
Target Technological learning and indigenous product development; import substitution  
Detailed pattern Having MNCs as partners and learning from them closely; following a bottom-up pathway 
Bus iness rewards Economic incentives provided by the government; fast expansion of production capacity 
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Table 4.9 Basic info on Group-B tel ecom-equipment firms  
Among Group-B firms, there were governmental elements in the establishment of DTT and GDT. 
But these two firms did not belong to the orthodox plan of government for the development of 
telecom-equipment industry.  
The DTT (Datang Telecom Tech.) was reconstructed from governmental research institutes and a 
section of the Academy of Telecoms Technologies division within the MPT system. Even today, 
DTT is still called the ―China Academy of Telecom Tech (CATT)‖. Meanwhile, it is also owned 
by the SASAC as one of the central government-owned firms. This arrangement is termed ―One 
institute two mandates (YiGe ShiTi LiangKuai PaiZi)‖. This means in a certain research institute 
two operational rules coexist with each other: one is academic and the other commercial (Gu and 
Lundvall, 2006, p302). It is a particular phenomenon for the transitional industrial S&T system in 
China. DTT can be regarded as a competitive industrial group, by which it has to be responsible 
for its own benefit-making. Meanwhile, CATT retains partial functions of a public institute. So it 
is continuously required to provide industrial technological services, for which limited 
governmental appropriation is offered. 
The GDT was a JV established by CIT
33
 and eight MOEs. As a company, GDT was built in 1995, 
but its core product and technology had been developed by CIT from the mid 1980s on. The 
HJD-04, namely its core product model, was launched in 1991, which was the first indigenous 
large-scale PDSS in China
34
. The PTIC (China Posts and Telecom Industrial Co) and the LTEP 
(Luoyang Telephone Equipment Plant)
35
 provided assistance in finance and experimental 
facilities during the development of HJD-04, and they set up an alliance with CIT to produce the 
HJD series before GDT was formally established. Hereafter, by referring to GDT in this thesis, 
we include both the alliance before 1995 and the industrial group after that. 
                                                 
33 CIT is a military S&T unit, namely the Centre of Information Tech. at Zhengzhou Institute of Information Engineering 
of the People‘s Liberation Army. 
34 In the contexts of China‘s telecom-equipment sector, switch was called as ―large scale‖ if it could provide more than 
10,000 lines of communication with one set of equipment. 
35 PTIC was the orthodox industrial group of MPT as equipment provider, and the supervising agent of affiliated MOEs. 
LTEP was an affiliated MOE to PTIC. 
Firm 
Est 
year 
First product model 
Ownership 
Start-up stage Current stage 
ZTE 1985 
Low-end analog 
switch 
Spin-off from a military 
SOE 
Listed, about 40% held by 
SOEs 
Huawe
i 
1988 
Low-end analog 
switch 
Private firm 
collectively-owned mainly; 
mixed-ownership 
DTT 1993 Large scale PDSS 
Reformed from 
governmental institutes 
Mixed-ownership, listed firm, 
dominated held by SASAC 
GDT 1995 Large scale PDSS 
JV by 8 MOEs and 1 
military institute 
Mixed-ownership, dominated 
by a SOE 
Xinwei 1995 
Technical standard of 
mobile telecom 
Mixed ownership; 44% held 
by DTT 
Ibid; ready to be listed 
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Besides the above two, Xinwei was jointly established by DTT and CWiLL (an American start-up 
firm held by a group of overseas Chinese scientists). As for Huawei and ZTE, detailed 
introduction will be made in the respective case studies. 
4.4.1.2 Car-making sector 
Table 4.10 Basic information on Group-B car-making firms 
No car-making Group-B firms were MOEs of the ministry in charge of the automobile industry. 
Chery and Geely represented over 100 new entrants entering this sector during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s that had no support or permission from the government prior to 2001. They were 
owned in different forms. The firms of this kind included the GreatWall, BYD, GoNow, 
ZhongTai, LiFan, etc. 
HaFei and ChangAn represented another group of firms. They were MOEs. Nevertheless, they 
were not affiliated to the ministry that exactly supervised the automobile industry
36
. These firms, 
including the YunQue, ChangHe, ChangFeng, etc., entered the automobile industry in the 1980s. 
Their entries were supported by industrial policies of encouraging the conversion of military 
technologies into civil products, which were made under the pressure of lowering the growth of 
military expenditures beginning in the early 1980s
37
. As an outcome of coordination at the 
ministerial level, these firms were allowed to produce marginal products in civil markets, mainly 
minibuses and mini-trucks.  
Brilliant was a representative of former SOEs held by the regional government. After two decades 
of reform, most of them were based on mixed-ownership. Before 2001, they had been licensed to 
produce automobile but with the exception of cars. Thus, before entering the car-making sector, 
they produced other automotive products, e.g. trucks, MPVs or specific-use vehicles. 
                                                 
36 HaFei was held by the MOAI while ChangAn was held by the Ministry of Weapon Industry. 
37 It was for the cease of direct contradiction between China and the capitalist camp by the end of the 1970s, and with 
USSR since 1984. After these changes, many military projects were given up, or their budgets were cut down. 
Firm 
Year 
founded 
First product model 
Ownership 
Start-up stage Current stage (2009) 
HaFei 1984 One design for minibus 
Newly established 
division of a SOE 
Incorporated with another SOE, 
listed  
Chery 1997 
One design for an 
engine, one design for a 
sedan 
SOE SOE, mixed held 
Geely 1997 
One design for 
hatchback 
Private company Private firm, listed 
Brilliant 1991 One design of MPV Mixed ownership  Mixed, listed 
ChangAn 1984 One design of minibus SOE 
Mixed, dominated by SOE,  
listed 
82 
 
4.4.2 Impact of national institutional change on strategies of Group-B firms 
Being different from its bottom-up reform of the agriculture sector, China‘s reform in the 
industrial sector mainly followed a top-down mode. The reform of the industrial system was led 
by policy- makers and society elites, although some industrial practitioners jumped the gun from 
time to time. Therefore, as to Group-B firms, legacies of central planning system brought them 
difficulties in their infancy since they were outsiders to the GuiKou Management system. 
Consequently, they were also not welcomed by MNCs as potential TMFT partners because they 
could not provide the benefits of the TMFT business model. The contextual conditions brought 
about the particular views of Group-B firms on technological learning patterns, and induced their 
strategy-making of learning.  
4.4.2.1 Car-making sector 
In the car-making sector, there were two licensing regulation systems, one for domestic firms and 
one for foreign investment, both of which placed Group-B firms in a disadvantageous position.  
(1) Regulation for domestic firms 
Before 2001, it was necessary for firms to get licence for every model of theirs, either imported or 
locally developed, before corresponding models were launched on the domestic market. It was 
called ―MuLu GuanLi‖ (Catalogue Management), since all newly approved models would be 
listed by regulators periodically in a catalogue. For example, in Shanghai-Volkswagen, there were 
9 licences for the ―Passat” series (data from April 2007) imported from Volkswagen. This was 
because there were technical dissimilarities with regard to important details (such as engines or 
gearboxes adopted) for these 9 versions of the ―Passat‖.  
Even though the licence regulation stressed product models, it in fact was a barrier to industry 
entry. Once firms had already been listed as automobile manufacturing firms, licence regulation 
for specific models was a technical inspection method. On the contrary, if firms were not accepted 
by regulators as automobile producers, they would be kept far from the catalogue in spite of 
anything in the technical dimension. Such a system was the legacy of the former command 
economy in industrial entry administration, by which policy-makers aimed to bring about national 
champions by providing them the market protection. 
Before 2001, only FAW, DongFeng, SAIC, Guangzhou Auto and Nanjing Auto were allowed to 
produce cars, i.e. the sedans, hatchbacks and estate cars. Among these five, the former three were 
called the ―Big Three‖ of the Chinese car-making sector, which implied their significance in the 
scheme of central planners; they were really the three largest automobile manufacturers of China 
during most of the past decades. Even today, they are still the core players in the Chinese 
automobile industry.  
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In addition to the five above, Beijing Auto was allowed to produce jeeps and pick-ups. Beijing 
Auto and the above five were owned by the ministry in charge of the automobile industry. 
Therefore, they were called the ―Six Bigs‖ in the car-making sector, referring to their orthodoxy 
within the industrial administration
38. By regulators before 2001, only the ―Six Bigs plus Three 
Minis” (6+3) were supported by the central government39. The ―Three Minis‖ were HaFei40, 
ChangAn and Tianjin Automobile, which were allowed to produce marginal passenger car 
products, namely mini-cars or mini-buses. The permissions were provided at the request of 
military division and regional governments in order to improve their economic situation.  
Table 4.11 Production licence system of the car-making sector (before 2001) 
Note: HaFei and ChangAn were licensed to produce mini-buses but not mini-cars; Tianjin Auto was 
licensed to produce mini-cars.  
The regulation system of production licensing was finally changed in 2001. The regulation 
examinations prior to production were removed, to be replaced with an authorisation system 
posterior to the product launch. This meant that firms could apply to regulators initiatively after 
2001. Product models would be authorised if passing the technical and investment requirements. 
This change gradually permitted a series of firms to enter the car-making sector, including all the 
Group-B firms in our study. 
(2) Regulation for foreign investments 
The regulation for foreign investments in the car-making sector remains even today. This can be 
summarised with two rules. Firstly, MNCs have to cooperate with Chinese firms if they want to 
establish productive firms in China; secondly, the maximum amount of productive JVs they can 
establish is two. For example, since Toyota had already built up productive JVs with Tianjin Auto 
and Guangzhou Auto, it could not establish a third one with FAW until FAW merged Tianjin Auto 
in 2002. 
The regulation regarding foreign investments was permitted as an extra clause of the agreement 
between China and the WTO. It was designed to protect the indigenous automobile industry and 
to oblige MNCs by concentrating on technological transfer – if it did exist in an effective way. It 
in fact gave advantages to backbone SOEs for their negotiations with MNCs, since MNCs only 
                                                 
38 In the era of command economy, Nanjing Auto, Guangzhou Auto and Beijing Auto were jointly owned by ministry and 
regional government.  
39 Actually, the structure of car sector kept evolving even under the central planning system, which represented the 
competition of industrial and policy resources among ministries, and between central and regional governments.  
40 In early days, HaFei and ChangHe used the same licence since they belonged to the same ministry. 
Products licensed (amount of firms) Firms 
General cars (5) ―Big Three‖: FAW, DongFeng and SAIC 
Others: Nanjing and Guangzhou 
Jeeps and Pick-ups (1) Beijing 
Mini-cars or Mini-buses (3) HaFei, ChangAn and Tianjin 
84 
 
had limited choices in number of local partners for both the limitation of regulation and the 
limited choices of competent candidates. Some backbone SOEs consequently had different JVs 
with more than one MNC. For example, FAW had JVs with Audi (Volkswagen), Volkswagen and 
Toyota, as well as non-entity cooperative production with Mazda (Ford); DongFeng had JVs with 
Citroën (PSA), Honda, Nissan (Renault), and Kia (Hyundai); SAIC has JVs with GM and 
Volkswagen; Guangzhou Auto has JVs with Toyota and Honda; and Beijing Auto has JVs with 
AMC (Chrysler), Chrysler, Daimler-Benz and Hyundai.  
Apparently, with such a regulation, MNCs would not choose Group-B firms as their local 
collaborators when Group-B firms were in their infancy and did not recieve the equitable 
treatment from the Chinese government. 
4.4.2.2 Telecom-equipment sector 
As mentioned, the telecom-equipment sector was one of the sectors opened to international 
competition early in the 1980s. Then the industrial regulation mainly focused on the technical 
dimension, and few other rules were set to prevent the entry of imported products or domestic 
providers. However, since the regulators, the SOE equipment providers and the telecom-operators 
all derived from the former MPT system, Group-A firms had the orthodox kinship with the 
regulators and telecom-operators. They had also been embedded in the existing mainstream value 
networks. All these apparently brought Group-B firms an advantage over newcomers. On the 
contrary, Group-B firms were difficult to win the favour from the regulators and 
telecom-operators in their early phase; they were regarded as outsiders. 
The case of HJD-04 illustrated the invisible barriers well. The HJD-04 was the first indigenous 
large-scale industrialised PDSS model in China with a significant technological contribution to 
the entire domestic or even the global industrial community at that time. It was developed by the 
CIT, an outsider to the MPT system. During the development of HJD-04, the PTIC and the LTEP 
offered assistance to the CIT
41
.  
However, even with the assistance of PTIC, MPT still denied the application of HJD-04 for the 
official technical approval in 1991, which was necessary for any equipment model to be installed 
on the Chinese telecom-network. The nominal reason that MPT gave was that CIT had not applied 
for an approval for this project beforehand, which was indeed just an administrative rule under 
reform. In fact, it was because, firstly, the officials and technical experts of MPT recognised the 
HJD-04 as ―computer system‖ rather than a telecom system in the mid-term official examination 
for the HJD-04 in 1989. Such an opinion in fact reflected the cognitive limitations of relevant 
                                                 
41 PTIC allocated 3 million RMB to CIT for its development of HJD-04. CIT itself invested 0.15 million RMB, which 
was borrowed from the Institute of Information Engineering of the People‘s Liberation Army  and was the total investment 
used by CIT to develop HJD-04 before getting the aid from PTIC. 
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examiners deeply rooted in an ideology grounded on the branch-based industrial ministry system. 
Ironically, even the PTIC, namely the major financial sponsor of this project, ever stopped its aids 
for CIT in 1988 for the same query. Secondly, even though PTIC was the orthodox industrial 
group of telecom-equipment affiliated to MPT, the PTIC was officially appointed to the 
manufacturing division, not the R&D division. Therefore, what PTIC did in fact crossed the 
red-line and violated the norm within the MPT system, which was certainly not welcomed. 
Thirdly, MPT felt unhappy that its industrial scheme was challenged by a domestic outsider. By 
1991, MPT had already had three Sino-foreign productive JVs established by MOEs under the 
TMFT framework. Meanwhile, the research division of MPT had already carried out several 
product development projects, including the DS-30 and the DS-2000 as key projects. Therefore, 
the emergence of HJD-04 actually became a challenge to MPT‘s learning schemes42.  
Finally, the problem between HJD-04 and MPT was solved only after the involvement of the top 
authority of the military and the Chairman of China
43
. These leaders took the HJD-04 as an 
important example of appropriating military technologies for civilian uses, which was a national 
theme of that period. MPT had to arrange a technical examination for HJD-04 by the end of 1991. 
Nevertheless, it still organised a very ―hostile‖ committee – major members of the committee 
were all potential rivals or victims of the HJD-04‘s potential success, namely people from the 
orthodox research divisions and from Sino-foreign JVs. Even after HJD-04 had proven to be a 
model advanced in technology and convenient for industrialisation, MPT still compelled two 
executive managers of PTIC to retire ahead of their normal schedules, as a punishment for their 
offence to the industrial ministry system.  
4.4.3 Summary 
In the early phases of Group-B firms, Chinese policy-makers had not regarded them as competent 
candidates to realise effective technological learning. They were excluded from the TMFT 
framework by both policy-makers and MNCs
44
. We summarise the reasons as follows: 
Firstly, as new entrants, Group-B firms had not the same market power as the incumbent SOEs.  
Secondly, Group-B firms were unable to obtain production licences in the car-making sector. As 
for the telecom-equipment sector, Group-B firms did not have close relationships with the 
                                                 
42 In fact, HJD-04‘s success did bring about disruption to the MPT system not only in terms of technology. After HJD-04 
was identified as a PDSS model with different but outstanding technical features, the R&D funds allocated from the SPC 
to the No.1 and No. 10 research institutes of MPT for the DS series projects were significantly decreased. So, it is not 
difficult to understand the hostile opinion of MPT regarding such a challenge as an ex post test. 
43 ShangKun Yang was the Chairman of China at that time. As a revolutionist before 1949, he had intimate relationship 
with the military. 
44 Before 2001, some Sino-foreign JVs had been built by military-background SOEs with MNCs. These SOEs were 
picked because of the limited choice of MNCs according to the regulation and because of the coordination of government. 
These JVs produced mini-bus, mini-car or MPV, according to licences they had. For example, ChangAn co-operated with 
Suzuki to produce small size hatchback (but in name of ―minibus‖ for the licence) from 1995 on.  
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industrial regulators, customers or even component suppliers. There were other policies 
discriminatory to these non-orthodox firms
45
. All of these made Group-B firms outsiders to the 
existing political-economic industrial value networks. 
Therefore, Group-B firms could not provide economic incentives to MNCs in the ways that 
Group-A firms did. Most of them did not get support from governments with incentive policy 
packages. Several of them were supported by regional governments, such as Chery, HaFei and 
DTT, but the packages even in case the regional governments would provide them were not 
attractive enough to MNCs compared with the prevalent TMFT framework. 
Only when Group-B firms had formally entered the corresponding sectors and proven their 
potential by market competitiveness, did MNCs make proposals to establish productive JVs with 
them
46
. 
Thereby, Group-B firms were induced to focus on in-house capability building if they wanted to 
develop systemic products. Throughout the independent development of products, they selected 
and built up their own organisational systems, which created fundamental differences between 
those of the Group-A firms. 
4.5 Industrial background: performance comparison 
In the past over two decades, Group-A firms have achieved the steady growth of production 
capacities. However, Group-B firms have begun challenging incumbents at a fast rate of growth. 
If considering the new product development, they shape a sharp contrast against the Group-A 
firms: Group-B firms act aggressively in developing new products while Group-A firms 
contribute little.  
4.5.1 Production capacity 
Many Group-A firms enjoyed a steady growth of production capacity under the TMFT framework. 
In the car-making sector, the production of cars equalled more than 600,000 sets in 2000, namely 
the year before new entrants were officially allowed, producing a sharp contrast with only 4,000 
sets in 1982, namely the year before the setup of the first Sino-foreign productive JV.  
Starting from 2005 and 2006 respectively, SAIC and FAW became listed in Fortune 500
47
, and 
                                                 
45 For example, in the car-making sector, Group-A firms could import sample cars or subsystems from overseas with very 
low duties and quickly in the name of ―sample products‖, whereas Group -B firms, since they were without official support, 
had to go through the procedure and pay as much as for consuming imports. 
46 For example, after ChangAn had already got the licence for car-making and presented good performance in mini-bus 
segment, it established a JV with Ford in 2001. The JV between Brilliant and BMW was set up in 2002 when Brilliant had 
accumulated comparative resources and competence in manufacturing MPVs. HaFei denied the proposals from 
Mitsubishi to establish JV twice. Chery denied the proposal from GM. GM suggested a JV when it found that the 
economic-compact models of Chery successfully overwhelmed its former Daewoo models in the Chinese market. 
47 FAW had not applied to be assessed by the Fortune before 2006. 
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ranked 373 and 303 in 2008. In general, Group-A firms had leading roles in the fast growing 
domestic market, by which the TMFT policy did realise its target for import substitution. Among 
the JVs set up by large MOEs, only the Guangzhou-Peugeot and Nanjing-Fiat ever met with 
fundamental failure. Peugeot quit the Guangzhou-Peugeot for the continuous financial loss, and 
sold its share at one Franc to the Chinese side in 1997. Feeling unsatisfactory with the 
performance, Fiat also quit the JV with Nanjing Auto in December 2007. Additionally, Fuji Heavy 
quit from the Fuji Heavy-GuizhouYunQue in 2002, but it was in the minicar segment. 
Figure 4.2 Evolution of the Chinese Car-making Industry  
 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2008) 
In the telecom-equipment sector, the TMFT policy led to the emergences of a series of ―star 
enterprises‖, including Nanjing-Ericsson, Beijing-International, and Qingdao-Lucent. 
Shanghai-Bell was the top one among them. From 2000 on, Shanghai-Bell became the largest 
provider of telecom switches in the whole world. In 2000, its new-sales of all kinds of switches 
were 10.79 million lines. Up until 2002, there had been 78 million lines of S1240 (the first 
product Shanghai-Bell imported from BTM) installed on the Chinese telecom network. It 
dominated the high-end market of PDSS (C1-C2
48
), with a market share of over 95%. 
On the other hand, as newcomers, Group-B firms realised even faster growth rates than Group-A 
                                                 
48 China‘s telecom network comprises C1-C5 layers, as a pyramid in quantity, but is reverse in unit price and significance. 
C1 is at the top, referring to the layer of national telecom exchangers. C2 is at the provincial layer.  
―War‖ imposed by 
new entrants 
Change of regulation 
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firms ever did. They started their business from serving market segments to which Group-A firms 
and foreign firms seldom paid attention. Gradually, they grew to attack the mainstream market.  
In the car-making sector, Group-B firms had been insistently promoting the striking expansion of 
the Chinese car market since 2001. They provided more choices of car models for customers by 
their capabilities of product development, especially for the low-priced or economic-compact cars. 
With the rapid growth of Group-B firms, and the competition introduced by them, China‘s 
automobile industry has been growing at a stunning speed since 2001. In 2009, the Chinese 
automobile production and market size went beyond those of the United States and Japan, ranking 
No.1 in the world by 13.8 and 13.6 million sets respectively. The fast expansion of the Chinese 
automobile industry should be due to the growth of Group-A firms, but particularly to the 
emergence of Group-B firms after 2001, which changed the industry totally (see table below). 
Table 4.12 Share of indigenous brands in domestic car-making market (2001-2008)  
Source: China Association of Automobile Manufacturers and HongYueXinSi Consultant. 
Note: The share is calculated by sets of cars. The statistics on “indigenous brands” include brands 
based on imported technologies, e.g. XiaLi and RedFlag. 
Among Group-B firms, Chery entered the list of top-10 car-makers in the Chinese domestic 
market from 2002 onward, namely from the second year it was officially allowed to enter this 
sector. Geely that occupied the Volvo in 2010 starting from 2005 and BYD from 2009 firmly held 
their positions in the top-10. The F3 model of BYD became the No.1 model as of October 2008 in 
terms of sales in the Chinese car market, which was sustained until the 1
st
 quarter of 2009. 
Besides, HaFei, Brilliant, and ChangAn
49
 were very competitive candidates for the top-10 in 
recent years; GreatWall, ZhongXing, GoNow and LiFan also grew rapidly.  
Besides, Group-B firms were no doubt the major force of car exports. Chery led the exports from 
2002 onwards. Its exports, by completed car, CKD and SKD kits, were 119,800 sets in 2007, 
occupying a significant share of the total Chinese automobile exports of that year at 590,000 sets, 
which included the statistics for the exports of cars, trucks and other civil vehicles. In 2008, its 
exports were about 140,000 sets. 
However, as regards the processing technologies, Group-A firms still had general advantages. For 
example, to finish the welding tasks for one car body-in-white in Guangzhou-Honda needed 45 
seconds on average. For Chery, to finish the welding tasks required 180 seconds for one Fulwin, 
180 seconds for one QQ, and 240 seconds for one Eastar; the best team of Chery could finish 
welding a car body in 130 seconds (data from 2006). But it was obviously less efficient by 
                                                 
49 A Sino-foreign JV of ChangAn‘s is in the top-10 in 2007 and 2008, namely ChangAn-Ford-Mazda. 
Year 2001 … 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (first half) 
Share <5% — 20.60% 24.67% 25.67% 26% 25.92% 45.32% 
sets   462,500 692,029 982,800 1,242,200 1,308,200 2,054,900 
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comparison with that of the Guangzhou-Honda. 
For the the telecom-equipment sector, Group-B firms had surpassed Group-A firms in general. In 
their early phases, the development of Group-B firms had lowered the prices of equipment 
significantly. Regarding the PDSS in the mainstream domestic market, the average price in the 
1980s was 1500–3000 RMB/line, which was cut to 600 RMB/line by the early 1990s. In the late 
1990s, the price of imported products was further depressed to 300-600 RMB/line. Indeed, 
confronted with the tough competition raised by indigenous firms, MNCs even had to implement 
dumping strategy to maintain their previous market advantage, especially for some initial 
instalment markets
50
. Fujitsu was notorious in the late 1990s for dumping its PDSS at the price of 
15-25 RMB/line. In spite of that, the share of indigenous PDSS products still rose steadily: it was 
10.6% in 1992, and went beyond 60% in 1998 after the price war of PDSS during 1995-1998. 
Table 4.13 demonstrates the domestic telecom-equipment firms included in the annual ―top-100 
ICT manufacturing firms of China‖. This table indicates the catching-up process of Group-B firms 
with their domestic competitors. Because of the rapid growth of Group-B firms, the market shares 
of many Group-A firms in the Chinese market had been squashed. Even for the global 
competition, according to the statistics of Dell‘Oro, in the first three quarters of 2009, Huawei had 
occupied 20% of the global market, ranked No.2 in the world only after Ericsson. ZTE occupied 5% 
of the global market in 2008. 
                                                 
50 The initial market is very important in the telecom equipment market, since providers can benefit from further 
procurement of customers based on the existing network. 
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Table 4.13 Rank of telecom-equipment firms in the “top-100 domestic ICT manufacturing firms list” of 
China (modified) 
Note: The numbers in brackets are the ranks of corresponding firms on the top-100 ICT firms list; the 
ranking is done annually by the government according to a synthesis calculation of business revenue 
and profits. The ranks of PTIC in 2006 and 2007 are calculated by the author since it denied to be 
evaluated by this list. The ranks of GDT before 1995 are calculated by the author; GDT had not been 
established as a company formally before 1995, but relevant SOEs in this table had been producing HJD 
series products developed by CIT. 
4.5.2 New product development 
In spite of the general production capacity growth of Group-A firms and Group-B firms, there is a 
sharp contrast in the domain of new product development between these two groups of firms.  
In the car-making sector, only DongFeng among Group-A firms had developed a systemic car 
model by 1996. That model was finally launched and produced at small scale only. By contrast, 
the frequency of new product launches of Group-B firms was maintained at high rates after 2001. 
In the telecom-equipment sector, there had been no new systemic product launched by Group-A 
firms during the past two decades. Many Group-A firms just continually imported product models 
from foreign partners. Only a few of them established the capabilities to provide network 
solutions for customers based on products they manufactured. For example, Shanghai-Bell and 
Nanjing-Ericsson were able to produce full series of products of landline telecom, 2G (second 
generation) and 3G (third generation) mobile systems, digital data transmission, etc. Worth 
mentioning technological development in Shanghai-Bell, as the top performing Group-A firm, 
were two product modules it developed locally in the 1990s. Some other JVs even continued to 
Year 
Group-A firms Group-B firms 
Sino-foreign JVs SOEs 
1986-1991 N/A N/A N/A 
1992 Shanghai-Bell [5] 
Beijing-Siemens [73] 
Hangzhou [36] (GDT) 
1995 Shanghai-Bell [7] 
Beijing-Siemens [33] 
Hangzhou [12] 
Shanghai [55] 
Nanjing [83] 
Shanghai Wireless [90] 
Luoyang [91] 
Chongqing [95] 
Huawei [26] 
(GDT) 
2000 Shanghai-Bell [12] 
Nanjing-Ericsson [13] 
Beijing-Siemens [32] 
PTIC [1] 
Guangzhou PT [79] 
Huawei [8] 
ZTE [22] 
DTT [36] 
JinPeng [61] 
2006 Alcatel-Shanghai-Bell [15] 
Nanjing-Ericsson [23] 
PTIC [13] Huawei [3] 
ZTE [11] 
WRI [58] 
DTT [91] 
2007 Alcatel-Shanghai-Bell [10] 
Nanjing-Ericsson [18] 
PTIC [21] 
Jiangxi [79] 
Huawei [1] 
ZTE [4] 
WRI [50] 
DTT [84] 
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produce the same products as they had been producing from the very beginning on.  
Group-B firms all demonstrate aggressiveness in new product development. Huawei and ZTE had 
developed their own full series of telecom products and key components that were generally 
produced by international frontier equipment providers. DTT and Xinwei had their capabilities in 
developing frontier technical systems. From 1998, they had developed the technical standards of a 
mobile telecom system that finally became the SCDMA and TD-SCDMA. Based on these 
technical standards, the full series of equipment had been developed, and industrial alliances were 
set up to shape the value networks. SCDMA was the first indigenous mobile telecom standard that 
had been developed with over 10 million installed lines. The R5 version of SCDMA, i.e. the 
McWill, with official support from Chinese government for its excellent technical performance,  
became a competitive rival for WiMax. TD-SCDMA had been considered as one of the ITU 
(International Telecommunication Union) standards for 3G mobile telecoms, and began mass 
commercialisation in 2008. By June 2010, the network of TD-SCDMA provided services for over 
10 million subscribers in China, and the scale continued to expand. 
The comparison between Group-A and Group-B firms with regard to new product development is 
demonstrated in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14 The performance of developing new products (before 2006)  
Group Firms 
No. of new 
systemic products 
developed 
Other products developed 
G-A car 
FAW 0 
3 car bodyworks partly remodelled based on imported 
models 
DongFeng 1 1 car bodywork partly remodelled based on imported model 
SAIC 0 
4 car bodyworks partly remodelled based on imported 
models 
G-A 
tele-eqm
t 
Shanghai-Bell 0 2 specific-purpose modules developed 
Jiangsu-Fujits
u 
0 NA 
G-B car 
Chery 7 Relevant core components and assemblies 
Geely 9 Relevant core components and assemblies 
HaFei 4 1 car model based on re-engineering of imported model 
G-B 
tele-eqm
t 
Huawei 
Full sets equipment 
for telecom 
relevant handsets, supportive technical standards 
ZTE 
Full sets equipment 
for telecom 
relevant handsets, supportive technical standards 
DTT 
TD-SCDMA 
standard; Full-set 
equipment 
relevant handsets, supportive technical standards 
Xinwei 
SCDMA standard 
(4 generations); 
Full-set equipment 
relevant handsets 
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4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, by briefly going through some key points of the Chinese reforms, we have aimed 
to give a picture of the sources, the learning patterns and the performances of the two groups of 
domestic firms that we study.  
The TMFT policy was generated to fulfil the expectations of the Chinese for a method of 
transferring technologies inward with high efficiency and low cost. The seeming weaknesses of 
other patterns of technology import, the financial status and the political change drove 
policy-makers to look for highly packaged technological transfer methods. The TMFT policy 
came as a solution, by having the backbone SOEs establish productive JVs with MNCs. Two 
targets were emphasized together, namely to realise import substitution and technological 
catching-up. 
Many backbone SOEs were involved in the TMFT policy. They followed this policy not only 
because they were influenced by industrial ministries, but also because the legacy of the central 
planning system brought them the poor experience in organising the development of complicated 
products. Particularly when Group-A firms perceived the apparent gap of technological 
capabilities between them and international giant firms, they felt unconfident in the face of 
international competition and felt hungry for assistance from the MNCs. 
A series of supportive policies was set up by Chinese central government to underpin the TMFT 
practices. Moreover, regional governments distorted the prices of critical factors to encourage the 
establishment of Sino-foreign JVs, including the use of land, the factory buildings, the human 
resources, the infrastructures and the soft loans. These supportive policies and special incentive 
packages provided by government in fact shaped TMFT into a likely profitable business model. 
The view of Group-A firms on learning and then their learning patterns were shaped during this 
course. The orthodoxy and the benefits from the expansion of production capacities convinced 
many industrial practitioners that the TMFT framework was an effective pattern. 
Concerning the impacts of TMFT policy that they received, the Group-B firms were the cases 
contrary to the Group-A firms. Group-B firms grew outside of the orthodox industrial system of 
central planning system. Their status of being newcomers and their lack of governmental support 
made them barely attractive to MNCs as TMFT collaborators. This induced some new indigenous 
firms to implement independent strategies of learning if they wanted to develop products in-house 
in spite of unfavourable external conditions. These firms became Group-B firms. 
Both Group-A firms and Group-B firms had achieved significant growth of production capacity. 
As incumbents of Chinese industries, Group-A firms continued leading the industries before they 
were confronted with challenges from new entrants. Some Group-B firms had realised even faster 
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growth rates, and came to challenge or surpassed the incumbents. Moreover, they demonstrated 
aggressive performances in developing new products, which established their market success, and 
overwhelmed the progress of Group-A firms in terms of product technologies. 
Returning to our theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, this sharp difference between these two 
groups of firms in technological capability building cannot be explained by resource-based 
elements, e.g. the governmental support, the human resources, the financial status, the foreign 
partners, the equipment and production methods and even the market shares in their early phases. 
It is imperative for us to explore the difference of their learning patterns and find out where their 
differences of technological learning reside. 
94 
 
Chapter 5. Comparison: developmental activities and strategic intent 
5.1 Introduction 
From this chapter, our focus is on the comparison of learning patterns between these two groups 
of firms. We aim to explore the black-boxes of their organisations. Certainly, not all organisational 
dimensions can be analysed in this thesis. What we do is to highlight the important features that 
possibly result in the differences of their technological learning performances. The major 
theoretical concern is whether the organisational system plays a significant role in the process of 
technological learning. 
In order to explore the relations between the organisational system and the process of 
technological learning, we adopt the concept of ―product development platform‖ to frame our 
empirical studies. According to F. Lu (2007), the product development platform is a dynamic 
system that comprises R&D teams, product sequences, technical support systems, and experience 
and knowledge that take product development as their major purpose. Similarly, Fleck (2000) 
suggests that the platform is the coupling of product and activity; and Helfat and Raubitschek 
(2000) postulate that the development of the product development platform involves a 
co-evolution of knowledge, capabilities and products. In this thesis, three elements are included in 
the ―product development platform‖, as follows. (i) The organisation works as the carrier of 
technologies and as the developer of products through organising and executing a continuity of 
developmental activities, and the organisation also embeds the relevant organisational knowledge 
of organising and executing correspondingly. (ii) The technology is the medium for the 
exploitation of capabilities of organisations, and is also the materialised knowledge to be used or 
outsourced to create the product. (iii) The product embodies in logical requirements and physical 
vehicles for the interaction between organisation and technology, and is also the economic output 
of this platform. Besides, the interactions of all these elements are taking place on a continuity of 
developmental activities. 
In this thesis, the term ―platform‖ is also adopted for ―product platform‖, particularly for the 
analysis of the car-making sector. The ―product platform‖ refers to a comparatively stable system 
to underpin a product family. The stable system consists of a series of subsystems, including the 
frame of the car, engine, transmission, suspension, driveshaft, differential, etc. Within a product 
platform, the architecture and designing logics for integrating these subsystems are kept stable, 
which does not deny incremental changes or multiple choices of each subsystem. For upgrading 
the product generations, the product platform can be changed as a whole. However, the changes of 
each subsystem would follow some designing principles that characterise the product family. 
Front-line practitioners in the automobile industry usually use the term ―chassis‖ in a broad sense 
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when referring to the product platform.  
In our research, we take the ―product platform‖ as a coupling of product and corresponding 
technological requirements. In other words, it is the materialised object of the ―product 
development platform‖. 
The product platform is an expensive target to develop in terms of both financial cost and time 
consumed. It is also difficult to learn from external sources, since it embodies the logics of 
integrating of multiple subsystems, relevant technical skills and trade-offs to realise the building 
of system. For the complexity of these relations, some design logics are not demonstrated in 
blueprints, and hardly possible for learners to reproduce in an exact way through reverse- 
engineering. These invisible logics include at least two kinds: the trade-off among different 
subsystems and the impact assessment of component diversification at system level. We 
emphasize these because the term ―product platform‖ is often used by industrial practitioners to 
measure the depth of technological exploration. Usually, the practitioners in the Chinese 
automobile industry classify the product development activities into five categories: (i) adjusting 
parts and decorations, (ii) adjusting the interior accessories, exterior accessories and bodyworks, 
(iii) developing new bodyworks, (iv) upgrading subsystems of chassis and (v) developing new 
platforms. Only the latter two entail substantial knowledge about product platforms. In our study, 
as regards the lack of in-house systemic product development activities, Group-A firms do not 
own product platforms although they can buy chassis subsystems or particular models from 
overseas. By contrast, Group-B firms are continuously investing in building up their product 
platforms. 
Another term we will use as a core concept in this thesis is the ―organisational learning system‖ or 
―organisational system‖, as defined in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.1.2). It is the organisational 
dimension of the product development platform. By comparison with the orthodox governance 
issues, namely structure, control and process, we have resource allocation and application at 
centre stage to study technological learning. In DCs, the shaping of resource allocation and 
application pattern is also an evolutionary process comprising learning, selecting and building 
essences. Therefore, we highlight ―strategic intent‖ and relevantly the ―authority over resource 
allocation‖ to study the organisational structure, resource control and allocation. We adopt the 
concept of ―institutional arrangements of organisational mobilisation and learning integration‖ to 
study organisational control and application of resources for learning. The ―facilities and 
institutions for knowledge accumulation‖ are explored from the knowledge side to examine the 
connections between consuming resource and obtaining knowledge, and examine the connections 
between the individual and the collective in generating, accumulating and sharing knowledge. 
In the following two chapters, we will compare the organisational learning systems of these two 
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groups of firms. In this chapter, the focus is the developmental activities that provide the 
empirical foundation for analysing, and the strategic intent.  
As mentioned, the TMFT policy had the target of building indigenous technological capabilities 
as well as import substitution. However, such a target of capability-building had not been really 
insisted on by Group-A firms in the long run. Even though the decision-makers of Group-A firms 
had not altered their long-term ambitions intentionally, they never implemented a full set of 
in-house product development activities for generating systemic understanding of products and 
relevant complex technologies. Rather, they stressed imitating the predetermined blueprints from 
their foreign partners. Multiple factors will be quoted for their deviation from original intent. 
Even without direct measurement of strategic intent, we still can state, according to their 
decade-long activities, that Group-A firms had been captured by the business model based merely 
on the extension of production capacity, and had been dependent on imported technologies. By 
contrast, Group-B firms insisted on their intent of indigenous product development, and their 
commercial successes did prove this strategy was feasible and sustainable. Even though Group-B 
firms also made use of foreign technologies, they had gradually built up complete sets of 
developmental activities, which were taken as the core of their product development platform and 
to support their knowledge acquisition from various sources. 
5.2 Strategic intent and developmental activities of Group-A firms 
As previously mentioned, along with the Chinese reform, SOEs gradually obtained managerial 
autonomy. The autonomy for operational management came first, and then the autonomy for 
general strategy making. However, Group-A firms were still inclined to listen to industrial 
ministries. The reasons were multi-fold. In addition to the ownership linkage, the lack of 
experience in independently carrying out the development of complex products and technologies 
was essential. The lack of experience and then confidence was also mirrored in their cooperation 
with MNCs: relying on experienced foreign partners apparently sounded conservative and safe for 
them, especially when facing the uncertainty of learning under tough market competition.  
The attainment of managerial autonomy and the cooperation with MNCs had not automatically 
brought about effective learning for product technologies. As for those previous indigenous 
product platforms of corresponding SOEs
51
 before they set up JVs with MNCs, most of these 
platforms had been abandoned or marginalised with their TMFT practice; and new product 
platforms had not been established. Only a very few exceptions were found in the five industries 
                                                 
51 For examples, before they set up JVs with MNCs, FAW had the RedFlag platform; Beijing Auto had the BJ212 
platform; and SAIC had the Shanghai platform. 
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we ever investigated
52
. 
The lack of product development activities uprooted capability building for in-house product 
development. Such a situation also gradually removed the long-term intent of Group-A firms 
towards indigenous technological capability building. Finally, Group-A firms were captured by 
the profit-making based on the extension of production capacity. 
5.2.1 Governmental impacts 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, there were two expectations that the Chinese government had on 
the TMFT practices of Group-A firms, namely to have foreign partners and learn from them 
closely, and to follow a bottom-up learning pattern.  
Besides, in the early phase of TMFT practices, it was the government that worked as the 
commander to mobilise high quality state-owned assets to set up Sino-foreign productive JVs. 
Therefore, there was no possibility for relevant SOEs being ignorant of the original targets of the 
policy-makers about this policy, namely to realise indigenous capability building as well as import 
substitution. However, the government also had little knowledge about how to realise this target in 
practice. Hence, the governmental impacts on the TMFT practices must be studied through policy 
practices in addition to their slogans and macro guidelines.  
In practice, to localise the production became the primary mission that policy-makers stressed for 
SOEs involved in the TMFT framework. In the early 2000s, even after the target of import 
substitution had been largely achieved in many industries, production localisation was still 
underlined as a first-place task. The inclination can be interpreted mainly by two points. 
Firstly, policy-makers, with the indoctrination of foreign firms and economists, worshipped 
economies of scale. In the automobile industry, policy-makers even pointed out articulately that 
the production capacity of 300,000 set/year was a basic line for the survival of a single automobile 
maker, which was partly extended from the viewpoint of Maxcy and Silberston (1959). As the 
advanced indigenous product models were absent, the localisation of production of imported 
product models was seemingly the necessity for realising the economies of scale. 
Secondly, policy-makers broadly had a linear bottom-up model of technological learning in their 
mindset (Lu and Feng, 2005). By this model, the importation of foreign product models was 
                                                 
52 Shanghai-Mitsubishi Elevator (SMEC) is a positive example that became independent again through a contest of 
corporate control against Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi had already moved away from the governance and technological learning 
of this JV, i.e. Mitsubishi had stopped providing any new product models for SMEC. But with its own technological 
learning and in-house product development, SMEC remain a top domestic equipment provider, and is sustainably 
competitive with reference to international giants in the Chinese market. In the car-making sector, ChangAn and Brilliant 
have kept investing intensively in technological learning in their subsidiaries stressing in-house product development 
although they also have Sino-foreign JVs. But both these two established JVs quite late compared with other backbone 
SOES involved in TMFT, and they had already built up strong in-house product development lines in relevant fields 
before setting up JVs.  
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expected to bring about relevant technologies. Then the production localisation, including that of 
components and end-products, could improve local knowledge about relevant technologies; 
finally, the knowledge accumulation through production localisation could lead to the growth of 
indigenous technological capability. In the ―Outline of National Industrial Policy in 1990s‖ of 
China announced in 1994, this model was summarised as ―import – assimilation – absorption‖.  
Figure 5.1 Linear bottom -up model of technological learning 
importing advanced 
product models
localizing the component 
production and assembly
indigenous development 
capability
 
Source: F. Lu and Feng, 2005, p24 
Therefore, production localisation was regarded as not only the key to commercial survival, but 
also a primary and necessary step for effective technological learning. As for key projects, the 
process of production localisation even became the issue of the whole Chinese society. In 1988, 
RongJi Zhu
53
 even required the SAIC to promise that the localisation rate of the production of 
―Santana‖ (the first imported model of Shanghai-Volkswagen) would reach 25% by 1988 and 50% 
by 1989. Based on the original JV contract, Chinese government expected it to be 80% in 1991, 
namely in 7 years after setting up the JV. This situation was general for Group-A firms in different 
industries. In its early phase, Shanghai-Bell was expected to actualise 20% of production 
localisation soon after the foundation and 70% by 1993 (X.Shen, 1999, p91).  
On the other hand, Group-A firms were also eager to speed up the localisation of production 
because it was closely connected to their capacity for profit making. Before 1989, Shanghai-Bell 
stayed in deficit all the time. One important reason was the low rate of component localisation 
that the cost in sum of imported components they used was even higher than the price of the same 
product imported in a completely assembled manner. Thus, to increase the production localisation, 
and to make use of the domestic human resources and other economic factors to lower the cost 
was a common urgent task for Group-A firms. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present examples of the 
progress of production localisation.  
Table 5.1 Production localisation rate of components of Santana (Shanghai-Volkswagen) 
Source: collected from documents 
                                                 
53 ZHU was the Mayor of Shanghai in 1988-1991, the Vice Primer in charge of economy in 1993-1998, and the Primer in 
1998 -2003, who was a major executor of the SOE reform and TMFT framework at that country level. 
Year 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 2000 
Production localisation rate, % NA 2.7 12.6 30.6 60 70 92 
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Table 5.2 Localisation rate of components of PDSS (Group-A firms, 1997) 
Source: Zhang (2003) 
5.2.2 Financial concerns 
For Group-A firms, financial tensions were common in their early phases. There were two reasons: 
firstly, they did not have extensive financial resources before TMFT. The small scale of domestic 
industries led to the limited financial capability. As we know, the shortage of finances actually 
was a substantial reason for the Chinese to invent the TMFT policy; secondly, to produce 
imported models by setting up JVs with MNCs was still expensive.  
Even though the TMFT framework included MNCs as shareholders, technology transfer was still 
costly. Taking the car-making sector as an instance, it costs hundreds of million of USD for 
importing each car model from overseas
54
, although the specific price of each project varied. 
Besides, the deal of production permission for car models was usually bound with agreement of 
the production royalties, the procurement of equipment, and the deal for importing CKD 
assemblies and components. The bound agreements could pile up more financial costs. For 
example, when FAW-Volkswagen was set up to import the Jetta-A2 model, a manufacturing line 
of Volkswagen‘s in Westmoreland (Pennsylvania, U.S.) was disassembled and moved to China. 
For the Jetta-A2 model and the equipment, the Chinese side had to pay Volkswagen 11.13 billion 
RMB. It is worth mentioning that Volkswagen in its global mainstream market was abandoning 
the Jetta-A2 model
55
 so that the factory in Westmoreland had been retired early in 1988
56
. Table 
5.3 lists the initial expenditures for the model imports and relevant equipment procurement from 
foreign partners of Group-A firms
57
. We also demonstrate the initial financial capacity that 
Group-B firms had at establishment to show the contrast and prove how expensive the TMFT 
could be. 
                                                 
54 In most cases, what the JV obtained through paying this fee was only the production permission of corresponding 
models, i.e. Sino-foreign JVs did not have the IPRs of relevant models. Except for special statement all terms relevant to 
the importation of product models in this thesis refers to this interpretation here. 
55 Jetta-A2 was officially replaced by Jetta-A3 in 1992 by Volkswagen for its global mainstream market.  
56 This manufacturing line was established to produce the Golf before. In the whole deal of FAW-Volkswagen cooperation, 
it was priced at 25 million USD. But it was made with additional conditions: the Chinese side had to import 14,500 sets of 
Audi-100 CKD kits by the price in 1987.  
57 The equipment procured from foreign partners did not fulfil certainly the basic needs for production. In many cases, in 
order to save money, SOEs would not import the full set of machines.  
Firm Shanghai-
Bell 
Beijing-  
international 
Tianjin 
-NEC 
Guangdong
-Nortel 
Qingdao- 
Lucent 
JiangSu-
Fujitsu 
Nanjing- 
Ericsson 
Rate 70% 60% 50% About 50% About 50% 40% 25% 
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Table 5.3 Initial expenditures of Group-A and B firms (unit: billion RMB) 
Note: The “c.p.”refers to Current Price of foreign exchanges.  
In addition to the initial expenditure for model imports and equipment procurement, JVs still had 
to raise funds for CKD component imports, other equipment imports, training personnel in the 
foreign side, technical consultancy, technical certifications, and once again, all the similar fees for 
importing the subsystem and component designs and realising the localisation of production. 
Therefore, although the fee for technical transfer was only one of the major expenditures that 
were presented clearly in most main JV contracts, the total practical expenditures for completing 
the physical construction of production localisation were usually several times more than the fee 
for technical transfer. Take the CKD imports as an example. Shanghai-Volkswagen planed to 
produce 89,000 sets of Santana by importing almost full set of CKD kits before it realised 60% of 
the localisation. For the CKD imports of each set, Shanghai-Volkswagen had to pay 10,000 USD 
to the Volkswagen side. So for the CKD kits alone during this period, it had to pay 0.89 billion 
USD which was more than half of the initial fee for technical transfer and partial equipment 
imports. Indeed, when the 60% target was achieved in 1990, the real imports of CKD kits had 
exceeded 89,000 sets. This did not mean Shanghai-Volkswagen stopped importing assemblies and 
components from the overseas Volkswagen network, but this just meant that the JV stopped 
buying almost full set CKD kits to produce this model. For all relevant expenditures (see Table 
                                                 
58 Group-B firms announced more capital than they in fact had, because there was still floor requirements of financial 
capacity that was enacted by the industrial regulator.  
Group-A Firms Initial expenditures for 
importing models & 
equipment 
Note 
Shanghai-  
Volkswagen 
3.58 
(=1.54, in USD, c.p.) 
In 1984. The expenditure was for importing the Santana model 
and some production equipment (not including supply chain) 
FAW- 
Volkswagen 
11.13 
(=2.09, in USD, c.p.) 
In 1991. The expenditure was for importing the Jetta-2 model 
and some production equipment (not including supply chain) 
DongFeng- 
Citroën 
13 
(=2.36, in USD, c.p.) 
In 1992. The expenditure was for importing the Citroën-ZX 
model and some production equipment (not including supply 
chain) 
Group-B Firms Registered capital
58
 Note 
Chery 1.75 (in fact, 0.7-0.8)  
(=0.21/0.08-0.10 in 
USD, c.p.) 
In 1997. The real fund Chery had was less, only about 0.7-0.8 
billion. The expenditure was for the first-stage construction of 
infrastructures (manufacturing lines, R&D laboratories, etc.) 
and the development of the first car model. 
Geely 0.5 (in fact, 0.1) 
(=0.06/0.01, in USD, 
c.p.) 
In 1997. The real fund Geely had was less, only about 0.1 
billion. The expenditure was for the first-stage construction of 
infrastructures (manufacturing lines, R&D laboratories, etc.) 
and the development of the first industrialised car model. 
HaFei 0.9 (not registered 
capital)  
(=0.11 in USD, c.p.) 
In 2002. The expenditure was for the third-stage construction of 
its infrastructures (manufacturing lines, R&D laboratories, 
etc.), which were set up for its first car model and other two 
vehicle models and for the development of the first car model. 
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5.4), most of them went to the foreign partners and their global value network. Therefore, for the 
MNCs, these incomes were steady. Even though Sino-foreign JVs could meet the deficit, but only 
if the JVs did not encounter serious difficulties and ceased normal production, benefits for MNCs 
could be guaranteed through components trades, technical services, production royalties, etc. 
These business activities, demonstrating as inputs of Sino-foreign JVs, also brought in significant 
incomes to MNCs. 
Table 5.4 Fees paid to foreign partners for establishing Sino -foreign JVs under the TMFT policy 
Therefore, reconsider the controversy among policy-makers about patterns of introducing foreign 
technologies in the early 1980s. Even though the TMFT policy could introduce MNCs as 
stakeholders and bring about high-packaged technological transfer, its industrial practices were 
still costly, which was beyond the expectation of Chinese participants. However, as too huge 
expenditures had been made step-by-step, relevant people in charge had to keep silent, but just 
hope for good outcomes. Among these expenditures, the central government and regional 
governments provided quite a lot. Regarding the 7
th
 - 8
th
 FYP (during 1986-1995), about 18 billion 
USD from the state revenues were appropriated for the establishment of JVs between the 
backbone SOEs with MNCs, without mentioning that from regional governments. Hence, there 
were multiple domestic stakeholders looking forward to get repaid through rapid development of 
Group-A firms, including (i) the government that expected to be repaid through crowding-in and 
multiplier effects of the investment, and via the tax revenues, (ii) relevant local banks which had 
been coordinated by government to credit Group-A firms with preferential treatment, (iii) local 
allied or affiliated supportive firms that had made complementary investments, and (iv) 
employees who in general were eager for stable improvement of welfare compared with the 
difficulties of SOEs in the 1980s and 1990s. These stakeholders inevitably had the voice in the 
decision-making of Group-A firms. Under such pressures, Group-A firms, unless they were 
extraordinarily risk-oriented, would be inclined to do their best to shorten the period of cost- 
Item Note 
Technical transfer fee For the permissions and the blueprints for localised production 
Technical Royalty 
For each product (subsystem) produced with IPRs (Intellectual Property 
Rights) of foreign partners 
KD imports For importing the CKD/SKD kits  
Equipment & instruments For importing relevant equipment and instruments 
Training For personnel training to ensure the proper manipulation of equipment  
Technical consultancy For employing foreign experts to help settle technical problems 
Technical certifications 
For technical certification: every technical/production segment of JVs 
must achieve the certification of its foreign parent firm, since the latter 
retains possession of the brand and (or) design. 
Commissions 
For the production licence (technologies or brands): usually 4.5-6% in the 
car sector, and 2-6% in the telecom-equipment sector 
Transfer fee for subsystems 
& components 
For firms to produce locally the sub-systems or components of the 
imported designs: all the fees above 
Others For many other items we have not investigated 
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recovery. For this purpose, to promote the localisation of production was critical as an urgent and 
comparatively reliable strategy. By contrast, any other kinds of capability explorations were 
certainly placed inferior during this course. 
On the other hand, the financial concern had become broadly adopted nominal excuses of 
Group-A firms to rationalise the absence of their indigenous product platform development. 
Nevertheless, this could be regarded as only excuse. As can be seen from Table 5.3, compared 
with Group-A firms, the financial status of Group-B firms in their starting-up phases could be 
regarded as barren but they still successfully began product development from their early phases. 
Therefore, the financial deficiencies in early phases were not necessary to keep Group-A firms 
away from product development and technical exploration. However when Group-A firms 
believed there were other better ways or aimed to avoid the uncertainty of technological learning, 
financial shortage became very good excuses for them to validate their choices. Worse was the 
fact that financial difficulties were temporary situations for most Group-A firms
59
, but their 
strategies and behaviour, which made the development of products and complex technologies to 
the inferior significance, were gradually embedded in their organisational cultures and traditions. 
Therefore, it was not difficult to understand that FAW abandoned the existing RedFlag platform in 
1994. The cases of Shanghai-Bell below demonstrates exactly how the decisions for short-term 
trade-offs gradually led to the change of foundations of organisation. 
TextBox 5.1 Two controversies within Shanghai-Bell 
In 1988, Shanghai-Bell developed a RASM (remote autonomous switching module) to optimize 
the application of S1240 based on the demand characters of the Chinese market. After the launch 
of RASM, an internal controversy occurred. A group of old engineers, who had product 
development experience before joining Shanghai-Bell, insisted on carrying out further technical 
exploration since they took this as a good starting point to deepen the knowledge base for 
Shanghai-Bell. On the contrary, a group of young engineers, who were college graduates before 
entering Shanghai-Bell, criticised this proposal as the legacy of the command economy, namely 
investing in basic research without considering economic efficiency. They argued that 
Shanghai-Bell should make use of the technical resources of Bell Global, and only respond to 
visible market demands. 
The executives supported the opinion of the young engineers. The old engineers were solaced by a 
promise that Shanghai-Bell would invest more in technical exploration when its financial status 
became better in the future
60
. Another similar controversy happened in 1992 after developing a 
                                                 
59 Shanghai-Bell gained profits in the financial sheet from 1988 on, after 4 years of the TMFT practice, FAW-Volkswagen 
from 1995, also in 4 years. 
60 The year 1988 was the first that Shanghai-Bell achieved financial profits. Before that, Shanghai-Bell was in deficit.  
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CuAE (customer application engineering) software package
61
. The executives made the same 
decision with the same excuse, although the financial status had improved significantly. In fact, 
the decisions were made only for handling the temporary situations at those moments. Executives 
did not intend to remove the long-term intent to carry out in-depth technological learning in the 
organisation. However, the results did change the cultures and visions among first-line engineers, 
that indigenous technical exploration became an undesirable topic to discuss. Similar spontaneous 
controversies have not happened ever since. 
During 1989-2001, Shanghai-Bell did not stay in deficit. Its production capacity grew fast to 15 
times the designing capacity of 1995; it even became the No.1 PDSS maker of the world in 2001 
with 17,000,000 lines of PDSS output. Along with the growth of production capacity, the retained 
profits increased. It had 1.16 billion RMB in 1994. However, there was no spontaneous 
controversy among front-line engineers about indigenous technical exploration after 1992. Even 
though during most of the 1990s Shanghai-Bell kept investing 5%-7% of sales in R&D, the firm 
had not developed effective mechanism and the organisational members had not been effectively 
mobilised to carry out in-depth technical exploration or product development. Hence, before 2001, 
only one patent had been developed by Shanghai-Bell, which was the RASM model mentioned in 
the first internal controversy (see Textbox 5.1). And it was exactly because of the absence of 
in-house product development capabilities, the dominance of Shanghai-Bell had to be traded over 
to the foreign side (by holding 50%+1 stock share) in 2001, because the Chinese side had no 
bargaining power considering the continual dependency on imported product designs. 
5.2.3 Negative attitude of foreign partners 
Regarding the foreign side, the attractiveness of the TMFT framework originated from the 
favourable treatments provided by the Chinese government, the potential of the Chinese market 
and the low productive cost, so that MNCs had consensus with the Chinese side to enlarge the 
production capacity rapidly. However, MNCs displayed different attitude with the Chinese side on 
developing technological capabilities of JVs locally beyond just being manufacturing and local 
marketing bases, since they did not want to raise any potential competitor against themselves. 
Compared with the inexperienced Chinese government and SOEs under the new circumstances, 
most MNCs did have roadmaps to protect their benefits in the TMFT framework. 
(1) Attitudes 
During 1980s-1990s, most MNCs were firmly negative about the product exports of Sino-foreign 
                                                 
61 CuAE is one software package at the application layer, which is designed to generate specific customer application 
software upon the corresponding customer demands. The CuAE developed by Shanghai-Bell was so successful that some 
other subsidiaries of BTM worldwide also bought it from Shanghai-Bell.  
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JVs under the TMFT framework even though exportation had been formulated in original JV 
contracts in many cases
62
. 
The statement of the Belgian General Manager of Shanghai-Bell in 1993 identified this attitude 
clearly: ―It is common knowledge that, through technology transfer, the technology supplier wants 
to create markets rather than create competitors… if Shanghai-Bell attempts to export, the process 
of technology transfer will be slowed down on the Alcatel side. Obviously, Alcatel doesn’t want to 
have a rival who is as strong as itself in technology” (X. Shen, 1999, p82). In such circumstances, 
the exports of Shanghai-Bell never reached 30% before 1999. However, according to the original 
JV contract, to export products of Shanghai-Bell based on imported designs was designed 
explicitly as a critical way to balance the forex reserves of the Chinese side. Given the shortage of 
forex at that time, China asked for a governmental loan from Belgium to set up Shanghai-Bell. 
For this sake, 30% of the annual output of this JV had been expected in the contract to the exports. 
However, it was obviously not in the interests of the Belgian BTM in the global market and they 
did not support this in practice. When conflicts occurred within the directorate board of 
Shanghai-Bell, the Chinese executives had no effective way to have the foreign side on the 
contract since the JV still had to rely on the technological inputs from the foreign side to complete 
the production localisation of relevant components.  
In fact, the difference of opinion in product exports between the Chinese and the foreign sides was 
general in most cases under TMFT framework. In the phase of negotiation of JV plans, this 
difference of opinion played significant role in the failures of many cases. Even for those MNCs 
that finally agreed to cooperate, they also refused the suggestions of the Chinese about product 
exports, such as the AMC (with Beijing Auto) and the Volkswagen (with SAIC). When 
Volkswagen considered establishing a second productive JV in China in 1987, FAW suggested an 
export-oriented plan, but this proposal was firmly declined by the Germans (Hahn, 2005, p133).  
In the car-making sector, only Guangzhou-Honda, in which Honda owned 70% stake and the 
Chinese side just worked simply as a shareholder, had regularly exported a significant amount of 
products
63
. Similarly, the ratio of exports in Shanghai-Bell grew significantly after it was 
dominated by Alcatel in 2001
64
. However, after Shanghai-Bell had become the global 
                                                 
62 In order not to generate misunderstanding, we must point out that our discussion here related only to the productive 
Sino-foreign JVs that were set up under the TMFT framework, and was not applicable to the foreign wholly-owned or 
dominated firms in China. Those foreign wholly-owned or dominated firms that emerged in large number especially after 
1991 (for the incentive of the Chinese government by the 1991 Income Tax Law for FFEs), especially in consumer 
electronics, garment, etc., were built to make use of Chinese comparative advantage of production cost and actually 
turned China into the ―global factory‖. 
63 Guangzhou-Honda is a special JV in China. The Chinese insisted that the domestic side owned at least 50% stake in the 
Sino-foreign JVs in the car-making sector. However, Honda persuaded the Chinese government with its export-oriented 
scheme. In the telecom-equipment and other industries, there was no such regulation. 
64 In fact, the export of Shanghai-Bell had started to grow significantly from 1999. One reason was the insistence of the 
Chinese side, because in 1998 the MPT system was reformed into the MII, and the new authority went back to stressing 
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manufacturing centre for the Alcatel-Lucent group, the brands of products it provided became the 
―Alcatel‖ and ―Alcatel-Lucent‖ only in international markets. 
Compared with their attitudes in product exports, the foreign sides had much more negative about 
the local in-depth exploration of product technologies carried out by JVs, even though the 
learning could be already formulated in original JV contracts.  
For example, in Shanghai-Volkswagen, soon after the establishment of this JV, the Chinese side 
found that there was no practical effective arrangement to generate product-related technologies 
(Liu, 1992, p264). Instead, the German side proposed to build this JV into a pure manufacturing 
base for a single model, namely a Santana model. According to Welkener, who was the assistant 
managing director and the chief of the German team in Shanghai-Volkswagen at that time, if the 
Chinese side accepted his proposal, through continuous improvement without major changes of 
design, the Santana could be produced at 5,000 USD per set around 2000, and then ―…Santana 
would be the most competitive car in the world‖ (ibid).  
The Chinese side insisted that the JV should aim at developing the capabilities of engineering 
design as being agreed in the original contract. The German side did not accept that and defended 
itself with a series of ―practical difficulties‖, especially those about the weakness of the Chinese in 
resource-based factors. After the intervention of the Chinese government, the German side had to 
put forward three alternative options to Shanghai-Volkswagen in the early 1990s, as possible ways 
to cultivate the capability to generate a next-generation product. The first was to take over a brand 
new model designed by Volkswagen; the second was to take over a already mature model from 
Volkswagen; and the third was to design a brand new model together that would be suitable for 
Chinese market and have export potential.  
The Chinese side took the third. However, during the cooperation, the German side had not 
respond actively and efficiently to all requests from the Chinese side about sending experienced 
experts, using equipment, teaching methods and providing consultant services. Thereby, it was 
very difficult to implement the joint design so that the project was adjusted again and again. 
Finally, the Chinese had to agree on a ―new” project, namely the Santana-2000 that was started in 
1993 and launched in 1995. The Santana-2000 project was dominated by German engineers, 
carried by the Volkswagen‘s subsidiary in Brazil, and was still based on the Passat-B2 platform as 
the original version of the Santana was. No important change relevant to the product platform had 
been made. However, by this project, Volkswagen announced that it had already fulfilled its duty 
of cooperative development for this stage. In fact, all the Chinese could do was just to send 10 
                                                                                                                                                  
this point in the original contract. The second reason was  more important: after 1998, the growth rate of the Chinese PDSS 
market had slowed down. But Shanghai-Bell had not diversified with product lines before 2001, and the rise of Group-B 
firms seriously limited its market share for the PDSS products. Therefore, the foreign stakeholders changed their strategy. 
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engineers to Brazil under the permission of Volkswagen. 
In other JVs, situations were similar. In Beijing-AMC (later Beijing-Chrysler), an R&D centre 
was schemed in the JV contract. However, because of the reluctance of the American side, not 
until 1995, 10 years later than expected, this centre was not built up. Moreover, when the Chinese 
side sent engineers to AMC and Chrysler as contracted to be trained for the R&D centre, the 
American side insisted that Chinese engineers could not enter any area involving the activities of 
product development within their places. Even after the centre had been constructed, it was 
unwelcomed by the American side. In 2002 when Beijing-Chrysler was moved to another factory 
site, this R&D centre was temporarily dismissed. However, it was not built up again as expected 
because of the non-cooperation of the foreign side. 
(2) Methods of control 
More important were the methods of the foreign sides to restrain the technological learning of 
Group-A firms. In general, foreign sides controlled the technical information provided for their 
Chinese collaborators, and controlled the technical improvement procedures of JVs. These 
measures could prevent learning practices entailing product development and product technology 
from happening.  
(i) Control of technical information 
The technical information that foreign partners provided for the Chinese sides was often 
incomplete and fragmentary. Generally, the foreign partners were not willing to provide any 
information beyond the necessary for achieving the production localisation as schemed. Therefore, 
two kinds of data could be found as missing from packages that Group-A firms obtained from 
foreign partners. 
Firstly, the data specifically relevant to product design and engineering development other than 
for manufacturing were possibly absent. Information in blueprints from foreign sides embodied 
mainly the structural layouts of objects, the processing requirements and the introduction of 
materials adopted, i.e. the information about how to manufacture the corresponding objectives 
instead of development process. That is to say, the knowledge about ―why design details are made 
like this‖, and ―by what methods these design details are realised‖ was not included.  
For example, an LSI (Large Scale Integration) chip provider named BeiLing was founded as a 
complementary cooperation to provide chips for Shanghai-Bell. This plant was equipped with 
processing capabilities that were embodied in its equipment. BeiLing could realise processing 
precision at 3-micrometer level and could produce 13 different LSI chips. However, the Belgian 
side provided no information about the designs of corresponding chips. What BeiLing obtained 
was equipment and processing procedures and data. Then all it could do was to produce chips that 
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had already been well encapsulated beforehand. Therefore, what Chinese partners could learn and 
could do was just to manufacture, which in essence, in Richardson‘s terms (1972, p889), had 
complementarity, but absolutely had not similarity to the developmental activities that the Chinese 
should need for building the indigenous technological capabilities for product development. 
The situations in the car-making sector were similar. Among all the activities cooperatively 
implemented in the JVs, only those relevant to the adjustment of designs entailed product design 
and engineering development tasks. For these projects, the foreign sides would provide relevant 
original design details as references. For example, in order to meet the preferences of local 
customers, the models of Elysée and FuKang
65
 had been adjusted by DongFeng-Citroën. During 
these projects, Citroën provided corresponding data of the original front-face designs to be altered. 
Furthermore, since the JV planned to make use of the local supply chain of engine production, 
Citroën also provided precisely relevant data for matching the engine systems – which were not 
general data about the engines. It also did not mean the JV had the properties of relevant original 
data transferred inward during the cooperation. 
Secondly, even for the information related to manufacturing requirements, what MNCs provided 
in many cases was only the minimum subset of necessary information for manufacturing activities 
really carried out locally by Sino-foreign JVs. For example, in the FAW-Toyota (JV) and 
FAW-Mazda (cooperative production), Chinese engineers found that the blueprints handed over 
by their Japanese partners had been scissored. This meant that before delivering these blueprints, 
the foreign partners had already eliminated the ―inessential‖ information from printed drawings 
and relevant digital documents. The scissored information was deliberately selected to eliminate 
any information beyond the needs for appointing localised manufacturing. For instance, details 
entailing the KD components or services that were imported from the MNCs‘ value networks 
were eliminated. Only the necessary interface data for assembly remained. When Chinese 
engineers asked foreign representatives for the corresponding details, answers were always that 
those were business secrets of their parent company, namely the foreign side. For example, as the 
dies for the A-surface plates of engine hood of the Mazda-6 model produced in FAW were 
provided by the foreign side, the information of pressing requirements for A-surface plates was 
scissored from the blueprints delivered to Chinese engineers. Similarly, when FAW imported the 
Dodge-600 engine model from Chrysler in 1987, Chrysler provided only the blueprint for the 
general layout of this engine. In order to know the details of KD components since these details 
were necessary for promoting the production localisation rate, FAW had to pay additional fees, 
after the deal of engine model transfer had been done, at 10,000 USD per page for over 500 sheets 
of blueprint to Chrysler. In addition, this could happen only because Chrysler respected the 
                                                 
65 FuKang is the localised model of Citroën-ZX, and Elysée is the localised model of Citroën-ZX-988.  
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potential to reach a JV agreement with FAW. Even more astonishingly in Shanghai-Volkswagen, 
Chinese engineers do not have a full list of components and parts for any car model they have 
ever produced even today, although some models are outdated in the market. In other words, after 
30 years of close learning from foreign partners, Chinese engineers there even cannot work out a 
full name list of disassemble components and parts of products they work on from day to day, not 
to mention the component details. 
The scissored information could be very important for Chinese engineers to develop systemic 
understandings of the products. Within the complicated systems, technical details were highly 
interconnected. So lacking the technical information of particular details might form critical 
obstacles against learners to understand the others or the entire system. Moreover, the fact was 
that they did not just lack a bit but much of detailed information. Therefore, this strategy of 
foreign sides did hinder Chinese engineers from implementing reverse-engineering easily, not to 
mention reproducing the original developmental process. This made the ―close learning‖ expected 
by the policy-makers and Group-A firms de facto happen quite far away from generating systemic 
knowledge about product design and relevant engineering development.  
(ii) Control of technological improvement procedures 
The foreign sides were also able to contain incremental technical advances within JVs by a series 
of formulated supervising devices. The ―inspecting and confirming right‖ was the core for these 
devices. This method was originally developed to enhance the accountability and quality control 
in developmental processes. It was meaningful in both technology and governance. In technology, 
inspecting section was set by the end of every step of development, and inspecting and confirming 
section was set by the end of every stage. These sections meant to test, examine and approve the 
corresponding steps or stages of projects. In governance, these procedures indicated that the 
corresponding developmental tasks had been approbated. However, the approbations were made 
legally only by the chief experts exactly having the rights vested by the project scheme. 
So, as owners of imported designs and corresponding brands, MNCs had the right to control 
technical improvements based on them. For most cases in Group-A firms, JVs only had the 
permission to produce imported models by paying fees for the importation of these models, which 
did not mean they had the corresponding IPRs. Moreover, most incremental improvement projects 
carried out by Group-A firms were not to develop new models, but to adjust designs based on 
original models. Although JVs could retain the designs of adjustment they developed, their 
adjustment still had to rely on the rest complementary original designs for practical uses. Besides, 
in most cases, adjusted models were still labelled with original brands, which again was a 
question of trademarks entailing the foreign side. Therefore, the foreign sides had proper excuses 
to control this behaviour in the name of protecting the benefits from their property, which 
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endowed them with the dominant role over ―inspecting and confirming rights‖. 
The tactics usually adopted by MNCs to depress technical changes they did not favour were the 
manipulation of time and quality requirements. Since the inspection and confirmation of critical 
sections were implemented by the foreign sides in their headquarters, the Chinese sides had no 
control over how long the certification should take and what qualitative standards the adjustments 
ought to reach. These controls were in the hand of the MNCs. Nearly never-ending time 
requirements and unrealistic standards could be set by foreign sides to eliminate unfavourable 
technical schemes or to induce these schemes to change favourably for them. Finally, Chinese 
engineers all recognised that they did not have practical rights to lead any project relevant to 
product development and complex technologies
66
. It was a common complaint of Chinese 
engineers that in Group-A firms even for revision of just one bolt, they had no real 
decision-making power but were obliged to refer to permission of the MNCs. 
The hinge problem of the Santana's rear doors was typical for explaining this point. When 
problems occurred, Chinese engineers had no rights or resources available to fix them, while 
Germans were not motivated to handle them as soon as possible. Not until it turned into a severe 
political and strategic issue even entailing a vice premier of China, was the problem solved
67
. 
Hence, regarding the practical effects, this method had the incremental technical improvement of 
products under the supervision of MNCs rather than being decided by the insiders of JVs or by the 
parent Chinese SOEs. Decisions were made to serve the global benefits of MNCs rather than the 
expectations of Sino-foreign JVs or the initial expectations of Chinese policy-makers. It was to 
say, the nominal expectations of building in-house technological capability were also manipulated 
by foreign sides mainly that were outsiders to this target. In the autobiography of Carl Hahn (the 
president of Volkswagen during 1982-1993), he articulates that the German side indeed was in 
charge of product technologies in these productive Sino-foreign JVs, including FAW-Volkswagen, 
                                                 
66 We only met two exception cases during the fieldwork. One was the FAW‘s styling adjustment to the Jetta model in 
1998. Since it was not part of Volkswagen‘s plans, FAW had to pay special fees from its own account to the German side 
for relevant original data and authorisation to adjust the front face and some other exteriors. These developmental 
activities were finally allowed to be carried out mainly in China. The amount of the fee is kept as a business secret, but 
conservatively estimated to be 70-80 million USD. The adjustment had to be under the supervision of the German side, 
and the outcomes belong to the JV not the Chinese side unilaterally. As another case, the former chief engineer of 
Nanjing-Fiat from the Chinese side also announced that he had shared the inspecting and confirming rights in some design 
localising projects. But this happened only given an abnormal context within the Nanjing-Fiat. At that time, Chinese 
executives had been seriously competing against foreign executives over the control of resource since the foreign side was 
found to be planning by stealth to establish another productive Sino-foreign JV with other SOEs and with competitive 
product schemes against that of Nanjing-Fiat. For this reason, the Chinese directors supported the chief engineer in 
claiming shared decision-making power over these projects without respect to any result. Indeed, he did not get good 
cooperation from the foreign side. This JV was ended in 2007.  
67 Abnormal noises from the hinges of Santana‘s rear doors were reported by Chinese engineers in 1986. However, the 
German side did not react swiftly to improve this for the Chinese market, and Chinese engineers did not have the rights to 
carry out relevant changes. Not until a vice-premier of China spoke to the president of Volkswagen in 1987 did German 
realise that their Chinese partners had been really annoyed by this problem, which was related to the general reputation of 
Volkswagen in China. Only after that, was this technical problem solved by Volkswagen (Hahn, 2005).  
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Shanghai-Volkswagen and other JV suppliers (Hahn, 2005, p119).  
Even for the learning within Group-A firms associated with processing technologies, the foreign 
sides were not always ready to cooperate. This was because, as mentioned previously, the benefits 
of MNCs in running Sino-foreign JVs came not only from producing and selling end-products but 
also from businesses relevant to component, equipment and technical services trades. Then the 
rapid capability growth of JVs in processing technology was not always in the interests of MNCs. 
Another case of Santana‘s car door demonstrated this point clearly. In its early phase, 
Shanghai-Volkswagen was criticized for the imprecise clearance between the car body and the 
doors. Since the German side was reluctant to offer any know-how to fix this problem, Chinese 
had to implement a series of remedial measures to improve the quality: they firstly turned to 
importing steel plates directly from the original supplier of Volkswagen in Europe instead of 
making use of local suppliers, but this did not fix the problem. Then the Chinese side chose to 
purchase another complete set of stamping lines, even though most equipment of the previous line 
was also imported but not 100% from the Volkswagen network. But the improvement brought by 
the new line was almost invisible. Finally, SAIC had to buy a Germany company which ever 
provided the same door assembly for Volkswagen, and then got the secret: it was just to hold the 
punch mould in its final position for several seconds before it was pulled back! The Volkswagen 
side knew this little thing clearly but just witnessed their Chinese spending money. 
(iii) Other methods 
In some cases, the decisions of JVs about equipment adoption also needed the approval from 
MNCs, entailing the types of equipment, the providers and the technical parameters (Shen, 1999, 
p78-79). In other cases, managers from MNCs controlled the IPR department of JVs, such as in 
DongFeng-Nissan and Shanghai-Bell. These measures certainly enhanced the abilities of foreign 
sides to control the development process in JVs. 
In short, the Sino-foreign JVs could not obtain complete information by studying blueprints and 
activities introduced by their foreign partners. They also could not freely generate product 
improvements on their own. By these means, MNCs worked as supervisors to detain ing Chinese 
learners from being potential competitors. As for the Chinese side, the JVs did not really work as 
the loci to develop products, or the loci to cultivate the capabilities for product development.  
5.2.4 Production localisation activities: to imitate as similarly as possible 
According to their linear model of bottom-up technological learning, Group-A firms believed that 
the practices of manufacturing advanced products could smoothly bring about the technological 
capabilities as by-products in the nominally homologous domains related to the products but in 
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the heterogeneous more advanced categories of capabilities
68
. The critical consideration in their 
mindset was to speed up the manufacturing localisation efficiently. To imitate the imported 
models as similarly as possible consequently became a convenient way to reduce the time and 
resource consumption. 
In the Chinese aircraft-making industry, the ―Derivative Method (YuanZhun Fa)‖ had been used 
for decades for the Chinese learning of Soviet benchmarks. The essential feature of this pattern 
was that, when encountering any technical problem during incremental product improvement, the 
decision-making should refer to the Soviet experts (prior to the Sino-Soviet Split) or the imported 
original Soviet designs. Decision-makers believed that, considering the complexity of the aircraft 
product system, such a strategy was efficient to ensure reliability. Certainly, to decision-makers, it 
was just a pattern to solve problematic details of design. However, it indeed led to the aversion to 
any remarkable technical risks in the mainstream thinking of product development, which 
prevented front-line learners from generating systemic understanding of products, and hindered 
underlying technical explorations that entailed uncertainty. 
We do not intend to explore the cognitive linkages about learning within the Chinese domestic 
industries. However, the stress on imitation by Group-A firms in the two sectors we study was 
even more severe. Decision-makers required the front-line practitioners to stick to imported 
models during the production localisation, and opposed almost any heterogeneous development 
coming out with impenetrable uncertainties against their very limited neighbourhood of 
knowledge at that time. Even those attempts that had been made to imitate the given models but 
finally turned out with different results would also be replaced by ―better‖ plans to yield exactly 
the same outcomes as the benchmarks. Otherwise, developers were asked to check where the 
―mistake‖ resided. In short, the learning platform was constructed based on activities to realise 
production localisation; heterogeneous ideas of individuals were not supported. So these ideas 
were unlikely to be incorporated by the organisational SECI processes, and were unlikely to be 
incorporated into collective memories. 
Therefore, during the practice of production localisation, in addition to earning experience from 
day to day, the learning carried out by front-line Chinese included training to study the dimensions 
of existing models, to study the operations of equipment, to study the managerial approaches, etc. 
                                                 
68 Then during the process of foreign partners hunting, Chinese sides had inclination to seek cooperation based on 
emerging products in spite of the fact that what they obtained through this cooperation were just permissions for 
production localisation in most cases. For example, in the case of Shanghai-Bell, Belgium BTM was appreciated by MPT 
because the S1240 system was one distributed-control system that had just emerged in the global telecom industry at that 
time. Moreover, the Belgian side consented to transferring the production of the LSI chip to China, which was critical for 
Chinese to make their final decision. Regarding the negotiation between FAW and Audi that led to an agreement in 1988, 
the German side‘s attitude to have the possibility of licensing the Audi-100 was the key to FAW‘s enthusiasm, as Audi-100 
(launched in 1983) was regarded by Chinese as a new advanced (luxury) car model by comparison with many other 
candidates. 
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As argued by Kogut and Zander (1992, p391), being taught the functional skills of how to do 
something is different from being taught how to create it. These learning activities yielded 
positive outcomes to promote production capacity and processing technologies. However, they 
had no effective linkage to the expectations of learning about how to erect an effective product 
development system. 
(1) Processing technologies 
Processing technologies were the major contents that the Chinese front-line practitioners had 
learned through TMFT practices. In early phases, Chinese engineers, technicians and workers 
were categorised into specific groups for training to adapt the new production systems. The 
contents of training included knowledge about equipment operations, relevant regulations, 
supplementary skills and principles for efficiency improvement. Foreign experts directly 
participated in training and production supervision in order to achieve the same quality and 
efficiency level according to their global standards.  
During this, close and day-by-day learning did pay off in most cases. Through learning by doing, 
Group-A firms had even made a number of innovations in manufacturing processes. For instance, 
Shanghai-Bell was the first domestic telecom-equipment firm in realising the Computer- 
Integrated-Making-System that helped to increase the production automation. Also for the 
Delta-12, namely a test device, its processing capacity was promoted by Chinese engineers from 8 
minutes per piece to 4 minutes per piece. These innovations contributed remarkably to the rapid 
growth of production capacity in Shanghai-Bell, which exceeded the original designing 
production capacity (300,000 line/year) in 1989 (340,000 lines). BTM even adopted the Delta-12 
improved by Chinese engineers in its other global manufacturing bases. 
(2) Approach of operational management 
As for the approaches of operational management, including those for the management of 
workshops, firms and industrial chains, Group-A firms did learn much from their foreign partners.  
The improvement of operational management was regarded as important for Chinese economic 
reform at firm level. Before the economic reform, labour relations within SOEs, particularly the 
“TieFanWan” (“Iron Bowl”, lifetime employment) and “DaGuoFan” (“Eating from the same big 
pot”, absolute egalitarianism) had been broadly criticised as sources of the low efficient 
managerial control. With the encouragements from the government, reforms within Sino-foreign 
JVs were realised by incorporating new managerial approaches that were led or introduced by 
foreign partners while breaking down the previous ones. To cooperate with MNCs was an 
important source for the Chinese industrial community to adopt the Fordist or TQM (Total Quality 
Management) patterns, at least for the nominal terms of managerial approaches they learned. 
113 
 
However, we ought to note that going through the TMFT practices was not the only way for the 
Chinese industrial community to incorporate new managerial approaches, which applied even to 
Group-A firms. For example, FAW learned JIT (Just In Time) with the assistance of Hino Motors 
(Japan) from 1989 on, during the process that FAW localised the LO6S
 
(a truck model) of Hino by 
licensing production. Shanghai-Bell had the Bureau VERITAS Quality International to provide 
consultant services for its quality control system in 1995. 
Through the TMFT practices in the past three decades, the manufacturing capabilities of involved 
domestic firms had overall been evidently improved. In the car-making sector when the first 
productive Sino-foreign JV was set up, only the rear-view mirrors and the tyres among all local 
supplies were able to satisfy the quality standards of Volkswagen. In the telecom-equipment sector, 
the top-performing equipment that could be massively produced locally in the early 1980s were 
the crossbar switches only, which had long time faded away from mainstream international 
markets. By comparison, China today has already become the largest producer and exporter of 
these industries globally. During this process, the normal learning curves worked as to the 
progress of production localisation of Group-A firms in different phases. For example, the 
localised rate of Santana achieved by the Shanghai-Volkswagen in 6 years was 70% (in 1990). 
However, for Shanghai-GM that was set up in 1996, 40% of the production localisation for the 
Buick model was achieved in only 2 years. Therefore, we do not mean to underestimate the 
contribution of the TMFT practices in this way. 
 (3) In-house product platforms: being neglected 
Compared with the stress on production localisation, the development of in-house systemic 
product was neglected by Group-A firms from their early phases onwards. In their later stages, 
their organisational learning systems had been built aiming at a business model based on 
manufacturing localisation, which were difficult for them to transfer and mobilise their 
organisations for effectively learning of developing complicated systemic products and systems.  
Particularly, the in-house systemic product platforms that had ever been owned and developed by 
relevant SOEs were abandoned, marginalised or transplanted to imported product platforms. As 
for development under the TMFT framework, there were a few new products developed by 
Group-A firms. But these projects were implemented in the following manners: first, some of 
them were set up by engineers spontaneously without permission from corporate authority; 
second, some originated from divergent opinions within the top authority of firms; third, some 
were launched under pressure from government and soc ial appeals heading for indigenous 
innovations; or the fourth, products were developed by the overseas companies that were newly 
purchased by Group-A firms. None of these projects had been placed at the centre stage of 
learning activities and resource allocation in Group-A firms; none of them had been well 
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connected to the experience and learning activities that Group-A firms earned and implemented 
on production localisation.  
For details, see the Appendix-1 (Table A – 1.1 and Table A – 1.2). 
[Insert Appendix-1 here] 
(4) Product adjustment projects 
The product adjustment projects were implemented by Sino-foreign JVs to maximize the benefits 
based on imported product models. We categorise these projects into groups as follows. These 
projects entailed activities of technical development, whereas all of them were included in the first 
three categories of development activities in the automobile industry only (refer to Introduction 
Section of this chapter). Their effects were limited for capability-building because of the ranges 
they covered and the patterns they were based on. 
(i) To adjust imported models to meet the local demand preferences 
Regarding the local demand preferences, Group-A firms would make peripheral or moderate 
adjustments on the imported models. For example, Chinese customers were fond of saloons more 
than hatchbacks, and did not favour two or three-door cars
69
. In the telecom-equipment sector, 
telecom-operators would request customised adjustments to meet local regulations or complicated 
application circumstances. Since relevant local information was necessary, these adjustments were 
better accomplished closer to the source of information. It explained partly why the RASM, 
CuAE and Country-Development-Engineering
70
 modules of S1240 system were developed by 
Chinese engineers of Shanghai-Bell. 
Regarding this kind of adjustments, core features of designs were kept untouched, such as the 
chassis system, the general structure and the frame of the bodywork within a car model. In the 
telecom-equipment sector, only additional modules were added or were cut down.  
 (ii) To adjust imported models to suit local supply chains 
Time was a critical factor for the progress of manufacturing localisation. So contingently, to make 
use of existing local supplies was a reasonable alternative when the manufacturing localisation of 
some components could not be completed in the short time. Therefore, there were adjustment 
projects to be implemented by Group-A firms or relevant local suppliers. For example, in the 
car-making sector, ShenYang-Mitsubishi was ever the only domestic independent engine maker 
before 2001 to provide car engines. Group-A firms and their foreign partners would cooperate 
                                                 
69 For example, the original models of Peugeot 307 launched in Europe in 2001 were hatchbacks. But for Chinese demand 
features, the Peugeot 307 was localised into saloon models by DongFeng-PSA in 2004. 
70 The Country-Development-Engineering module is a software package to enable telecom-operators deal with specific 
situations of network and regulation requirements in practical application circumstances. 
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with this independent provider if they wanted to adopt its engine. 
However, for these projects, as the purpose was time- and investment-saving, the range of 
adjustments would be strictly controlled, without any in-depth technological exploration involved. 
Usually, only limited modularised assemblies were included in the scheme, and accordingly only 
the knowledge of their interfaces was investigated. 
 (iii) To adjust imported models to extend product life 
In order to benefit from sunk costs, adjustments would be made to extend the life of models. As 
for these projects, the major technical features of models were kept untouched. Only the styling, 
accessories and some modular assemblies were changed. 
In the Chinese car market, the ―Old Three‖ were typical cases for extending model lives. The ―Old 
Three‖ were three car models that had led the Chinese car market during most of the 1990s. 
Among them, Santana was launched by Volkswagen in 1981 with the name ―Passat-B2‖, Jetta by 
Volkswagen in 1979 with the name ―Jetta-A2‖, FuKang by Citroën in 1991 with the name 
―Citroën-ZX‖. In the headquarters of corresponding MNCs, the production of Passat-B2, Jetta-A2 
and Citroën-ZX had been stopped respectively in 1988, 1992 and 1998. However, in China, their 
life cycles had been extended through adjustment projects to generate new versions continuously, 
which made these models still popular in the Chinese market even today. 
In order to achieve technical adjustments, investigations into the evolution of market demands and 
rival products were implemented locally. The styling and accessories would be re-designed, and 
the new adopted modular assemblies would be matched. However, as mentioned, most 
adjustments do not entail in-depth technical change of product systems, and in most cases, these 
adjustments were led or supervised by the foreign sides. 
5.2.5 Sequence of developmental activities 
Compared with the growth of their production capacity and manufacturing capability, Group-A 
firms exhibited inabilities to switch into the new stage of effective technological capability- 
building for new product development. Very few product development projects had been carried 
out, and none of them had been placed at the centre of the strategy-making, organisational 
learning and resource allocation of the firms. As Nelson (1991, p68) points out ―at any time the 
practiced routines that are built into an organization define a set of things the organization is 
capable of doing confidently‖. Aiming at commercial success, Group-A firms were inclined to 
duplicate their successful experience of localising the production of imported models, which they 
had gained and proved to be effective, by gaining profits from the market. The inclination of 
Group-A firms is embodied in the strategy of Group-A firms continually to set up JVs with 
different MNCs (see Appendix-4), and continually to import new models. Therefore, returning to 
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routines, the activities that the organisation could carry out with confidence and had been done 
repeatedly certainly contribute significantly to the evolution of its routine. 
In addition to Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, we list the major products produced by the first JVs of SOEs 
respectively up to 2008. All of these models, except for BJ2020, were imported from their foreign 
partners. The BJ2020 was taken as an important asset to finance the Beijing-AMC JV
71
, but 
received very little further development.  
Table 5.5 Product sequencing of productive Sino-foreign JVs  
However, the inefficiency of product development could not be simply explained as the lack of 
R&D investment, as implied by the practical measurement of ―absorptive capacity‖ in the 
conventional literature. Group-A firms actually invested quite large amount of resources and 
personnel in in-house R&D, which were obviously superior in terms of absolute amounts 
compared with their Group-B counterparts when Group-B firms were still in their early phase. 
This point will be elaborated in Section 6.2.2.3.  
In fact, the R&D personnel of Group-A firms also worked actively, but just for projects of ―basic 
research‖ or ―long-run purpose development‖. Similar to those marginalised product development 
projects, the laboratorial jobs engaged fewer cooperative departments, fewer personnel and 
resources; so these jobs were more feasible for them to implement, since these R&D personnel 
were marginalised and kept away from the centre of learning in Group-A firms and had not many 
other choices unless they were also employed in the localisation of production. In fact, the R&D 
departments of Group-A firms were with intent to act the leading role in the domestic industrial 
communities for government-funded S&T projects, since by these projects their achievements 
were easy to measure by the governmental awards with which they were honoured, treasured as 
tradition in Chinese society. This situation changed only after the technological capabilities of 
Group-B firms were acknowledged by the government, and then Group-B firms got involved in 
these projects, which happened in the telecom-equipment sector after 1991, and in the car-making 
                                                 
71 BJ2020 (earlier named BJ212) was a jeep platform indigenously developed in 1966. Before the 1990s, it was the most 
popular small size (5 seats -7 seats) passenger vehicle in the Chinese market. Till 2005 when this series were finally 
stopped production there had been over 1,200,000 sets held by consumers in the Chinese market. In most years before 
1990, the profit-making of BJ2020 was even better than that of the total Beijing-Chrysler (Beijing-AMC in early years). 
And in the 1990s, BJ2020 remained a major source of profit for this JV. 
Firm Major product platforms manufactured 
FAW-VW Jetta, Audi 100, Audi A6, Audi A4, Golf, Bora, Caddy, etc. 
DongFeng-Citroën Citroën ZX, Citroën Elysée, Citroën Quatre, Citroën Xsara Picasso, Citroën 
Triomphe, Citroën Visiospace, Citroën C2, Citroën C5, etc. 
Shanghai-VW Santana, Passat, Polo, Gol, Touran, Octavia, etc. 
Beijing-Chrysler  BJ2020, Cherokee BJ6420, Cherokee BJ2021, Cherokee Jeep 2500, Cherokee 
Jeep Star, Chrysler 300C, etc. 
Shanghai-Bell PBX (SSU12), PDSS (S1240), IDSN and GSM models from the foreign side, etc. 
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sector after the mid 2000s. The more popular and worse situation happening to the R&D division 
of Group-A firms was that the R&D expenditures were ―effectively‖ consumed by fragmentary 
projects without systematically scheming for capability- building, by training programmes, by 
overseas visits, by the participation or organisation of conferences, because the R&D personnel 
were depressed by their role in their organisations. The product design localisation, the interface 
the Chinese-characterisation (especially of software), the testing of imported products or 
equipment were also top candidates to be registered as R&D expenditures. 
5.2.6 Analysis and summary 
Strategic intent was difficult to measure for the lack of quantitative instruments, especially when 
the strategic intent of Group-A firms had undergone through an evolutionary process. Therefore, 
we rely on the study of their developmental activities to identify the corresponding evolution. 
Strategic intent is not definitely presented exactly by activities in the short term. However, in the 
long run, the intent requires supports from relevant activities. Otherwise, strategic intent could not 
last firmly as collective commitment. 
Among their activities, it was evident that the localisation of production was taken as primary by 
Group-A firms. The worship of scale economies and the belief in linear model of bottom-up 
learning constructed the cognitive conditions for such a strategy. The financial tensions and the 
negative attitudes of foreign partners over indigenous technological capability building, as well as 
their business successes based on production localisation, jointly induced and then enhanced such 
an inclination.  
As for learning practices, Group-A firms required their front-line practitioners to imitate the 
imported models as accurately as possible. Ideas of heterogeneity among those original designs 
were unwelcome in their SECI process of knowledge conversion. As localisation of production 
was taken as the major platform to organise activities and to allocate resources, the development 
of existing product platforms and new products had been abandoned or marginalised. The 
resources for R&D were expended, but by modes far from being well-schemed and integrated. 
This in fact enhanced the orientation within the organisations to advocate exclusively a business 
model based on the expansion of production capacity. Meanwhile, the incentive policy packages 
provided by governments that were also inexperienced regarding the issue of technological 
capability building also de facto fostered this inclination; so did the first-mover advantages of 
market power obtained by Group-A firms during the reform. 
Hereby, we can say, by observing their activities over the past two decades, the original strategic 
intent of Group-A firms, namely a joint ―technological capability‖ and ―production capacity‖ 
orientation as guided by the design of the TMFT policy, had taken place by an exclusive 
―production capacity‖ orientation. After 2000, the response made by the decision-makers of 
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Group-A firms to the public inquiries for indigenous products also revealed this point. They 
stressed exaggerated resource-based requirements as preconditions for the transition heading the 
in-house product development: ―... (the preparation to develop systemic products indigenously 
needs) two generations of engineers, and over two decades…production capacity of 300,000 
set/year for individual plants…20 billion USD for R&D”72. They suggested, ―the emergence of 
indigenous innovation requires preconditions as the production capacity of 5,000,000 set/year of 
the entire domestic car industry”73, and asserted that ―the dominance of indigenous technical 
standards of electric automobiles shall be consigned to the Nissan which can lead us to a high level 
capability”74, etc. 
Certainly, the shift of strategic intent happened by a gradual, evolutionary and uneven process 
within organisations. In addition, collective change was not applicable to every organisational 
member at the micro level. Otherwise, we cannot explain why there were consistent brain flows 
from Group-A firms to Group-B firms, especially when Group-B firms could not provide as good 
material conditions and benefits for employees as Group-A firms did.  
5.3 Strategic intent and developmental activities of Group-B firms 
As for the Group-B firms, they seldom received supports from central government. Accordingly, 
since they were out of the major governmental scheme for the development of relevant industries, 
there were away from governmental interventions specific to their learning patterns. Meanwhile, 
as they were not attractive to MNCs in their early phase as JV partners under the TMFT 
framework, their learning practices were not intertwined with the attempts and actions of foreign 
collaborators.  
5.3.1 Evolution of strategic intent 
It was not true that all newborn-local firms insisted on capability-building for systemic product 
development, which was not easy for DC firm firms especially considering the lack of indigenous 
capabilities and the market challenge from globalised competition. Group-B firms were exactly 
the first-movers among domestic firms that insisted on doing this after the TMFT policy had been 
widely advocated. Their strategic intent could be identified based on their long-term activities.  
(1) Chery and Geely 
Chery and Geely had both entered the car-making sector when this industry was still strictly 
                                                 
72 Referring to the Dialogue program of CCTV (China Central Television), 2004-02-15. This was claimed by YanFeng 
Zhu, the president of FAW and the Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of CCP at that time. 
73 Referring to China CBN, 2008-01-21. This was claimed by Yanfeng Zhu. He was the vice-governor of Jilin province 
(where FAW is located in) and the Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of CCP at that moment. 
74 Referring to the 21st Century Economic Report (web version), 2009-04-15, this was said by Wei Miao, the former 
president of DongFeng, and the vice minister of Ministry of Industry and Information Technology  at that time. 
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regulated with entry barriers. Without official licences, their industry-specific investments bore 
the risks of losing if the regulator noticed and banned them. Besides, without official licences, 
they could sell their products only in very limited geographic areas, and it was feasible only if the 
corresponding regional governments supported them
75
. Undoubtedly, the founders of these two 
firms were very clearly aware of the risks
76
. However, in spite of these, they continually invested 
in the development of systemic products from their inception phase onwards. 
It was also worth mentioning their opportunity costs. Before entering the car-making sector, Geely 
had obtained the second largest share in the domestic light motorcycle market segment in China. 
In order to provide financial support and human resources for its car-making division, Geely 
gradually retreated from this successful division. As for Chery, its founders were all from other 
firms where most of them had obtained stable and respectable careers. The current president of 
Chery was from the FAW and had been honoured as one of the ―top-10 young FAWers‖ in the 
early 1990s, which indicated he could have a bright future in FAW. Chery‘s other core engineers 
who came from the FAW had also been treated as parts of the skeleton engineering force of FAW. 
 (2) HaFei 
After proving their potential in manufacturing and developing systemic car products, HaFei and 
Chery were invited by MNCs to establish JVs under the TMFT framework. Mitsubishi had made 
such a proposal to HaFei twice, and got support from the provincial government and the 
asset-holder of HaFei, AVIC (China Aviation Industry Corporation). However, HaFei‘s 
decision-makers refused these proposals, and insisted to the government and AVIC that they could 
continually achieve the growth of indigenous technological capabilities as they had already done. 
(3) Huawei and ZTE 
The intentions of Huawei and ZTE should be studied in particular contexts. In the early 1990s , 
China was experiencing a bubble economy. Public stock exchanges were opened as a new method 
of investment in 1990; the price of real estate also increased strikingly. Millions of people flooded 
into the newly opened Shenzhen Stock Exchange
77
. Many industrial firms transferred their 
working funds to the stock or real estate markets. The total amount transferred from the industrial 
sector to the capital market to pursue short-term profits reached several hundred billion RMB. A 
                                                 
75 The divide in opinion between central and regional governments is always a theme of China‘s economic development. 
Since Chery was invested in by local governmental agents, the regional government manipulated the regional 
transportation administration to issue licence-numbers as taxi-cabs for Chery‘s products within Wuhu City, from which 
Chery originated. Geely also had very limited sales within Zhejiang Province before 2001. 
76 The penalization of regulation could be very tough. Certainly, the execution would not be carried out by administrative 
orders directly. Instead, it would be implemented by legal methods, such as tax investigation as tax evasion was not rare 
among domestic firms. In 2004, a firm named TieBen violated the regulation of investments in the steel-making sector. 
The tax investigation upon TieBen came out with 294 million RMB tax evasions. The legal representative of TieBen was 
imprisoned; TieBen was re-organised according to the relevant laws and regulation.  
77 Huawei and ZTE are located in Shenzhen. There are only two exchange centres in China, Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
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number of Chinese high-tech firms joined this tide, and were even diversified by building up real 
estate subsidiaries, such as Stone and Lenovo in Q. Lu‘s study (2000).  
In the face of intensive economic bubbles, Huawei still invested all it earned in the previous 5 
years, namely around 0.1 billion RMB in total, to develop its large-scale PDSS in-house
78
. In 
order to raise the money for this project, ZhengFei Ren, the founder of Huawei, even borrowed 
money from an underground bank at 24% annual interest in his own name. In ZTE, the executive 
managers fought against the requirements from shareholders to enter multiple domains to pursue 
better short-term profits. In order to win a stable environment for product development, they 
signed a special agreement with the shareholders by which they promised to hand the fixed annual 
residuals over to the shareholders for exchanging managerial autonomy. 
Their commitments to long-term technological capability building were also institutionalised 
through formal corporate regulations. In 1998, the ―Huawei Fundamental Law‖ was announced as 
the basic code of mindset and conduct of this organisation, in which Huawei defined itself as a 
developer of telecom-equipment only (not for other diversified domains to pursue short-term 
returns), and to stimulate at least 10% of annual sales revenue to R&D. ZTE also formulated ―four 
fundamental rules”, which required its members to focus on technical exploration and to build up 
the ZTE brand by competitive products. 
5.3.2 Developmental activities: trajectories and pathways 
Group-B firms also invested heavily in manufacturing lines, but these lines were principally built 
to serve their own schemes of in-house product development, not for localising the production of 
imported models
79
. Importantly, they kept developing in-house product platforms from their 
beginning. From this perspective, the trajectory of Group-B firms did not belong to either the 
traditional bottom-up or the top-down mode. They did not start from assembling or simply from 
basic S&T knowledge.  
Considering the stage of industrialisation of China, it was inapplicable to domestic firms in most 
industries to start product developments relying on the local original S&T knowledge, especially 
in the 1980s and 1990s. However, unlike some other underdeveloped countries, China had 
established a comparatively complete industrial and research system during the 1950s-1970s, and 
had cultivated its own products in these industries. Besides the specialised engineering knowledge, 
there was experience of system integration embedded in the domestic industrial networks. The 
                                                 
78 This decision caused divide of opinion. Two out of the three co-founders left Huawei. But this event also optimised the 
organisation of Huawei.  
79 Brilliant Auto, not a Group-B firm in a strict sense, was an exception. Before developing indigenous product platforms, 
Brilliant had already built up manufacturing lines to produce the Haice MPV model imported from Toyota. But it still had 
to construct new lines for its indigenous car models. 
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knowledge of this kind might be backward by comparison with that in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, it provided a basic sense of system integration for local elite engineers. After 1972, 
the emergence of foreign technologies in a massive manner in China provided the domestic 
industrial community with enlightenment about new product information, processing technologies, 
managerial approaches and global production specialisation, which in turn could be 
complementary to local experience. In theory, opportunities could be created by domestic 
practitioners to organise learning spirally by combining the indigenous experience with the newly 
obtained exotic technologies. Group-B firms were exactly such cases. To accumulate the 
knowledge for developing systemic products in their infancy, various methods had been employed 
to obtain knowledge from domestic and international sources. 
To study competitive products was a popular method adopted by Group-B firms when they just 
entered this sector. However, this method did not mean to copy or simply imitate the competitive 
products although the simple copying of foreign products did happen to some poor-performing 
Chinese firms. Group-B firms had not detailed blueprints or other original data of corresponding 
competitive models. Rather, they analysed the competitive models on their own. These 
comprehensive analyses of competitive products provided guidance and reference for the trade-off 
of detailed designs of new product systems developed by Group-B firms. In their infant stages, 
when Group-B firms had not sufficient resources and capabilities to analyse a large number of 
competitive products, some details would be observed as similar to those of particular referenced 
products. In such situations, we name the benchmark(s) as the ―target model(s)‖ of the designs of 
Group-B firms. For example, the first car model of Chery, the Fulwin, took the Toledo of SEAT as 
its target model. As the financial strength of Group-B firms increased, more and more references 
were included to study, and more and more local characteristics were created based on their 
integrative learning. Finally Group-B firms turned to obverse product development pattern when 
they had obtained sufficient capabilities. 
The external technical cooperation was another important source of knowledge creation of 
Group-B firms in early phase. During their cooperation with foreign partners, the Group-B firms 
themselves worked as the integrators to make use of the external technical services that they 
outsourced, and took the cooperative projects as platforms for deliberate learning rather than 
purely a commercial method to acquire codified technical results. 
Group-B firms all started their journeys from low-end markets by providing products with better 
performance/price ratio. In the car-making sector, the first-generation products that Group-B firms 
provided were often at only 1/2 or 2/3 of price of the mainstream competitive products in order to 
exchange the toleration of customers upon the comparative low-class qualities. As for the 
Group-B telecom-equipment firms, they started from market segments that incumbents did not 
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care much about or had already ignored. The first product of GDT was a semi-digital PBX; for 
Huawei and ZTE, the first product models were both PBXs based on analogue technologies. 
Xinwei was the only exception. It entered this sector with the SCDMA standards of mobile 
telecom systems, which grew up from its laboratory and experimental emulative network. 
However, for practical commercialisation, Xinwei also started by providing services in peripheral 
market segments. 
In general, even given their disadvantages with regard to resources, policy support and 
technological foundations, Group-B firms still managed to develop their own product platforms 
from their early stages on. They persisted with the strategic intent of indigenous product 
development. Capability-building has been implemented with activities of new product 
development. 
5.3.3 Developmental activities: complete chain of product development 
In addition to the manufacturing section, the Group-B firms had included most product 
developmental activities in-house. Certainly, considering the weak foundations of Group-B firms 
in terms of technological capabilities and resources, these activities were not all built in-house at 
once, but were developed by an evolutionary process.  
Certainly, we cannot cover all aspects of developmental activities in this thes is. Here we stress the 
relations between the in-house efforts and external cooperation, which provide a distinct contrast 
between Group-B firms and Group-A firms, and highlight the persistence of Group-B firms 
regarding the development of systemic products and complex technologies. 
5.3.3.1 In-house learning and external cooperative projects 
To implement the independent strategies for capability-building was not equal to being isolated 
from outside in term of knowledge creation. In fact, in the industries related to complex products 
and systems, seldom firms could include all developmental activities in-house for the products 
they produced, given the current globalised industrial circumstances. In addition to purchasing 
standard modules from the market, Group-B firms undertook external cooperative projects to 
obtain technical services and to facilitate their own technological learning.  
The relation between in-house development and external cooperation of Group-B firms evolved 
over time, while the leading role of the in-house development during the integration was upheld. 
This process can be depicted by an inverted U curve into three phases. Phase-1 refers to the infant 
stage of Group-B firms launching their earliest product platforms aiming at mass-production. 
Phase-2 then refers to Group-B firms being gradually accepted by the domestic market and 
launching their second-generation products. Phase-3 is identified by their becoming competitive 
players in general in the domestic community. They launched their third and subsequent 
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generations of products, and built up the capability foundations in-house to support sustainable 
obverse product development. 
Figure 5.2 Evolution of the importance of developmental services outsourced of Group-B firms 
 
In Phase-1, Group-B firms had to develop the products and subsystems mainly on their own since 
they were almost invisible to potential external co-operators. Only standardised subsystems and 
components could be purchased from market. However, this kind of market purchases might also 
be difficult to process. Suppliers usually required reliability from their customers, which was 
based on long-term trust, reputation and visible financial strength, since either the large volume 
supplies or the customised component development, would bring risks to the suppliers. Because 
of the inability to provide these conditions, products developed by Group-B firms in this phase 
were usually located at the low-end or low-level market segments for the limitations of supply 
chains they could access. The complexities of products and technologies were minimised for 
convenience. On the contrary, during this period, Group-B firms obtained the essential knowledge 
of different aspects of relevant technologies for product development since they had to develop 
many technical functions in-house on their own, and emphasized the breadth of knowledge within 
their small development teams. 
In Phase-2, as the businesses of Group-B firms had been roughly established, the external 
co-operators and suppliers became more accessible. Group-B firms employed the external 
technical services and components to promote the qualities of products and to facilitate in-house 
technological learning. However, the newborn local firms were divergent in their learning patterns 
and performances during this phase. Some successfully built up in-house technological 
capabilities, while others failed. For the successful cases, they took external cooperation as 
guidance for in-depth knowledge exploration of in-house learning. 
Importance of 
external links 
Time 
In-house R&D dominates 
NPD (Phase-1) 
Technical cooperation 
dominates NPD (Phase-2) 
In-house capabilities are broadly 
established (Phase-3) 
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In general, after one generation of products development
80
 in the third phase, the in-house 
knowledge foundations of Group-B firms for the sustainable development of systemic products 
and complex technologies had been set up. Certainly, the extent varied in different domains. For 
the knowledge that was difficult to handle at that moment, indigenous integrators established 
stable collaborative relationships with international suppliers, as also discovered by Brusoni, 
Prencipe and Pavitt (2001). But in general, several driving forces cause a transition to strengthen 
the dominance of in-house force from this phase: (i) the accumulative outcomes of learning, (ii) 
the desire to obtain a series of benefit brought by in-house development, e.g. cutting the costs of 
development projects, promoting the interchangeable rate of components, increasing the 
bargaining powers in external cooperation and increasing the capacities for design flexibilities, (iii) 
and the impetus of in-house developmental force for more power relating to resource allocation, 
which was indeed the fulfilment of their strategic intent. 
Table 5.6 Evolution of the in-house development and services outsourced in Chery and Geely (-2008) 
                                                 
80 This usually took 4-5 years in successful Group-B firms in the car-making industry. It was no coincidence. Regarding 
international mainstream, commonly the cycle for a single car development is about 18-24 months from project initiation 
to SOP (start of production). Thereby, 4 years were sufficient for the same team to develop 2 product models in the same 
market segment with the foreign assistance (see the case of Chery in the table) which realised a twofold ―exploration - 
deepening‖ process of the learning. If they implemented a parallel pattern of product development, 3 or more models 
could be developed in 4 years. 
81 For the car models of Chery, There are two named systems. One is the marketing, e.g. the QQ for the S11 model; the 
other relates the product in product series. For example, for S11, S means minicar (highly compact car, equals A00); 1X 
means it belongs to the first platform of A00; X1 refers to its sequence in this platform. From highly compact cars to 
luxury cars, there are six classes according to the vehicle length and wheelbase, i.e. A00-A0-A-B-C-F, plus T for SUVs, 
M for racers, and P for pickups. In this table, S11 is for QQ (3), A11 for Fulwin, A14 for Cowin, and B11 for Eastar. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Knowledge 
dimension 
Pursuing the breadth of 
knowledge 
Pursuing the depth of 
knowledge 
Pursuing the breadth and 
depth of knowledge 
Chery 1997-2002 2002-2006 2006- 
Car models S11, A11, A14, B11
81
, etc. 
S12, S21, A18, A21, B14, T11, 
etc. 
T21, A13, A18, B12, B14, 
B21, M14, P11, etc. 
In-house 
development 
car configuration;  chassis 
engineering; engines etc. 
engines; die design 
complete car development; 
new technical exploration 
External 
Cooperation 
die design 
car configuration; engine 
design; chassis engineering; die 
design etc. 
broad & general cooperation 
Market 
Transaction 
dies; engines; transmission; 
electronics 
dies (via a JV); electronics broad & general cooperation* 
Geely 1997-2003 2003-2007** 2005- 
Car models 
HQ/MR series, SMA series, 
Mybo-1 
CK-1, CG-1, CI-1, LG series 
etc. 
FC series, CD-1, GC-1, LC-1, 
etc. 
In-house 
development 
car configuration , c hass is  
engineering, e ngines,  dies,  etc.  
engines; transmission; 
electronics 
complete car development; 
new technical exploration 
External 
Cooperation 
very few 
car configuration; chassis 
engineering; die design; 
Electronics etc. 
broad & general cooperation 
Market 
Transaction 
engines; transmission; 
electronics 
electronics broad & general cooperation 
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Note *: “Broad & general cooperation” refers to such a status: Group-B firms have become 
comparative mature competitors in the Chinese market, and have already built in-house capabilities for 
most core fields, even varied in extent for different domains; external cooperative projects are to make 
use of international specialised forces, not as necessary and critical complements to in-house 
capabilities, which is similar to the strategies of international giants in implementing external technical 
sources in this industry.  
**: there was overlap between Geely’s Phase-2 and Phase-3. 
Table 5.6 lists the evolution of in-house development, external cooperation and market 
transactions in Chery and Geely, which presents an inverted U curve for the significance of 
external cooperative projects to Group-B firms‘ capability-building. In the coming subsection, we 
present details of each phase to support our argument and explain their driving forces for shifts. 
5.3.3.2 Phases in detail 
(1) Phase-1 
In their infant stage, Group-B firms had to rely on their in-house forces and the few suppliers they 
were able to assess. Comparatively simple models were developed for the limitation from both 
in-house technical capabilities and the limitation of external supply chains. 
For example, for the development of A11 (Fulwin), the first car model of Chery, the mainstream 
suppliers refused to participate in the development the customised components. Many of them 
also refused to produce those components that had already been designed by Chery
82
. Only 
several small firms and a few others that had good relationships with Chery for personal contexts 
agreed to share the risks. 
The unfavourable situation of its supply chain even forced Chery to adjust the original design of 
Fulwin to utilise more existing components of Jetta, one of the ―Old Three‖ models, which had a 
large supply foundation at that time
83
. Meanwhile, it introduced new suppliers into this domain. 
Its supplier of stamping dies was FuZhen from Taiwan. FuZhen showed enthusiasm as it was also 
an outsider to the car-making sector, but regarded this cooperation as a valuable chance to enter. 
In fact, FuZhen succeeded in this strategy and rapidly became a well-known stamping die 
developer in the Chinese automobile industry. It later attracted the orders from many other 
Group-B firms and even some Group-A firms. 
At that time, situations for other Group-B firms were similarly difficult. It was even worse for 
Geely for the shortages of resources. It even had no automatic production line in early phase. 
People had to use handcart to connect different working procedures and maintain the production 
                                                 
82 In a latter case of the Cowin (A14) development, BMW accepted the request of Chery and supply engines based on 
existing models. But not surprisingly, it required Chery large amount of orders at once, which indicated BMW‘s 
indifference to long-term cooperation. 
83 Personal contexts of Chery‘s core members who had worked in FAW were critical to obtaining cooperation from these 
suppliers. 
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pace. Machines were mostly second-hand. Some metal stamping dies were even made from 
half-metal and half-synthetic resin to save costs! Moreover, Geely even had no CAD 
(Computer-Aided Design) capability when it had already launched its first car model. Without 
doubt, it was reasonable for leading specialised suppliers being indifferent to such car-maker. 
Therefore, in its infancy, Geely had to persuade the local suppliers of its motorcycle value 
networks to enter the car-making sector, which were also 100% newcomers to this industrial 
domain. 
In addition to the unfriendly attitudes of suppliers, Group-B telecom-equipment firms moreover 
had to face the strict embargo regulated by COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export to 
Communist Countries) before 1994, which isolated the Chinese mainland from high-tech products 
and services from relevant countries. Among the prohibited goods, high-end IC chips and 
high-precision processing machines were particularly significant for them considering the weak 
domestic semiconductor and relevant industries at that time. The traditional centralised structure 
of PDSS systems required precisely high-end IC chips with strong data-processing capacities, but 
these chips were inaccessible to Chinese developers. However, the difficulty also induced some 
Chinese developers to explore the new decentralised technical architecture of product systems by 
themselves. For instance, when CIT developed the HJD-04 model, what they could get were 
standardised chips with small data processing capacities such as the No. 244, No. 245 and No. 374 
chips. Even for these chips, engineers of CIT could buy them only from the bulk cargo market of 
Shenzhen that was a special economic zone of China and had some informal merchandise inflows 
from Hong Kong. Nevertheless, CIT did succeed in developing the HJD-04 system with these 
standardised chips, in which the chips that worked as data-processing centres for most modules 
were the Motorola-68000, also a low-end chip. 
(2) Phase-2 
In Phase-2, Group-B firms had been recognised as promising attackers in their industries for the 
commercial successes of their first-generation products in the last phase. This changed their 
external circumstances, especially the attitudes of foreign specialised technical firms that were 
looking for business opportunities in China.  
HaFei was the first-mover to employ international technical services for its in-house product 
development in the Chinese car-making sector. The cooperation between HaFei and Pininfarina 
(Italy) started in 1995, in which the foreign side accepted to provide the bodywork styling service 
for an independent product development project from HaFei. This pattern was quickly identified 
by other indigenous firms that were also searching for practical ways to utilise external technical 
resources. Chery and Geely started to cooperate with international technical companies from 2001, 
the first year they were officially allowed to enter the car-making sector.  
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TextBox 5.2 Cooperation of HaFei with Pininfarina  
Pininfarina began to seek potential co-operators in China from 1993, as its profit-making capacity 
was depressed by the downturn of the global automobile industry. Pininfarina regarded HaFei as 
an excellent candidate for its motivation for implementing product development and digitalised 
design capability that was transferred by HaFei from its aircraft-making division and was 
remarkable in the Chinese domestic automobile industry at that time. Pininfarina initiatively 
proposed a project to HaFei in 1995, which was to develop the bodywork for a minibus model, 
namely the ZhongYi. HaFei developed the chassis and other subsystems on its own, based on its 
capabilities accumulated during the preceding 12 years. 
At the beginning, Pininfarina wanted to practise it as a turnkey project in spite of the agreement it 
had made to open the developmental process to HaFei. In Italy, Chinese visiting engineers were 
forbidden to enter the areas where real developmental activities were going in. They were allowed 
to witness the development outcomes only when periodic blueprints came out. It certainly was not 
what HaFei expected. The Chinese side took the contract as the weapon, and threatened to cease 
the cooperation. Pininfarina had to accept HaFei‘s request and let Chinese engineers participate in 
the developmental process. For learning, HaFei had in total sent over 100 engineers to Italy in this 
project, despite its severe limitations in finance. 
The ZhongYi prototype was launched in 1998 successfully. After that, HaFei established more 
partnerships with external technical partners for its product development. In developing the Lubo 
model, Lotus (UK and Malaysia) was in to provide the engineering optimisation for the chassis. 
HaFei also cooperated with Mitsubishi in the SaiMa project and with Tjinnova (China) in other 
projects.  
The external cooperation promoted capability-building in HaFei. In 2003, HaFei launched a new 
minibus named MinYi, which was developed mainly by in-house engineers, and proved the 
growth of their capabilities. 
We cannot list all projects involving external cooperation of each Group-B firm during this phase, 
since they were large in number, and were documented in different categories according to the 
mode or extent of cooperation. Therefore, we just present the prominent cooperative projects of 
Chery ongoing in the year of 2005 in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 Important outsourcing cooperative projects of Chery in the year 2005 
Note: data are collected by author, and these are far from being complete in number. In particular, most 
projects related to the development of components and processing technologies are not included.  
In the telecom-equipment sector, Group-B firms could not access the foreign technical service 
providers in most cases before 1995 as they were obstructed by COCOM, but they cooperated 
with domestic research institutes and universities. By these projects, they employed and 
re-integrated the intellectual resources accumulated by the R&D divisions of previous 
branch-based industrial systems. Huawei and ZTE had once cooperated with almost every 
institute affiliated to the former MPT system during 1980s-1990s. 
Group-B firms gradually worked out the mechanisms to ensure the learning activities really 
co-operated with the external partners as expected. In most cases, external co-operators were not 
motivated to help Group-B firms to build up in-house capabilities. Rather, they were likely to 
prevent this for their own future benefit. Thus, the practices of learning from external co-operators 
were not like the ―teaching and learning‖ in classrooms, but like a tug-of-war. Original contracts 
of cooperative projects were the most frequent applied weapons used by Group-B firms to have 
external co-operators to open the developmental processes for engineers from Group-B firms to 
learn, as exhibited by the HaFei-Pininfarina case. As Group-B firms became experienced in or 
through external cooperative projects, they made the contract drafting a developmental process 
led by engineers rather than just business negotiators. The effectiveness of contract clauses as 
weapons was achieved not only because of the hunger of the foreign sides for business, but also 
for the insistence of Group-B firms. As the strategic intent of Group-B firms prioritised the 
learning beyond simply getting well-established products for manufacturing, they did show their 
decisiveness to suspend or even cancel ongoing projects if what foreign sides did damaged the 
core value of cooperation for them. Their insistence did push foreign sides to perform as 
scheduled in the contracts. Besides, with the growth of in-house technological capabilities of 
Group-B firms, more and more cooperative projects were arranged to locate in the places of the 
Chinese sides. This enhanced the ability of Group-B firms to control the process and enable them 
Cooperative partner  Projects Location of cooperation Start date 
AVL (Austria)  ACTECO Engines (including 3 
families, 18 models) 
Both sides; according to plan 2002 
Bertone (Italy) Car configuration Both sides; mainly in Italy 2002 
I.de.A (Italy) Car configuration Both sides; mainly in Italy 2004 
Pininfarina S.P.A.  Car configuration Both sides; mainly in Italy 2003 
IAT (China)  Car configuration Both sides  2003 
Torino Design (Italy) Car configuration Both sides; mainly in Italy 2004 
MIRA (UK) Chassis engineering; testing & 
adjustment 
Both sides; according to plan 2002 
Lotus Consulting; testing & adjustment Both sides; according to plan 2002 
Ricardo plc (UK)  Hybrid power tech; Transmission Both sides; according to plan 2004 
Dürr (Germany) Paint shops Both sides; mainly in China 2002 
MAG Hüller Hille (Germany) Production line of engine cylinder Both sides; mainly in China 2002 
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to invest more personnel to participate in and learn from the cooperation.  
When employing external cooperation, Group-B firms had not stopped in-house capability- 
building. During Phase-2, most Group-B firms had established and expanded specialised technical 
departments. The developmental activities of experienced co-operators were closely traced and 
taken as the appropriate direction for deepening and broadening the knowledge accumulation of 
in-house engineers, and as the direction re-constructed their organisations accordingly.  
Chery‘s learning in regard to NVH (noise, vibration and harshness) control of car development 
was a good example. The control of NVH was important for high quality car-making. However, 
prior to Phase-2, Chery‘s engineers had not acknowledged this concept, which meant that the 
first-generation products of Chery did not engage with any NVH control. Considering that most of 
Chery‘s core engineers were from Group-A firms and from other vehicle-makers, this indicated 
that the concept of NVH control for car development had never been unfolded in the domestic 
community including Group-A firms. 
Figure 5.3 Knowledge domains closely relevant to NVH control  
 
This concept was introduced by Lotus unintentionally to Chery when Lotus advertised another 
service to Chery through a presentation. Chery‘s engineers seized on this unfamiliar but possibly 
important concept and tried to dig deeper. Finally, Lotus agreed to make a paid presentation for its 
potential customer. The presentation brought about a critical concept related to systemic 
optimisation of products, entailing a wide chain of relevant knowledge for domestic engineers to 
learn (as in Figure 5.3). After obtaining this guidance, Chinese engineers themselves carried out 
detailed explorations, and they re-structured their technical departments according to the new 
cognition that they developed evolutionarily through the cooperative projects. 
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 (3) Phase-3 
In Phase-3, the learning activities of Group-B firms largely stopped centring on external 
cooperation, which did not mean the decrease of cooperative projects in absolute amounts. The 
number of cooperative projects still increased, but external cooperation did not play the influential 
role in scheduling product development as before. Gradually, external services were employed 
only as needed as specialised assistance to Group-B firms‘ in-house developers rather than a 
―master‖ to lead the process. Critical parts of product development were changed to be developed 
in-house again. The new phenomena emerging in this phase concerning the relations between 
in-house development and external cooperation can be put into three categories. 
Firstly, the location of cooperative projects shifted more to Group-B firms. Consequently, external 
co-operators more turned to providing specialised consultancy or packaged services; and Group-B 
firms could invest more personnel to the relevant development and learning activities. For 
example, Table 5.8 demonstrates the evolution of cooperation between Chery and AVL, which 
was aiming to develop 3 series including 18 engine models.  
Table 5.8 Chery’s Cooperation with AVL in developm ent of engines (2002--2008) 
Note*: another 7 models were added in the third phase mainly by the Chinese side. 
Geely also realised the change during this phase. It even began to dominate cooperative projects 
for external requirements. In 2005, the Hong Kong Productivity Council proposed a cooperative 
project with Geely to build a car model aiming to promote the auto component industry in Hong 
Kong. The Hong Kong side invested heavily in this project and organised the suppliers, but the 
leading role of this project attributed to Geely since no Hong Kong participant could replace 
Geely‘s functions of technological integration and systemic product development. 
As to the telecom-equipment sector, the alliance between Huawei and 3Com exhibits exactly 
Huawei‘s growth of capability and its change of role regarding external cooperation 84 . A 
productive JV named H3C was established in 2003 by these two firms. The core products of H3C, 
namely the SR8800 series routers, were secondarily developed based on Huawei‘s existing models. 
                                                 
84 Here, it is helpful to point out Cisco‘s lawsuit against Huawei in the name of Huawei‘s ―allegedly counterfeiting‖ its 
IPRs which happened during the Huawei-3Com negotiations in 2003 (Cisco was the incumbent in the data 
communication equipment market, facing the attack from Huawei). In this case, 3Com went to the witness stand for 
Huawei, and testified that Huawei really had built up relevant capabilities for developing the products sued by Cisco. Prof. 
Dennis Allison of the Stanford Univ., who was invited by the court to act as the third-party attester as a communication 
technologist, also testified that for the same technical function within Huawei‘s VRP model and Cisco‘s IOS model in 
question, Cisco employed 20 million lines codes while Huawei only employed 2 million. So he denied that Huawei would 
copy or imitate Cisco‘s codes. Finally, Cisco withdrew the accusation in 2004. 
Phase Models developed location Role of AVL Time period 
1 4 Mainly in AVL Dominant 3 years 
2 3 Mainly in AVL Supervisor 
3 11(18)* Mainly in Chery Consultant 4 years 
131 
 
In fact, those existing models were valued by 3Com as a major part of Huawei‘s investment in 
this JV. Former Huawei engineers played the leading roles for R&D and post-sales services of 
H3C, with a total number of employers over 1,000 whereas there were only 50 from 3Com. The 
situation even continued after Huawei sold its all shares of this JV to 3Com. Besides, Siemens 
also manufactures Huawei‘s digital network products via OEM for the European market. 
Secondly, some previous external cooperation had been replaced by in-house projects or by 
projects contracted to affiliated firms. A series of first-tier suppliers had been established by 
Group-B firms. For example, the number of first-tier supportive firms owned by Chery was over 
30 in 2006. International leading suppliers also established JVs or cooperative plants for Group-B 
firms. These affiliated supportive firms had covered most critical sections of the supply chain (see 
TextBox 5.3), and had ―permanent‖ or ―quasi-permanent‖ relationships with the Group-B firms. 
TextBox 5.3 Affiliated supportive firms of Chery (data from 2007) 
The surge of establishing affiliated supportive firms started in 2004. Three kinds of firms were 
invested in by Chery to exploit different sources of knowledge. They included those firms 
spun-off from the growing in-house capabilities of Chery, those ventures established in China by 
Chery and external technical experts from universities, public research institutes, overseas, etc., 
and those ventures established by Chery in overseas to make use of foreign R&D capabilities, 
such as Chery‘s subsidiary for transmission in Australia. 
Some of these affiliated firms became successful very soon. For instance, Bonaire, the affiliated 
air-conditioner developer of Chery, had already covered 80% of Chery‘s procurement of air 
conditioners. It also seized about a 30% share of the entire domestic market. ATECH, the 
affiliated instrument and meter provider of Chery, had occupied 100% R&D tasks of relevant 
parts of Chery, accounted for 80-100% of Chery‘s real usage, and reduced costs of relevant 
components by 50%
85
, which was also an important contribution to the whole domestic sector. 
TROITEC was a provider invested in by Chery to provide the Engine Management System 
module. Now, it provided services for 20+ domestic car-makers, including many Group-A firms. 
In the telecom-equipment sector, we can take the LSI chip as an indication: in Phase-2 (after 
1994), Group-B firms had to request LSI chips from international specialised chip developers, 
such as Mitel, Texas Instruments and STMicroelectronics. This obviously limited the space for 
indigenous developmental activities. Based on the outsourced chips, what Group-B firms could do 
was to develop their solutions and corresponding architectures of the system, to develop software 
and peripheral ASICs. However, as they persisted in capability-building, in Phase-3, Group-B 
                                                 
85 For example, the price of the instrument and meter set for QQ (S11) was 400 RMB/set when Chery purchased it from 
outside. Now ATECH can provide it at 200 RMB/set and lowers the price for the whole domestic market. Many other 
firms have been its customers, including some Group-A firms. 
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firms had been able to develop LSI chips and other critical modules in-house, which promoted 
their creativities of product development and strengths in response to market demands. 
Figure 5.4 presents the capability growth of Huawei in the domain of ASICs, carried out mainly 
by HiSilicon, which was founded in 2004 based on the ASIC department of Huawei established in 
1991. For a long period, HiSilicon could only develop peripheral chips. However, with the 
persistence of learning efforts, HiSilicon could produce major ASIC chips from 1998. The change 
enabled Huawei to develop beyond its former follower strategy of product development (by 
following the directions of international frontier firms) toward actively self-determined product 
innovations. From around 2000, chip development was no longer the weakness of Huawei‘s 
capabilities. Rather, HiSilicon started to diversify the categories of chip development to employ 
its capability for benefits around 2004, and began to provide the services for other firms. 
Figure 5.4 Rapid development of the specialised ASIC subsidiary of Huawei  
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Note: the top row represents design capabilities, represented by the scale of chips per unit and the 
level of precision; the bottom row represents the technical milestones and the new domains it 
successfully explored. 
Terms: SOC: System On a Chip; COT: Customer-Owned Tool; CE: Consumer Electronics 
Source: HiSilicon Tech. 
Thirdly, in-house technological capabilities rapidly increased. For the sake of brevity, we skip the 
description of their growth in each field. Instead, we emphasize their abilities of long-term 
technical exploration, which were achieved by the central R&D centres of Group-B firms, which 
were usually spun-off from their product development divisions. 
In the car-making sector, the number of patent applications by Chery ranked the 2
nd
 in the Chinese 
automobile industry from 2007 (note that MNCs also applied patents in China to protect their 
technologies and products), and the 1
st
 among Group-B firms. 
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Table 5.9 Patent application of Chery (2006-2008) 
As for Geely, a series of high-end subsystems had been developed in-house, including the EPS 
(Electronic Power Steering) and the CVVT (Continuous Variable Valve Timing) engine before 
2007. The progresses enabled Geely to adopt high-end subsystems in low-price cars. By 2007, 
Geely had been granted 417 patents. In 2008, Geely‘s original technology named ―Blow-out 
Monitoring & Brake System (BMBS)‖ was announced at the Detroit Auto Show and was awarded 
a ―Special Contribution Grand Prize for Invention and Creation”.  
The progress achieved by Group-B telecom-equipment firms was more remarkable. As reported 
by WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation), Huawei was ranked as the 1
st
 applicant 
under Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in the world in 2008. ZTE was ranked the 38th in 2008 
with 329 applications published. With these patents, Huawei and ZTE had already become core 
members of alliances for frontier technologies, including the alliances for WCDMA, CDMA2000, 
WiMax, LTE (Long Term Evolution), etc
86
.  
Table 5.10 Patent applications from Huawei (2005-2008) 
Data sources: For PCT applications, data are collected from WIPO; for the rest, data are from 
interviews and annual reports from Huawei. 
5.3.3.3 Divergence of new indigenous firms 
As we have indicated, it was wrong to state that all newborn local firms would succeed in 
in-house capability building. The building of their organisational learning systems has to 
experience a ―cognition – selection – implementation‖ process, during which divergences could 
occur. As a result, some of them failed, or met significant difficulties.  
In the telecom-equipment sector, there were over 200 newborn domestic firms entering this 
industry during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Many of them experienced difficulties to catch 
                                                 
86 Huawei had 156 kernel patents of WCDMA (data from 2008), occupying about 7% of all kernel WCDMA patents 
owned by members of the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), and was ranked the 5th in the world. As for LTE, by 
2008, Huawei had already submitted over 900 technical proposals to 3GPP, and over 550 technical proposals to SAE 
(System Architecture Evolution). In 2009, Huawei and Nokia shared the first LTE networking construction in the world 
(in Sweden). As for CDMA series standards, Huawei had more than 1200 related patents. About 400 of these were critical 
in the global community, and 40 of these were kernel. For WiMax, ZTE was one of the 15 directorate members of the 
WiMax Forum, which was the core for WiMax technological communication and IPR trading. Huawei had princip al 
membership of the WiMax Forum, and had over 100 WiMax related patents (data from 2007). 
 2006 2007 2008 Grand total (2008) 
Total applications  631 1058 1099 3197 
Includes: patents for inventions 127 244 412 805 
Granted    1671 
 Each year Grand total 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Total application     19187 26880 35773 
Includes PCT 249 575 1365 1737    
Granted     2742 4256  
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up regarding the development and commercialisation of large-scale PDSS, which mirrored the 
non-effectiveness of their learning or relevant organisational changes. Until 1998, most of them 
had been cleared out as well as the poorly performing Group-A firms by tough competition of the 
price war of PDSS raised by Huawei, ZTE, JinPeng and Shanghai-Bell. In the car-making sector, 
many new entrants also failed to build effective organisational learning systems. To be specific, 
they just took the wrong way. Witnessing the triumph of HaFei, Chery and Geely in exploiting 
international technological resources, they also tried to cooperate with external technical 
companies but turned out to rely continuously on external technologies. More than 100 new firms 
rushed into the car-making sector in 2001
87
. During 2003-2005, in the segment of SUV-making 
alone, there were over 30 new makers that adopted the same stamping dies set (with the body 
design embedded) provided simultaneously by the same firm from Nanhai City. Only if the 
domestic firms had basic capability of manufacturing truck chassis, could the provider, with 
technologies from Taiwan, give them a solution, namely the ―stamping dies and embedded 
bodywork design plus the in-house chassis of customers‖, to launch an SUV model. However, the 
reliance on external technologies made these firms incapable of surviving the product-oriented 
competition. After 2005, most of them had been washed out.  
Two cases are analysed to reveal how different cognitions led to different trajectories of 
organisation building, and then to divergent learning performances. Both firms had had successful 
experiences: Brilliant succeeded in localising the production of Haice (an MPV model) from 
Toyota in the 1990s; GDT was well known for its success in developing the HJD-04 model. They 
also had strong financial commitments to new product development. Nevertheless, they still met 
great difficulties in their further learning journey. Brilliant had its product platform mainly rely on 
outsourced technologies and services. The member units of GDT still believed in the relation 
between the R&D and production of the previous command economic system. Their cognitions 
led them to wrong selections and constructions of organisation building.  
(1) Case of ZhongHua series, Brilliant Auto 
The ZhongHua series was initiated by Brilliant in 1997, with M1 as the first model. It was a well- 
known failure in developing the indigenous products by employing external technical resources. 
A group of financiers dominated Brilliant before 2003. The engineers, except for heads of 
production bases, were excluded from the team of executives. With regard to indigenous 
capability building, these financiers emphasized the possession of brands, IPRs and production 
                                                 
87 Because the regulation of car-making has been transferred to an ―ex-post approval‖ system, we cannot find exact 
statistics from the government about how many new car-makers crowded into this sector around 2001, since many of 
them failed in just a few years. But the crowding-in of new entrants could be verified by interviews, and by those 
rarely-heard car brands we can discover in domestic second-hand car markets even today. 
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capacities, which could be ―measured‖ by their financial methods. Therefore regarding the 
process of technological learning, they were delighted only to see codified outputs, no matter how 
and whence the outputs came. So they naturally regarded making use of external technical 
resources as a promising method. In detail, the body styling and systemic configuration of M1 
were developed by Italdesign (Italy), and the chassis was developed based on that of the Galanz 
by Mitsubishi. Three firms from Germany, namely TRW, ZF, and Lemforder, were contracted to 
develop the brake, steering, and suspension subsystems respectively. MIRA provided the general 
testing for the prototype. Another four firms from Germany contracted the planning and 
construction tasks of production lines: Schuler for the metal stamping workshop, KUKA for the 
welding workshop including all robots, Dürr for the painting workshop and Schenck for the final 
assembly workshop. Besides, ITCA (Italy) was contracted to develop critical stamping dies.  
However, because of the marginal position of the in-house technical and engineering personnel in 
the decision-making of Brilliant, they had few opportunities to touch their ―own‖ product model 
before the product design was finally delivered onto production lines. During Brilliant‘s 
negotiations with foreign contractors that were indeed highly technology and engineering related, 
the in-house engineers were excluded on their own decision-makers from the delegate team, or 
just worked for checking and receiving the data from foreign sides when the contracted tasks were 
finished. Thus, the engineers of Brilliant had no chance to learn through these cooperative 
development projects. After the model was delivered, they were just treated as operators of 
different specialised divisions of production lines. Here, the executives of Brilliant were just 
duplicating their successful experience in localising the Haice model; and they thought that the 
―product technology (IPRs and brand) plus production‖ strategy could naturally bring about 
technological capabilities with the day-by-day operations of in-house engineers. 
However, the negative consequences emerged: in 2000, the first lot of M1 cars were found to have 
many problems, including severe off-tracking. Even insiders conceded that ―the quality was as bad 
as [that of] products crudely made by amateurs‖88. 
In the face of these unexpected difficulties, in-house engineers were firstly expected to fix them. 
However, since they were 100% new-hands to the newly delivered product model and newly 
delivered production lines, they did not have the capability expected by the executives. In fact, 
even though in-house engineers were supposed to fix these problems, they had very little 
influence over strategic resource allocation in practice. 
The disappointed decision-makers attributed the failure to the low quality of domestic engineers. 
Then a solution was made to apply high-quality technical work forces by employing more and 
                                                 
88 Interviews with Xiaogang Lin, Zhigang Liu and Yong Ding, 2005. 
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―better‖ foreign aid. During 2000-2004, Brilliant implemented three rounds of significant 
revisions to the M1 model. Huge financial resources had been expended purchasing services from 
international technical firms and supplementary equipment. By 2005, the ZhongHua series project 
had already cost 4 billion RMB. However, the M1 still had not succeeded in satisfying customers 
as a technically appropriate car, except that Brilliant had made a very long list of foreign 
contractors (see Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5 Foreign Contractors Involved in developing ZhongHua M1 (1997-2005) 
 
Note: Taikisha: a Japanese equipment provider; DSA: a German equipment provider; Graco: a U.S. 
equipment provider; Fori: a U.S. equipment provider; Langer: a German equipment provider 
During this process, although in-house engineers had seldom been given opportunities by 
executives to participate in critical development projects, they were punished for their ―inborn‖ 
unsatisfactory performance – a financier was appointed to head them. However, in fact, it was 
exactly the absence of in-house capability building that led to the failure to integrate the external 
technical services. Considering that external contractors all focused on maximising the technical 
performance of their perspective fields, there was no in-house actor to coordinate and integrate 
outsourced services. Rather, since outsourced tasks were highly specialised, and in-house 
engineers had not been arranged to participate in or even witness, the outcomes of external 
contractors turned out to be opaque to in-house engineers and other contractors. This increased the 
inclination of each contractor to maximise technical requirements in their respective fields to 
ensure liabilities, and promoted the systemic complexity for anyone to understand it, even no 
mentioning the tacit knowledge embedded by each side. 
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The situation changed only after 2004. In that year, financiers lost their control, and the new 
authority hired FuQuan Zhao
89
 as a senior vice president to lead the technical and product 
development. He implemented a series of organisational reforms, including enhancing the 
professional R&D teams and promoting the status of engineers, most of which can be found in our 
analyses of Group-B firms‘ organisational system in the next chapter. Critically, the reform had 
the in-house engineers supervise the process of outsourced projects, and control the resources 
allocated to foreign partners and time schedules. By doing so, effective platforms of technological 
learning for in-house engineers were gradually constructed. 
The reform achieved remarkable results. New models were launched in 2006, namely the M2 for 
the car segment and the Granse for the MPV segment. The significantly improved qualities began 
to re-build the reputation of Brilliant (see Table 5.11).  
Table 5.11 Car sales of Brilliant, Chery and Geely during 2003-2007 (Unit: 1,000 sets)  
In sum, the evolution of Brilliant proved that resource investment and foreign technical aids 
would not definitely bring about technological capability growth. It was the reform, entailing 
organisational changes as core components, which bring about the critical difference of outcome. 
 (2) Case of GDT 
HJD-04 was the first large-scale PDSS developed and industrialised successfully by the Chinese. 
Its technical development was undertaken by CIT. Before transferring into the telecom domain, 
CIT was specialised in researching computer technologies as a military unit. Core members of 
CIT had participated in governmental and military research programmes since the late 1960s, 
including the development of the first indigenous computer based on IC technology (J101, begun 
in 1972) and of a mega computer project (H103-II, begun in 1976). CIT itself had developed a 
mega-computer for military users called DP300, which was based on a distributed mode of 
technical architecture. This mode could improve the computational capacity of the computer with 
relatively weak and small-scale IC chips. It was exactly the distributed mode they carried on that 
helped HJD-04 break through the inability of the domestic IC industry to provide large scale chips, 
and developed HJD-04 into a technically frontier matrix-distributed structure
90
. 
                                                 
89 Zhao had worked as the director of research at Daimler-Chrysler‘s R&D centre. Zhao‘s reputation helped him to carry 
out these reforms in Brilliant.  
90 To be specific, in the HJD-04 system, the CIT adopted the ―500 million basic floating-point operations per second‖ 
technology they had developed in the computer domain. And the advanced technical features of HJD-04, even regarding 
the global industrial community, could be presented as its ‗level-wise distributed controlling structure‘ and ‗replicated 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Brilliant 25.6 11 9 58.1 (M1/M2=25.5/32.6) 115 (M1/M2=32/82) 
Chery 90.4 86.5 185.6 272.4 381.2 
Geely 75.8 96.7 149.9 204.3 217.7 
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Therefore, the developers of the HJD series had experienced technical successes in the previous 
command economic system, and such technical successes worked to their triumph of HJD-04 
significantly. It very possibly enhanced their belief about organising R&D activities as in the 
previous industrial system. CIT and other member units of GDT did make this mistake. 
After launching the HJD-04 model, GDT was operated as a tight alliance during 1992-1994: PTIC 
was the major financial investor and coordinator of the alliance; CIT worked as the technical 
centre; and the experiment factory of CIT, four MOEs affiliated to MPT worked as manufacturing 
units. Moreover, in 1995, the alliance built up a formal industrial group: in addition to the 
members of the alliance, two MOEs affiliated to the Ministry of Electronic Industry and one MOE 
affiliated to the military joined in. However, during 1995-2001, GDT was still a loose industrial 
group and member units had independent financial accounts and rights. 
Even though managerial autonomy was largely attained by this newly established firm, the R&D 
side and the manufacturing side within the firm still followed the coordinative pattern as in the 
command economic system, although there was no authority forcing them to do so. The member 
units had not updated their cognition about the dynamic relationships between R&D, production 
and marketing. As product technologies were regarded as free goods to producers in the central 
planning economy only if planners had made corresponding arrangements, PTIC kept this legacy 
informally to some extent, and offered the technologies of HJD-04 free to 4 subordinate factories. 
Later, 5 more factories were allowed by PTIC to join GDT as relevant ministries and regional 
governments appealed to it in the name of saving these poor-performing SOEs. In fact, the loose 
IPR control happened to almost all members. Then finally, there were over 20 SOEs in practice 
producing HJD-04 contemporarily although some of them were even not supervised by GDT. 
HJD-04 providers even competed against each other in the market. 
Regarding the investment in R&D, the manufacturing units were reluctant to raise for CIT, 
because in the previous central planning system the regular funds for R&D specialised institutes 
were allocated directly from the government, and were separate from that for the manufacturing 
division. With the coordination of PTIC, members all accepted that as a company in the new 
market-oriented circumstance they had to learn to organise R&D within their own industrial group. 
In other words, they should be self-organised to feed their own R&D division, i.e. the CIT. Finally, 
they worked out one flexible method to decide the annual fee according to probable sales of each 
in the last year. Therefore, the fee was somewhat quasi-―production licence royalty‖ for the 
developer of technologies, i.e. CIT. 
CIT was also influenced heavily by the legacy of the central command system. It still acted as a 
                                                                                                                                                  
T-type switching network‘, which were GDT patents granted. 
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research institute fully funded by the government regardlessly
91
. Its strategies were set to 
maximise the technical targets appointed by the top-down order (previously by the governmental 
industrial administration, now on its own decision-makers or by the government-funded projects), 
not the connections with the manufacturing division or the visible demands of customers. 
Supported by the State Science and Technology Commission, CIT built up a ―National Digital 
Switching System Engineering and Technology Research Centre‖. A series of frontier 
technological explorations were carried out as parts of national S&T programmes, without 
carefully considering the commercialisation aspects. These projects included the development of 
advanced intelligent networks, a super large-scale PDSS, the CDMA application, the radio 
network controller of 3G mobile, the LSI chip, etc. For its achievements in long-term technical 
exploration, CIT were honoured with a series of governmental awards. 
However, in spite of these awards, CIT had not provided effective incremental improvement and 
new product development for the GDT. In 1996, one bug in the HJD-04 system was discovered 
but GDT could not generate a quick consensus or a course of action among its members. 
Especially, the funds of CIT had been almost totally occupied by its technical exploration projects. 
Meanwhile manufacturing units were reluctant to do or to fund this task
92
. So the technical bug 
was not solved soon, which caused dissatisfaction among telecom operators. Finally, the 
expanding negative effects of this bug acting upon the telecom network turned out to be 
intolerable to the industrial regulator. MPT announced an administrative order in 1996 to suspend 
the business of GDT for a 9-month rectification. After the prescribed period, GDT did succeed in 
solving this technical problem through funding CIT for a solution, but did not succeed in 
generating internal cohesion among members to respond to the emerging product-oriented 
competition. Meanwhile, new indigenous firms, like Huawei, ZTE and JinPeng, raised a price war 
on PDSS. These firms provided intensive post-sales services and derived products. Thereby, GDT 
in fact opened a ―window of weakness‖ towards competitors and became fragile to the new 
competition. More importantly, it never fixed its organisational mobilisation problem. As 
JiangXing Wu, the leader of CIT, admitted GDT was more like a club for money collecting and 
splitting than an integrated enterprise, and every unit just cared about its own benefits
93
. After the 
bug event, GDT never recovered its leading role in the domestic telecom-equipment industry. In 
1998, the military side quit GDT, clearly announcing the failure of GDT‘s previous pattern.  
                                                 
91 In fact, the reason for CIT‘s transformation into the telecom industry was exactly because the government could not 
fund it efficiently as before. From the early 1980s, large-scale disarmament was carried out to cease opposition with the 
West for China getting well with the capitalism camp. Therefore, the military S&T system was expected to be reformed, 
and military technologies were expected to be transferred for civilian use, for saving the state expenditures in relevant 
fields. That was why CIT had to search for new applications for their technological competences. 
92 In fact, for the reluctance of the manufacturing units, the fees they paid to CIT were not sufficient for CIT‘s expenditure. 
To raise money for its R&D behaviour, CIT insisted from 1992 on having its own experimental factory the right of 
producing and selling the HJD series of products. 
93 Interview with JiangXing Wu in 2004.  
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The failure of GDT manifested problems far beyond resources. It once had excellent products and 
technologies, an excellent R&D team, excellent manufacturing units (backbone SOEs and PTIC 
that had the largest mobilisation capacity in its industry), and even a market advantage: up to 1997, 
there had been over 10,000,000 lines of HJD-04 installed in the Chinese telephony network, with 
more than 4000 C3-C5 switching centres. The operational management also could not simply be 
blamed because for each unit it was good. The failure primarily resulted from a misleading 
understanding about technological learning under the new circumstances. With that understanding, 
GDT could not translate its strategic intent into effective organisation by integrating the R&D and 
manufacturing units and responding to the emerging product-oriented competition. Their 
cognition might be invisible, but difficult to change. Even in 2004 Wu still believed that if he 
attracted more financial resources at that time, or if factories could espouse a greater commitment 
to the collective benefit (and listen to the CIT), he could fix all technical problems associated with 
GDT; then, GDT would be on the proper road to sustainable success. 
5.4 Analysis: contrasts between the two groups of firms 
In this chapter, we have already analysed the developmental activities and strategic intent of the 
studied firms. These two dimensions are highly interconnected because the developmental 
activities provide the behavioural foundations for fulfilling strategic intent in the long run. For 
better understanding, we make a direct comparison here. 
In general, Group-A firms concentrated on the localisation of production, and followed the 
arrangements recommended by the foreign sides. Their efforts brought about the growth of 
operational skills but the neglect of systemic product development because of a series of 
limitations and inducements. Such a trend had solidified along with their development in the last 
three decades. Group-B firms on the contrary had insisted on in-house product development, 
which certainly had not evolved smoothly. However, they had all the time kept the dominance of 
their product development process. 
5.4.1 Developmental activities 
(1) Activities at the centre of learning 
Taking the car-making sector as an example, a comparison of major activities of Group-A and 
Group-B firms is demonstrated by Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6 Activities carried out by Group-A and B firms (car-making sector)  
[Insert Appendix-3 here] 
The mainstream activities of Group-A firms were the localisation of production. Besides the 
routinised manufacturing practices, they also implemented a series of complementary functional 
activities, such as for market research and feasibility analysis; but these activities were organised 
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not for uncertain and developmental ends, but just for adopting existing products of foreign 
partners. During their production localisation, they also had to develop relevant methods and 
equipment for mass production. But most product development procedures which logically should 
be located between market research and production, i.e. the product model development, the 
prototype development and the engineering development for mass production, were absent in 
Group-A firms. The outcomes that ought to be developed through these procedures were brought 
in with codified blueprints and data in theory. Therefore, according to the activities carried out by 
Group-A firms, learning happened as mainly centred production lines. 
In comparison, Group-B firms might not be able to produce some high-tech and high-precision 
subsystems in their early phases. However, they did not miss any generic critical procedure of 
product development. Even for those outsourced subsystems or components, Group-B firms also 
gradually built up corresponding in-house development platforms. Moreover, ―inspecting and 
confirming‖ sections for all development procedures were implemented in-house, or by delegated 
teams. Certainly, Group-B firms also carried out other activities, such as market research, 
feasibility analysis, production line development and manufacturing practices. 
In Group-A firms, the activities at the centre of organisational learning also included periodical 
localisation of imported product models. The purpose of model localisation could be to meet local 
regulations, to utilise local supply networks better, or to satisfy local demands better. However, 
whatever the purpose was, these projects entailed only partial designs of corresponding product 
systems. Group-A firms only had the IPRs of adjusted parts, not the whole product systems. Even 
for the adjusted parts, the Chinese in most cases did not have the inspecting and confirming rights 
for most (if not all) sections and steps of development. These rights were attributed to the foreign 
sides. As inspecting and confirming were methods for both technical control and governance 
control, without approval, technical changes were not allowed to be put into effect, and relevant 
resources were not allowed to be allocated for generating these changes. Therefore, the Chinese 
sides did not have practical control of development processes, including any decision-making 
about what to learn, when to learn, how to learn, or even who could learn through these projects. 
In fact, since the foreign sides would not allocate many excellent personnel permanently to 
Sino-foreign JVs, these localised adjustment projects were usually led by visiting (or temporarily 
hired) engineers sent by the foreign sides
94
. This not only cost financial resources in Sino-foreign 
JVs, but importantly had these tasks planned and technically dominated by ―outsiders‖. In other 
                                                 
94 It explains why we find special items in the payroll books of Group-A firms. For example, during the localisation of 
production for Jetta in the early 1990s, FAW-Volkswagen employed a group of visiting Volkswagen technical experts, 
who belonged to Volkswagen, not to FAW-Volkswagen. Even with the rotation of visiting experts, the total number was 
still around 60 at any specific moment of this period. For each visiting expert, the expenditures were 3.6 million RMB per 
year exhibited in the payroll books. JinBei-GM, the cost of every visiting expert was 0.36 million USD/year.  
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words, the outside engineers representing external benefits and external knowledge creation 
systems played the integrative roles in the learning processes of Group-A firms through these 
projects. Important parts of relevant experience would not be retained by domestic organisations, 
since outsiders were not stable elements of them, and the developmental activities of visiting 
engineers did not originate from local Chinese learning systems. 
(2) Marginalised activities 
Group-A firms also had implemented several (but only several) new product development projects 
in the past two decades. Certainly, it could be argued that these marginalised projects might work 
as experiments and seeds for in-house capability building, but this arises only in theory. In the past 
twenty years, the seeds have not been transplanted into the centre of Group-A firms‘ technological 
learning. These projects were never connected to the mainstream technological learning practices 
and resource allocation, or formally to the major SECI processes of knowledge creation in 
Group-A firms. 
Basic technical exploration had also implemented by some Group-A firms. These activities were 
mostly isolated from the practical major activities (production localisation) and practical product 
development, since the R&D centres were not authorised with resources to carry out practical 
product development.  
By comparison, the development of products was carried out as the centre of developmental 
activities in Group-B firms. They also implement long-term technical exploration. The 
departments of long-term technical exploration were spin-offs from the product development 
work forces; and at least to date they have had substantive schedules to industrialise their findings 
into engineering applications. Such a tight connection was inherited from their product-oriented 
competitive strategy.  
5.4.2 Strategic intent 
There is no common quantitative measure for strategic intent. However, we can identify the 
difference by their attitudes and long-run activities, and such a comparison shows distinct 
different between these two groups of firms. 
In general, both groups of firms shared similar strategic intent at their start-up phase. The original 
intention of TMFT policy was to facilitate both indigenous technological capability building and 
import substitution, while that of Group-B firms was for indigenous technological capability 
building and business survival.  
Nevertheless, during TMFT practice, Group-A firms had gradually marginalised their intent of 
product development. A business model based on stretching production capacity, benefiting from 
governmental support and de facto market advantages, underpinned the shift. Their strong reliance 
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on current profitability deflected them from the wider development of capabilities (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992, p393). There were controversies within the Group-A firms; however, in-house 
appeals for indigenous systemic product development rose and fell sporadically. Although what 
the decision-makers did in those circumstances might not mean giving up the previous 
developmental intent in the long run, these results did change their organisational cultures, and 
their mainstream views on technological learning within organisations. Even with the ir growing 
financial strength, chances for their revival of in-house systemic product development were 
seldom retained. Some engineers thereby left Group-A firms and joined Group-B firms in order to 
pursue indigenous capability building.  
In comparison, the strategic intent of Group-B firms was enhanced by their continual practice of 
developing complex technologies, components, subsystems and systemic products. Sharply 
distinguished from the strategic choices of Group-A firms, Group-B firms rejected proposals from 
MNCs to set up JVs under the TMFT framework when they had already proven their potential.  
The contradistinction about the strategic intent of these two groups of firms was highlighted in a 
public controversy during 2004-2005
95
. Major Group-A firms expressly opposed stressing 
indigenous product development, and listed a series of ―reasons‖ to validate their rationality, most 
of which were termed preconditions for in-house technological capability building and were 
related to resources or production capacities. Even when those preconditions had been fulfilled
96
, 
they simply piled on the thresholds again. 
The more substantial vote by Group-A firms was their continual renewal of productive JV 
contracts with MNCs. Take the SAIC as example : its previous JV contract with Volkswagen 
covered 25 years, 1985-2010 (practical cooperation started in 1984). In 2002, when there were 
still 7 years to go, SAIC decided to extend this contract for 20 more years. In the new contract, 
there was no clause stressing systemic products development carried out indigenously or 
cooperatively. Even the previous clauses regarding the rate of manufacturing localisation were 
eliminated as ―old-fashioned‖. All contents were set for continuing import of product models and 
for stretching production capacity. 
SAIC was no exception among Group-A firms. Rather, it was typical for Group-A firms to do so 
or to continue setting up new JVs with new foreign partners for manufacturing localisation. The 
latest dates of the current JV contracts for FAW, DongFeng, SAIC, Beijing Auto and Guangzhou 
Auto are now 2041, 2053, 2030, 2035 and 2034 respectively. Table 5.12 highlights this common 
                                                 
95 In fact, this public controversy was raised firstly in the car-making sector and gradually spread to broader 
manufacturing industries from 2000. The report of NanFeng Chuang Journal (No.4, 2000), named ―ZhongGuo QiCheYe 
de ShengSiJie (Life or Death for China’s Auto Industry)‖, was recognised as an earliest editorial for this topic. 
96 The actual output of SAIC-Volkswagen had exceeded 0.3 million sets by 2002, and the total output was 0.49 million 
sets for SAIC as a whole in 2002, and 0.6 million in 2003. FAW had also output of over 0.5 million sets in 2003. 
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feature. Figure 5.6 reflects another fact, that most giant car-making MNCs had been gradually 
introduced by Group-A firms as JV collaborators under the TMFT framework. 
Table 5. 12 Continuous establishment of JV by Group-A firms  
[Insert Appendix-4 here] 
Figure 5.7 Entry time of MNCs under the TMFT framework (Passenger cars only) 
 
 
Note: The date is only for the start of production localisation by Sino-foreign JVs in manufacturing 
completed products of passenger cars, not the date for JVs being established or for other kinds of JVs. 
In the public controversy, Group-B firms were criticised by some media that might have the 
encouragements from Group-A firms. By the criticisms, manufacturing quality, production 
capacity (at that moment), and non-frontier technical features of products in comparison with 
those of Group-A firms or imports were usually stressed. However, no Group-B firms changed 
their strategies confronting these criticisms. Rather, they fought back in public and announced 
new investment plans, which received support from some ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. 
In 2005, the Chinese central government announced a change of national strategy that indigenous 
innovation capabilities and the ―quality of growth‖ ought to be highlighted instead of pure GDP 
advocacy and the growth of manufacturing capacity based on low-cost labour. This change was 
manifested with the ―National Guidelines on Medium and Long-Term Programs for S&T 
Development (2006-2020)‖ in 2006. Only after that did Group-A firms have to announce a series 
of plans in the name of ―indigenous product model development‖ to respond to the pressure 
imposed by the government and the public opinion. 
Therefore, we can conclude that during the past two decades of TMFT practices, Group-A firms 
gradually deviated from their original strategic intent. They stressed the expansion of production 
capacity and marginalised the importance of in-house product platform building. Comparatively, 
Group-B firms insisted their strategic intent from their beginnings. 
5.4.3 Technological progress 
Before 2005, there was no systemic product or complex product technology that was developed 
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and industrialised by Group-A firms
97
. On the contrary, Group-B firms had continued launching 
new products, and launching complex technologies presented by these products. 
In the telecom-equipment sector, Shanghai-Bell, which had been a manufacturing base for the 
global development strategy of Alcatel since 2001, was able to provide its domestic users with 
customised network solutions, which represented the most advanced capability in-built among 
Group-A firms in this sector. However, the major products adopted in Shanghai-Bell‘s solutions 
were based on imported models, except for several modules mentioned previously that they 
developed locally. Since the Chinese side had totally lost the dominant roles within Group-A 
telecom-equipment firms, there was seldom significant improvement after the policy change in 
2005. 
In the car-making sector, from 2005 Group-A firms launched a series of ―indigenous product 
development‖ projects as responses to the change of government policy and social opinions (see 
Table 5.13). Nevertheless, their projects continued to rely on foreign partners. In fact, Group-A 
firms had not yet raised a full set of developmental activities in-house. Then it remained difficult 
for them to generate in-house technological capability as they claimed. 
Table 5.13 New “Indigenous” Products of Group-A firms (from 2004)  
[Insert Appendix-2 here] 
Among these new product models, some were entirely outsourced. For example, the Besturn of 
FAW was a model that had already been completed by Italdesign in the mid 1990s; some were 
based on imported platforms. For example, the RedFlag-HQ3 of FAW was based on the 2000 
annual version of Grown-Majesta (Toyota). Moreover, SAIC acquired two experienced product 
development teams from overseas. However, front-line engineers of SAIC in China were barely 
involved in the relevant development activities of these overseas subsidiaries.  
By contrast, Group-B firms displayed good performances in new product development. In the past 
10 years (1998-2008), not including earlier periods, the number of new product platforms 
launched by Chery, Geely and HaFei was 10, 8 and 4 respectively. The progress of Group-B firms 
                                                 
97 Regarding this point, this might be controversial for the case of Tianjin Auto among some Chinese scholars. Tianjin 
Auto got its XiaLi minicar model in 1984 as a localised version of the Charade model, by a productive cooperation project 
with Daihatsu (Japan). Dissimilar to most model importing projects, Tianjin had the IPRs of the XiaLi model, and 
produced it by CKD imports before 2000. Because of the self-owned IPRs of this model, Tianjin Auto made several 
improvement versions of XiaLi. However, no significant change was made before 2000 since the production did still rely 
on imported CKD critical subsystems. And the platform (based on the original model) was backward, being developed by 
Daihatsu in the 1970s, so that it allowed very limited space for the Chinese to implement incremental improvements 
unless local engineers were encouraged to make significant technological changes upon this platform – but these did not 
happen. On the other hand, although the platform of Charade was promoted several times by Japanese, upgraded 
technologies had not been transferred to XiaLi. Only after Tianjin set up productive a JV with Toyota in 2000, obvious 
changes were made through importing and localising the production of the later version of Charade (Toyota acquired 
Daihatsu in 1998). But the Charade had stopped production in Japan since 1999 for its backwardness. Thus, we do not 
support the view that Tianjin Auto had established obvious technological capabilities. 
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had changed the domestic market structure, and upheld a lasting product-oriented competition that 
had never happened in China before. Before 2001 even though many MNCs had established 
productive JVs in China, the number of car models launched in the Chinese market was truly 
small. The ―Old Three‖ had a market share of over 50% during most of the 1990s. In 2000, only 
12 models in the Chinese market achieved production volumes over 10,000 sets in that year. In 
other words, most domestic customers could choose from just these 12 models. In 2001, there 
were only 13 models newly launched in the Chinese market. Ironically, there had been 12 giant 
MNCs that had set up productive JVs in China by 2001. The emergence of Group-B firms pushed 
the competition in the Chinese market becoming product-oriented. MNCs had to launch more and 
more, and better and better models in China as responses. The number of newly launched models 
increased from 80 to 120 after 2005, and stayed at a comparatively high level since then (see 
Table 5.14). 
Table 5.14 Car models newly launched in the Chinese market 
Source: from varied sources; 
Note: the statistics include common cars (sedan, hatchback and station-wagon), MPVs and SUVs. 
The market share of previously leading car models clearly fell. The ―Old Three” models still 
occupied 47% of the domestic market in 2001, but their share fell to 34% in 2002, and to 18% in 
2004. Their absolute sales went down with a lost of 43%, 70% and 77% respectively in 2004. The 
average price per set of these three models was about 140,000 RMB in 2002, while only around 
60,000 RMB in 2008.  
Moreover, this tough product-oriented competition and the progress of Group-B firms had 
promoted the technical levels embodied in car models in the Chinese market. Considering the 
market segment of family-use cars, namely A-level cars, we can find significant changes by 
studying the technical modules employed by these models. In addition to the ―Old Three”, 
Chinese media generally select three A-level cars as the ―Medium Three‖ and three as the ―New 
Three‖, which were all produced by Sino-foreign JVs; their emergence timing and popularity on 
Chinese market are the criteria for selection. These selected models represent the general technical 
levels of imported models at corresponding time periods, as shown in Table 5.15. 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
car models newly launched 13 28 50 50- 80+ 117 90 107 221 
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Table 5.15 Popular A-level cars in Chinese market and their technical features  
Note: * this is for the early versions of these car models in question; **wide-bodied designs are usually 
1750mm in width, while the former designs of A-level cars were usually 1700. 
Terms: CAN: Controller Area Network; CD: Compact Disc; EBD: Electric Brake force Distribution; 
ESP: Electronic Stability Program; MP3: MPEG Audio Layer III; PDC: Parking Distance Control. 
Even though MNCs continually launched better models by local production, Group-B firms 
succeeded in keeping pace to catch up. In 2001, when they were officially allowed to enter the 
car-making sector, the first-generation car models of Chery and Geely were only approximately 
equivalent to the ―Old Three” if ignoring their backwardness in manufacturing precision. Only the 
Lubo model of HaFei already embodied major technical features of ―Medium Three‖. Around 
2003, when Chery and Geely launched their second-generation products and the upgraded 
versions of their first-generation models, could they provide most technical modules adopted by 
the ―Medium Three”. In 2005, HaFei launched its SaiBao-3 model, and Chery and Geely launched 
their ―global cars‖ (third-generation) around 2006-2007, which meant these models were designed 
for the global mainstream market. These models had technical features similar to those of the 
―New Three‖, and their manufacturing qualities became comparable to those of mainstream 
Group-A products. Hereby, we draw a schema regarding the catching-up of Group-B firms in 
reference to providing advanced car models as Figure 5.8. 
Jargons Car models (their former names in MNCs) Launch-time in the Chinese Market 
―Old 
Three‖ 
Santana (Passat-B2, Volkswagen) 
Jetta (Jetta-A2, Volkswagen) 
FuKang (Citroën-ZX,Citroën)  
1984-1992 
Technical 
Features* 
Styling: square-based shape, wedge-shape 
Security: no ABS, no airbag, etc. 
Driving Comfort: no power windows, no power-assisted steering, etc. 
Chassis System: solid axle suspension 
Warranty: 2 years or 40,000 km 
―Medium 
Three‖ 
Elantra (Elantra-6, Hyundai),  
Familia (Mazda-323, Mazda),  
Excelle (Nubira, GM-Daewoo) 
Around 2002 
Technical 
Features 
Styling: curve-based shape, streamlining 
Security: ABS, EBS, 2 airbags; 
Driving Comfort: power-assisted steering, PDC, power windows, air-conditioning with 
main console, CD player, etc. 
Chassis System: independent suspension 
Warranty: No general standard 
―New 
Three‖ 
Focus (Focus, Ford-Europe), 
Sagitar (Jetta-A5, Volkswagen),  
Peugeot307 (Peugeot307, Peugeot) 
Around 2006-2007 
Technical 
Features 
Styling: wide-bodied shape**, semi-coupe style 
Security: ABS, EBD, ESP, 4-6 airbags; 
Driving Comfort: CAN-bus, EPS, multifunction steering wheel, power-assisted steering, 
PDC, power window lift, air-conditioning with main console, intelligent voice guide 
system, DVD and MP3 player, Bluetooth application, etc. 
Chassis System: independent suspension with rear multi- link 
Warranty: 3 years or 100,000 km 
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Figure 5.8 Group-B firms chasing after products of MNCs (schema, car-making sector)  
 
In the telecom-equipment sector, Huawei and ZTE had developed beyond the ―product following 
strategy‖ implemented in previous phases, and became innovators in a global sense. The case 
below can present exactly such a shift. 
TextBox 5.4 Huawei’s leading capability in developing soft-switch technology 
Since 2003, Huawei began to win big deals through tough competition against international giants 
in global mainstream market for its WCDMA R4 equipment, for which Huawei‘s strength in 
soft-switch technology and in relevant derived solutions were critical.  
Before the real industrialisation of R4, the WCDMA (3G) network construction was dominated by 
the R99 version based on circuit-switch technology. The emergence of R99 was disruptive for the 
former 2G network (GSM) since it required the replacement of most existing equipment. By 
contrast, the development of R4 version, which was led by Huawei and only a few international 
competitors, could provide smooth evolution from the 2G system to 3G, because its embedded 
soft-switch technology promoted the compatibility of operation, reduced relevant hardware 
replacements and finally realised the near universality of the core-network layer between the 
GSM and the WCDMA systems. 
In the industrial community of WCDMA, Huawei was a latecomer outside the original 
constitution for the R99, R4, R5 or R6 versions of WCDMA in terms of the theoretical scheme
98
. 
However, its success in soft-switch technology and its R4 development exhibited systemic 
understanding held by its in-house engineers about the product and technical system of both 2G 
and 3G networks, since the original scheme of these standards did not indicate practical threads 
                                                 
98 The soft-switch technology and R4 version of WCDMA were not invented by Huawei. The R4 was schemed by the 
WCDMA industrial alliance as one-step of the evolution of WCDMA, and passed by ETSI (European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute) with soft-switch as an element included. However, technical standards only 
provided ideas and basic parameters. They could be realised only with the efforts of equipment providers in developing 
product systems and networking solutions. 
Year 
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for industrialised designs, especially for those creating smooth evolution for the installed 
equipment of the last generation. Otherwise, without substantial understanding, they would have 
followed the R99 version as other major global competitors did, since with a product follower 
strategy latecomer firms would study existing models on the market and develop their product 
systems by following the existing framework.  
Hereby, Huawei‘s global leadership in soft-switch technology reflected not only its progress in 
particular technologies but also, by its performance in reconstructing the mobile telecom systems, 
its accumulation of systemic understanding. Only with that, could Huawei invent a new technical 
trajectory, and develop the R4 into a competence-enhancing innovation for its customers rather 
than a competence-destroying solution, which was indeed disruptive for equipment providers 
concentrating on R99. Therefore, we can say Huawei was no longer a strategy follower. 
Certainly, we should not neglect the resources investment of Huawei: to realise this progress, 
Huawei invested at least 1 billion RMB each year during 1998-2004 for R&D in this field.  
In short, there were distinct differences between these two groups of domestic firms regarding the 
developmental activities. As the developmental activities in a long run could be regarded as the 
weathercock of strategic intent, the differences reflected that Group-A firms had deviated from 
their original intent of in-house technological capability building. The growing experience earned 
through TMFT practices had not brought forth any signs about strategic shift of Group-A firms 
until recently. By comparison, Group-B firms insisted on their original intent. Certainly, we 
cannot attribute the performance differences in capability-building as a whole to the difference of 
strategic intent. In the next chapter, we explore the organisational learning systems of these firms, 
which should be regarded as the organisational translation of strategic intent in the long run, and 
as the organisational platforms for the learning activities. 
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Chapter 6. Comparison: authority, organisational integration and 
knowledge accumulation 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the comparison of the authority over strategic resource allocation, the 
arrangements for organisational mobilisation and learning integration, and the facilities and 
institutions for knowledge accumulation between these two groups of firms.  
This empirical study will argue that the organisational learning systems established by Group-A 
firms were highly specialised but rigid. Resource allocation was dominated by top managers with 
backgrounds in production, marketing or finance rather than in the development of products or 
relevant complex technologies. The production localisation practices were divided into specialised 
domains and carried out by different organisational units. The scope for communication and 
knowledge conversion of the front-line engineers was confined within their specialised units. 
Correspondingly, the knowledge databases, if ever established, were unilaterally manipulated by 
knowledge gatekeepers of specialised units. The knowledge database was formed as the summary 
of experience collected every few years, or even as translated versions of manuals of their foreign 
partners. 
The learning activities of Group-B firms were organised differently. Top managers from product 
development divisions had more influence on allocating strategic resources. Even though a 
specialised structure of departments was also employed, institutions were set up to ensure the 
developmental activities were carried out on cross-boundary, inter-departmental organisational 
platforms. Substantial communications across specialised departments were guaranteed for 
engineers to facilitate their knowledge conversion. The knowledge database was set up as tightly 
coupled with the dynamic developmental activities; meanwhile it was also accessible to 
organisational members across a broad scope. In fact, in many cases, the knowledge database 
worked as the platform for the inter-departmental collaboration and learning in real time. 
6.2 Organisational learning systems of Group-A firms 
6.2.1 Authority over the allocation of strategic resources 
We take the formation of the top committee
99
 for strategy making of firms as the agent to be 
                                                 
99 The top committee, in this thesis, refers to the committee in charge of strategy making. The top committees vary in 
form from the directorate board to the executive management team (EMT) in different firms, and there may be overlaps of 
personnel between them. In most Group-A firms, it is the directorate board acting this role, especially noting that only at 
this level that Chinese sides can negotiate with foreign sides effectively. In Group-B firms, directorate boards are usually 
away from practical strategy making, but focus on maintaining and increasing the asset values. Certainly, the specific 
names of these agents would differ in different cases. 
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analysed for our study of their authority over the allocation of strategic resources. We cannot 
assert that such an agent accurately presents the distribution of decision-making power within 
these firms, but it at least exhibits the comparative importance of different divisions by reference 
to the allocation of strategic resources. 
In Group-A firms, the engineers who were expert in product and product technology development 
had little impact on the top committees. This can be explained by the following reasons: 
Firstly, the tradition of the central planning system mattered. The former governmental branch- 
based industrial administration, which was set up for static professionalization, had these 
backbone SOEs to focus on production and stay away from R&D to some extent. In backbone 
SOEs, there were only ―product office(s)‖ to handle incremental improvement tasks and the 
technical documents. Most SOEs relied on industrial research institutes for new product design 
and complex technological development. Alternatively, important product technologies were 
developed by government-led projects at the industry level. Therefore, when Group-A firms were 
transformed from SOEs, they carried on the production-oriented tradition for decision-making. 
Secondly, the legacy learned from the Soviets had also led to the inferiority of R&D in their 
power distribution. As noted, the modern Chinese industrialisation was largely influenced by the 
Soviet form when it began, which brought in some features of Soviet factories. To take the 
automobile industry as example, at that time, the automobile product models of Soviet Russia 
were largely transferred from other countries, such as the USA and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, 
the significance of in-house R&D was underestimated and the executing agencies were limited as 
only sub-department ―product office(s)‖. The situations of most Chinese SOEs were the same. 
Thirdly, in the early phases of Sino-foreign JVs, the Chinese R&D personnel had obvious 
disadvantages in terms of technological capabilities compared to foreign experts. This fact resided 
not only in the comparative ly backward status of the domestic community, but also in the legacy 
of central planning. The branch-based industrial administration had the SOEs and research 
institutes as executors of professional tasks only when the ministries worked as the headquarters 
for strategy-making of industries, which left the front-line economic units short of experience 
related to technological integration. When the open-door policy was implemented, local engineers 
found themselves deficient in handling the imported products and subsystems, which were 
complex and stressed integrations of multi-disciplinary technologies. This led to marginalisation 
of their roles within the organisations while the leading roles were attributed to the foreign sides. 
Fourthly, the practical business model focusing on the expansion of production localisation did 
not favour a workforce for in-house product development. The incomes of Group-A firms 
depended mainly on the localised production of imported models, while the in-house development 
of systemic products and complex technologies acted only as cost bearing rather than profit 
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making. So when the Group-A firms lacked confidence in the efficiency of their learning to catch 
up in technological capability, and perceived financial tensions in their early phases as dangerous, 
the in-house development of product and relevant complex product technology was regarded as 
risky and uneconomic, and thus not appreciated. In fact, in Group-A firms, the R&D teams and 
product developers were usually interrupted from their own schedules, and directed to the tasks of 
production localisation. Sometimes, such assignments were even permanent in the interests of 
organisational reform or modernisation
100
, which caused a somewhat irreversible weakening of 
the in-house labour forces for product development. 
Last but not least, from the accumulation of the above factors, the lack of indigenous product 
developmental activities led to a decline of real product developers in absolute amounts. For 
example, the number of engineers in FAW who had the abilit ies and could be mobilised to take 
part in configuring new car model development did not exceed 10 in 2006
101
. As the in-house 
development of product and relevant complex technology was marginalised, it was difficult for 
developers to attract younger generations to replenish the workforce. 
Therefore, in Group-A firms (see Table 6.1), the engineers from production lines held more power 
on top committees, as well as personnel from marketing and finance. As a legacy of the central 
planning era, the administrative cadre also had their voice on top committees. The R&D engineers 
usually had one but only one seat to represent the department-level R&D centre. 
Table 6.1 Structure of Top Committees of some Group-A firms (2007) 
Note: for the SAIC case, we calculate the data for the directorate boards and for the EMTs of the SAIC 
Group and of the SAIC Motor together. The SAIC Group had an 83.83% share of SAIC Motor. 
Take the FAW case in the table. On FAW‘s top committee in 2007, there were 5 of 10 who had not 
had engineering or technical backgrounds but were experts in other domains, such as 
administration, finance or human resources. Among the 5 with engineering and technical 
backgrounds, 2 were from the production lines. Another 2 out of the other 3 had technical 
development experience, but they gained this before the 1970s, before they were switched to 
management roles in workshops or factories. Only 1 of the 10 on FAW‘s top committee 
represented the R&D centre. However, except for basic research and design localisation of 
                                                 
100 An extreme case happened in the power equipment sector when XiYi, the largest power instrument provider in China, 
was encouraged to establish a JV with Yokogawa (Japan). In this JV, in the name of organisational reform, 200 product 
developers and scientists from XiYi‘s national-level R&D centre were allocated to the marketing and post-sales service 
departments. Only about ten scientists were left in a nominal R&D centre to carry out the model localisation tasks. 
101 From the interview with Zheng Cheng (2007), the chief configuration designer of RedFlag during 1958-1995. 
Managing and Decision-making Committee FAW DongFeng SAIC 
Total number of members 10 10 16 
-Members with technical or engineering background 5 6 5 
--Members with product development experience in car-making sector 3 0 0 
---Members with corresponding experience in the past two decades 0 0 0 
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imported models, the R&D centre had never officially carried out new product development in the 
car-making segment after 1994 (the centre was in charge of product development for trucks, but 
the truck division was not involved in the TMFT framework). 
6.2.2 Patterns of organising learning: a professional and rigid system 
With a primary stress on production localisation, the organisational systems of Group-A firms 
were built to be highly specialised but also rigid, which led to the fragmentary formulation of 
knowledge generation and accumulation. 
The localisation of production in Group-A firms was first divided into specialised tasks, and 
carried out by specialised affiliated or correlative firms and factories individually. As the imported 
product models had already been well developed, there were few uncertainties regarding 
job-allocation and technological integration among subsystems and components. Only when local 
participants could not reproduce some designs accurately enough or some subsystems had not 
been imported would in-depth interaction and cooperation among relevant local participants and 
foreign sides be implemented.  
Further, within every local organisation involved in such a process, a similar mechanism was 
implemented to study the imported designs. The learning requirements were divided into 
specialised segments. The chiefs of each segment played the leading roles, or in other words, they 
were the gatekeepers of technological learning. This brought fundamental difficulties to bear for 
mobilising organisational members and for integrating learning activities. 
6.2.2.1 Learning among firms based on production localisation 
The production localisation of imported models was divided into specialised tasks among a series 
of affiliated or correlative firms and factories, namely the integrators, associated suppliers, 
affiliated subsidiaries and in-house factories. For example, for Shanghai-Volkswagen, over 400 
domestic firms were involved in cooperating with Volkswagen and global suppliers appointed by 
Volkswagen to establish the local manufacturing and supply system. As for Shanghai-GM, the 
number of new foreign-local cooperations was some 300 since Shanghai-GM was able to make 
use of some localised suppliers of Shanghai-Volkswagen. 
In reference to each task that corresponded to particular subsystems or components, the designs 
had been well developed and frozen by their original foreign developers. Thus after the tasks had 
been assigned, learning was carried out separately by associated firms and subsidiaries, not tightly 
coordinated by the productive JV or the corresponding Group-A firm in terms of detailed learning 
activities. Therefore production localisation was carried out without any organisation becoming 
responsible for real technological integration. In such a system, the organisations which were 
named as ―integrative‖ or ―general‖ were not really responsible for integrating the learning 
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activities among participant organisations. For instance, the ―general leading office‖ that was 
established during the construction of the local manufacturing and supply network was only 
responsible for the layout of tasks, the generation of schedules and administration relevant to the 
time and resource dimensions. The general assembly factory, as integrator in terms of the physical 
shape of products, was just to accomplish the final manufacturing and assembly. In product 
development sequences there was no concrete learning activity at the systemic product level 
among participant organisations.  
From this, it can be claimed that production localisation was constructed out of segmentally 
specialised manufacturing services provided by participant organisations. The technical 
interactions among these service providers were framed by well-designed interfaces within the 
product system. The contents of communications among them, certainly, were based on the 
dimensions of these interfaces, such as the sizes and positions of components and the power 
takeoff of the engine. The communications were carried out at firm/factory level only, by 
representative personnel who might not be engineers. It was impossible for front-line engineers in 
one participant organisation to mobilise resources, information and personnel from another 
cooperating organisation in real time for the needs of development and learning. 
Table 6.2 Local participants for the production localisation of Santana (exampl es, incomplete) 
Table 6.2 lists a few of the 400 participant organisations involved in the production localisation of 
the Santana model. The segment-based specialised system was coordinated with governmental 
support, similar to the ―1240 Bureau‖ which was supported by the government to coordinate the 
production localisation of the S1240 PDSS produced by Shanghai-Bell. An alliance named 
Companies Tasks 
Shanghai Automotive Gear Works. Gear box manufacturing 
Shanghai GKN Drive Shaft Co. Drive shaft manufacturing 
Shanghai Huizhong Auto Manufacturing Co. Chassis assemblies, e.g. front suspension, sub-frame, 
rear axle, control arm and shock absorber 
Shanghai Sanden Behr Auto Air Conditioning Co. Air conditioning system manufacturing 
Shanghai SIIC Transportation Electric Co. Auto motors, auto electric and electronic appliances  
China Spring Factory Automotive suspension springs, engine valve springs, 
stabilizer bars, die springs, shaped springs, etc. 
Yanfeng Visteon Auto Trim Systems Co. Trims, including electronics subsystems (multimedia,  
cluster, HVAC controls), seat subsystems, overhead 
subsystems (door panels, instrument panels, console, 
pillar trims, soft trim), exterior subsystems (fascia, 
cladding, grille) and safety subsystems (steering wheel, 
airbags, seat belts) 
Shanghai Koito Auto Lamp Co.  Lamps manufacturing 
Kolbenschmidt Shanghai Piston Co. Piston manufacturing 
Shanghai Auto Clutch Works. Clutch manufacturing 
Shanghai Delphi Auto Air Conditioning Systems Co. Air conditioner manufacturing 
Shanghai Ri Yong - JEA Gate Electric Co. Radiator fan assembly manufacturing 
Shanghai Powder and Metallurgy Plant  Producing iron-based powder metallurgy parts 
…[others] …  
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―Shanghai Santana Localization Community‖ was formed in 1988, headed by SAIC and 
Volkswagen, with 105 founding suppliers, 16 research institutes and banks. This did not mean that 
before 1998 SAIC did all the developmental tasks in-house. Rather, before 1988, SAIC only did 
the assembly based on CKD imports, except for a short list of localised peripheral components 
such as the tyres, radio, horn, antenna, and nameplate. 
In order to provide qualified manufacturing services, most participant organisations were required 
to establish JVs or technical cooperation with foreign partners in the original value network of 
Volkswagen. Similar patterns of learning to the Group-A firms were also implemented for 
integrated products. Again, we do not mean to deny the progress that domestic suppliers had 
obtained through carrying out TMFT practices in terms of precision processing and managerial 
skills. However, these local participants also had to tie them to foreign partners, and many of them 
had no independent strategy and implementation of product or critical technology development. 
For example, the Shanghai Clutch Factory had already been well-known in the domestic 
community for its product development capability. Even in the central planning era, it could 
actively develop customised clutches for many users. Nevertheless, in order to suit itself to the 
production localisation led by Shanghai-GM, it was encouraged to transfer itself into a JV with ZF 
Sachs AG, as introduced by GM in 2002. In spite of the promotion of processing technologies, its 
product development team had been cut off. Thereby, when its previous domestic customers 
contacted it for new product development, Shanghai-Sachs, the JV, had already lost the capability 
that Shanghai Clutch Factory previously had, and could provide only products mainly based on 
the existing designs of Sachs. 
As for the Group-A telecom-equipment firms, the situations there were similar. For example, the 
LSI chip production of S1240 was localised by BeiLing, a productive Sino-foreign JV, which was 
built according to the original Shanghai-Bell contract. However, the construction and 
development of BeiLing had little to do with the learning practices of Chinese engineers in 
Shanghai-Bell. Certainly, from another perspective, Shanghai-BeiLing did have little technical 
information to communicate in practice other than its processing dimensions. What it did in the 
localisation was just to set up the manufacturing base. The major equipment that it used had been 
well developed or appointed by the foreign side, and the products it processed had been well- 
encapsulated by the Belgium BTM. Without touching the substantial technological contents of the 
objects, namely the designs of ICs, and without integrative thinking about the relevant interfaces, 
Shanghai-BeiLing really had very little to communicate to Shanghai-Bell in terms of micro-level 
knowledge creation, and vice versa. 
6.2.2.2 Learning within firms based on production localisation 
Within each participant organisation, the division of labour for production localisation also 
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entailed institutionalised barriers for front-line practitioners to generate understanding of the 
product systems. Being directed to imitate the imported models as accurately as possible, the tasks 
of localisation they carried out were also divided into specialised segments. The chief experts and 
administrators worked as leaders for the learning activities within each specialised segment, 
whom we refer to as the ―gatekeepers‖ of knowledge creation within corresponding organisational 
units. In the flux stages of production localisation, these leading roles were fulfilled by foreign 
experts who were temporarily sent in by the foreign side.  
In fact, the knowledge-gatekeeper institution is broadly adopted in firms, including Group-B firms. 
Some scholars, such as Allen and Cohen (1969) and Tushman (1977), stress the importance of 
―gate-keeping‖ and ―boundary-spanning‖ in organisations. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that 
the absorptive capacities of firms depend on the individuals who stand either at the interfaces 
between the firm and the external environment or at the interfaces between subunits within the 
firm. Particularly for technical information that is difficult for internal staff to assimilate, the 
gatekeepers both monitor the environment and translate the technical information into forms 
understandable to the internal group (ibid, p132).  
During the development of Group-A firms, the chief experts of specialised segments did work 
actively on translating technical information about production localisation into understandable 
language for affiliated members. Within their organisational units, they worked as leaders for the 
decomposition, assignment and coordination of tasks, and to ensure the efficiency of 
specialisation. However, their role of monitoring the outcomes of organisational learning which 
converged on existing imported designs should be especially underlined. Since to imitate 
imported models as accurately as possible was regarded as critical for production localisation, and 
as economical for technological learning, the gatekeepers stressed realising the imported 
well-designed details rather than exploring any heterogeneous ideas. Heterogeneous ideas were 
regarded as bringing about design changes and additional ―unnecessary‖ uncertainty, which 
implied unstable, unexpected and additional time- and resource-consuming outcomes, and then 
were not appreciated by the business models and learning patterns of Group-A firms.  
Therefore, from the perspective of knowledge creation, the gatekeepers handled the information 
that arose within their organisational range by working as learning organisers and information 
filters to select and record particular knowledge flows. The intellectual outcomes that were taken 
as irrelevant to the organisational goal of imitating the existing imported model, no matter 
whether it was tacit or codified, would not be recorded as organisational memory and would not 
be transferred through the gatekeepers to the upper level of the organisation. If we apply this point 
to the SECI knowledge spiral (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka and Toyama, 2002), the chief 
experts here worked as the split-flow valve of technical information flow (see Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Information gatekeepers of the SECI process 
 
Note: the original figure of the SECI process is from Nonaka and Toyama (2002, p996) 
 
Such a gatekeeper arrangement depressed the amount of heterogeneous thinking and discussion 
carried out by subordinate engineers. Besides, the in-depth cross-boundary platforms of 
communication and learning interaction among front-line engineers from different segments were 
inactive, since these would be opposed to control by gatekeepers. 
However, a diverse knowledge structure within an organisation was critical to elicit learning and 
problem-solving leading to innovation (Simon, 1985). The gatekeepers of Group-A firms worked 
beyond directing and translating external information for in-house learning, but restricted the 
range of knowledge search and conversion. Under such a system, they aimed at avoiding the 
trial-and-error process of learning as waste. Learning and knowledge accumulation was directed 
to follow the imported designs that were finite in amount. Particularly since the interfaces within 
imported products had been well developed by the foreign sides and local learning tasks were 
divided by these interfaces, the lack of effective cross-boundary organisational platforms 
undermined learners‘ understanding about the interfaces, relevant design logics and system 
integration. Therefore, what had been built through the learning practices based on production 
localisation in Group-A firms was a highly fragmentary knowledge creation system regarding the 
product systems and product-relevant technologies. 
6.2.2.3 Learning based on in-house R&D 
As already observed, there were still R&D personnel, R&D departments and R&D activities in 
Group-A firms. The in-house R&D forces of Group-A firms could be legacies accumulated before 
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the TMFT era
102
, or were developed in response to governmental encouragement or requirements, 
or were invested in according to a ―production plus R&D‖ strategy. Regarding the last source, 
decision-makers of Group-A firms thought by financing in-house R&D activities they could 
promote technological capability building naturally only if these activities were really R&D- 
relevant and carried out in-house. Such thinking could be understood as the ―absorptive capacity‖ 
model in a narrow sense. However, significant barriers resulting from the organisational learning 
systems and underlying institutions impeded the effectiveness of this strategy. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the marginalised role of the in-house R&D workforces in product 
development could not simply be attributed to the lack of R&D investment. Even with concerns 
of financial tension, the financial situations of Group-A firms in their early phases were still much 
better than those of Group-B firms. In terms of R&D personnel, as backbone SOEs, Group-A 
firms also had occupied most elites of the former central planning industrial system (see the last 
footnote for the case of FAW). Indeed, because of the original intent of indigenous technological 
capability building formulated by the TMFT policy, there were generally special clauses in JV 
contracts to stipulate the ratio of revenue for R&D expenditure. Relevant overseas programmes 
for training R&D personnel were also scheduled. In Shanghai-Bell, the R&D foundation was cited 
in the contract as 3% of annual sales
103
. In Shanghai-Volkswagen, 3% of the sale value was 
obligated to building a technical centre. The actual R&D expenditures were even higher than the 
cited ratios as their financial situation became better and better in practice (see Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 Ratio of R&D expenditure to sales revenue (telecom-equipment sector)  
Source: calculated by using the information published in the “Top 100 Chinese ICT firms” lists of MII 
Therefore, the narrow-sense definition of ―absorptive capacity‖ measured by the quantity of R&D 
                                                 
102 For example, FAW was arranged to merge two governmental research institutes in 1979. Before that, it had only one 
product office and one design office as development forces, both small as sub-department units. The new R&D centre of 
FAW built in 1979 consisted of three parts: in addition to the design office of FAW and the Changchun Materials Research 
Institute, the largest part was the Changchun Automobile Research Institute, which was founded earlier than FAW in 1950 
and was the largest national research institute specialised in the automobile technology. Even in the early 2000s, the R&D 
centre of FAW was still the largest in the Chinese automobile industry with nearly 2000 employees among which over 
1300 were S&T personnel. It ranked the 5th among all governmental research institutes in 2002 with 1000 ―S&T 
achievements‖ in total, 200 of them awarded by ministry-level or higher governmental bureaus. 
103 For the deficit of Shanghai-Bell before 1988, this clause was in effect practised from 1989 on. 
Groups Firms 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Group-A PTIC  2.96% 0.95% 0.91% NA NA NA 
Panda  0.52% 0.88% 1.60% 1.18% 1.18% 1.24% 
Beijing-international  2.90% 4.10% 8.06% 4.81% - - 
Shanghai-Bell  5.60% 5.25% 5.81% 7.10% 7.29% 7.60% 
Group-B Huawei  13.62% 18.79% 17.75% 14.67% 12.53% 10.11% 
ZTE  11.96% 10.34% 9.49% 7.63% 9.92% 9.08% 
DTT  11.79% 12.33% 6.23% - - - 
WRI  - 6.51% 5.37% 6.51% 4.70% 5.49% 
JinPeng  1.33% 1.00% 2.22% 2.77% 3.01% 6.78% 
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investment could not disclose the source of poor performance of the in-house R&D workforce of 
Group-A firms in terms of systemic product or complex technology development, which was 
especially distinct compared with the Group-B firms in their early phases. The hardship of 
Group-A firms on this score originated more from internal organisational barriers. 
For the localisation of imported models, foreign experts led or supervised most product 
adjustment projects carried out locally. Further, since the foreign sides owned the inspecting and 
confirming rights for any technical change based on original imported designs, they rooted out the 
possibilities for in-house developers to initiate product development projects based on imported 
designs even of their own conception. 
As for the production localisation, generic activities acted as the central arena of collective 
learning by occupying the main workforce and investment. However, as always, the gatekeepers 
of segmental organisational units reduced the in-depth cross-boundary communication with 
external units because it contradicted their learning targets. Even within segmental units, 
heterogeneous ideas were not welcomed. Rather, learning was directed to generate outcomes that 
converged towards imported designs. The knowledge search implemented by participants was 
strictly restrained within a very limited neighbourhood centring on the imitation of original 
designs. This system brought about organisational barriers for in-house R&D forces to mobilise 
relevant learning from these teams and departments, and much reduced the diversity of 
knowledge among relevant members. Additionally, the learning tasks of production localisat ion 
were divided and carried out by different segmental units, departments, and even externally 
associated firms. Such a structure of labour division added to the difficulties in quantity and 
quality for R&D personnel to overcome if they wanted to integrate the learning activities carried 
out by each organisational unit. In fact, it was almost impossible to realise without authorization 
and cooperation from the highest level since in Group-A firms there were no institutionalised 
arrangements to facilitate the R&D personnel to overcome the above organisational barriers. 
Therefore, in Group-A firms, organisational barriers were set, even if unintentionally, for the 
benefits of static professionalization. Without any corresponding institutions to help them, the 
in-house R&D staff were hardly likely to mobilise resources and workforces for learning from 
other departments or associated firms. However, as recognised by some scholars, development 
should not be thought of as the application of scientific knowledge, but incorporates engineering 
knowledge from many sources (Rosenberg and Steinmueller, 1988, p232). The knowledge 
accumulation based on industrialisation processes is necessary to realise the robustness of product 
development. However, in Group-A firms, the potential in-house integrators of learning were 
impeded or even isolated from their laboratories and scientific knowledge by a series of 
organisational barriers. 
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For the product development projects launched in Group-A firms, that did not happen often, nor 
was the situation improved much unless corresponding organisational systems were changed. 
Since the in-house R&D forces had rare impacts on the decision-making, the learning pattern 
would not be developed to allocate and apply resources and to schedule cooperation according to 
the demands centred on R&D personnel for development in real time (if they knew about these). 
Ironically, under such a system, even the R&D workforces themselves would be also incorporated 
into a similar specialised but rigid system to the engineering departments. The case of JiaBao was 
a good example of this (see TextBox 6.1). 
TextBox 6.1 JiaBao project of FAW 
The JiaBao was minibus model launched by FAW. For its first batch of formal products, side-roll 
happened when the vehicle passed sharp turns at high speed in case of slippery road conditions.  
When this model was developed since 1996, an inter-departmental team was organised. However, 
since resources were firmly controlled by the top-down hierarchy, and practical tasks were 
implemented as department-based, the members of inter-departmental team were just 
representatives of departments, and the practical function of this team was just to assign resources 
and tasks. Hence, when several testing engineers did realise the hidden trouble of side-roll
104
, they 
had no official way to request specific technical experiments that would cost time and resources, 
and cause a series of technical revisions relevant to many departments. They even had no official 
channel to pass this thought upwards since it was related to the systemic design and was already 
beyond their limits at that stage. People around were also reluctant to respond seriously, since 
most front-line engineers were also unable to stimulate such a big change, and then they just 
avoided to be the trigger to a risky ―expensive‖ trouble. Finally, when the message was informally 
passed to the top manager in charge, it came just as a rumour. The commander neglected it as a 
rumour coming up without serious technical details. But ironically, in such an organisation, before 
the problem was seriously identified, the specific testing scheme would not be authorized with 
resource support to generate corresponding codified details.  
Thereby, although it might not be intentionally arranged by Group-A firms, in-house R&D forces 
were practical marginalised within their organisations. Considering that, in addition to 
participating in adjustment projects, R&D forces turned to get self-satisfied with initiating 
projects within their mobilisation range, such as ―basic research‖ or other fragmentary projects, as 
we pointed out in Chapter 5 (see the Subsection 5.2.5), which were certainly away from the 
learning activities carried out by other departments based on practical engineering tasks.  
                                                 
104 They found systemic developers had adopted the ―disc-brake‖ rather than the ―drum-brake‖. Based on uncodified 
experience of theirs, side-roll would likely happen under particular conditions considering the dynamic system and the 
weight distribution of this vehicle. 
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The practice of Group-A firms could be worse. For the gradual shift of strategic intent and the 
growing pessimism over indigenous product development, the authority of in-house R&D forces 
in Group-A firms had not been broadened, rather been narrowed. In DongFeng, since the firm 
continued setting up new productive JVs with MNCs, its in-house R&D forces were disintegrated 
and allocated as assets to JVs piece by piece to do model localisation, technical testing and other 
similar activities. It only kept almost the minimum forces in reserve for the development of 
electric- and military-use vehicles, which were appointed by Chinese government as the read-line 
for DongFeng. 
6.2.3 Knowledge database and supportive institutions 
To study the knowledge accumulation systems that domestic firms established can help to analyse 
their institutional arrangements for knowledge generation and accumulation. We categorise the 
relevant arrangements into two groups: one is the devices constructed, in other words, the 
foreground institutions to direct knowledge accumulation; second is the backed mechanisms 
developed to ensure and enhance knowledge accumulation. In general, Group-A firms had not 
developed the ―comprehensive knowledge databases‖. 
6.2.3.1 Facilities for knowledge accumulating 
In Group-A firms, there were no general database opened broadly to general front-line 
practitioners. Knowledge was collected by chief experts and administrative managers of 
specialised segments, and along the practices of production localisation the collection of 
intellectual outcomes was selected. The knowledge integration from the segment level to the 
factory level was accomplished by chief experts of segments and the corresponding factory, with 
the associated of specialised technicians The SECI process for most engineers, technicians and 
workers was limited within their segments. As for broader scope of organisation, the frequencies 
and intensiveness of SECI processes of knowledge conversion fell sharply.  
At firm level, the ―product office‖ or ―technology office‖ was the place to build up the knowledge 
database both for blueprints of imported models and for in-house accumulated experience. As for 
the imported models, as mentioned, Group-A firms were not offered full sets of blueprints, but 
only those parts that were relevant to the manufacturing tasks that were really carried out locally. 
As for experience gained through production localisation, the keepers did not integrate or further 
process the collected information. Rather they just edited them. Their inaction as knowledge 
integrator was partly due to their inability since these specialised ―knowledge workers‖ were far 
away from practical activities and relevant SECI processes, in addition to their lack of motivation 
and resources as support. So experience collected was generally represented as un-compiled 
documents and well-edited ―operational handbooks‖ or ―operational manuals‖. These manuals 
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and handbooks were accessible to general organisational members, but they included only 
summaries of experience about processing engineering and operational managerial approaches. 
Seldom information about the development of product and relevant complex product technology 
was included for the lack of relevant activities. In some Group-A firms, the ―operational 
handbook‖ was even only the localised or edited version of the handbook or manual of their 
foreign partners since they were short of effective knowledge accumulation or confidence. 
In recent years in some prominent R&D centres of Group-A firms, such as the Pan Asia Technical 
Automotive Centre Co. (PATAC) of SAIC-GM, in-house R&D forces began to collect technical 
information on competing products. However, the data they collected were only those originating 
from mapping such products, which were rudimentary in terms of both technical depth and 
breadth. Particularly since the practitioners did not have to make trade-offs among the massive 
technical details within the complex system under any pressure of carrying out real product 
development in-house for practical product projects, they were insensitive and inefficient at 
searching for and locating underlying technical details during the reverse engineering. These 
capabilities could not be improved unless they had real product development experience as with 
learning by doing. Besides, the building of product knowledge accumulation in this way had little 
connection to engineering experience gained through production localisation because neither side 
had the motivation or organisational channels to do so.  
In fact, since the learning practices were costly regarding the time and resources consumed, the 
accumulation of knowledge was again related to matters of governance and resource allocation. 
Since resources were not allocated for implementing the development of systemic products and 
complex product technologies, there were hardly opportunities for Group-A firms to establish 
strong databases in these domains. Their development in some Group-A firms is summarised in 
Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Knowledge database development of Group-A firms  
Firms Comprehensive knowledge 
database 
Notes 
FAW No. Only for manufacturing 
and localised projects. 
Only blueprints of imported models and data on localised 
adjustment were retained; blueprints of imported models were 
incomplete in terms of technology; experience based on 
manufacturing operations was accumulated as manuals. 
SAIC 1- No (SAIC-China)  
2-Yes (SAIC-UK Technical 
Centre Limited), but only 
for the UK part. 
3- Yes (SAIC-SsangYong), 
but only for the SsangYong 
Regarding SAIC-China, similar to that of FAW, though manuals 
were partly based on translation of foreign original copies. 
Regarding SAIC-UK, there was no official regularised channel for 
sharing knowledge with SAIC-China. Regarding SAIC-Ssang, the 
policy of SAIC was the same as SAIC-UK. Now SAIC has lost even 
operational control of this firm. 
DongFeng No. Only for manufacturing 
and localised projects. 
Similar to FAW. Moreover, the IPRs were supervised by the foreign 
side. 
Shanghai 
-Bell 
No. Only for manufacturing 
and localised projects. 
Similar to FAW 
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6.2.3.2 Arrangements to promote knowledge accumulation 
The mechanism that upheld the knowledge database building of Group-A firms was primarily 
interwoven with their other institutional arrangements for organising learning. Their relationships 
with foreign partners led to an inability to obtain full sets of blueprints and technical data of 
imported models, and so Chinese engineers lost their dominance in most local product adjustment 
projects. Their authority over strategic resource allocation, having marginalised the in-house R&D 
workforce for product and relevant technology development, led to its difficulties in mobilising 
resources from other departments for integrative learning. This point also relates to their learning 
organisational patterns that separated R&D from production localisation practices and divided the 
latter into specialised individual segments. The knowledge gatekeepers were set up to maximise 
static professionalization of the learning activities for production localisation, but on the contrary 
impeded the range and extent of organisational activities with which central knowledge databases 
of firms could deeply interact.  
Without changing the above institutional arrangements accordingly, the knowledge accumulation 
mechanisms of Group-A firms could not be substantially promoted for the benefits of generating 
systemic understanding of product and complex product technologies. 
The situation for some Group-A firms in practice could be worse. Take DongFeng as an example: 
after setting up the JV with Nissan in 2003, it lost most of its in-house R&D personnel as an 
independent team to employ. Within DongFeng-Nissan, according to the JV contract, the foreign 
side stipulated clearly that the ―information officer‖ post of the newly set-up R&D centre must be 
assigned by Nissan. Thereby, it was impossible for indigenous subsidiaries of DongFeng to obtain 
any direct technical spillover from DongFeng-Nissan. The new R&D centre became a pure 
information deliverer, serving concerted production localisation.  
SAIC presented another extreme. It could access three large databases, but it had not effectively 
utilised them. Firstly, PATAC, the R&D centre jointly held by SAIC and GM, could access and 
work on the global database of GM. However, since the database was GM‘s exclusive property, 
GM strictly supervised every project based on it, and forbade it from being used by or diffused to 
any projects that might raise competition against GM. So using this database, what PATAC could 
develop were concept cars that were far from being industrialised. Secondly, through equity 
purchases, SAIC acquired the technical database of MG Rover and SsangYong, but SAIC had not 
built up any effective linkage in terms of knowledge sharing or developmental activities in real 
time between them and the R&D or engineering forces in China. As to the SsangYong case, the 
database was closely supervised by the Korean workers‘ union to prevent knowledge from being 
164 
 
transmitted to China
105
. The database of MG Rover and PTL was built into the core asset of the 
SAIC-UK centre. But until now, this centre has been held in trust by Ricardo as a 
quasi-independent technical service firm to SAIC, and there was no sign that tight connection of 
developmental activities would be built to link potential counterpart activities in China.  
The situation for Shanghai-Bell was somewhat different. Since it could provide customised 
network solutions for local customers, this brought some related accumulation. However, as 
mentioned above, it was separated from the development of products adopted in its network 
solutions, which came from its partner MNC
106
. Other telecom-equipment Group-A firms seldom 
worked as independent bidders in the market, and correspondingly they did not have any 
independent database about product development or significant technical development. 
6.2.4 Analysis: specialised and rigid organisational learning systems of Group-A firms 
Group-A firms had thus transformed their organisations for facilitating production localisation and 
relevant technological learning under the TMFT framework. For the first-movers among Group-A 
firms, such organisational transformations were carried out under similar circumstances, namely 
the governmental expectations, the attitudes of the foreign sides, the financial concerns and their 
own views embedded in social cognition about technological learning and catching-up at that time. 
Even though there is no direct evidence that any Chinese authority ever tried to persuade Group-A 
firms with details of learning patterns except for the general model introduced in Chapter 4, the 
organisational systems of Group-A firms turned out to possess great similarities. That is, the 
developers of systemic product and relevant complex product technology were marginalised in 
decision-making for strategic resource allocation. Learning through production localisation was 
carried out by a specialised and rigid system that could facilitate the efficiency of mastering 
production skills within the pre-determined technical and organisational structures, but was 
fragmentary in organisational mobilisation and learning integration. Knowledge databases were 
built up without purposeful integration between manufacturing and product-oriented R&D, and 
among different segments. Heterogeneous thoughts relevant to product and technical systems 
were depressed along their learning based on production localisation practices. Thus, with 
carrying out activities buttressed by such organisational systems for long, their intent of 
technological capability building has also gradually faded away. 
                                                 
105 But for the tough strike which has been raised by Korean employees started before SAIC‘s entry and has lasted over 3 
years. SAIC gave up management authority over SsangYong from Feb 2009. 
106 Certainly, considering the change of its dominance to Alcatel from 2001, as  a substantial body of Alcatel-Lucent, there 
are signs that very recently some functions of Alcatel-Lucent‘s global R&D would possibly be transferred in, which is to 
utilise the local R&D strength brought by Group-B firms and being recognised in recent years, and also one part of the 
wave of MNC‘s utilising Chinese local R&D workers in some industries from early 2000 (Xue et al. 2002).  
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Here, for discussion based on the summary of Group-A firms, we have two points to stress. Firstly, 
we must point out that building their kind of organisational systems was primarily a question of 
cognition, selection, and then implementation. Such a process must be associated with cognition, 
investment, organisational cohesion, trial-and-error practices and accompanying organisational 
capabilities. Otherwise, it might seem that to improve the efficiency of technological capability 
building, Group-A firms only needed to set up new arrangements according to some guidebooks 
about advanced management. 
Consider the case of the ―SanKouLe‖ model, by which a minicar model was spontaneously 
developed by a dozen of FAW engineers without official permission (see the Appendix-1). When 
this project was exposed to FAW‘s authority as a technical success, the president of FAW at that 
time was to give relevant engineers an award. However, other executive managers and common 
engineers opposed this proposal, and their reason to deny it was in the name that such an award 
would distract the attention of the whole organisation from stressing the production localisation in 
process of Audi-100. Thereby, participants of SanKouLe on the contrary got a serious official 
warning instead. In this case, the volition of the FAW president was overwhelmed by the existing 
organisational learning system, including the other top authority holders, the middle-level of 
managers and technical chiefs and the organisational culture. 
Starting from this point, to change the system, potential reformers not only had to deal with the 
organisational inertia, but also had to work out new pattern of learning. Reformers must get 
effective support based on organisational cohesion to realise the ―Pareto improvement‖ with two 
targets as promoting production localisation and in-house technological capability simultaneously. 
However, the leaders of Group-A firms themselves did not have relevant experience; and they had 
seldom colleagues around who obtained experience or knowledge of this to consult. This might be 
dissimilar to the circumstances in general in industrially advanced countries. In fact, before the 
success of Group-B telecom-equipment firms became to be recognised in the 2
nd
 half of 1990s, 
the Chinese industrial community had not experienced significant success with such a ―dual-target‖ 
in mass manufacturing civil industries. Therefore, at that time if Group-A firms leaders could not 
invent, they would also have not domestic first-mover samples under the same or similar external 
conditions to follow about how to translate their intent into developing such ambidextrous 
organisations. The fact was that there had not been any substantial collective move or attempt 
among Group-A firms in these two sectors to carry out organisational reforms for such a change. 
Secondly, considering Group-A firms‘ organisational learning patterns, we encounter a ―what‖ 
question regarding the SECI process of knowledge creation. As the SECI process is based on the 
communication and ―learning by doing‖ activities of organisational members (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995), the outcomes of ―knowledge to be created‖ are certainly related to their 
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communications and activities. Therefore, the efficiency certainly matters, as we can see among 
most Group-A firms the learning about manufacturing was quite successful, but the input control, 
process control and relevant institutions should also be questioned at the foreground of studies. 
Questions about who controlled the resources for the SECI process, who were mobilised and what 
information was allowed to be loaded are not negligible. 
To explore these questions, we still need to dig more empirical evidences, as what we will do 
regarding the cases of Group-B firms. Anyway, based on analyses on hand, we can figure out that 
conventional advocacies of bottom-up technological learning patterns for DCs usually entail a 
series of presumptions that might not have been pronounced by their advocators. For example, 
―the activities corresponding to the practices of lower-level capabilities could generate 
higher-level knowledge‖, ―the decision-makers of firms contain sufficient motivation, knowledge 
and ability to mobilise their organisations to achieve capability-building‖, and ―corresponding 
organisational learning processes are well integrated‖, etc. According to our analyses of Group-A 
firms, these presumptions should not be taken for granted, although we are not simply to deny the 
practices of bottom-up trajectory. 
6.3 Organisational learning systems of Group-B firms 
In this section, we follow a similar structure of the last section to explore the organisational 
learning systems of Group-B firms. 
6.3.1 Authority over allocation of strategic resources 
Persistent strategic intent regarding the in-house capability building had Group-B firms advance 
with sizable stretch coming from the gap of their current capabilities and resources with the ends 
of their organisations (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). Correspondingly, institutions built to address 
the strategic resource allocation were required to ensure a long-term commitment to technological 
capability building and to realise the appropriate efficiency of technological learning. 
By comparison with Group-A firms, the R&D personnel had substantial influences in decision- 
making of Group-B firms. Since most Group-B firms were new entrants and not included in the 
TMFT framework, the in-house product development was the basis of their business. Their 
strategy to run the product-oriented competition (see Section 5.5.3 in Chapter 5) also urged the 
developers of systemic products and relevant product technologies to be located in the centre 
stage of the strategic resource allocation and tasks scheming. It was because R&D personnel 
obviously had advantages in identifying and comprehending activities related to the product and 
technology development, particularly considering that in the domestic industrial community, the 
relevant experience did not exist prevalently. Besides, the authority structures within Group-B 
firms were also closely path dependent. As Group-B firms all grew up from small organisations 
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led by their original product and technology development teams, core members of these teams did 
have more opportunities to participate in decision-making. For example, ZTE was built by a 
spin-off team from the ―Technical Office‖ of the No. 691 factory affiliated to Ministry of 
Aerospace Industry. HaFei Auto was a the spin-off team from the R&D centre of HaFei Aircraft. 
Huawei was an entirely newly set firm in the private sector, but its earliest core of organisation 
was also a small product development team
107
. After they were set up, Group-B firms had to 
survive through a series of challenges by having their products be competitive, and by expanding 
the breadth and depth of knowledge in response to rapid changes of the industries. The relevant 
experience also enhanced the significance of R&D personnel within their organisations. However, 
we cannot regard the dominance of R&D personnel in strategic resource allocation as an easy 
arrangement to recognise, select and implement by organisations. It could entail intensive 
organisational conflicts and struggles. The case of authority contest in Geely exactly presented 
this point.  
Geely started as a family-control firm led by LI ShuFu. Around 2001, other family members by 
blood quitted its car-making business since they regarded it as high-risk
108
, which gave LI a 
chance to reform the firm. Experienced engineers and technical managers were introduced from 
outside and a somehow ―dual leadership‖ management system was formed for its regional bases109: 
the finance and routine managerial operations were supervised by a general or deputy general 
manager from the LI‘s inner circle. Meanwhile the strategy making at least regarding the R&D 
relevant activities was led by an experienced manager with technological and engineering 
backgrounds that Geely recruited from external. Besides, a central R&D centre was built up as the 
heart of Geely as for the mid-term and long-term product schedules and the development of 
complex technologies, which was also led by professionals. Therefore, the legacy of family 
control supervised the money flows and the comparatively static operations; meanwhile the 
professionals led the dynamic parts, i.e. the product and critical technology development and the 
relevant expansion of production capacities. 
However, it did not mean a complete transition of the organisation. A conflict about the supply 
chain happened during 2004-2005, with the contradiction between the family-control legacy and 
the professional force lying behind. A reform was generated only with the intervention of Li with 
his absolute authority, and only because it came to a vital occasion entailing ―life or death‖. 
TextBox 6.2 Contest about the reform of the first-tier supply chain of Geely 
                                                 
107 Certainly, in order to raise their initial capital, they both had several years‘ history in running other bus iness. Huawei 
did agent sales of imported PDSS, and ZTE did OEM manufacturing of electronics.  
108 Later, one other family member also ran a car-maker that manufacturing Alto, namely the model imported from 
Suzuki. 
109 The structure of Geely could be regarded as one central R&D centre and six regional bases (data from 2008). Each 
base had fully functional administration from R&D, manufacturing, marketing and post -sale services.  
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During 2004-2005, Geely was in difficulties for the insufficient qualities of components provided 
by a number of its first-tier suppliers. The component problems delayed the developmental 
process of ongoing product developmental projects, and caused bad performances of existing 
product models launched on the market. Professional engineers and technical managers could not 
tolerate the situation, and proclaimed a reform upon the supply chain. However, it in essence 
challenged the tradition associated with the force of family control. 
Quality problems happened to many first-tier suppliers which had quasi-permanent cooperation 
with Geely since Geely still focused on its motorcycle and building materials business (from 
1994, and the late 1980s respectively). For long-term cooperation and cross-shareholding, they 
had in fact become an extension of LI‘s inner circle, and showed cohesion to follow Geely by 
taking the risks to enter the car-making business since 1997. Thereby, many executive managers 
standing for the family control force opposed this reform and raised a server controversy on the 
top committee. They claimed in the name of stability that for the public identification of Geely as 
latecomer, it was difficult to find other close co-operators for sharing the risks of product 
development. Finally, LI and one vice president (from his inner circle as well) voted to support the 
reform and entrusted the reform to a committee dominated by professionals. Through the reform, 
Geely eliminated bad-performing suppliers, and imposed supervision on the governance and 
technological management of other first-tier suppliers at least for temporally.  
The scheme cost in total two years for Geely to realise. A few top managers got demoted in order 
to make the reform work, while the authority and manpower of professionals with technological 
and engineering backgrounds were enhanced to realise the control schemed by the reform. Finally, 
with the significant raise of professionals in the top committee, the reform developed Geely away 
from being attached to inner-circle benefits, and changed the mainstream organisational values. LI 
and his core followers still had critical influences for their shareholding, but they control the 
strategic direction of business development only, and entrusted the authority of general resources 
investment to professional managers. It formed up a mixed structure of corporate control, and 
showed effective in guiding product-oriented innovation.  
We list the structures of top committee in Group-B firm by the table below. We can see that 
developmental engineers led Group-B firms. Even only counting in the committee members with 
experience of product development in recent years, they also had substantial influences for 
decision-making. 
To take Chery as an example, in 2007, among 9 members on the ―managing and decision-making 
committee‖, namely the top committee of Chery, only 1 represented the central R&D centre which 
was similar to the situation in FAW. However, except for the 1 representing finance, all the rest 8 
members had engineering and technological backgrounds, even including the 2 from the human 
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resources division and marketing division. In fact, other than the 1 from the marketing division, 
all the rest 7 had ever participated in product development in Chery‘s early years. 
In fact, even mentioning the front lines, Chery was also dissimilar from Group-A firms. In 2006, 
there were about 4,000 engineers employed by Chery. Among them, 1500 engineers could be 
mobilised, without attachment to production lines, to take part in new product development, 
which was unimaginable regarding Group-A firms. 
Table 6.5 Structure of Top Committee of some Group-B firms (2007) 110 
6.3.2 Learning organising pattern: cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms 
The institutional arrangements of organisational mobilisation and learning integration address the 
question that through what kinds of mechanisms learning is carried out among organisational 
members of firms, and individual learning is tied for collective and purposeful (but not certainly 
appointed by top-down authority) targets. For this topic, we concern the organisational integration 
that firms achieve enables them to ―socialise participants in a complex division of labour to apply 
their skills and efforts to the achievement of common goals‖ (Lazonick and West, 1995, p231). As 
latecomers, new indigenous firms had to mobilise their members and resources as much as 
possible to maximize efficiency in making use of what they possess. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) 
also emphasize that early and integrated problem solving is the key for performance of product 
development. As to the industrial environments which Group-B firms were located in, Chinese 
previous industrial administration divided the relevant industrial practices into a highly 
specialised but rigid system. However, the international competition emerging along the reform 
and open-door policy obviously did not follow this logic. Then Group-B firms must assimilate 
intellectual resources from different industrial domains, and integrate learning inside their 
organisations or cooperative networks. 
Then how the firms achieved effective organisational mobilisation and learning integration come 
                                                 
110 The data of Huawei is not included in this table for its special organisational culture. Firstly, Huawei is an engineer-led 
firm without doubt, represented by absolutely advantage of engineers in the EMT. Second, Huawei is an innovative firm 
upholding heroism engineer culture. Its founder and godfather REN ZhengFei, who ever pushed all the critical product 
development in Huawei‘s even only had less than 2% stock share, had absolute authority. Underneath him, two legendary 
engineers, namely ZHENG Baoyong and LI Yinan who were both REN‘s protégés, were respected with authority in 
practical development organising in 1990s. Now the chairman of board, namely SUN Yafang who in fact is the assistant 
fellow to REN, also had engineering and technical background. Thirdly, based on the last point, the real aut hority 
distribution and evolution of Huawei‘s EMT were quite flux, and hardly to be clarified by structural data simply. 
Therefore we do not list it in. 
Managing and Decision-making Committee Chery Geely HaFei ZTE DTT 
Total number of members 9 11 9 22 9 
-Members with technical or engineering background 8 6 7 18 7 
--Members with product development experience in 
corresponding sectors 
7 
5 
6 14 6 
---Members with corresponding experience in the past 2 decades 7 5 6 14 5 
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out as a question. In addition to the learning held by professional departments, the cross-boundary 
inter-departmental platforms worked significantly as to the technological learning in Group-B 
firms. We take a time sequence to discuss this topic. 
6.3.2.1 Inception stage 
In their inception stages, technological capabilities of Group-B firms were based on competences 
of individuals who came to participate in their organisations generally from different places. 
Therefore, organisational integration was urgent for generating effective capability-building. As 
the size of Group-B firms was small at that time (see Table 6.6), it was not difficult for their 
leaders to work on mobilising the organisations. In fact, most leaders of Group-B firms worked as 
practical chief engineers in their inceptive stage, even including Li ShuFu, the founder of Geely, 
who had not obtained technical automobile knowledge before.  
Table 6.6 Approximate number of organisational members of Group-B firms in the year of starting the 
projects for their 1st industrialised product model 
The case of Chery is taken to demonstrate the mechanism of organisational integration in the 
inception stages of Group-B firms when official binding arrangements were still crude.  
The inceptive organisational configuration of Chery comprised three main parts. First, there were 
about 10 founding engineers recruited by investors from automotive components makers and 
governmental bureaus. They were good at supply chain development, plant construction, public 
relations, and so on. Second, there was a group of engineers recruited from FAW. Yin TongYao, its 
president and later chairperson, was the first to be attracted by Chery. The other young FAW 
engineers came to follow Yin from good personal relationships. They had been trained together 
overseas by a p associated with the setting up of FAW-Volkswagen, by which FAW aimed to 
cultivate the second-tier backbone engineers among the young generations. Thereby, their 
participation significantly promoted the capabilities of Chery in manufacturing. Moreover, there 
was another group of retired engineers from FAW invited by Yin and his colleagues since most of 
them had been supervisors or senior fellows of Yin and his peers in FAW. Most veteran engineers 
had become skilled before the prevalence of TMFT, and had experience and memories about 
systemic product development before. Therefore, in addition to the manufacturing capabilities, 
they contributed to Chery on the systemic configuration of products, and the development of                                                   
engine models, and so on, although they also did many of these tasks through trial-and-error. The 
third part was made up of engineers who were recruited from other domestic vehicle-makers, 
 Chery Geely Auto HaFei Auto Huawei ZTE Xinwei 
Number of members 35-100 30-100 30 20 100 30-40 
Year of data 1997 1998 1983 1990 1988 1995 
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mainly from the makers of agricultural vehicles and modified trucks
111
. Several of them were 
classmates at Yin‘s university. They had rough product development experience of vehicle 
development, including product system configuration, chassis engineering and bodywork design.  
Therefore, in the inception stage, a basic development team was organised to fulfil different 
functions of car development, relying on integrating individual competences. Certainly, Chery 
pursued professionalization by developing professional departments, but in terms of knowledge 
creation, organisational members were not fenced in by strict boundaries. Rather, they worked 
together with intensive interactions, entering each other‘s realms in the process, which enabled 
them to master the development of contextual subsystems and components in real time. Doing so 
exerted the capabilities of each individual by exposing an open development process to most 
participants, and to some extent remedied the weakness of their overall possession of 
competences, especially the lack of experience in systemic product development. 
The shared strategic intent among members and hard-working spirit were important for achieving 
organisational cohesion. As already seen, the founding members left their previous posts and 
stable or even promising careers to join Chery, just to seek something different from their 
previous experience under TMFT. Besides, the core leaders
112
 worked as roaming institutional 
agents to mobilise different units. They personally participated in most projects during this stage; 
their intimate relations with most founding members promoted the effects of their coordination 
and authority to overcome conflicts among units, and realised high efficiency of information flow 
and resource allocation.  
As for patterns of organising learning, Chery did not have existing technical targets for members 
to follow. Rather, it was for each participant unit to determine the directions, essential features and 
specific details of designs in their specialised fields. The reasonable nature of this pattern was 
supported by the institutions of resource application, i.e. corresponding resources were entrusted 
to each unit. Certainly, Group-B firms also implemented budgetary systems. However, the 
budgets derived from exogenous financial restrictions were mainly responsible for directing the 
detailed learning practices. Only when the application of resources was controlled by front-line 
units could they fulfil the responsibilities of coping with the uncertainties associated with 
                                                 
111 There had been indigenous product developers in these two segments because relevant licence regulations were not 
strict since the regulators did not regard them as important sectors. Thus very basic product development capabilities had 
been indigenously developed. Agriculture vehicles were a specified type designed for transporting passengers and goods 
on bumpy roads in the countryside. They were similar to pickups but much simplified and cheaper. By contrast for cars in 
general, they adopted small diesel engines but strong chassis; thus they ran slower but could carry a lot (usually 
overloaded), and omitted many accessories to save costs. Modified trucks were produced based on truck chassis that 
makers outsourced, and with bodywork developed in-house, most of which was very rough. Usually, modified rather than 
standardized trucks were developed, for niche markets. 
112 The three core members were XiaLai Zhan, TongYao Yin and JianHui Lu. Zhan, representing the investors, n was the 
founder and first chairperson of Chery, also the deputy mayor of Wuhu City where Chery was located. He was regarded as 
the moral leader even after officially resigning from Chery. Lu was the chief engineer of Chery before 2004.  
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effective technological learning in real time, and then communications engender in-depth 
interactions among them during the process of learning.  
For example, when the first prototype of Chery‘s first car, the Fulwin, was coming out, the 
engineers in charge of the supply chain reported difficulties in finding suppliers to participate in 
the development of chassis assemblies. The engineers in charge of plant construction and 
equipment development quickly advised adopting some interchangeable components from the 
local supply network of Jetta, because they personally knew the Jetta system well and had good 
contexts with some second-tier suppliers for their experience in the production localisation of 
Jetta in FAW. Following this advice, the engineers in charge of system configuration brought in a 
Toledo (1991 version) from SEAT which shared major technical features with the Jetta as the 
target model for this adjustment. Through close interactions, other departments also adjusted their 
designs accordingly, so did the units responsible for industrialisation preparation. Thereby, even 
with such a change, Chery still succeeded in launching the final prototype in 1999 as expected. 
During this activity, the core leaders mobilised each unit to work for the collective aims although 
the aims themselves were also dynamic. The front-line engineers were encouraged to be involved 
in a broad circle of knowledge creation within the organisation and across departments, and were 
energised with entrusted resources to generate their solutions just-in-time. 
The pattern of Chery in mobilising its organisation and integrating the collective learning should 
be highlighted by comparison with the pattern of Group-A firms. In FAW, when its CA6DFx 
series truck had been scorned, customers required an adjustment to add two footboards outside the 
cabin doors, otherwise with the original design drivers had to step on the front wheels to enter the 
cabin, which was inconvenient and even dangerous under particular conditions. The FAW official 
accepted this suggestion, but it still cost 6 months for FAW to adjust simply the blueprints. Much 
time was spent on communication, liability classification, task layout and resource allocation. In 
fact, informal communication among engineers was not problematic since as a legacy of housing 
welfare of SOEs, the engineers of FAW lived close together, which permitted informal 
communications. However, informal communications proved unable to supply the formal ―Ba‖ of 
work coordination and technological learning. Further, since front-line engineers and units did not 
have resource authorisation, their communications were inefficient unless relevant projects had 
been schemed by the top-down authority. Here, some might argue that it was because the Group-A 
firms were too big to be flexible. However, in my view, it was because too few people could make 
decisions rather than the situation in Group-B firms that many people could make decisions for 
their own parts. Group-B firms insisted on this even when they had grown and had larger R&D 
workforces than Group-A firms. 
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6.3.2.2 After the inception stage 
After the inceptive stage, cross-boundary platforms were still the major arenas on which Group-B 
firms carried out developmental tasks and technological learning. To realise the organisational 
mobilisation and learning integration, both informal and formal arrangements had been 
developed. 
(1) Informal arrangements 
Many informal institutional arrangements used in the inceptive stage remained. New informal 
arrangements were also developed to promote the interactions among organisational members and 
across the intra-organisation boundaries that were set for professionalization. We just list some of 
the informal arrangements that might be not popular in the literature here. 
In the telecom-equipment sector, a tutorial system was implemented, which initially was set to 
accelerate the cultivation of junior engineers. Later, since the personnel flows across departments 
were quite frequent, tutors were often in departments different from those of their students. This 
situation was found to be even more helpful in promoting the breadth and depth of students‘ 
knowledge and helpful to enhance coordination among different units than what was originally 
expected. As a result, this tradition was solidified as a life-long arrangement for newcomers.  
Besides, in order to activate and diversify the knowledge creation, Group-B firms invented a 
―free-recruitment‖ arrangement. The arrangement allowed project managers to recruit members 
across the departmental boundaries by posting advertisement. Specialised departments were also 
encouraged to post advertisements for solutions regarding the technical problems they could not 
fix. Further, engineers were encouraged to establish project teams aiming at particular attempts, 
only if the initiators could pass the examination held by a panel sent by the corporate technology 
and product committee. This tradition not only meant to encourage learning cross boundaries, but 
was also used to maximise the intellectual services generated by the in-house talents. 
In the car-making sector, Chery invented a tradition that on the last weekend of every month, high 
rank managers would test-drive the cars under developing (usually several dozen in number), with 
development engineers sitting in passenger seats. By doing so, opportunities were provided as for 
the direct communications between front-line developers and corporate decision-makers, and to 
prevent problems and appeals from being shielded by the hierarchy or departmental boundaries. 
The relevant effects went beyond the limitation of time and locus of test-drives. At any spare time, 
development engineers would try to chase the corresponding high-rank managers to check their 
improvements upon the problems or advices put forward by the managers, because a competitive 
atmosphere had been formed up among the development teams for the publicly ―problem 
displaying and improving‖ effects associated with this tradition. 
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Certainly, Group-B firms also generally adopted the job rotation, as an arrangement to maintain 
the flexibility of organisations. In Huawei, for high-level managers, the firm insisted an informal 
post rotation for every 2 years. 
(2) Formal Arrangements 
Formal arrangements were established gradually by Group-B firms. A series of them were 
constructed to ensure the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms of development and 
learning. Accordingly, a significant part of power for resource allocation resided in coordinators 
of these platforms. In this section, we organise our analyses by longitudinally depicting their 
general pattern of tasks processing, namely the ―parallel development pattern‖. The ―parallel 
development pattern‖ contrasts with the linear stepwise pattern, and means for a specific project, 
different departments carried out their respective portions in parallel if possible. This pattern is set 
to shorten the time to market of new product developments (see the figure below). For example, 
by doing so, in the car-making sector, the development cycle of frontier car-makers for a new car 
model has been reduced to 18-24 months currently by comparing to about 48-60 months in the 
1980s. The average development cycle for Group-B firms was about 24 months at normal 
situations during 2001-2006 in reference to the development of their second-generation models. 
The ―parallel development pattern‖ was not invented by Chinese indigenous firms. Actually, 
Group-B firms learned it from the global giant competitors. However, the underlying institutional 
arrangements to ensure effective parallel processing were not codified and could not be easily 
duplicated from any samples. These arrangements, dealing with scheming tasks, resource 
allocation and interaction among organisational members, were concentrated in the intra- 
organisation conflicts, relevant to the organisational path dependence and the distribution of 
authority. Thus, the realisation of such a pattern was deeply an organisation-specific process. 
Figure 6.2 Schema: Linear stepwise model vs. parallel development pattern 
 
To scheme the tasks, resource allocation and intra-organisation interaction was the core of parallel 
development. Although all relevant departments participated in scheming the tasks, in Group-B 
firms the product and complex technology development teams dominated this process associated 
with the project management department (or equivalent department), since apparently its tasks 
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entailed the most uncertainty considering the tensions between the capability foundations and 
ends of Group-B firms in this stage of capability-building. Then in practice, product developers 
acted specially the kernel role to schedule the time and to arrange the tasks for other departments. 
During the process, it also worked to connect, mobilise and integrate participants pace by pace. 
The Gantt chart below schematises a virtual product development project. 
Figure 6.3 Schema: Parallel development for a car model (car-making sector, Gantt chart)  
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Readers might argue that such a pattern was also implemented by Group-A firms. It was true. 
However, since the interfaces of their learning objectives, which represented by their imported 
blueprints, had been well-developed between different modules/assemblies, and between different 
working procedures, the major uncertainties for their learning organising were  more located 
within specialised segments, such as equipment debugging, pace controlling, quality promoting, 
which also entailed the department-based pre-determined resource allocation. Therefore, they did 
not impose such significant requirements of intra-organisation interaction associated with the 
underlying dynamic developmental processes in real time. Rather, they stressed the dimension of 
time and scale as to the interfaces. The role of R&D force was placed inferior or even disappeared 
during the scheming of production localisation.  
Generally, product development processes can be summarised by three stages. We take a project 
of new car model development as example. 
Stage-1: Planning 
Major tasks for this stage are to plan the tasks, style the product and make technical preparation.  
[See Appendix-5 for the “Planning Stage”] 
(i) Team composition 
After the product development directive is made, a small inter-departmental team is organised, 
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raised by the department of project management mainly.  
(ii) Inter-departmental communication and interaction 
Representatives from different relevant departments attend regular meetings to discuss timing and 
the approximate arrangement of budgets. Concerns of discussion include the current workloads, 
technical requirements, feasibilities, and decisions about in-house development and outsourcing. 
Common knowledge (Grant, 1996) among different participant units began to be cultivated. After 
several rounds of intensive interactions, the general time nodes are determined. 
To style the product and to decide the system configuration are central technical tasks of this stage. 
Styling engineers transfer the objective of strategic plan into visual artefacts, namely into sketches, 
digital drawings, clay models and milling models. Then, the system configuration made by 
general designers establishes a fundamental physical structure with major parameters for 
participant units to work on. The styling room and the general design department are frequently 
taken as the locus of discussion. The layouts for different stages are shared among members of the 
team from time to time in order to achieve the effectiveness of interaction among departments. 
This stage defines the general characteristics and functions of the product to develop. Interactions 
among participant units are necessary to ensure the feasibility of project. It is also a process to 
connect the new product development with the previous knowledge accumulation, which involves 
not only the knowledge of specialised segments but also the integrative understanding. Without 
effective organisational mobilisation associated with this process, the development of new 
products may divorce from the current capabilities of each specialised domain, and drive the 
project into crisis of being unrealistic or outdated.  
Stage-2: Technical development 
The major task for this stage is to develop an appropriate prototype. Relevant departments should 
have their designs ready for industrialisation. Some tasks for industrialisation are also included. 
[See Appendix-5 for the “Technical Development Stage”] 
(i) Team composition 
A larger team is formed as the product development team including representative engineers from 
relevant departments. Front-line engineers make up the majority of the development team. 
Mangers from the project management department transfer into assisting and supervising roles, to 
control the time requirements and financial budgets of the project. 
An inside project-oriented squad is formed up within every department to serve the specific 
project, and to take part in the inter-departmental team as representatives of their home 
departments. The representatives played the role of ―liaison engineers‖ (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, 
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p103) to bridging their home departments with corresponding project teams. Moreover, they also 
have to act as real practitioners of the project. It does not mean other members of the home 
department do not work for the project. In fact, even with increasing forces of R&D personnel, 
Group-B firms in most case face the tension of human resource for their ambitious amounts of 
developmental projects progressing parallel. In most cases of Group-B firms, engineers in general 
would attend definitely only one project, but usually several or even dozens of projects 
spontaneously. Thus, the representative team have to be organised based on the lean principle. 
Home departments would organise flexible forums to support their representatives in response to 
emerging technical problems. Home department members, who in fact are also working as 
representative in other projects, share their knowledge to generate solutions. Further, the 
representative team may also be flexible regarding its formation. Experts or senior members good 
at specific domains could be drawn in as members of their representative team to enrich the 
interaction with other departments for tasks related to their expert domains. We can say members 
of home departments work together as a group of knowledge-sharers; knowledge gatekeepers, 
usually acted by technical leaders or senior engineers, are not set to stipulate the boundary of 
knowledge creation process of affiliated members, but work as coordinators and supervisors to 
ensure the quality of knowledge output.  
Meanwhile, to realise such a matrix-wise learning pattern, budgets for departments are allocated 
according to both the departments and the projects. 
(ii) Inter-departmental communication and interaction 
As for the inter-departmental team, weekly meeting is the regular arrangement to push the 
mobilisation and interaction among departments. One high-level manager, usually a head of 
department or higher post, is appointed as the nominal leader of the project, while the practical 
project manager is usually acted by a section chief or a junior vice departmental head. In addition, 
a group of senior managers, usually vice-heads or junior heads of departments, are arranged to 
attend meetings on demand. They are not required to be fixed members of the project, but their 
authority could help to fix problems relevant to the conflicts among departments. Besides, some 
first-tier suppliers begin to be involved. When technical features of new models are essentially 
fixed, questions would concern detailed parameters; so for the discussion about the feasibility and 
economy, suppliers are obliged to participate in relevant discussion.  
Interactions among participants could be intensive. Since interconnections are pervasive within 
the product system among different subsystems and components, it is usually that sources of 
technical problems about interconnections cannot be 100% clarified, especially considering the 
immaturity of experience of developers in Group-B firms. In order to persuade the other side(s), 
various tools in addition to technical reports are employed by participants, including dynamic 
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emulations, digital pictures, videos or even prototypes of assemblies. The intensive interactions, 
or tough arguments sometimes, make the meetings into technical forums or even technical 
competitions. But only with the intensive interactions, could shared meaning be produced among 
different participants (Grant, 1996) through schema, metaphor, analogy and stories (Spender, 1989; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Brown and Duguid, 1991). Only with the intensive interactions, 
could knowledge redundancy among participants be raised that permits individuals to invade the 
functional boundaries of each other and causes loose couples among them (Nonaka, 1990; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p80-81). Of course, compromises would finally be generated among 
different units under the coordination of higher authority. For some extreme cases, in order to 
generate temporal consensus and push the project forward, arbitrary decisions would be made by 
project leaders according to their personal experience and the negotiations with relevant 
participants. For these difficult points, in order to benefit the future development, recorded special 
treatments for particular types of problems would be developed by the team, which can be taken 
as references or remedied by other teams along the future projects. As for consensual progress, the 
team would record every discussed topic, relevant solutions and other outlines. In the next 
meeting, every unit has to give an account of the tasks it has been assigned to or proposed in the 
last meeting.  
During this stage, resources allocated special for projects are kept and supervised by the project 
management department and the nominal high post project leader, but are executed and adjusted 
among participant units by the practical project manager. Since the budgets for specialised 
departments are not sufficient for them to carry out tasks appointed, this arrangement yields 
incentives for them to involve in the learning on the inter-departmental platform actively. 
Stage-3: Industrialisation 
The major task for this stage is to develop the prototype into an industrialised model. The focus is 
to work out engineering methods for the manufacturing of the corresponding model. 
[See Appendix-5 for the “Industrialisation Stage”] 
(i) Team composition 
The product development team is enlarged, but altered for its configuration. Product R&D 
departments gradually hand over the dominance to the down-stream co-operators, but still keep 
basic seats in the team in order to maintain the abilities of quick response to any emerging 
requirements related to design adjustment. In-house equipment developers take over the central 
positions, such as the die developers, production line schemers, machine developers and those for 
clamp and attached tools, so do the engineers in charge of testing, namely engineers of 
laboratories and those in distant skid pads. 
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 (ii) Inter-departmental communication and interaction 
Meetings take place daily, semi-weekly, or weekly according to the degree of maturation of the 
project. Generally, the frequency and intensity of meeting increase as the model becomes 
industrialised. Top managers, namely the directors of the firm, executive managers, and senior 
heads of departments, are assigned to supervise the meetings in rotation. For some occasions if 
special problems emerge as urgent, the top manager in charge of the corresponding field would be 
specially called to host the meeting beyond the normal rotative sequence. 
Regular meetings are usually arranged at work-sites, such as in testing laboratories, stamping die 
developing centres, test-assembly plants and auditing rooms. On-site meetings are convenient for 
problem solving and the SECI process of knowledge conversion, since many details under 
development could be still tacit and sticky, and could be better exhibited by presentation or trial.  
The interactions are tough and intensive. It is because huge investments have been made, then 
significant alterations of designs are hardly acceptable, which causes developers sensitive to 
technical problems. Besides, as the industrialisation proceeds, improvement tasks focus more and 
more on delicate details, particularly those interlinking regimes of different units. As some 
knowledge under development is tacit and sticky, these problems must be scrutinized through 
cooperation. Otherwise, problems may possibly spread and involve more segments. Thereby, top 
managers are arranged to promote the cooperation and to adjust resource allocation among 
participants on-site. Mistakes, neglect and relevant responsibilities are exposed, not hidden, since 
in front of all participants, cooperative units would challenge the explanations and frameworks of 
each other. Through such a process, stubborn problems are fixed by generating mutual adjustment 
(Thompson, 1967, p56) and compromise. The authority of top managers is employed to control 
potential departmental selfishness in such cases. 
The way of resource allocation inherits the pattern of last stage. Budgets beyond the resources 
controlled by the product development team could be offered as needed, if the additional 
investments are necessary or significant for general benefits of the firm, such as for building 
critical laboratories, instruments and equipment, workshops or implementing special experiments. 
In fact, it is an important path to explain the growth of Group-B firms in physical infrastructures. 
As we said, the above procedures were typical for Group-B car-makers in their early phase. 
Group-B telecom-equipment firms implemented patterns similar. The major dissimilar point is the 
role worked by a ―system department‖, which is created for the customised essence of this 
industry. The nominal task of this department is to price the involved customised products. It 
gives the product development teams the appropriate prices according to the customised technical 
requirements, or denies the prices put forth by customers. Meanwhile, it also gives the front-line 
developers clear directions regarding the technical solutions for corresponding deals, such as by 
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informing the teams or departments what (solutions) they really could try. To fulfil the role, the 
system department consists with senior engineers who have had rich experience in multiple 
domains, being familiar with the costs and technical parameters of each department. Its opinions, 
reflecting a core intellectual accumulation of the firm, act the role of gatekeeper to direct the 
learning in critical direction and cost and time control. As an advisor to the project managers, it 
actually acts as a specialised standing agent in term of technological development for mobilising 
and directing the front-line engineers. 
To summarise here, what we stress is not the formation of learning organising, such as the matrix- 
wise formation implemented by Group-B firms, although it was significant and made sense. What 
we stress here are the institutions that underpin the effective organisational mobilisation for 
learning, and integrate the creative individual learning for collective purpose. By investigating the 
learning organising of Group-B firms, we can say that the organisational mobilisation and 
learning integration would not automatically or easily happen within firms in DCs. Resource and 
human force investments, strategic intent, or even purposeful targets of learning are not sufficient 
for the emergence of organisational integration. Institutional arrangements are needed to 
incentivize members to learn on interactive platforms. First, front-line members need to be 
motivated with resource support. In Group-B firms, technical progresses in detail are not framed 
by administrative authority, external consultants or imported technical schemes directly, but rather 
by front-line engineers. To cope with the uncertainty underlying the development of complex 
systems, the interactions among different segments and departments are critical to control and 
push practical progresses in each domain. Then the inter-departmental platforms are at least as 
important as those based on specialised units are. For the intensiveness of developmental projects, 
the knowledge gatekeepers of specialised units have no intellectual ability and are not obliged to 
manipulate what exactly their subordinate members are learning or doing in detail. Rather, they 
just handle what kinds of tasks the subordinate members are carrying out and what kinds of 
challenges their members are confronted with. Therefore, their actual roles are as the tutors and 
coordinators of learning within their units, and the heads of technical services provided by their 
units to others. Since the creativities of knowledge reside on the basic organisational units for 
particular tasks, the application of resources at micro-level is entrusted to the basic units, rather 
than being exogenously determined. Meanwhile, the front-line practitioners should also be 
obliged to learn on the interactive platforms for collective purposes. The authority and resource 
allocation is employed to frame the organising of learning activities of participants, and to guild 
the technical integration. Otherwise, the development would be out of control despite feasibility 
and economical efficiency, and the interactions would not be bound as effective for resolving 
interrelated problems.  
Certainly, the above entails a subtle balance between the organisational mobilisation and the 
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technical integration for learning. As for this subtle point, Group-B firms developed their specific 
characteristic strategies and then routines during the organisational construction.  
6.3.3 Knowledge database and supportive institutions 
The system of knowledge accumulation, by which we referred to the facilities and institutions to 
collect, integrate and re-apply the knowledge that was created by members, worked significantly 
in Group-B firms. Firstly, it provided standing carriers of knowledge accumulation that helped the 
organisations steer away from relying on particular individuals. Negative effects caused by the 
departures of specific employees could be largely reduced. Secondly, it impelled the codification 
of tacit knowledge. In most cases, the construction of a knowledge accumulation system required 
members not only to submit their developmental blueprints and data but also to introduce or to 
explain the developmental process. For this purpose, members had to generate analysis reports 
and relevant documents, which intentionally or unintentionally codified their outcomes especially 
through collective discussion. Thirdly, it promoted the knowledge diffusion and re-innovation 
among organisational members, which fuelled the dynamics of knowledge accumulation as well. 
As colleagues and latecomer engineers could learn and apply the previous knowledge 
accumulated, knowledge trees could be cultivated dynamically through the development of the 
understandings and re-innovation of organisational members. It was also significantly helpful for 
the learning of new-coming members in that it provided prolific references. Fourthly, it 
contributed to knowledge flowing and cooperation beyond departmental boundaries and the time 
and locus limitation. With regulative permission, engineers were able to access knowledge 
accumulated by relevant units, which helped to promote the SECI process of knowledge 
conversion within firms. Therefore, in Group-B firms, knowledge databases became the physical 
platforms for the work and communication of engineers. Fifth, knowledge accumulation process 
was meanwhile a process of knowledge promotion and learning. To combine information from 
different organisational units led to not only new information but also new understanding (Huber, 
1991, p101-102; Daft and Weick, 1984, p285).  
In the following subsection, we stress the databases built by Group-B firms based on the practices 
of product and relevant technology development. It does not mean we neglect the knowledge 
accumulation of Group-B firms on processing technologies, but reflects our interest attracted by 
the difference by contrast with the Group-A firms. 
6.3.3.1 Facilities for knowledge accumulation 
The scale of knowledge matters a great deal with regard to the knowledge database. For instance, 
it is distinct for car door developers to have dozens of references as opposed to just one reference. 
Each reference presents the ideas and tactics of its original authors corresponding to different 
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design requirements. Thus, the ideal situation for a database is obtaining numberless references, 
so that its applicants can achieve new designs by simply combining and improving previous 
designs if they can decipher the requirements they meet. In this sense, building a robust 
knowledge database is a strategic target for firms, which must be based on an accumulative 
process. 
The widespread of digital tools facilitates the codification of knowledge accumulation, and helps 
it go beyond the time and locus limitation. Many Group-B firms had stressed digitalisation of 
knowledge accumulation from their early years on, but the situations among them were divergent. 
Geely and HaFei presented the two extremes in their inceptive stages. HaFei had begun to build 
up its strength in digitalised product development since 1983 in the airplane domain; and as we 
said, it later transferred relevant capabilities from its airplane division to its auto divis ion. As for 
Geely, it was backward in making use of digital design tools in its inceptive phase, although it did 
not mean Geely had not taken good care of its technical documents. For the development of its 
first car model, Geely‘s engineers could only employ hand-drawing which resulted in the 
asymmetry between the designs of left and right car doors, which was discovered by its in-house 
engineers only after they got equipped with digital mapping technologies. Only after 2002, did 
Geely transfer its CAD department from the motorcycle firm to the car-making firm, which 
started the latter in constructing a comprehensive digital knowledge database. 
In general, since developing their respective 2
nd
 generation products, all Group-B firms had 
already established comprehensive knowledge databases based on digital technologies. Features 
of their knowledge accumulating systems could be generalised as follows: 
Firstly, not only were the data of well-package designs included in the knowledge database of 
Group-B firms, but the analytical reports and explanative documents were included as well. In 
other words, knowledge databases were much more than just the pure archives of final blueprints.   
Even exhibited as final designs, much embedded knowledge was still complicated or tacit, and 
could be demonstrated well only with necessary analyses and explanation. For example, 
developers in the telecom-equipment sector might be unable to present their ideas clearly by using 
pure programming lines, although they added non-executable lines as short illustrations in the 
programs. Especially programs could contain code lines in huge number, which contributed to the 
complexities to decipher the relevant knowledge, and added to the difficulties that new-coming 
members had in learning. The technical linkages within product systems also introduced 
complexity. In the car-making sector, the development of the brake subsystem was closely 
connected to the analyses of the dynamics of entire vehicle, the road conditions and even the 
possible weight loads and distribution. Without relevant supportive explanations and analyses, 
colleagues and new-coming members would have difficulties to understand why corresponding 
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designs were selected while others were not. 
So, writing up experiences, explaining ideas and analysing technical choices were important for 
the communications based on knowledge databases. Especially within the Group-B telecom- 
equipment firms, ―turning over the documents (copies)‖ was jargon to describe that their jobs had 
been done and they were delivering the task to the next step. 
By contrast, among Group-A firms, there was no case in which MNCs provided their productive 
Sino-foreign JVs or Chinese SOE partners with the analytical reports or explanatory documents as 
supporting materials for their blueprints sold. Even worse, they would cut off the so-called 
―unnecessary‖ remarks from the original blueprints, as they did not want to provide information 
for their Chinese partners to use potentially in reverse learning.  
Secondly, knowledge databases in Group-B firms did not just include the data or documents about 
existing models or procedures, but also those about the trial and failed attempts. The data about 
trials and failures disclosed the tactics and manoeuvres employed by developers when they 
addressed particular technical and economic dimensions. Colleagues and latecomers could learn 
from them about not only the contrasts to successful experience but also other considerations, 
analyses, audits and decision-making processes, which helped to put them into the real complex 
of development under those circumstances. 
Thirdly, data originating from mapping and analysing the products of competitors were recorded 
in their databases. In fact, this was an important way of Group-B firms to enhance the amount of 
data and to construct their databases to realise the economy of knowledge scale. 
Fourthly, knowledge databases were difficult to purchase on the external market. Since knowledge 
databases were broadly regarded as the core intellectual property of firms in product-oriented 
industries, it was difficult to buy such databases unless new indigenous firms could merge the 
target firms as whole. Some specialised consultant firms did offer their databases for sale. 
Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, what they could offer were data obtained through 
mapping existing products on the market, for estimated price at several million RMB per model in 
general (retail, data from 2006). If indigenous firms had already built up their appropriate 
in-house product development teams, to generate such data were only normal jobs consuming 
resources, human forces and time. Furthermore, data sold by them were without relevant analyses 
or explanation, since the information providers did not really experience the developmental 
process. The usefulness of the data they provided was positive but limited to the building of 
in-house knowledge accumulation systems of Group-B firms. 
Fifthly, the formation of knowledge databases was dissimilar among Group-B firms; but no matter 
what kind of formation they used, they all realise the effective collection and re-application of 
knowledge all over the general range of their organisations. For Group-B car-making firms, 
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general knowledge databases had been built up across different developmental units. With 
permissions, engineers could access the knowledge databases in relevant domains in general. In 
the telecom-equipment sector, since this industry had already been highly modularised, the 
departmental knowledge databases were more active than the general database, while the project 
management department obtained all developing data and documents in theory. Since the 
computer network of firms could link departmental databases easily, their knowledge databases 
were also accessible for in-house engineers in general under a set of institutional arrangements. 
6.3.3.2 Arrangements to promote knowledge accumulation 
Certainly, knowledge would not converge at a particular locus automatically. In Group-B firms, a 
series of institutional arrangements have been set up to regulate the contents and time-schedules 
of accumulation and to facilitate the processes. 
In Group-B firms, to archive data and documents was not an option for organisational members, 
instead was a compulsive requirement. It was embodied as binding regulations, and was presented 
with detailed schedules in project plans associated with resource allocation.  
As for developmental projects, the procedures of ―inspection‖ at the end of each step and the 
procedures of ―inspecting and confirming‖ following each stage were meaningful in both 
technology and governance (see subsection 5.2.3 in Chapter 5). The handover of relevant data and 
documents was necessary to complete the ―inspection‖ or ―inspecting and confirming‖ procedure, 
which meant the data for the corresponding step had been frozen and passed over to the next step. 
Unless the data were officially activated again by higher authority, relevant data were not allowed 
to be changed as valid versions in the project. Without the ―inspection‖ or ―inspecting and 
confirming‖ procedures being completed, the project could not proceed, and further resource 
allocation for subsequent procedures would not be made. 
By comparison, in Group-A firms, since the systemic products were not locally developed in 
China, the relevant data and documents about the development processes certainly were not 
presented to local Chinese engineers. Regarding the model localisation projects, foreign sides 
controlled the ―inspecting and confirming‖ procedures. Thereby, the headquarters of foreign sides 
controlled the comprehensive data accumulation while the Chinese sides only had the data of 
adjustment parts and the process data under their control. 
In Group-B firms, besides the accumulation based on product and technology development 
projects, they also allocated funds for programs to promote knowledge accumulation.  
Firstly, the standardisation of technological experience accumulated was stressed. Engineers were 
mobilised to standardise the experience that they had to generalise typical parameters for designs, 
and consequently to generalise typical designs scheme. It could promote the efficiency, shorten 
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the development cycles and increase the interchangeable rate of components among product 
models and platforms. Meanwhile, it was also a process of knowledge integration and 
re-innovation. 
For example, within the ―instruments and meters development group‖ of Chery which was a 
common basic unit of Chery‘s R&D force, engineers summarised 47 key parameters for the 
design of consoles, and further, they sorted out a series of development solutions in responding to 
typical technical requirements. The outcomes were published as the departmental development 
manual. Then colleagues and new-coming members could learn from and apply the standard 
experience. In order to incentivize engineers in doing so, awards were offered. 
Secondly, the analyses of failure were stressed. The FEMA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) 
was developed by studying historical failures, and used to avoid failures beforehand, including 
D(evelopment)-FEMA and P(rocessing)-FEMA. Even though FEMA handbooks could be 
purchased on the market, its development was still highly firm specific because the sources of 
failure might be firm specific. Sometimes even with the same term, modes of failure might be 
different since failures were deeply embedded in organisational processes. For instance, the 
oversized clearance between the car-door and the bodywork could originate from the stamping die 
providers, from the operations of the assembly line, from the inexperienced bodywork designers, 
or from the weakness of material engineering. As well, the patterns of identifying and coping with 
failures were also firm specific. Whether the oversized clearance problem should be attributed to 
the die suppliers, to the processing line, to the bodywork development unit, to the material 
research unit, or whether it should be investigated thorough the involved organisational units , was 
a question of governance more than one of pure technology or engineering.  
Thus, the building of FEMA in-house was a continuous re-consideration and self-improvement of 
the technological development system of firms, and required thorough study entailing all involved 
units. In Group-B firms, inter-departmental teams were set up for developing FEMA. Interviews 
and investigations were arranged. Conferences were held in which relevant units were all engaged 
to discuss existing development patterns and potential weaknesses. If the situations were too 
complicated, trials could be implemented to imitate the previous process. Even special 
departments were set up to carry out continuous innovation and failure analysis, such as the 
―Commercial Improvement Department‖ in Chery. 
6.4 Analysis: contrasts between the two groups of firms 
In this chapter, we have analysed the organisational learning patterns of these two groups of firms. 
A summary is made here to present the comparisons directly. 
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6.4.1 Authority over resource allocation 
There is a distinguishable difference on the authority over strategic resource allocation between 
the Group-A and Group-B firms. The difference can be demonstrated by the composition of 
backgrounds of their top committee members. In Group-A firms, the engineering force for the 
development of product and product technology was marginalised on top committees; instead, 
people from the production lines and other divisions dominate the strategic resource allocation. 
The marginalisation of product development personnel in the power structure partly resulted from 
the legacy of industrial system in the former central planning economy. The comparative 
disadvantage of indigenous R&D personnel than foreign experts, the emphasis on manufacturing 
localisation and the neglect of indigenous platforms also enhanced such a situation.  
By contrast, the product development force played a leading role in decision-making of strategic 
resource allocation in Group-B firms. The path-dependency affords the experts of product 
development a comparatively superior voice within Group-B firms. Furthermore, Group-B firms 
continue pursuing product-oriented competition, which has the R&D force at the locus of the 
development scheme under uncertainty.  
6.4.2 Organisational mobilisation and learning integration 
Regarding the arrangements of them to mobilise organisational members and to integrate learning 
for collective and purposeful targets, there are also recognisable differences between them.  
As for Group-A firms, there were barriers opposing the organisational mobilisation and learning 
integration. The process of production localisation was separated into professional segments and 
carried out by specialised external co-operators and internal units. Such a scheming process was 
totally top-down associated with the well-developed imported blueprints. Then except for the task 
layout at inceptive stage, there was no practical need for participants to be mobilised and to 
generate any further understanding to cope with uncertainties related to product systems and 
in-depth linkages between different segments. Consequently, there was no need to maintain the 
cross-boundary communication among front-line engineers, and certainly, there was no 
arrangement that enabled the R&D force to mobilise the resources effectively from other 
participant units. As for each professional segment, knowledge gatekeepers were set to stress the 
productivity of learning upon imported blueprints and other assistant guides. The contents of 
learning were supervised, as heterogeneous thoughts about product systems were regarded as 
unproductive, which ruined the foundation of organisational mobilisation for integrative learning 
under uncertainty.  
As to the in-house R&D forces of Group-A firms, they also were fuelled with resources. However, 
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there was no normalised mechanism to connect their R&D activities with the learning activities 
placed on the centre stage of Group-A firms, i.e. the practices of production localisation. As well, 
there was no regular mechanism for the R&D forces to activate organisational members of 
relevant departmental units to generate integrative thinking grounded on or beyond the imported 
technological data. Without the support of higher-order organising principals, functional 
knowledge would not come together by new recipes (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Even within the 
R&D forces, resources were allocated based on top-down and branch-based arrangement, which 
organisationally blocks the horizontal communications for technical integration.  
By comparison with the highly professional and rigid systems of learning in Group-A firms, the 
technological learning activities of Group-B firms were built on cross-boundary 
inter-departmental platforms in addition to the specialised developmental activities in professional 
departments. 
In addition to the matrix-wise relations between the product development teams and functional 
departments, Group-B firms developed a series of institutional arrangements to encourage 
inter-departmental interactions and learning. Many critical activities and controls of 
developmental progresses were tied to the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms. To 
underlie such an arrangement, in addition to the fixed funds for professional departments, the 
allocations of strategic resources were entrusted to project teams, which were formed by 
representative engineers from multiple relevant departments. Then being independent in budget 
from any specialised department, the project teams could allocate the resources on hand according 
to the needs raised by practical developmental processes. So the concrete technological progresses 
were achieved by the front-line basic units with resource allocated based on the logics deriving 
from their collective learning process; their behaviours were not restricted by any exogenous 
technological scheme. During the developmental process, higher authorities were arranged to 
frame the organisational coordination of learning, particularly those to realise coordination across 
different intra-organisation boundaries. 
6.4.3 Knowledge accumulation systems 
In general, Group-A firms had not built up comprehensive knowledge databases. The actions of 
collecting intellectual outcomes within their organisations were executed as response to the top- 
down authority. The codified experiences were collected from the front lines, but the process was 
framed by the top-down given frameworks, namely by the knowledge gatekeepers and underlying 
institutional arrangements. As the primary developmental task for practitioners was to imitate 
imported models, the major intellectual accumulation was presented as the experience of best 
practices of manufacturing operations. Since the major embodiments of intellectual accumulations 
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(i.e. the operational handbooks or manuals) were updated only by years in most cases, such a 
system rooted out the possibility for organisational members to interact with the collective 
knowledge accumulation dynamically, and contributed little to the knowledge diffusion across 
different units in real time. As to the in-house R&D forces, as they were marginalised in Group-A 
firms, the knowledge accumulated from their practices as databases was also isolated with the 
experience based on production localisation. Certainly, since they seldom had resources 
authorised to implement development of systemic product and complex product technology, and 
since they were unable to obtain full sets of blueprints from foreign partners, their knowledge 
accumulations was obviously limited. 
We cannot attribute the disadvantage of Group-A firms in building comprehensive knowledge 
databases to their resources, as we ever compared their resources advantage over those of 
Group-B firms. In theory, there was also no external constraint to stop them from developing 
in-house knowledge databases. At least, Group-A firms could expand their knowledge pools by 
studying existing competitive products
113
. However, to invest in knowledge accumulation was 
―expensive‖ both in terms of resource consuming and in terms of authority of governance. Their 
stagnancy of knowledge database was embedded in the underlying organisational institutions and 
resource allocations as we mentioned above.  
By contrast, Group-B firms imposed the regulations for experience summary and submission on 
the procedures of project progress, which was associated with the allocation of relevant resources. 
Such institutions mobilised organisational members to participate in the collective knowledge 
accumulation along with developmental activities their implement. Besides, Group-B firms also 
implemented a series of special projects to promote the quantity and quality of knowledge 
accumulation, including standardising the experience, systemically analysing the failures, etc., 
which also required efforts of members to achieve in-depth knowledge conversion, and to explore 
learning integration.  
Since the knowledge databases of Group-B firms were generally accessible to their in-house 
engineers in relevant domains, the databases worked as locus of knowledge conversion, diffusion 
and re-innovation, and even became important physical parts of product development platforms 
for the implement of learning and cooperative activities.  
6.5 Summary: comparison of organisational learning systems 
In these two chapters, we explore the organisational black-boxes of these two groups of firms. We 
cannot affirm that important features relating to technological learning of firms have all been 
                                                 
113 Certainly, without practical considerations for industrialisation and commercialisation, the accumulation of 
knowledge about existing products cannot lead to significant growths of in-house technological capabilities. Otherwise, 
specialised consultant firms should have already become excellent integrative product providers. 
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covered. At least the features in question are closely pertinent to the learning patterns of firms. 
The two groups of firms demonstrated a series of differences, although most of them could not be 
simply measured by quantitative methods. 
Certainly, these differences did not occur in an isolated manner. They were deeply interlinked 
with each other, and are connected with their differences of activities that worked as the 
foundation for the ―organisation-technology-product‖ platform of firms regarding 
capability-building. They were as well relevant to the dissimilar evolution of strategic intent. In 
line with the gradual shift of strategic intent, Group-A firms had their knowledge search localised 
because the development of ―proximate‖ technologies only did not oblige them to change their 
recipes for organising research (Kogut and Zander, 1992, p392). By contrast, the strategic intent 
of Group-B firms directed their resource allocation, learning organisation and knowledge 
accumulation.  
Some may argue that the differences between Group-A and Group-B firms just reflected the 
dissimilar inclinations between incumbents and new entrants. However, considering their macro 
contexts, both Group-A firms and Group-B firms were latecomers in terms of technological 
capability by comparison with international frontiers. In particular, Group-A firms had not had 
historical advantages of technological capabilities as legacies for their rigidity, even if we take 
core rigidity as the other side of the coin of core capability (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In other 
words, Group-A firms were becoming rigid as regards building new technological capability, not 
because of the negative symbiotic legacies of being strong, but because of the inertia of being 
weak. Consider the fact that for stretching their production capacities (such as building up new 
JVs repeatedly) Group-A firms were continually transforming their organisations during a long 
period, which suggested their flexibility of organisation in a pure sense. Meanwhile, it is also 
unreasonable to argue that the weakness in technological capability building was brought about by 
specific organisational rigidities when firms focused on other strengths, unless we admitted that it 
was in general very difficult for firms to build ambidextrous organisations good at both 
production capacity and technological capability simultaneously. However, even without 
accounting for the international giants, the success of Group-B firms also has rejected this 
hypothesis. 
After acknowledging the above differences of organisational systems between these two groups of 
firms, we still have to verify the significance of these differences. Firstly, we must prove that the 
patterns of Group-B firms were effective for capability-building and commercial prosperity. This 
point has been verified by the successes of Group-B firms. Secondly, we shall claim that the 
organisational features of Group-B firms related to these differences were directly associated with 
their performances ion technological learning. This analysis is in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Process: knowledge creation and organisational learning 
systems  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify whether the organisational features of Group-B firms related to the 
differences from Group-A firms highlighted in the last two chapters were significant for the 
processes of technological learning of Group-B firms. 
In this chapter, we stress the processes through which Group-B firms searched for, generated and 
accumulated new knowledge. This does not mean we neglect the significance of ―learning by 
doing‖ which brings about the refinement of skill and the incremental increase of knowledge. 
Rather, we just aim to highlight the dynamic processes of DC firms in developing in-house 
―new-new‖ knowledge to undertake sustainable catching-up. 
In fact, the special interest in new categories of knowledge comes from reconsidering classical 
stepwise studies of technological learning in DCs. In explaining the technological paths or 
trajectories taken by catching-up firms, resource-based factors are usually taken into account, 
including the intensiveness of R&D expenditures, the accumulation of human resources, the 
prices manipulated by government, etc. These can help explain the supply of technological 
learning in particular stages, but can hardly reveal the indigenous dynamics of latecomers to leap 
from one stage to another in pursuit of capabilities of a higher category. In this sense, the position 
of latecomer firms in generating knowledge belonging to new categories should be at the heart of 
catching-up studies, no matter what trajectories the firms implement. 
In this chapter, we mainly study the early phases of Group-B firms, from their inception up to 
about 10 years after they started developing their first systemic products. Our empirical analyses 
are organised in time sequence. Two issues are particularly stressed, namely the inceptive 
foundation of knowledge, and the major sources of knowledge search, generation and 
accumulation of Group-B firms. 
7.2 Inception knowledge base 
As Group-B firms were first-movers among indigenous technological and product integrators that 
grew up from the industrial foundations of transitional China, the knowledge and patterns of 
technological learning they created were likely to be new to both themselves and the entire 
domestic industrial community. Therefore, it is critical for us to disclose the sources of their 
inceptive knowledge, which acted as the core of a knowledge spiral.  
We stylise the analyses of knowledge creation in Group-B firms as a ―search-generation- 
accumulation‖ process, which definitely required resource investment. Relevant resources would 
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not go together naturally nor readily coexist with some possible combinations, especially if the 
patterns were new to the practitioners. The effective transformation from resources to 
combinations and then to applications of resources requires Group-B firms to have effective 
organisational cores. As in the inceptive stage, the scales of organisations were all small, and the 
heroism of elites worked significantly to integrate the entire organisations. However, the 
organisational systems of Group-B firms demonstrated the following elements with their learning.  
Firstly, the organisations must sustain their strategic intent regarding in-house technological 
capability building. As effective learning for catching-up purposes was new and entailed high 
uncertainties, the latecomer firms, or to be specific even their elite leaders, could not adequately 
scheme the practical learning schedules, patterns and directions, especially in the inceptive stages. 
The sustainable strategic intent rather than foreseeable plans activated the firms to explore 
continually the domains of uncertainty. In some cases, the strategic intent for long-term 
capability-building even reflected ―unreasonable‖ investments in spite of any foreseeable plan114. 
Secondly, strategic resource allocation stressing technical and product deve lopment was also 
necessary. As for continually attracting excellent technical personnel, and re-integrating the 
intellectual assets on hand, these strategic activities could be completed only through practices of 
technical and product development. Thirdly, the mobilisation and integration involved was 
demanding; otherwise the learning implemented by Group-B firms would just simply throw the 
individuals with different competences together in ways that clearly made it impossible to 
generate any new knowledge dynamically.  
As mentioned above, most Group-B firms started their businesses from comparatively simple, 
low-end products. They had to combine different modes of learning together (Kogut and Zander, 
1992), such as learning through studying existing marketed products, and through recruiting and 
integrating personnel with complementary technical competences. However, if we stress the 
prominent sources of knowledge in their inceptive stages, the situations were somewhat different 
between the car-making and the telecom-equipment sectors. In the car-making sector reverse 
engineering could provide useful information for the learning by Group-B firms. However, in the 
telecom-equipment sector, this method contributed very little, and firms relied more on integrating 
knowledge from multiple domestic sources after being inspired by the HJD-04. 
                                                 
114 For example, Huawei had started to accumulate and cultivate large number of young engineers from its inceptive stage 
on. For instance, REN required its Beijing Research Centre to expand the recruitment of new graduates in spite of worries 
about budgets and job assignments. REN claimed,"…even if new engineers were employed by us only to ‗sieve the sand‘ 
temporarily (in case Huawei had nothing well schemed for them to do once), we should still spare no efforts in recruiting 
engineering and technical personnel…‖ Following his  directive, the Beijing centre expanded from 20 engineers in 1996 to 
over 1,000 engineers in 2000. Spare young engineers were assigned to study all kinds of communication protocols, which 
worked a significant role later during Huawei‘s transition from narrow-band to wide-band communication systems, and 
from a follower of product strategy to an innovator of new products (e.g. its soft -switch technology largely originated 
from the Beijing centre), which began in the late 1990s [according to the interview with Che HaiPing (2003)]  
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7.2.1 Car manufacturing sector 
In the car-making sector, reverse engineering of products has been taken as a popular method to 
generate useful information for product development by the entire global automobile community. 
Group-B firms also implemented this method. However, this did not mean that early products of 
Group-B firms were based on copying or simply imitating competitive products. Existing 
products were just drawn in to be studied as references for Group-B firms in developing their own 
designs (see subsection 5.3.2 in Chapter 5). This method did help remarkably when Group-B 
firms had not accumulated sufficient scales of their knowledge databases. 
Figure 7.1 A pattern of re-innovation based on studying referential product models 
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Figure 7.1 exhibits the pattern of re-innovation based on studying referential models. Firms study 
existing products that would compete with their developmental target as references. For example, 
they collect all A-level sedan models specialised for family use if they want to launch one on fheir 
own in this market segment. Features of the product systems are generalised and further studied. 
For each feature, a series of prominent factors are highlighted. For example, for the feature of 
―inner space of car body‖, engineers would include such factors as the ―wheelbase‖, the ―vehicle 
length‖, and so on. Data of referential car models for each factor are obtained by reverse 
engineering. Usually developers would group factors into couples or triples, and place each factor 
into multiplex groups consistent with logically relevant factors. Clusters that consist of dense 
points of references are identified by projecting the data of references onto the 2- or 3-dimension 
coordinate systems. Meanwhile, developers pursue their firm-specific analytical procedures based 
on their idiosyncratic technical tendencies, in-house capabilities, and capabilities of their supply 
chain. Then the distributions of referential clusters are employed by developers to help determine        
the corresponding factors of in-house product design. 
If we regard the real data of existing products as the embodiments of knowledge of their original 
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developers, this method enables latecomers to extract, translate and interpret the relevant 
information by reverse engineering, and give it meaning (Daft and Weick, 1984) based on their 
own understandings. The data are integrated with the knowledge that in-house engineers have 
already obtained to generate new in-built understandings of the product system (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Besides, as a practical strategy for product development, to locate the technological 
dimensions of their designs within the clusters of references can guarantee that latecomers stay 
away from gross errors of design, which thereby bring time and cost savings. Certainly, with the 
interpreted data, it does not mean that latecomer developers could think or act as original 
experienced developers of studied products did. Dynamically, the effects of learning depend on 
the in-built knowledge foundation and the services generated by the in-house forces collectively.  
Therefore, the implementation of this method is highly firm-specific. If latecomer firms rely on 
this method in generating product configuration, it directs firms to be with the following strategy 
of product development. In fact, most Group-B firms in either sector experienced such a phase in 
their early years of product following. As for extreme cases, if the latecomer firms have only very 
weak in-house technological capabilities, and study only a few references, the result of 
development would likely come out as the simple imitation of target models, as some of these 
cases had been critic ized or even sued by international competitors in the car-making sector. 
However, the Group-B firms in our study had not fallen into that category of extreme cases. On 
the contrary, along with the growth of financial capacities and technological capabilities, Group-B 
firms continually promoted large amounts of referential models, and refined their analytical 
techniques. For example, in the database of Chery for windscreen wipers, the referential models 
had reached over six hundred in number (data from 2006). However, the importance of the 
re-innovation method had been demoted from a major type of product configuration to an 
assistant tool, as in-house engineers had formed, to boost their own understanding of product and 
technical systems. Indeed, Group-B firms have turned to obverse product development patterns 
after they completed the development of their second-generation products. 
Certainly, re-innovation was not the only theme of the developmental activities of Group-B firms 
in their inceptive stages. In the subsections below, we analyse the detailed processes of Group-B 
firms in two dimensions – their organising of teams and their activities – to establish the inceptive 
knowledge base, and aim to highlight the relationships between them. 
7.2.1.1 Inceptive knowledge base of Chery 
Chery, when it was established as an entity, was an outsider to the previous administration of the 
automobile industry by the central planners. We have already elaborated its earliest organisational 
configuration in the Subsection 6.3.2.1. 
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Chery originated in the ―951‖ project of Anhui Province that was started in 1996. In order to 
avoid offending the industrial regulator, it was registered as the ―Preparatory Office of Anhui Auto 
Parts Industrial Corporation‖ and concealed its car development activities at the beginning. At 
that time, Chery invested all self-owned assets and loans into the new product development 
projects and the construction of production facilities for these projects. In order to save resource 
for product development, during developing its first car model, founding members even worked 
and lived in timber sheds without constructing the ―unnecessary‖ buildings. 
The earliest project of Chery was to buy and move back an old manufacturing line for Ford CVH 
engines from Bridgend, Wales, UK
115
, and to develop two optimised engine model based on CVH.  
The outcomes, namely the CAC478 and CAC480 engines, were medium product innovations that 
relied on the experience of former FAW engine experts. 
Meanwhile, the first car model of Chery, namely the Fulwin, was started to develop. During the 
course of development, Chery‘s engineers had studied a series of competitive models, such as the 
Palio of Fiat and the Polo of Volkswagen. However, as we said, when the development of supply 
chain met difficulties, Fulwin was adjusted by targeting the 1991 version of Toledo (SEAT). 
Indeed, Chery had been familiar to the Toledo system before
116
, and had option to buy a batch of 
cheap machines uninstalled from a Toledo production line, which were held by a Taiwanese firm. 
After the launch of Fulwin, Chery was charged by Volkswagen. However, the charge was for the 
violation of the ―VW” brand that was discovered on some chassis assemblies of some Fulwin 
sets
117
, not for the violation of product design. It reflected that in essence the re-innovation 
process of Fulwin model development was not simple imitation or copying.  
The high price quality brought Fulwin success quickly. As a family-use economic sedan, it was 
priced at only 1/2 to 2/3 of the prices of the ―Old Three‖ models118, and ranked the No. 9 on the 
Chinese market of 2001 (the first year it got permission to sell nationwide) in terms of sales of 
individual car models. It contributed significantly to the change in the Chinese market structure.  
For the other first-generation car models of Chery, i.e. QQ (S11), Eastar (B11) and Cowin (A14), 
                                                 
115 This line, which was priced at 25 million USD, was bought as a preparation of new car development plans of Chery. 
Due to the bad performances of the engineering force of the dealer, Chery‘s local engineers took over the second stage 
instalment of this line. 
116 From the end of 1996 on, Chery began to contact SEAT for the purpose to import technologies for locally independent 
production. Several negotiations had been arranged between the involved two sides, but came out with no official 
agreement.  
117 It was caused by the negligence of Tower Automotive (U.S.), a supplier for Volkswagen‘s Jetta model and Chery‘s 
Fulwin model. For the charge of Volkswagen, Chery had to stop import from Tower, and turned to rely on in-house 
technical and engineering force. And its in-house force did manipulate in relevant engineering and production of the 
corresponding chassis assemblies. In 2003, Chery and Tower Automotive began to build up a productive JV in Wuhu City 
and carried out close co-operation in chassis development and manufacturing 
118 In 2001, the prices for the basic setting version of FuKang-1998, Jetta-1998 and Santana-2000 were 133000, 155000 
and 175000 RMB/set, while Fulwin was priced only at 88000 RMB/set only. 
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the re-innovation pattern was also an important method employed by developers. However, the 
amount of referential models of reverse engineering and the efforts of observe-engineering 
continuously increased. Therefore, when GM claimed Chery‘s QQ violated its Spark  model (also 
the Matiz of Daewoo) in design, Chery was able to present 24 patents it had obtained related to 
the designs of QQ. 
This change originated from the growth of Chery‘s in-house capabilities, which firstly came from 
the expansion of its organisation. For the expressional strategic intent and the success of Fulwin, 
Chery became an emerging power to attract domestic engineers with the same ambition. More 
than 100 former FAW engineers had taken part in Chery during the period of its 1
st
 generation 
models development. A team from the R&D centre of DongFeng, which had experienced the 
model localisation in DongFeng-Citroën, participated in Chery as an affiliated design firm named 
Kaking. Kaking, by a series of trial and error, succeeded in taking over the tasks about systemic 
configuration and bodywork styling during this period. Then, the previous in-house product 
development team could turn to focus on product industrialisation. In short, every segment of 
Chery had been strengthened by participation of new personnel, and Chery mainly relied on 
competences carried by individual members. You can say Chery was practising a game of jigsaw 
puzzle, for which the institutions to activate organisational members and to integrate their learning, 
as depicted in Chapter 6, were definitely critical.  
Secondly, the persistence of learning based on practical developmental projects worked 
importantly in integrating the existing competences of individuals and generating new knowledge. 
As we knew, for many critical parts of product and complex technology development, the 
in-house engineers had not obtained sufficient according competences, as limited by the general 
capabilities of domestic industrial community. For these tasks, developers had to take moderate 
risks by adventures, which was supported by the cohesive organisational culture and resource 
authorised. For example, as to the chassis, in-house engineers only had experience of developing 
truck chassis assemblies. As to the engine, in-house engineers only had experience of developing 
backward diesel engines. As to the systemic configuration and bodywork-styling, in-house 
engineers only had experience of model localisation which were carried out under the supervision 
by foreign experts in Group-A firms. As to the automotive electronics and internal accessories, 
in-house engineers had seldom experience of development. Regarding the adventures, the 
re-innovation pattern provided a critical platform for each professionalised unit to extend their 
knowledge base by studying competitive products and employing the combinative capabilities 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). The practical developmental projects also provided a platform based 
for jigsaws to interact with each other, as the tacit knowledge carried by individuals could be 
revealed only through its application and through a series of mutual adjustments (Polanyi, 1966; 
Grant, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1988, p265). Further, at the frontier of knowledge exploration 
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within the national industrial community, the codification of knowledge was a highly 
organisation-specific phenomenon, and then the knowledge that had been codified in one 
organisation would not definitely was codified in another one. Then the close interaction, namely 
through the communities-of-practice on inter-department to platforms generate common structure 
and meaning for the transfer of each experience (Brown and Duguid, 1991), was the only way to 
make up necessary complementary tacit knowledge or even codified knowledge to facilitate the 
knowledge integration and further creation of new knowledge. 
The growth of knowledge, which was represented as innovation (to the local organisations) in 
terms of product development, ―not only adapt to existing organisational and industrial 
arrangements, but they also transform the structure and practice of these environments‖ (Van de 
Ven, 1986, p591). Chery‘s growth of in-house capabilities during this period was supported by its 
institutions in its inceptive stage as we depict in Chapter 6, which were fundamentally different 
from those its members had ever experienced in Group-A firms. However, as the depth of 
interaction growing, the organisational evolution was also required to co-evolve with the contents 
and patterns of knowledge creation.  
7.2.1.2 Inceptive knowledge base of Geely 
Geely shared many common grounds to Chery during their inceptive stages. Its strategic intent 
regarding indigenous product development attracted other members to participate in; the practical 
developmental projects that were implemented on the cross-boundary inter-departmental 
platforms provided the arena of competence integration among individuals. 
However, there were also some special features in the case of Geely. Firstly, since Geely was 
severely short of finance, it employed a special contract responsibility system of factory building, 
by which some of the necessary workshops in its inceptive stage were invested by business 
partners that were not legally incorporated into the firm
119
. Thus, the authority of LI and his 
intimate circle worked critically in maintaining the organisational cohesion, especially in 
mobilising these units. Secondly, in the earliest years, Geely severely lacked experienced 
engineers. In 1997, only 7 engineers could be mobilised from its motorcycle division with 
backgrounds related to the development of comparatively complex products. Only 3 among them 
had experiences related to vehicle making, but were just for modified truck and jeep merely. 
Moreover, they had no digital development tools and relevant capabilities on hand. 
For the very weak capability foundation for car-making, before developing its first product model 
                                                 
119 This pattern was illegal by Chinese corporation law, but also reflected Geely‘s intent as to the indigenous product 
development. 
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for real industrialisation, Geely implemented three trial projects to establish a basic knowledge 
core which afterwards enabled Geely with basic components of absorptive capacity to interact 
with new-coming members, and to deal with the projects with real industrialisation aims. Geely 
started its first trial project in 1997, which was to disassemble two cars, and combined the 
bodywork of a Benz-C280 with the chassis of a RedFlag-CA7220. This project yielded very basic 
knowledge of car systems and development for the team. The second trial project was to 
disassemble an AnChi (a mini-car produced domestically without regulative licence), with 
purpose to accumulate further knowledge about the product system and relevant lists of 
components, by which Geely began to establish its system of component management. By the 
terms we used for the re-innovation pattern, developers investigated the features and factors of the 
product system. In 1998, Geely started to imitate a car model, taking a ZhongHua Bullet (a 
domestically produced car without regulative licence) as benchmark. Besides the reverse 
engineering, combining their previous knowledge in the re-innovation pattern, Geely‘s team made 
a series of marginal design on this model, and even adjusted some technical weaknesses of the 
ZhongHua Bullet in the suspension. By manufacturing a small batch of the imitated cars, Geely‘s 
engineers got skilled in producing car products at comparative stable qualities. 
The first model of Geely for real industrialisation, namely the HQ series, was started in 1998. The 
developers studied several car models as references, such as the FuKang of DongFeng, the Lancer 
of Mitsubishi, the Alto of Suzuki, the RedFlag of FAW, and the C280 of Benz. However, similar to 
Chery‘s case of Fulwin, Geely‘s in-house developer finally took XiaLi as the target model in order 
to adopt the engine and some chassis assemblies from the existing domestic supply chains of 
XiaLi. Besides, the ZhongHua Bullet model that Geely ever in-depth studied had many similarities 
to the XiaLi; and by contrast with other references, XiaLi and Aldo were much simpler in structure, 
which was in line with Geely‘s expectation regarding the first attempt of industrialisation. 
However, we cannot simply say the HQ was developed by simply imitating the XiaLi, considering 
the technical features with obvious differences, such as the car height. Ironically, many features of 
the bodywork of HQ, especially in the front and rear faces, car doors and lateral assemblies, tried 
to follow the classical features of Benz, although we must say that these ―luxury‖ styling features 
looked very unsuitable on an economic compact car model. 
The participation of new experienced engineers supported Geely much in developing the HQ into 
an industrialised model. Since 1998, a series of experts from SOES who were dissatisfied with the 
TMFT policy joined this new firm. Some policy-makers that had dissimilar opinion to the 
mainstream also unofficially encouraged engineers they personally knew to come and help Geely. 
Besides, from 2001, Geely started to benefit from the graduates from its own education division 
(Geely built up an education system as its second largest business since 1998, partly for its 
suffering from the lack of R&D personnel in inceptive stage).  
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After Geely had proven its potential and attempts with the HQ series, a larger tide of local experts 
came to join Geely since 2002. Among these new-coming members, there included the former 
chief engineer of Nanjing-Fiat, the former vice directors of FAW‘s R&D centre, the former CEO 
of FAW-Daewoo, the vice president of Daewoo (Korea), and so on. 
Similar to that of Chery, the integration of these jigsaws and the further new knowledge creation 
in Geely were realised through a series of practical developmental projects. Different models were 
developed based on the HQ product platform, such as for bodywork-styling favouring female 
taste (MR series), for lager inner space (HQ-7131), and for flexible uses (HQ-SRV). Another 
product platform, namely the Maple series, was developed by taking the FuKang of 
DongFeng-Citroën as the target model of some chassis assemblies. Regarding the critical 
technologies, Geely put forward a 4-cylinder engine model and its own EPS system in 2002. The 
basic force for the development of this engine model was a team having experience in diesel 
engine development only (came from the Shanghai Diesel Engine). However, being integrated 
into the new knowledge system and being associated with relevant units, this team succeeded in 
transferring their capabilities into the new domain.  
The accumulation of knowledge cultivated new changes. Geely‘s knowledge database had been 
transferred into a digital framework since 2001, and developed into a basic economic scale of 
references. Meanwhile, the routines for cross-boundary inter-departmental interaction had been 
in-built. Thus, the growing in-house forces called for adventures about new patterns of learning 
organising, and new technological implementation. From 2002, Geely developed a sports-car 
model and launched it in 2004. Its output, namely Mybo, was Geely‘s first obverse engineering 
project of product development, although some chassis assemblies of HQ series were still adopted 
in order to preserve high interchangeable rate of components, which presented the capability 
growth of Geely in the previous years. 
7.2.1.3 Inceptive knowledge base of HaFei 
By compared with Chery and Geely, HaFei was confronted with two special conditions in its 
inceptive stage. Firstly, HaFei was a quasi-military SOE, which disabled it to hire people from the 
external market; rather, it had to rely on internal training and the human resource system of the 
governmental aviation industry. Secondly, HaFei Auto was originated from a group of technical 
experts from HaFei Aircraft. The development of aircraft was very much different from the 
development of automobile. Therefore, HaFei Auto had to transform the in-house expertise to 
meet the requirements of automobile development.  
In 1983, the national automobile industrial administration decided to permit HaFei, ChangAn and 
ChangHe to enter the sector of mini-bus making which was in response to the appeal of the MOAI 
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(Ministry of Aviation Industry) and the Ministry of Weapon Industry to offer these military 
background SOEs an opportunity to make a living and to feed their appointed major business. 
Therefore, from the day it was born, HaFei Auto was confronted with tough pressures to survive 
and to feed its aircraft-making division
120
, which through the effective management engendered 
organisational cohesion, or something we can refer to comradely fellowship under crisis to 
support the appointed task and keep every member on board
121
. Besides, the founding members 
brought about the technology-oriented gene that, associated with the sense of honour for being a 
military background firm, grew up into the tradition of stressing indigenous capability building.  
HaFei started the automobile development from 1983. At that time, in order to help the three 
SOEs, the government planned to import the blueprints of SK90 from Suzuki; however, after 
obtaining the approval of mini-bus making, the three SOEs could not wait but started to study the  
SK90 on their own. Data were generated by precisely mapping. Besides, HaFei made a series of 
changes of design, including the vehicle length and wheelbase, the height and width, the 
suspension system and external accessories, and designed the new bodywork to develop the SK90 
it studied from a mini-bus into a pickup named WJ-120. 
The outcome was good, but in the process HaFei met a series of difficulties, related to the pattern 
its engineers implemented to carry out development. Firstly, the developers did not recognise that 
as products for mass production the automobiles should be developed with stress of quality 
consistence. The precisions of component designs were always over-stressed, since developers got 
used to the ―higher the precision, better the performance‖ thought of aircraft making. The 
engineers ever adapted the screws for aircrafts in the design of pickup because the screws were 
excellent regarding the precision (which could realise air sealing). They ever adopted the 
engineering plastics as stamping dies for some outer covering pieces, because they got 
accustomed to improve the designs consistently to promote the quality of design, for which the 
engineering plastics enabled them to adjust the dies but required much investment in subsequent 
refine of the products. As an extreme case, the parameters of gears for the transmission assemblies 
in WJ-120 were different from the parameters in the mini-bus model of ChangAn a lthough they 
did map the same model (SK90). It was because the abraded gears in the benchmark SK90 sets 
                                                 
120 The financial pressure was huge. Take the situation in 2002 as example, the total revenue for HaFei was  7 billion RMB, 
among which 6.5 billion was from HaFei Auto. HaFei Auto had to support the HaFei Aircraft financially. In fact without 
mentioning the high expenditure in physical cost of the aircraft -making division, HaFei Aircraft engaged 12,000 
employees out of the total 18,000 of HaFei. Including all share-holding service agencies spun off from the HaFei Group, 
there were in total 60,000 people for 6,000 employees of HaFei Auto to feed. And it explains why in building its new 
manufacturing plant for Lubo (HaFei‘s first car model) in 2002, HaFei only had 0.9 billion RMB available, which was its 
total financial accumulation in the past over 19 years. 
121 In fact, during 1984-2005, only one member of HaFei was  fired, and it was for his  criminal reason. We should note that, 
as contexts, during the great lay-off in the late 1990s for the reformation of SOEs in China, it is broadly believed that 
about 22-30 million industrial workers had got laid-off. The Northeast China, where HaFei is exactly located in, was the 
harder-hit area since it was the traditional heavy industrial base of China. So as a SOE, HaFei‘s achievement could be 
even regarded as a miracle.  
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were precisely measure by the developers of HaFei. Finally HaFei had to invest a gear factory by 
itself since the gears of WJ-120 were not interchangeable to those of ChangAn‘s, and was not 
even in line with any in the Chinese national industrial standard. 
Secondly, engineers had not changed their cognition about the producer-customer relationship. 
They were attracted more by the performance rather than the demands of customers. They ever 
presented 8 different prototypes as the final industrialised models of WJ-120 to the decision- 
makers, and claimed that each prototype was with technical specialities and should be developed 
as ―customised‖ models. However, none of the feature derived from real market demands. In 
delivering the WJ-120 products to dealers, they even included a ―non-achievement‖ list as they 
did in the aircraft-making industry
122
; and for different batches of WJ-120, the contents of the 
―non-achievement‖ lists were even different from each other!  
Thirdly, the labour division for the aircraft development in HaFei was based on the technologies 
implemented, such as the sheet-metal shaping, rubber manufacturing, and magnetic material- 
relevant technology. By contrast, the professionalization in the automobile development for mass 
market was according to the processing procedures and relevant developmental objects, such as 
the bodywork stamping, bodywork welding, bodywork painting and chassis assembling. They 
followed different logics, and HaFei had to invest a lot of cost in management to organise the 
development and production of WJ-120. 
The dull sales for the first batch of WJ-120 product compelled HaFei to re-consider its patterns of 
technological learning. A series of efforts was implemented during 1985-1992 with several 
practical projects, including the development of a two-row-seater WJ-120 pickup during 
1987-1988, the development of SHJ series mini-bus during 1986-1992, and the development of 
supply chains. During this process, engineers of HaFei started to implement market research, 
changed their previous developmental habits, adopted the re-innovation pattern, and realise the 
building and transformation of specialised units. For the sake of brevity, we pass over most details, 
but focus on what especially HaFei had done in order to build up a new organisational learning 
system by contrast with the Chery and Geely cases. 
In order to change the minds of its engineers, HaFei organised their engineers to visit domestic 
manufacturing firms. The visiting targets included not only large SOEs but also local small- and 
medium-sized township firms as the latter presented good performance in quickly responding to 
market demands. Some leading engineers were sent to visit Suzuki and Mitsubishi.  
                                                 
122 This meant that for non-essential technical features, if providers could not realise them as expected, they could list 
them out and inform customers. Conventionally in the aircraft industry, customers would not refuse to accept the product 
if they could get an appropriate price reduction or they would allow a time extension for the producer. It was acceptable 
based on the essence that aircraft-making was a customised industry in many cases. 
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Internally, HaFei highlighted the tradition inherited from the central planning era (refer to the 
―AnGang Constitution‖ in Chapter 8) and held regular on-site conferences at workshops to discuss 
technical and managerial questions. Engineers of all units were called upon to join in conferences 
at firm level at the beginning. Later, such conferences were developed as regular arrangements at 
department and workshop level. In these conferences, the ―criticism and self-criticism (PiPing Yu 
ZiWo PiPing)‖, as a legacy of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) for decades, were 
implemented among participants as a principle for improvements. Managers and leading 
engineers led the way of criticism and self-criticism first, followed by other common engineers 
and workers. Topics covered a range of managerial reform issues and technical problems. 
Standardisation and robustness of development methods were major targets for them to achieve 
collectively. With a traditional and quasi-political atmosphere, the regular inter-department 
conferences and the ―criticism and self-criticism‖ produced a platform for this organisation under 
pressure to facilitate disruptive organisational changes. Information was shared, transmitted 
bottom-up and transmitted horizontally across boundaries of different units.  
The milestone of HaFei‘s organisational transformation happened in 1991. In order to build up the 
production lines for the SHJ series (50,000 set/year), HaFei mobilised most of its engineers from 
all departments to take part in this project, including scheming the plants, developing or 
outsourcing the machines, constructing the production lines, and so on. The reason for doing so 
was to save cost under the tight financial situation
123
, for which HaFei had to minimize the 
outsourcing, and develop a number of machines in-house. Besides, decision-makers also 
considered it an important chance to promote the cross-boundary mutual learning. The 
organisational structure of specialised units was temporally knocked down, and new structure 
specialised in plant construction was set up. R&D engineers were also deeply involved in 
developing, testing and adjusting the manufacturing equipment. In this way, the engineers got 
deep mutual understanding of the technical criteria and guidelines of each other. 
These efforts yielded good performances. Engineers gradually mastered relevant development 
tools and organisational methods for cross-boundary inter-departmental cooperation. Particularly, 
developers much better recognised the industrial features of automobile and the market demands. 
Such a change was also reflected as the market success of newly launched products. In 1992, the 
sales of SHJ climbed to near 50,000 sets, close to its designed capacity, and never fell down again. 
By these intentional changes of organisation and by learning, HaFei established its potential to 
                                                 
123 Even the two-row-seater WJ-120 was popular in the market (the market orders were beyond HaFei‘s designed capacity 
in the first year when this product was launched in 1988, namely 10,000 set/year), HaFei Auto was still severely short of 
finance since it had to feed the aircraft-making division. Therefore, although the first prototype of SHJ had been 
completed by the end of 1988, HaFei still had no money to build up facilities to produce this model. Only with the support 
from AVIC II and the regional government to arrange loans, could HaFei raise enough money to do it in 1991. 
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carry out obverse engineering product development, and was ready to be discovered by 
Pininfarina since 1993. 
It is worth mentioning ChangHe, because its evolution provided an exactly contrast to HaFei 
about what if HaFei had not insisted its strategic intent or suffered to transform its organisation. 
ChangHe differentiated with HaFei from the beginning on. In 1983, MOAI issued an appointment 
that by imitating the SK90, HaFei developed a pickup model while ChangHe developed a 
mini-bus model. However, ChangHe gave up developing the chassis. It initiated a deal with HaFei 
that the latter would supply the chassis assemblies for it, while ChangHe could supply the 
bodywork
124
. Therefore, what ChangHe did was just to produce bodywork of mini-bus with low 
pace handcraft making (the capability it got expert in for its experience of aircraft making). In 
1984, the negotiation between the Chinese government and Suzuki led to the imports of the SK90 
blueprints. As their prototypes and relevant facilities had already been developed at that time
125
, 
HaFei and ChangAn did not change their schemes by taking the imported blueprints as references. 
Only ChangHe gave up its original plan and turned to stress the production localisation of the 
imported blueprints. In 1991, Chinese government negotiated with Suzuki again to import the 
blueprints of SK410 for these SOEs as an upgraded product. As arranged, the three SOEs would 
buy 1/3 blueprints each in order to save money, and share them afterwards. Again, HaFei just paid 
its share and took the blueprints as references, since it had been preparing the industrialisation of 
the SHJ series since 1988. However, ChangHe broke up the deal. It raised more money to buy 
back the full set blueprints of SK410, and refused to share them with other two. Even so, it could 
not launch its new mini-bus platform until it established JV with Suzuki in 1995. After that, 
ChangHe became a typical Group-A firm and gave up the independence of in-house development 
force. Only after 2006, in response to social appeals, did ChangHe begin to develop an indigenous 
car model with the outsourced body design from the Bertone (Italy). 
ChangHe had never placed itself to such a circumstance as HaFei did to transform its own 
organisation endogenously to establish effective in-house learning system. It had never suffered 
the pains to mobilise its different units and to explore the learning integration to carry out 
in-house product development in a new industry. It just made use of particular strength it had 
accumulated, and continuously relied on imported technical solutions and then on the foreign 
partner. It came out to be backward as to the technological capability for product development.  
                                                 
124 However, since the bodywork of mini-bus was distinct from that of pickup, HaFei in fact still had to develop it 
in-house. 
125 For example, HaFei had already started to build up its special gear factory. 
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7.2.2 Telecom-equipment sector  
In the telecom-equipment sector, the benefits brought about by reverse engineering for latecomers 
were conditional. Since the global telecom industry had been deeply involved with semiconductor 
and computer technologies, the underlying technical logics of frontier equipment had been 
shielded with encapsulated chips and compiled software codes. It was difficult to decipher the 
original knowledge by reverse engineering. Therefore, in the 1980s, most Chinese indigenous 
firms could develop low-end equipment only, such as PBX or small PDSS, because these products 
were simple in technical architecture and the chips that required were accessible by Chinese 
developers from the market. However, as for the large-scale PDSS models (>10,000 line/unit), 
namely the products occupying major market values, it was hard to study by reverse engineering. 
It explained why Chinese had to spend a lot of money in export the large PDSS, which reached 
about 30 billion USD during 1990-1995. About 80% of total investments in telecom networks 
were used to purchase the large PDSS and complementary equipment to build up the backbone 
and urban networks.  
In fact, China was not late in starting the modern electronic industry since the mid 1960s. 
However, for decades in the ―GuiKou Management‖ system, its electronic, semiconductor and 
computer industry was placed independent away from most other industries that could be relevant. 
It resulted in the weakness regarding the interdisciplinary applications, such as the automotive 
electronics, computerized numerical control machine tools, and digitalised telecom-equipment
126
. 
Domestic policy-makers and industrial practitioners did not understand the in-depth connections 
between different disciplines. It came out with not only a question whether the leaders were 
willing to reform the previous industrial system, but also a question whether the leaders knew 
what direction and how the reform should go. The DS series projects presented the best 
achievements the ministry-led domestic industrial community could obtain based on reverse 
engineering and adopting the traditional telephony technologies. By contrast, HJD-04 was the 
milestone, coming from outside the range of previous industrial administration, which brought 
about the breakthrough for the entire domestic industrial community.  
In the 1980s, most Group-B firms followed the traditional methods of reverse engineering and 
developed low-end products, influenced by the DS series, and benefited from the spillover of 
                                                 
126 It resulted in the low rate of advanced equipment installed in China: in 1982, 29% of telecom switching were realised 
by step- by-step switches, 33.7% by crossbar switches. Digitalised and semi-digitalised equipment only accounted for 
6.7%, most of which was procured from overseas in the‖43 Arrangement(s)” and the ―78 Plan” in the 1970s. The huge 
gap in capability between China and developed countries could be presented by the case of Shanghai Telephony, which 
was the parent SOE of Shanghai-Bell and ever an excellent domestic telecom-equipment provider awarded by the 
national industrial administration. However, during Aug. 1984 - Dec. 1985, Shanghai-Telephony quickly lost all 
customers of its crossbar switches as Shanghai- Bell was established with advanced PDSS model. Sales valued 2.7 million 
RMB were rejected from its previous customers. 
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governmental research accumulation. After the emergence of HJD-04, they were inspired with the 
new thoughts that indeed indicated the technological trajectory and technological integration. 
7.2.2.1 Sources of technological spillover: indigenous technical exploration in the 1980s 
DS series projects and HJD series projects represented two industrial forces of China in 1980s. As 
a complementary strategy to the TMFT policy, the execution of the DS series aimed at generating 
indigenous products through learning imported products. Its development process also reflected 
the merits and demerits of the industrial system to which it adhered. By contrast, the HJD series 
was led by an outsider to the MPT system. It reflected a spontaneous ―invasion‖ of traditional 
telephony regime by the computer technology, and an ―invasion‖ of MPT-led telecom-equipment 
industry by an outsider. 
(1) DS series 
DS series included the DS-2000 project and the DS-30 project. The DS-2000 project aimed to 
develop a 2000-line/unit PDSS system by reverse engineering the F150 model of Fujitsu. The 
DS-30 project was the successor to the front one, aiming to develop a PDSS with capacity over 
10,000-line/unit.  
In 1981, China introduced a first foreign PDSS model from Fujitsu, named F150. The F150 was 
in fact a model designed particularly for the Chinese market since before that Fujitsu had not had 
such a model on hand. Therefore, with the coordination from Chinese government, local engineers 
had chances to watch some developmental activities of Fujitsu, such as the communication with 
users, technical tests and system adjustments. In 1983, the DS series was started by imitating the 
F150 mainframe. Projects was mainly led by two institutes of MPT, namely the No.1 Institute, 
which was in charge of developing the switch for local telephony in the ―GuiKou Management‖ 
system so it led the DS-2000 project, and the No.10 institute, which was in charge of developing 
the switch for long distance telephony so it led the DS-30 project. Universities and other research 
institutes affiliated to the MPT played supporting roles. 
However, the learning based on reverse engineering did not happen smoothly as expected. As we 
know, Fujitsu was a top world mega-computer provider. Therefore, its competences related to 
computer technologies were represented, but was encapsulated and compiled in the F150 system. 
Especially it adopted a traditional centralised architecture for which its strength in semiconductor 
and computer provided the strong LSI chips to work as the centres within the centralised system. 
However, on the imitators‘ side, technical experts of MPT had little knowledge related to 
computer technologies. Therefore, they lacked the ability to discover, analyse and resolve 
technical problems about the computer control. The Group-A telecom-equipment firms were 
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supposed to be another important source for obtaining external new knowledge to the MPT 
system. However, as we said, what the local engineers got were just the skills for manufacturing 
and the management approaches for operations. As for horizontal cooperation, unless with the 
coordination of higher bureaus (ministry-level or higher), there were few official channels for 
involved developers to cooperate with experts from computer-related ministerial systems, 
although the relevant technical foundations were as well rather weak in China. Meanwhile, with 
the regulations of COCOM, advanced LSI chips were hardly accessible on the Chinese domestic 
market. 
With these difficulties, the underlying technologies of F150 were far beyond the absorptive 
capacity of Chinese engineers at that moment. The DS-2000 system had to simply follow the 
centralised technical architecture of F150, and adopt core chips from Fujitsu although there was 
no official channel to buy these chips actually. In other words, DS-2000 model could be regarded 
as the combination of a series of locally developed telephony functions with a core black-box 
outsourced from Fujitsu. The DS-2000 project was completed in 1986, and was awarded by 
Chinese government. However, it was produced in very limited amounts, indeed with only two 
sets in 1986. 
In order to solve these difficulties, MPT did a im to integrate learning within a wider context. In 
the subsequent DS-30 project, with the coordination among ministries, MPT included other 
institutes such as the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Chinese Academy of Sciences to 
develop relevant software packages supportively. However, it could not change the fact 
fundamentally that the DS series projects were led by MPT research institutes in technology and 
governance. With the prototype launched in 1991, the DS-30 model also suffered from the same 
bottlenecks as DS-2000 did. It explained why this model only had a very limited market share and 
a short market life in China.  
The development of DS series projects won a turn to get significant improved only with two 
conditions came true. First was the emergence of HJD-04, which changed the technical cognition 
of the DS developers. Based on it, they generated a better understanding about the underlying 
themes of digitalised PDSS systems, which means they got a guide to explore the previous 
―black-boxes‖. They began to place computational technologies at the central of product system 
design. In their upgraded PDSS model, namely the SP30 (100,000-line/unit), they developed 
connections among different switching modules by adopting matrix-wise decentralised structure 
and computational controlling technologies. Second was the entry into China‘s domestic market 
of the foreign special IC design firms brought about by the dismissal of COCOM in 1994, which 
solved the problems of DS series and SP30 in outsourcing central processors for each switching 
module.  
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In short, the DS series effectively mobilised resources within the range influenced by the branch- 
based industrial administration. This series did have trained a group of researchers. However, the 
DS series had not achieved success for the cognitive and organisational limitations of the 
administration system it was tied to, which limited its contribution to the domestic community in 
terms of both technical innovation and organisational innovation.  
(2) HJD series 
The HJD series opened up a different trajectory, for which we have analysed in the Subsection 
4.4.2.2 and 5.3.3.3. Here we spotlight its implications to the domestic industrial community.  
The developmental activities of CIT successfully achieved an integration of the computer 
technologies and the traditional telephony technologies in spite of the institutional barriers that 
still worked. Its decentralised structure with its technological innovation, namely the ―level-wise 
distributed controlling structure‖ and ―replicated T-type switching network‖, belonged to the 
frontier of the global industrial community.  
HJD-04‘s success had the domestic industrial community realise the importance of computer 
technologies to the modern telecom application. To be specific, what it indicated was the 
integration of relevant technologies from different domains, and the organisational integration of 
different resources to realise the technical target (e.g. CIT and the support from PTIC and LTEP). 
As we said, MPT organised a ―hostile‖ committee for the conference to decide whether HJD-04 
was qualified to be licensed in 1991. This committee consisted mostly of potential competitors of 
HJD-04, and was kept lasting for an entire month. It was a challenge to the HJD-04; but from 
another side, throughout the tough and long-lasting inspection, the technical architecture, working 
mechanism and network simulation of HJD-04 were well demonstrated to all participants, 
including policy-makers of MPT, researchers from universities and institutes, and engineers from 
SOEs and Group-A firms. In other words, the conference de facto acted as an important event to 
diffuse the technology and reputation of HJD-04 within the entire industrial community. Soon 
after HJD-04 obtaining approval, even ZTE and Huawei, which were still small firms located 
south 2,300 km away from Beijing, had already known its technical solution. 
In fact, some imported PDSS models, such as the S1240 of Shanghai-Bell, also adopted 
decentralised control technology, although they displayed differences from the HJD-04 regarding 
the practical solution. However, before these imported products or blueprints were shipped into 
China, their underlying technologies had been shielded by the packaged LSI designs and the 
compiled software. HJD-04 was the only one accessible to the domestic industrial community 
varied diffusion ways with its underlying technologies quasi-open through. Meanwhile, HJD-04 
presented a pattern to set up the large-scale PDSS system by employing common chips. With a 
matrix-wise decentralised control structure, CIT enabled the No. 244, No. 245 and No. 374 chips 
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which were standard chips on the market with small capacity to realise the modular switching 
functions and supporting functions, and adopted the Motorola-68000 which was also small to act 
as the central processor. Considering the regulation of COCOM, it indeed opened a wide 
perspective for the domestic community in terms of technical cognition and practical solutions to 
pursue technological success and commercial survival.  
In short, the success of HJD-04 stimulated the institutional, organisational and strategic changes 
to overcome the barriers among different technological disciplines and industrial systems as 
response to the emerging technological and industrial challenge. The industrial community did 
obtain progress through learning upon it. For instance, right after the launch of HJD-04, the SPC 
reduced its funds for the DS series projects, but stressed more on emerging firms. All these made 
the HJD-04 a milestone in the history of China‘s telecom-equipment sector, and changed the 
technical trajectory and organisational pattern of Chinese domestic firms, especially for Group-B 
firms. 
7.2.2.2 Inceptive knowledge base of Group-B firms 
In the late 1980s, there emerged over 200 new domestic firms that developed or did agent-sale of 
PBX or small PDSS. The newborn indigenous developers stretched their knowledge by studying 
foreign models and benefiting from spillover from governmental research accumulation. However, 
for the significant complexity of technologies embedded in large-scale PDSS, the relevant 
knowledge was not attainable to these newborn indigenous firms through reverse engineering. 
Moreover, there were no other relevant experience spillover from the domestic industrial 
community, since Group-A firms failed to obtain any significant process of product development 
in China. 
Therefore, only the emergence of HJD-04 inspired them with new cognitions. However, as the 
implications from HJD-04 were new to the domestic telecom industrial community, these 
newborn domestic firms reacted differently. Only a few firms got success, such as ZTE and 
Huawei. 
(1) Inceptive knowledge base of ZTE 
ZTE was founded in 1985 by a group of engineers spin-off from the No.691 Factory (in Shaanxi) 
affiliated to Ministry of Aerospace Industry. In China, the aerospace industry was also regulated 
as quasi-military. Hence, the No. 691 Factory also confronted the reduction of governmental 
appropriation in the 1980s, and had to seek commercial opportunity to ―make a living‖. Therefore, 
it sent a team to Shenzhen to explore the business opportunities. 
At the beginning, ZTE was a small firm to produce household electronic appliances according to 
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external business orders. It perceived the program-control telecom switch by chance: in order to 
sell his IC chips to ZTE, a Hong Kong dealer set up a very simple switch by his chips on a dining 
table in front of ZTE‘s engineers, to demonstrate that these chips could serve for multi-purpose. 
This model was tiny in terms of switching capacity, but shocked ZTE by showing a rough concept 
of program-control switching. 
ZTE decided to enter the telecom-equipment sector. Its members had experience regarding the 
electronics and semiconductors technical development when working in the No. 691 factory. ZTE 
turned to the Post and Telecom-equipment Plant of Shaanxi Province (SPTE) to look for support 
related to the traditional telephony technology. SPTE had already developed a prototype of a PBX, 
which was based on analogue crossbar technologies, only with the capacity at 32line/unit. Their 
cooperation started from 1986, ZTE invested most of money it had earned to industrialise this 
model, namely the ZXJ60.  
After that, ZTE started developing a PBX model named ZX500 based on real digital technologies 
to realise the capacity at 500 line/unit, which turned out to be competitive in the niche market of 
small PDSS (for the restraint of budgets some regional telecom operators in marginal market 
adopted large PBX instead of small PDSS). For this project, ZTE asked Beijing College of Posts 
and Telecoms for help, and took one PBX from Samsung as reference of development. As a result, 
the ZX500 was licensed by MPT in 1989.  
At that time, MPT caught out an imbalance of telecom development between the urban areas and 
the rural areas, since MNCs and Group-A firms were not willing to serve the peripheral markets. 
Inspired by the popularity of ZX500 and other domestic PBX models, MPT decided to encourage 
indigenous firms to develop PBX and small PDSS for peripheral markets. ZTE was one of the 
firms included in an official recommending list of MPT for telecom-operators in rural areas. 
The appreciation of MPT brought some opportunities for ZTE to cooperate with governmental 
research institutes of MPT. ZTE was arranged to cooperate with the No.10 Research Institute to 
develop an upgraded switch. However, the cooperation failed for the disagreement about 
governance pattern between the two sides. ZTE turned to work with the Nanjing College of Posts 
and Telecoms forwardly, which had been involved in the DS series projects. During 1989-1992, a 
cooperative project was carried out to develop a digitalised 500 line/unit PBX named ZX500A. 
The high cost performance of ZX500A and the good customer services of ZTE won good 
reputations. ZTE accumulated most of the funds, which was used for the development of its 
large-scale PDSS. 
In short, through a series of product development ZTE had accumulated an infant knowledge base, 
and got touch with domestic research resources. However, it still could not establish the 
understanding upon large-scale PDSS systems, since within the range of its knowledge search 
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there was no relevant answer. Besides, ZTE had organised a development team consisting of the 
segments expert in switching technology, telephony technology, manufacturing, marketing, and 
post-sale services. ZTE called back its engineers from the production lines of household 
electronic appliances, and recruited some experts from its cooperative partners, including SPTE 
and Nanjing College of Posts and Telecoms. 
Meanwhile, ZTE realised the fundamental organisational preparation during this period. The 
leading members had signed a contractual agreement with the No. 691 factory to ensure the 
autonomy of operational management. A further agreement was signed in 1993 that endowed the 
executive managers with the power of strategy making; as exchange, the managerial team, which 
was authorized by the ZTE collective, guaranteed the revenue growth rate to investors by taking 
on the stock share of the collective of employees as a mortgage. Therefore, ZTE, as a SOE in 
theory, turned out to be a firm controlled on its own managerial team, away from the turbulence of 
China‘s reform of SOEs during later periods.  
(2) Inceptive knowledge base of Huawei 
Huawei was established in Shenzhen in 1987. REN had absolute authority within the firm, and got 
support from his following elite engineers for his aggressive intent regarding the indigenous 
product development.  
Huawei started its business from doing agent sale of HAX PBX products of KangLi (Hong Kong). 
One year later, Huawei decided to develop its own PBX model in spite of the opposition from its 
Hong Kong partner. It cooperated with a team from Tsinghua University and developed a 500 
line/unit PBX named HJD48 based on analogue technologies. HJD48 was not an advanced model, 
but succeeded in satisfying rural customers and hotel customers. Its business success provided 
Huawei most financial resources for its further development until the launch of C&C08, namely 
its first large digitalised PDSS model. After the success of HJD48, Huawei started a new project 
to develop a 1000 lines/unit PDSS model based on analogue technologies, namely the JK1000.  
However, even with the smooth progress, Huawei had not accumulated effective knowledge about 
the large-scale PDSS
127
. What its engineers did was to follow an incrementally progressive 
trajectory. So as they had already developed a small-scale PBX based on analogue technology, 
and were developing a small-scale PDSS based on analogue technology, the next step which had 
been in their plan was to develop a small-scale digitalised PBX or PDSS. As for the large-scale 
digitalised PDSS, the prospect was still uncertain.  
However, Huawei had already made good preparation in organisational building. Since the 
                                                 
127 For example, around 1990, REN was still considering about a project to develop an only 200 line/unit digitalised 
PDSS model when he contacted overseas Chinese engineers in the Silicon Valley. 
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beginning, REN had scheduled a team for indigenous product development. The transformation of 
governmental industrial and research systems caused experienced engineers and researcher left 
their previous posts and migrated to Shenzhen for new opportunities. It benefited Huawei‘s 
organisational expansion. By recruiting all experienced engineers they could obtain, all members 
of Huawei in its inceptive stage had technical backgrounds, even including the sales 
representatives. In 1990, Huawei had already gathered 600 personnel, most of whom were 
experienced engineers. 
Strong strategic intent was also optimising this team. As we said, the insistence of REN and other 
core members on new product development engaged most internal finance resources and loans. 
Two founding partners left Huawei for their disagreement against the ambitious intentions, so did 
some common engineers if they wanted to avoid the great uncertainty that Huawei was 
undergoing. At the end of every financial year, after the annual bonuses were distributed, there 
emerged groups of resignation. The rate of staff turnover was as high as 30-50% and such a 
situation was constant until the launch of C&C08. However, from another perspective, it also 
preserved a coherent organisational culture that engineers who stayed stably all shared similar 
intent.  
In 1992, in spite that the JK1000 was still under development, Huawei stopped its previous 
scheme and started to develop the large-scale PDSS, because the implications of HJD-04‘s 
success changed the views of Huawei about learning and development. 
(3) Knowledge diffused from HJD series to ZTE and Huawei 
As regards the mechanism of technological diffusion from the HJD-04, the 1991 inspection 
conference acted as a critical event. After that, the MPT organised training programme to spread 
the successful experiences of domestic PDSS development, which was open to the entire domestic 
industrial community
128
. Meanwhile, the GDT alliance, which included a series of SOEs around 
the entire country, also enhanced the indirect technological spillover, without mentioning that 
there were a dozen of others producing HJD-04 without the permission of GDT. 
Group-B firms also got direct diffusion from the HJD-04 project. CIT, namely the development 
team of the HJD series, was quite open to domestic requests for technical consultancy as it still 
partly inherited the tradition of the central planning era. Huawei organised visits of its engineers 
to the projects of GDT when the latter was constructing networks for its customers. REN invited 
three leading technical experts of CIT as consultants to Huawei for eight months; and WU  even 
                                                 
128 In 1992, MPT organised a training programme to spread the new technologies of PDSS development, including those 
of the DS series  and the HJD-04. All domestic research institutes and firms were encouraged to take part in. Besides, MPT 
summarised the experience into a handbook, which was rough, but it still became an important guide for domestic PDSS 
development. 
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allowed his core follower to accept it. Even WU himself also provided advices and comments on 
the projects of Huawei occasionally. Similarly, ZTE also invited them to provide consulting 
services. When GDT ran into difficulties, some members of CIT joined the Group-B firms. 
The inspiration from the success of HJD-04 was firstly spiritual by echoing the ambitions of 
indigenous developers when they were still groping in dark. In our interviews, even if 
interviewees would have different ideas about the extent that they personally benefited from the 
HJD-04 in technology, they all emphasised highly the spiritual encouragement they received. In 
fact, even for the policy-makers, the bitterness of DS projects ever brought them the sense of 
failure, but the success of HJD-04 largely reversed the trend. 
The Group-B firms perceived from the HJD-04 primarily embodied as cognitions related to the 
technological development of PDSS. After 1991, there was no more new indigenously initiated 
PDSS model adopting centralised architectures of switching control, but all adopting 
decentralised ones, even though their similarities to the HJD-04 system varied
129
. It did not mean 
to deny the centralised architectures in general, but reflected the progress of understanding about 
product systems and the strategic choices of domestic practitioners with consideration about 
particular circumstances. With the distributed control system, indigenous practitioners could adopt 
standardized or small LSI processors that were more accessible on the market. In fact, since the 
HJD-04 had shed light on the core ―black-box‖ of large-scale PDSS as to the relation between the 
computational process realised by the LSI chips with the switching and controlling functions 
required by the telephony application, leading Group-B firms got inspired and started to establish 
their strengths in the in-house ASIC development.  
More importantly, HJD-04 implied a new pattern of technological integration, by which CIT 
integrated the non-telephony technology with traditional telephony technology, and integrated the 
organisation from non-telephony division with the SOEs affiliated to the MPT. This success had 
domestic practitioners not only to follow the experience of HJD-04, but further to re-consider the 
patterns of searching knowledge and the relevant organisational formation, the outcomes of which 
were certainly different from the traditional expertise distribution and interaction influenced by 
the branch-based industrial administration. ZTE and Huawei actualised their organisational 
transformations during the development of large PDSS models. The contents of transformations 
were similar to the building of cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms in Group-B 
car-making firms. By doing so, they created the flexible organisational platforms to solidify the 
technological integration to cope with the dynamic product and service oriented competition, 
                                                 
129 The ZXJ10 of ZTE, the C&C08 of Huawei and the EIM-601 of JinPeng all adopted decentralised architectures 
technically. Even the SP30 model of DTT, except for its inheritance from the DS-30 in individual modules, also adopted a 
distributed controlling structure to connect different modules.  
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rather than just integrating technologies and personnel statically for one project. 
With the internal organisational changes, the active employment of external technological 
resources was a critical method to realise technological integration, especially taking use of the 
resources of the governmental industrial and research systems. To take the development of 
Huawei‘s large-scale PDSS, namely the C&C08, as an example. The project was primarily based 
on the cooperation between Huawei with the No.10 Research Institute. Later, some researchers 
left the No.10, and joined Huawei. Up to 1992, for the C&C08 project, Huawei had already 
gathered experts from SOEs (e.g. the Changchun Telephone Equipment Plant), research institutes 
(e.g. the Research Institute of Data Communication of MPT), universities (e.g. the Huazhong 
University of Science and Technology), and so on. As for other projects, external cooperation was 
also a major method. For example, Huawei cooperated with Beijing College of Posts and 
Telecoms on ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), with Xi‘an Electronics Science and 
Technology University on ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode), with the Research Institute of 
Data Communication of MPT on STP (Signalling Transfer Point), and many others. 
Only after 2000, leading Group-B firms discovered they could not directly benefit from the 
technical resources accumulated by governmental S&T system for their projects any more, as they 
had already become leading players within the domestic community. However, their cooperation 
with external institutes was still maintained with more emphases on training personnel and mid 
and long-term technical exploration. Such an arrangement had been solidified, since as a 
by-product of external cooperation Group-B firms had established a series of R&D centres in 
hot-spot cities around China. ZTE had research centres in Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing, Xi‘an, and 
Chongqing, while Huawei had in Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing, Xi‘an, Chengdu, and Wuhan. These 
centres continuously worked as agents to make use of the external technical resources, and as 
professional developmental forces. 
Inside the Group-B firms, as we mentioned, the expertise that they recruited included people from 
various places and with various disciplinary backgrounds, including the traditional electro- 
magnetic telephony, radio, computer technology, semiconductors, materials, optical physics, and 
so on. The internal institutions aiming at the dynamic technological integration engendered the 
motives and flexibilities for them to do so. For example, during 1993-1995, 50% of new-coming 
members in Huawei were with software engineering backgrounds, which was definitely 
unimaginable in any traditional telephony equipment provider before. 
The organisational integration of expertise with different technological backgrounds did help to 
cope with the rising product-oriented competition. When Huawei developed its C&C08 version to 
realise over 10,000 line/set, developers had to connect different modules with a control module 
(2,000 lines for each switching module of C&C08). The communication among different modules 
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required fast and large data processing capacity. Usually, this should be according to the Intel 
Multi-bus II standard, which was broadly adopted, such as by the F150 of Fujitsu, the S1240 of 
Bell, and so on. Huawei met difficulty to achieve the processing of massive data at high speed 
with the bus. Then the developers decided to adopt optical fibre transmission. At that time, the 
application of optical fibre in the telecom-equipment sector had not yet been mature. Only the 
5ESS model of AT&T adopted it, but 5ESS was generally regarded as the most advanced PDSS 
contemporarily. However, since the chief and some other leading engineers of the C&C08 project 
had the background of optical physics, they made such a decision, although none of them knew 
any technical detail of the solution in 5ESS. Importantly, the organisation supported them with 
resources to risk, and with close interactions relevant colleagues knew their idea well and could 
give fully support. They succeeded in this attempt. It also opened the perspective of Huawei in 
applying optical fibre technology, which was proved later to be the trend of the global industrial 
community. Relevantly, the early move brought Huawei advantages in developing the SDH 
(Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) equipment, which adopted optical fibres as its fundamental 
transmission medium. 
Along with the above transitions, ZTE started the development of ZXJ10 in 1993 and launched 
this model with 10,000-line/unit after 18 months. Huawei launched the 2,000 line/unit C&C08 
model in 1993 and the 10,000 line/set model in 1995. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The building of inceptive knowledge base was far beyond pure technical exploration. The 
organisational expansion, the integration of knowledge carried by individuals, and the stretch of 
knowledge base were critical issues happened to Group-B firms in this stage. The active 
interaction among individuals was critical to realise inceptive knowledge integration, especially 
for the re-codifying of implicit knowledge or tacit knowledge, and the deepening of mutual 
understanding. Behind these processes, there were support from their organisational learning 
systems. Strategic intent and resource allocation caused the organisational cohesions, and ensured 
the investments for practical projects that worked as fundamental platforms of the above 
integration. As we see, the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms provided the 
organisational foundation for knowledge integrating and stretching. 
Therefore, the dynamics of Group-B firms could not be explained purely as the growth of 
technological expertise. In fact, even after Group-B firms had laid their groundwork of knowledge 
base, many Group-A firms still had advantages in product technologies regarding their 
accumulation before. For example, what Geely had achieved during 1997-1998 in terms of the 
technical advancement could have not been comparable to the ―SanKouLe‖, which was developed 
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spontaneously by a group of engineers of FAW in their spare time in the early 1990s. In another 
case, regarding the emergence of indigenous technical breakthrough, such as that of HJD-04 in 
1991, Group-A firms and other traditional governmental industrial entities had much better 
chances to get touch with the know-how of HJD series, but seldom did they seize the opportunity 
to generate real actions to develop any technology or product after being inspired. Even though 
some newborn firms, such as the ChangHong during 1991-1995, did successfully develop their 
own large-scale PDSS based on the excellent technical expertise they gathered in-house. However, 
without internal organisational transformations, they failed in coping with the dynamic 
product-oriented competition. 
7.3 After the Inceptive stage 
7.3.1 Introduction 
The technological learning of Group-B firms after the initial stage happened simultaneously in the 
divisions of production lines, product development, long-term technological exploration, machine 
tools development, and the developmental activities based on their crossing-boundaries platforms. 
Without market protection, Group-B firms must compete with domestic incumbents and global 
giants on Chinese market. In practices, Group-B firms had common intent as to building up 
multiplex product platforms, because the business based on small number of product lines was 
fragility in case competitive rivals were intended to attack them by price wars. Thus, developing 
their own products was still the urgent task for their learning and business operation.  
Practically, the business strategy of Group-B firms could be summarised as the ―XiaoBu KuaiPao 
(running quickly with short steps, RQSS hereinafter)‖ in general. By this strategy, the progress 
achieved by each step or each project was not expected to be a large move from the previous 
knowledge base. Rather, Group-B firms expected to gather small moves into large progress. 
Therefore, practical projects were implemented parallel, and generation by generation. There were 
overlaps of participants among different project teams, which induced tight communications 
among them. Iterative trials and gradual improvements were relayed among different projects, and 
along the sequence of projects. The mid- and low-end market segments tolerated the trials 
embodied in product outputs of Group-B firms if the firms could respond quickly to the shortages 
or mistakes as they were indentified.  
In the following subsections, we do not mean to focus on the business strategy and survival, but 
concentrate three major mechanisms of Group-B firms in creating new knowledge, namely 
learning through recruitment, learning through cooperative projects and learning through 
interactions with customers. These three mechanisms could not cover all the scope of their kind, 
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but we draw them from the empirical studies as regards their distinguishable roles in obtaining 
knowledge of new categories that could not be generated by repeating the existing activities. 
7.3.2 Learning through recruitment 
As analysed in the last section, integrating knowledge borne by new recruited members was 
critical for Group-B firms to establish their in-house knowledge base. In fact, since Group-B firms 
grew from small teams, continuously recruiting excellent personnel from outside was important as 
response to the needs for promoting the scale economies of organisation and knowledge. In 
practice, a strategy of personnel-intensive R&D was remarkable for Group-B firms in 
technological learning. However, comparing with Group-A firms that also took the Chinese labour 
supply as advantage, what Group-B firms stressed was the activation of large amount of 
well-educated engineers in addition to the labours for production lines. 
For instance, ZTE hired nearly 9,000 personnel in R&D personnel in 2005, and the number rises 
remarkably to over 20,000 by the end of 2008. In 2009, ZTE is enlarging its Nanjing Centre for 
R&D. As to the plan only Nanjing Centre will engage over 20,000 R&D personnel. The number 
of R&D personnel for Huawei was over 35,000 in 2007, and exceeded 40,000 in 2008. In the 
car-making sector, more than 6,000 engineers and researchers were hired by Chery out of about 
20,000 employees in total in 2008. Among them, about 3,000 were freed from routine operations 
of production lines, and centred on product and technology development. In BYD Auto, it had 
3,000 R&D personnel in 2006. By the end of 2007, the number increased to 5,000 only in BYD‘s 
Shanghai Centre. Considering that it just entered the car-making sector in 2003, it was a fast 
growing rate. Geely also employed 1,600 engineers in R&D in 2008.  
In this subsection, we summarise the practices of Group-B firms‘ learning through recruitment 
into three categories by the sources of employees, namely the local experienced engineers, 
university graduates and overseas returnees. The effectiveness of Group-B firms‘ integrating 
recruited personnel into the in-house organisational learning systems was the highlight.  
7.3.2.1 Local experienced engineers 
Chinese institutional systems introduced the mobility of the domestic human resources, and 
brought about possibilities for Group-B firms as they looked to make use of existing talent assets 
that had been accumulated by the central planning system previously. 
The local experienced engineers worked the core portion of Group-B firms‘ in-house human force 
in early phases. In fact, in early phase, local experienced engineers contributed to the major part 
of the organisational expansion of Group-B firms. Group-B firms did also hunt expertise 
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intensively. For example, Geely at the same time obtained 3 former vice directors of FAW‘s R&D 
centre (data from 2005). In the telecom-equipment sector, the No. 39 Research Institute of MEI 
(Ministry of Electronics Industry) suffered much from the brain drains to Huawei and ZTE. As its 
former researchers came back to attract their colleagues and successors ever and again, The No. 
39 Institute ever could not carry out large projects during 1995-1998 since it could not even form 
up an complete team for the projects. As their financial strength got enhanced, Group-B firms 
even could compete against Sino-foreign JVs for human resources. Qingdao-Lucent ever lost 
almost half of its testing team since these engineers got better offer from Huawei to participate in 
product development, and got better pay. 
The knowledge that local experienced engineers had obtained was not new to the domestic 
innovation system. However, the combination of their knowledge could be new. The integration of 
their competences constructed the collective knowledge frameworks of Group-B firms in their 
early phase. From a knowledge-based view, the integration realised by Group-B firms promoted 
the values of knowledge that had already existed on local experienced engineers, as it formed up a 
sharp contrast against the situations in the former central planning system and in Group-A firms. 
The pattern of Group-B firms bridged the S&T research with the industrialisation demands. The 
experts in different technical domains were not anymore regulated respectively by branch-based 
hierarchies. Moreover, they got fuelled with strategic resources to implement developmental 
projects at the centre stage of learning within firms. Working in Group-B firms, local experienced 
engineers from research institutes and universities were no longer distanced from the practical 
industrial applications in this stage. As well as the colleagues coming from SOEs, they turned to 
be executors of practical projects or to provide services aiming at industrialised needs. Resources 
were authorised to them to realise close interactions in real time, without administrat ion for 
professional regulation. For example, under the previous industrial administration, engineers 
specialised in the ECU (electronic control unit) for engine injector control had to pass through 
higher bureaus to communicate with engine developers if the latter were not their appointed 
partners. It was the same for the RF (radio frequency) developers. As most of them belonged to 
the No. 39 Research Institute of MEI, in the face of emerging challenge of mobile telecom, it was 
difficult for them to realise tight interactions with the telecom-equipment developers affiliated to 
MPT unless they got coordination among ministries. After many of them moved into Group-B 
firms, they could work closely with colleagues from relevant domains or from domains that were 
ever regarded as non-relevant. 
The integration of their knowledge, and the relevant further knowledge creation were efficiently 
achieved only based on the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms and through practical 
projects. As we had analysed it for the situation in their inceptive stages, for the sake of brevity, 
we do not elaborate the similar situation here again.  
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7.3.2.2 University graduates 
Before 1998, the recruitment of university graduates was regulated by government, associated 
with a series of institutions about social welfare and household registration. Being jointly assigned 
by the government with a career was both the right and the obligation of university graduates. 
Through the governmental job assignment system, graduates were offered stable, quasi-lifetime 
employment. Otherwise, they had to risk their life-time career. 
From 1994 on the regulation became flexible, and 1998 was the first year when the recruitment of 
graduates was deregulated. Firms were allowed and then later encouraged to access the university 
student. As soon as they got the rights, Group-B telecom-equipment firms raised a ―brains war‖ 
on campuses. For example, in Tsinghua Univ., a top university in China, Huawei and ZTE 
enrolled more than one hundred graduates who would be entitled with doctoral or master degrees 
in 1998. Finally, the administration of Tsinghua had to stand out and cease their on-campus 
advertisement since the university regarded it as not good to have large numbers of its graduates 
to compete with their alumni toughly in a same firm. In 1998, ZTE and Huawei enrolled about 
3,000 new graduates respectively in total. In that year, the statistics of Ministry of Education 
revealed that about 20% graduates in the telecom and computer relevant departments from the top 
20 universities in China were hired by Huawei (Wu and Ji, 2006, p155). Among these top-20 
universities, as to those affiliated to the MEI or MPT previously, such as XiDian Univ., the Univ. 
of Electronic S&T of China, HUST, the human resource departments of Group-B firms tried to 
have job talks with every graduate from relevant departments, in spite of whether specific 
graduates had made a forward request or not. By doing so, Huawei obtained nearly half of master 
graduates from relevant departments of these universities. In the Nanjing R&D centre of ZTE, it 
could be discovered that former teachers of Southeast Univ. (Nanjing) were working with their 
former students as ZTE had recruited many personnel from their labs.  
In Group-B firms, the large numbers of junior engineers got guidance from their senior colleagues 
and grew rapidly up from intensive practical projects. They worked as the major executors of the 
―personnel-intensive R&D strategy‖ of Group-B firms, which meant to invest comparatively large 
number of engineers onto each involved R&D domain at centre stage of their technological 
learning. Group-B firms were generally observed with this feature, and Huawei was the most 
famous for its ―Pascal‘s Principle‖, by which Huawei insisted to form up advantages of R&D 
personnel intensity in each hot-spot segment it engaged than its major competitors did. The 
massive annual new graduates in China provided the robust sources of well-educated junior 
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engineers
130
.  
The personnel-intensive R&D strategy enhanced the intensity of learning activities, and increased 
the gross productivities of learning. Based on the technical modularity and the basic integration 
capability of Group-B firms to layout the technological frameworks, this strategy increased the 
divisions for professionalization, which yielded comparatively better performances of learning. It 
also brought about the diversity of knowledge by integrating the learning of many people with 
different ideas, which potentially offset the lack of experience of Group-B firms to some extent. 
Therefore, for the development of LTE, which was at the frontier of the current global telecom 
industry, ZTE invested more than 2,000 engineers (data from 2006). On developing only the 
battery system for its E6 model of electric automobile, BYD gathered 500 engineers (data from 
2007). As for mature designs, the personnel-intensive strategy brought about potential advantages 
in realising the incremental improvements. Group-B firms invested groups of engineers on works 
as detailed as each part and each technical feature, which helped to continuously promote the 
quality and lower the cost. Chery even employed over 400 engineers professionally in further 
product improvement after SOP (Start of Production) (data from 2006). In the telecom-equipment 
sector, learning from interaction with customers was an important source of knowledge. The 
inputs with large groups of engineers could also promote the depth and breadth of interactions. 
For example, Huawei organised over 14,300 engineers to provide post-sale engineering services 
(data from 2007). 
However, the effectiveness of this strategy and the competences growth of junior engineers 
resided in the organisational learning systems, rather than recruiting people only. The 
organisational systems of Group-B firms kept junior engineers at the nodes of in-house learning 
network that were highly active for the large number of relevant projects, and were highly 
sensitive to interwoven teams and cross-boundary knowledge communication. For instance, in 
Chery, the average age of its in-house engineers was 24 while the average amount of projects 
engaging each engineer was 12 (data from 2006). Geely had only 200 engineers at its R&D centre 
in 2003; but in that year only, in addition to the tasks for current industrialised projects, these 200 
engineers completed more than 5,000 digital models for cars, assemblies and components to 
strengthen their knowledge accumulation. Thus, when Geely carried out the CK-1 car model 
project during 2003-2006, all digital models for 412 designed modules were completed in-house, 
although they had the Daewoo International as an external consultant for the bodywork design. It 
demonstrated how fast the junior engineers grow up. By contrast, when DongFeng-Citroën 
optimised an engine for FuKang which was finally launched in 1998, it cost 3 months for the JV 
                                                 
130 In 2003, the annual new university graduates were 2.12 million, and 6.31 million in 2010. (source: China Education 
Statistics) 
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team to engender just 1 digital model of component supervised by a Japanese technical firm 
appointed by the French side. 
By contrast, Group-A firms were not so incentivised to train junior R&D forces, since their major 
activity was to expand their product capacity. For example, in 1992, namely the 9
th
 year after it 
was founded, Shanghai-Bell had already established one more new factory and one more JV as 
production bases. However, it only had two rounds of large-scale recruitment of university 
graduate after its set-up, namely one in 1991 for recruiting 80 graduates and one in 1992 for 100 
graduates. Both were to train post-sale service engineers and managers for workshops. 
7.3.2.3 Overseas Chinese returnees 
Integrating knowledge carried by overseas returnees was also an important source of learning in 
Group-B firms. In general, the overseas returnees hired by Group-B firms were also experienced 
engineers. Therefore, our analysis about local experienced engineers is also applicable here. But, 
we specially point out the overseas returnees because employees from industrially advanced 
countries are widely taken as important impetus for the transitions of latecomers from lower 
stages to higher stages in terms of capability, as regards the literature stressing the bottom-up 
step-wise catching-up of firms in DCs. For example, Kim (1997, p90) notes ―…Late entrant firms 
acquire technological capability by stealing experienced technical personnel from the early 
acquirers…‖ Other scholars, such as Teece (1977), also take the move of personnel as a critical 
method of technological transfer, especially of tacit knowledge. However, we insist the practical 
effects of the transfers in question ought to be studied as real organisational processes. 
The role of returnees as to the in-house learning of Group-B firms could be summarised into two 
categories. The first group worked as leading engineers to organise learning of department(s) or 
entire firms. The second group focused on technical exploration within specific domains, worked 
as specialised experts, or led some first-tier specialised suppliers. To take Chery as example, in 
2007, there were about 12 returnees working as learning organisers at the firm level, about 30 as 
technical experts in professional domains, and over 30 as leaders of affiliated supply firms. 
The recognised returnees had experience as working in leading MNCs. By comparison with local 
engineers who had not ever experienced in advanced stages, they in theory seemed to be more 
capable in leading technological learning of Group-B firms aiming at advanced stages of 
development. People called those returnees who worked as learning organisers in Group-B firms 
as ―returnee stars‖. That was for the high expectations of stakeholders on them. However, 
practically, according to the experience in Group-B car-making firms, returnee stars could meet 
difficulties in several aspects, mainly relevant to the existing in-house organisational learning 
systems. 
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First, most of them were green in management since it was generally difficult for overseas 
Chinese to attain managerial posts in leading MNC car-makers except for very few exceptions. 
Thus, they could potentially be maladjusted to organise departments or firms to achieve 
complicated, multi-technology and multi-interest learning.  
Secondly, even for technical development, most returnee stars had little experience as technical 
integrators. Before joining Group-B firms, they just worked as technical experts in specific 
domains in MNCs, and barely had experience in carrying out practical car or complex technology 
development projects. In many cases, they had not realised the importance of close interactions in 
real time between different domains when Group-B firms carried out developmental projects in 
this stage. Rather, they were inclined to isolate their developmental activities within small 
professional domains, or to excluded other relevant groups as to sharing the in process knowledge. 
Generally, they were duplicating the experience they ever witnessed in giant MNCs, with which 
they tried to justify themselves. But they were also possibly trying to protect themselves from 
challenges of relevant co-operators or even subordinate teams, as their deficient knowledge in 
leading complex projects led to their weakness regarding the cross-boundary inter-departmental 
platforms, with which their protestor (also should be their learning co-operators) criticised them. 
At least, according to our opinion, they were trying to duplicate the previous experience in MNCs 
which ever endowed them powers and won them respects from Group-B firms, namely to work as 
technical experts to process the appointed tasks just professionally in their fields. For example, 
XU Gang, who was ever appointed as the vice-president of Chery in charge of R&D during 
2003-2006, had worked as senior expert in Ford, GM, Delphi and Visteon during 1995-2003. 
However, his mastery was only in the combustion process around the fuel injection within the 
engine. As leader of projects in Chery, he broke down the existing routine of development, and 
refused to interact with relevant units and assistant firms in real time or even by periods. His 
tenure delayed a series of product projects of Chery‘s and was ended by a disrepute event. 
Thirdly, returnee stars were not knowledge gatekeepers in industrialised projects of MNCs before. 
Therefore, they were less aware of practical industrialised trade-off and usually advocated 
advanced technical applications which were often resource demanding and beyond the current 
capabilities of supporting engineers and suppliers of Group-B firms. The S12 model of Chery was 
a typical example. After taking over the in-progress S12 project, returnee stars denied many 
existing design details, and suggested a series of adjustments, including a replacement of the 
suspension system. Certainly, some suggestions brought about benefits for the project. However, 
many of them were just experimented by them in laboratories. As results, some adjustments were 
phased out for the inconvenience regarding mass production; some others were insisted by the 
returnee stars, but were obviously beyond the capabilities of front-line engineers and suppliers. 
Finally, S12 became a bad-performing project in Chery‘s history. It was delayed by 18 additional 
221 
 
months (note that the development cycle of a new car model in Chery was only 18-24 months at 
that time) and cost much more investments than schemed. The launched car model was out of 
control in production cost (especially the complicated suspension system cost much), and was not 
welcomed on the market for its incongruity bodywork.  
From another perspective, the advocacies of failed returnee stars were also incompatible to the 
RQSS strategy that was implemented by Group-B firms as a basic strategy for business survival 
and technological learning. Returnee stars stressed regular, step-by-step procedures of 
development, and tried to fix most problems beforehand. They highlighted the professional-based 
pattern among different participating units with periodic interactions only which seemed to be 
clear and efficient, and criticised the intensive in-progress interaction among units as the source 
for chaos and technical faults. However, as lacking the well-established systemic or mutual 
understanding, cooperative units in Group-B firms required frequent interaction to refine their 
common understanding toward the collective developing targets, and even to enhance their 
knowledge or even confidence about the progress of each other.  
The incompatibility was also demonstrated by the lower-level organisation. In 2006, for the 
brains-drain, the department of engine development in Chery, which was absolutely dominated by 
returnee stars at that time, shrank in scale of personnel. Young engineers left for frustrated 
feelings that the environments were not as good as expected. The shrink of a major unit was the 
first time and the only one time in Chery‘s history to date.  
During 2006-2007, a series of broken-up happening between Group-B firms and returnee stars 
ended the fever of regarding returnee stars highly as learning leaders. The failed returnee stars 
prove to be inexperienced as to the social technologies that Group-B firms had been developing 
and were to develop. They failed to acclimate themselves and transferred the knowledge they had 
obtained into the new organisational environments. The higher-order rules of learning that they 
generated from their previous unrelated experiences were finally not internalised by the 
organisations that had their own memories about successful learning on hand. Alternatively, the 
returnee stars should accumulate the knowledge about learning organising through their own 
practices in Group-B firms. Indeed, some returnee stars did achieve remarkable success in this 
way, such as ZHAO FuQuan in Brilliant and Geely, and YUAN YongBin in Chery. 
By contrast, the success rate of returnees as technical specialists was much higher, because these 
returnees did not have to coordinate learning within a large range both in organisation and in 
technology. In Chery, around 30 returnee experts worked in R&D departments, and more than 30 
returnees led core suppliers co-invested by Chery (data from 2007). They focused on their 
specialised fields, and showed willingness to be integrated by the ongoing organisational routine. 
These characters won success for them in Chery. 
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7.3.2.4 Summary 
The learning through recruitment is realised on the organisational framework. Only with the 
aggressive strategic intent regarding indigenous product and technology development, Group-B 
firms would implement personnel-intensive strategy and recruit large amount of R&D engineers, 
whereas large-scale recruitment of R&D engineers had never happened in Group-A firms. Besides, 
the knowledge borne by individuals would not naturally be useful to the collective learning. 
Individuals must be cultivated and interacted with colleagues under the higher-orders embedded 
in the new ―organisation-technology-product‖ platforms to realise the mutual understanding and 
adjustment, and then the knowledge integration and further creation. Such processes were not 
achieved by academic forums, but by practical development projects. Thereby, again, the resource 
allocations that favoured the product and technology development and the supportive authorities 
were critical. Knowledge accumulation facilities also contributed to the knowledge diffusion, 
conversion among individuals and the cultivation of junior engineers. 
The experience of failed cases of learning by recruitment highlighted that the organisational 
learning systems worked as a filter of learning in addition to as a platform to facilitate. 
Knowledge conversion was not realised within a vacuum but required practical platforms, which 
consisted of the loci, participants, activities, absorptive capacity and schedules along time. Within 
the organisations, the abilities to absorb were uneven across different departments or different 
groups of participants (Dutrénit, 2000). Then the successful knowledge conversion relied on the 
performances of activities along the schedule, through the products or services as the agents to 
interact with market. In process, it also relied on the appropriate relations between the learning 
organising with the organisational institutions, the collective knowledge possession and the 
organisational knowledge distribution in real time. The advancement of target knowledge could 
not ensure the penetration of organisational system. The failure of some returnee stars exactly 
demonstrated that their knowledge inputs, including their advocacies of physical technologies and 
social technologies, got rejected by the organisational systems with practical consideration of 
technology and product development. 
7.3.3 Learning through external cooperative projects 
Cooperation with external partners, either with international or domestic co-operators, was an 
important source of new knowledge acquisition of Group-B firms. Generally, the method by 
exploiting external cooperation to overcome in-house bottlenecks was not invented by Chinese 
firms. However, to employ it as a schemed, regular and underlying source for in-house learning 
was an innovation to Chinese industrial community. As mentioned, the cooperation of HaFei with 
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Pininfarina since 1995 opened this pattern among Group-B car-making firms. In this subsection, 
we stress the mechanism that they search, generate and accumulate new knowledge through 
external cooperation.  
When the cooperative projects were held in the foreign sides geographically, in order to obtain 
knowledge through the developmental activities, Group-B firms sent out teams of engineers to 
external partners. For instances, Geely insisted on a ―2:1‖ principle which meant it put in at least 
double in number of engineers than its foreign partner did. In Chery, during 2002-2005, over 
1,000 man-times were sent by Chery to work and learn with foreign partners; and 70% of fees in 
terms of training expenditure were consumed by overseas learning. By learning through external 
cooperative projects, engineers of Group-B firms grew fast in technical expertise. For example, 
the chief engineer of Chery in the cooperative programme with AVL, namely Prof. HU (she has a 
professorship from the Tsinghua Univ.), in her sixties, got reactivated and re-organised for her 
expertise through the Chery-AVL projects. After 3 years‘ cooperation with AVL, HU was even 
invited officially by AVL to be a leading engineer of AVL to take charge of a division. In another 
case, FANG Yunzhou, namely a young engineer, grew into a leading expert in the domestic 
community of electro-automobile only in his early thirties. The competences of FANG were built 
through 6 years‘ practical projects invested by Chery; among the 6 years, he led 3 years‘ 
cooperation with Ricardo. With the capability growth of FANG and his colleagues, Chery was 
regarded as from nobody into one of domestic leading players in the governmental 
electro-automobile project organised by the Ministry of Science and Technology.  
However, we shall not consider the learning through external cooperation as an automatic process 
of knowledge inward piping. Foreign sides would not be happy to see the continuous capability 
growth of Group-B firms for the consequent reduce of their comparative technical advantages. 
The case of Brilliant Auto before 2004 also revealed that, without effective in-house institutional 
settings, external cooperation could help seldom as to the in-house capability building. Therefore, 
by contrast with conventional literature focusing on the trade-off about outsourcing or learning 
through alliance linkages (such as Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994), we shed our lights inside 
the Group-B firms, to study how they realise knowledge searching, generation and accumulation 
through the external cooperation.  
7.3.3.1 On-site knowledge searching and learning 
As we said exploiting the external cooperation was a general phenomenon, we cannot distinguish 
Group-B firms from other domestic firms if stressing only the quantity of engineers sent to 
external partners. In fact, overseas training was also a recurrent event held by Group-A firms. In 
some cases, the amount of engineers sent by Group-A firms was also large. For example, in the 
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mid 1980s, the number of Chinese engineers sent to Germany by Shanghai-Volkswagen was no 
less than 100 at any moment. Among them, 20 quotas were regularly set to stay in the designing 
department of Volkswagen for at least two years for each in order to train Chinese engineers for 
building up the Technical Centre of Shanghai-Volkswagen, which was supported by a fund as 3% 
of the revenue of Shanghai-Volkswagen (Liu, 1992). In 1990s, the team sent by FAW-Volkswagen 
to Westmoreland to study the production lines comprised 120 selected domestic engineers. In the 
telecom-equipment sector, in 1985 alone, Shangha i-Bell sent generally 60 engineers to Belgium. 
In addition, we cannot say the overseas training of Group-A firms was simply ineffective. As we 
said in previous chapters, many founding members or senior engineers of Group-B firms also 
benefited from these programs of Group-A firms for building their expertise at that time. 
However, the differences between the practices of Group-A and Group-B firms in learning 
through external cooperation were still distinguishable. Engineers sent by Group-A firms were 
mostly present for training to manipulate imported components and equipment, and for relevant 
checking and taking-over. The knowledge they could access was well schemed by MNCs in 
serving the building of factories in China or the productivity growth at workshop level. As for 
Chinese engineers visiting the departments of foreign sides in charge of developmental tasks, they 
were arranged as interns or assistants to foreign experts since there was no relevant practical 
developmental project of Group-A firms on those cooperative platforms. At most, partial design 
skills were taught in order to implement those localised adjustment projects, such as the team of 
DongFeng-Citroën in France. 
The pattern employed by Group-B firms was different, exhibited by the contents, platforms and 
dominant powers of learning. Delegate engineers of Group-B firms did not learn contents well- 
schemed by foreign partners. They were sent to master the dynamic process of the ongoing 
cooperative projects, namely to witness and participate in the real process of development. As 
their participation was termed by the contracts as an underlying part, not an accessory part of the 
advancement of projects, they were located on the same platforms with foreign engineers. 
Certainly, foreign partners would try to conceal or protect their intellectual assets such as the core 
databases. However, Chinese engineers at least got shared all the foreground information, which 
was dynamic and underpinned by the development mechanisms of foreign partners. Moreover, 
Chinese teams had the dominant role of the developmental process of cooperative projects, which 
was critical to ensure that the contents and platforms of learning to be implemented as what had 
been set by both sides beforehand. The dominant role in question derived from the financial 
investment in these projects made by Group-B firms, and embodied as the concrete clauses in 
contracts, and the technical inspection and confirmation rights possessed by Group-B firms. In 
order to proceed with the cooperative projects smoothly, foreign sides had to respond to the 
rational and relevant technical questions put forward by Chinese sides, or even had to teach them 
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by details. 
As we have analysed in the Textbox 5.2, foreign partners did not mean to open their intellectual 
storages to the Chinese learners at beginning. In the ―ZhongYi‖ project, after Chinese delegate 
engineers found that the Italian side was doing this cooperative project as a turnkey project, and 
their participation was heavily restrained, they protested against the Italian co-operator. In order to 
comfort the Chinese delegate co-operators, Pininfarina arranged a seminar given by a senior 
designer, in the name of spreading critical techniques adopted in the cooperative project. However, 
the seminar came out to be an introduction lecture of painting at amateur level. To be honest, it 
might ever work as the reception of Pininfarina to cater the delegate teams sent by its Chinese 
co-operators previously, because if those Chinese engineers were not really incentivized to master 
the developing process they would enjoy this casual lecture and reported to their boss as they had 
already attended some training in the foreign side. However, this time, the Chinese engineers of 
HaFei were irate. They announced a strike, and refused to cooperate with Pininfarina anymore. 
Out of Pininfarina‘s expectation, the protest got support from the headquarters of HaFei. HaFei‘s 
delegate team was encouraged to fight for their just demands according to every detailed clause 
they had set in the cooperative contract for learning. The each piece of design must be inspected 
and approbated by the Chinese team. Otherwise, the delegate team was authorised to cease the 
cooperation without paying Pininfarina the rest money. Finally, the Italian side had to accept the 
requests, and the delegate engineers of HaFei got on the same working platforms with their 
Pininfarina colleagues. 
It became a common tactic for Group-B firms to harness their learning through external 
cooperation, and even got developed with further detailed contract editing. Chery also got well 
known for its cooperation with Bertone (Italy) on the bodywork design of Chery‘s B21 model. 
Chery‘s delegate engineers refused to accept the output of Bertone for 3 times since the Italian 
side kept something relevant to development concealed. Bertone had to carry out the fourth round 
to communicate with the Chinese side and submit its output and report. It was the first time in 
Bertone‘s history to cost 4 rounds to finish a project. 
7.3.3.2 Role of organisational learning system 
In the cooperative projects, foreign sides would not forwardly point out the loci of new 
knowledge for Chinese partners. It was not only because of the interests of their sides, but also 
because of the differences regarding the contextual knowledge that each side had. The Chinese 
sides had to work out mechanism by themselves to obtain knowledge through the cooperation. 
The first thing Group-B firms could learn from external cooperation was advanced technologies 
implemented by partners. However, beneficial technical information would not flow down to 
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Group-B firms‘ pool automatically. A series of organisational efforts were critical.  
Beyond all, according to our interviews, representative engineers of Group-B firms were 
generally aware that their firms stressed the cooperation as an at least equally important process of 
knowledge acquisition as a process to outsource product or technology design. In fact, as a regular 
arrangement, delegate engineers of Group-B firms have to report to their home base 
inter-departmental team and their respective home departments not only the progress of projects, 
but also the new technologies they had learned from the cooperation. The collective aspiration of 
technological learning kept them sensitive to any thread to new knowledge.  
In addition, they were authorised, and endowed with resources for further knowledge searching. 
Since much knowledge borne by international specialised firms was novel to Group-B firms in 
their early stages, Chinese delegates could not even expect what they could explore beforehand. 
In other words, searching new knowledge was a process full of uncertainty for learners in 
backward status. As both telecom-equipment and car were both complex technical and product 
systems, technologies usually highly interlinked with each other among different subsystems, 
components or disciplines. Engineers must be authorised to search or even to set up new projects 
with their external co-operators for further gains, since without doubt, these moves all cost 
resources. Particularly, the existences of many threads of knowledge were sensitive to the 
correlative time and locus; otherwise they would vanish from the processing tasks. It required the 
decision about further knowledge exploration to be made at soon as possible or even 
extemporaneously. Thus, Group-B firms usually endowed small quotas of additional resources for 
delegate teams. Certainly, official decisions for further exploration were more decisive, which 
could be made quickly by Group-B firms based on their abilities of organisational mobilisation. 
The institutions of organisational mobilisation and learning integration of Group-B firms worked. 
In many cases, what delegate engineers could obtain from the external co-operators were just 
ideas, threads or fragments of new knowledge. It was usually far beyond the capabilities of the 
delegate team to draw out the whole elephant. Engineers at the home base must work the 
supporting roles to enable delegate engineers to explore new technologies further. Or even during 
the phase of knowledge identification, the inter-departmental home base force were already drawn 
in; after the delegate engineers got inspired through the cooperative projects, the information was 
transferred back to the home base and the major part of further exploration was practised by home 
engineers. 
The facilities of knowledge accumulation were apparently important to construct the sensibility 
and absorptive capacity of delegate engineers, and then to enhance the interaction between the 
home base and delegate teams. For example, in case of an cooperative project of car-door 
development, delegate engineers could access the knowledge database of the home base either to 
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study the corresponding knowledge accumulation about the car-door assemblies, or to get advices 
from multiple relevant departments (such as bodywork designers or engineers for systemic 
configuration) on the ongoing developmental object.  
By contrast, in Group-A firms, even individual engineers could be incentivized to learn from 
foreign partners. However, their rigid organisational structure certainly could not realise the active 
on-site knowledge searching.  
The second thing Group-B engineers could learn from foreign partners was the new method of 
development. The advanced methods were identified by the delegate engineers, but apparently the 
solidification and application of new methods must be achieved based on organisational collective 
efforts. For example, in HaFei‘s cooperation with Pininfarina, Chinese engineers found that Italian 
designers conducted the car configuration within the measuring cell from the very beginning. 
Before that, the testing cell, which consisted of a series of measuring instruments, was only used 
when designs had come to a relatively mature status. The new method was discovered to be better 
for the digitalisation of development in process, and then to promote the feasibility for other 
departments to share in-depth the information from very early on. This finding was reported to the 
home base. By inspiration, HaFei made a series of changes firstly entailing the product 
development and equipment departments. It also caused changes of the general schemes, 
including resource allocation, time scheduling of development procedures, and the data format of 
communications and task transfers, and so on. 
In addition to act as the platform to facilitate knowledge search through external cooperative 
projects, the organisational learning system also worked as the filter of this kind learning activities 
by excluding incompatible learning. This function was actualised through internal conflicts and 
subsequent adjustments within Group-B firms. For example, in the Chery-AVL cooperation, the 
Chery side required to eliminate a series of frontier technical features in order to improve the 
robustness and manufacturability. This decision was made not only because of the preferences of 
local engineers who were involved in the development of these engines, but were also influenced 
by engineers from other departments. It was because in the name of advanced technologies and 
the consequent difficulties of discussion, AVL reduced the frequency of interactions with Chery‘s 
relevant home-based departments. It caused inconveniences and discontents of other relevant 
departments of Chery. In fact, the advocacies of AVL relating to frontier technological features 
had caused delays of the development of engines, then relevant assemblies and systemic car 
products. More importantly, the delays and the lack of communication brought about barriers to 
the in-house collective learning among different units. Thereby the relevant technological features 
and the correlative patterns were required to adjust.  
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7.3.4 Learning through interaction with customers 
Learning from customers has been identified as important source of innovation, for example, 
learning from the lead users (von Hippel, 1988), and learning through the user-producer 
interaction (Rothwell, 1977; Lundvall, 1985, 1988). However, these viewpoints are mainly 
developed based on experience of industrially advanced countries, and stress the interaction 
between producers with leading or early users. Considering the reality that indigenous innovations 
in DCs may be not new worldwide in the pure technical sense, there is very possibly no leading 
users regarding particular technology implemented by Group-B firms to serve their customers, 
according to the definition of ―leading users‖ developed by Abernathy and Utterback (1978) in 
their ―product life cycles‖. Therefore, whether the interaction with customers is still significant or 
not for knowledge creation of firms in DCs remains questionable. 
However, based on our investigation, although Group-B firms had not mastered globally frontier 
technologies in their early phases, learning through interactions with customers was still critical 
for their knowledge creation. Between the two sectors we study, it was comparatively more 
significant in the telecom-equipment sector. The working conditions of telecom-equipment and 
the demands of users were often diversified and complicated. Therefore, for equipment providers, 
it was critical to stress these interactions to understand the needs of customers and the relations 
between the equipment systems with working conditions and the demands of telecom-users. 
In Huawei, over 14,300 engineers were appointed to provide services for customers directly, while 
ZTE had 9,200 (data from 2007). Xinwei was still in its infancy with only 2,500 employees in 
total in 2006; but even its leading engineers also served customers directly. In other words, 
Xinwei had its forward customer service teams, home base project teams and specialised R&D 
departments overlapped, which imitated the strategies of Huawei and ZTE in inceptive stages. 
Here, we stress that the new knowledge would not emerge automatically through the interaction 
between producer and customers. The creation of new knowledge entailed a process of problem 
identification, solution development and then knowledge accumulation, which obviously is a 
purposeful organisational process. So, rather than exploring what kind of knowledge is obtained 
from interaction with customers, we highlight the process of Group-B firms in identifying and 
developing solutions for problems discovered in the interaction with customers. 
7.3.4.1 On-site knowledge searching and learning 
Group-A firms hardly had space to learn from the interaction with customers even if individual 
engineers would like to do so. Because the products that Group-A firms provided for the market 
were technically developed exogenously, they did not have the rights, in terms of IPRs or 
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technical confirmation, to make any significant change to the product systems, and did not have 
underlying capabilities to make remarkable design adjustments in-house. Their products were 
changed only over generations since the relevant decisions were made not to serve for the 
capability growth of Group-A firms, but to optimise the benefits of MNCs by utilising the product 
life of their models. Thereby, without trajectory-broken change as to the strategy of Group-A 
firms, there was seldom space for them to search for requirements and to determine product 
modifications in response to customer demands after their products had been launched. 
Additionally, most Group-A firms had overlooked the interaction with customers in practice. The 
reasons might be complicated, partly because of the heritage of the command economy, and partly 
because of their (ever) long last incumbent market advantage. In the early years of Shanghai-Bell, 
it earned itself a bad reputation as a ―sitting salesman‖, which meant it never sent engineers to 
step out of its door to interact with customers. Regional telecom-operators had to make technical 
adjustments on their own if they wanted any service beyond the standard packaged functions. In 
fact, in early years, there were no fees recorded as for the improvement of product systems in 
productive Sino-foreign JVs. Now, as the top Group-A telecom-equipment firm, Shanghai-Bell 
was able to provide the customised solution of network construction. However, for its inability to 
change major products adopted in its solution, Shanghai-Bell had only very limited set of choices 
as to interacting with customers. 
By contrast, Group-B firms had been investing significantly in customer services since their 
inceptive stages. In general, the activities of Group-B firms on interacting with customers could 
be categorized into two, namely to improve the existing product systems gradually and to develop 
solutions to serve the niche market. 
In their early years, Group-B firms usually could not provide products with qualities as good as 
those of imports or Group-A firms, for which the difference came from not only process 
technologies, but also product designs and engineering. For instance, when Huawei provided 
equipment for its first important international customer, namely the Hutchnet in Hong Kong in 
1996, the equipment Huawei provided was still unstable in performance. However, engineers of 
Huawei could answer any technical requests of its customer 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. 
They even slept in the machine rooms of Hutchnet in order to respond quickly to any problem. In 
doing so, engineers could even throw technical changes during off-peak times, mainly at midnight, 
which brought convenience for business operations of Hutchnet. Consequently, Huawei even 
invented an ―online upgrading/adjustment‖ solution forwardly. Hence, the telecom service did not 
need to be suspended for most cases while the technical adjustments were in progress. 
Providing fast response with flexible solutions to the customer demands was a distinct feature of 
Group-B telecom-equipment firms today either in the domestic or international market. For 
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example, in 1998, an earthquake happening in Northeast China destroyed most telecom networks 
there. The service engineers of Huawei and ZTE arrived in the affected area in 24 hours. Ericsson 
had the largest market share with its GSM equipment in this area, but there was a long discussion 
within Ericsson-China first, about where the problem of system breakdown in earthquake resided 
in. Then not until two weeks later, Ericsson had not sent any engineer to the site. During this 
period, Group-B firms had finished technical maintenances of their equipment respectively. 
Moreover, Huawei even had provided some equipment for local operators to replace the network 
constructed by Ericsson temporarily. The point was after the service engineers of Ericsson arrived 
and did some checks, they informed the local telecom operators the system breakdown of their 
equipment was not their (service engineers) duty since apparently there was a designing weakness 
by overlooking the extreme working conditions, i.e. extremely cold, windy and, with earthquake. 
They gave their customers a telephone number, and informed the latter that customers were very 
much welcomed to report this technical problem to their product development division. Without 
surprise, the performance like this caused Ericsson a remarkable loss of market share in this area, 
which was mainly taken by Huawei. 
As implied by the above case, the fast response was assured by organisational system rather than 
by individual engineers or customer service teams only. To supporting the service engineers, 
Group-B firms had to establish strong connection between their home base and forward teams 
(see the figure below). Partially, it was why Group-B firms employ so many R&D engineers and 
post-sale service engineers. In this way, the project team worked in the foreground while the 
in-house specialised R&D force worked in the background to provide support for the forward 
teams. Home base project teams kept real time communication with forward service teams. It 
meant if the service team worked at midnight, the corresponding project team would also be then 
ready to interact too. As the project team was built on cross-boundary inter-departmental platform, 
the multiple technical backgrounds of its members could help its forward team to figure out 
problems and develop solutions in many cases. For those exceptions, the project team could 
mobilise the specialised R&D departments. Moreover they also had the rights to communicate 
with relevant specialised departments directly in needs. Then the forward teams, foreground R&D 
force and background R&D force worked in an integrative manner for identifying problems, 
searching solutions, and fixing problems. Software adjustment and upgrading could be carried out 
on-line; hardware-relevant problems could be dealt with in a short time by producing new 
modules and replacing old ones, since the home base project team and the specialised R&D 
departments had already on the way. Meanwhile, the forward teams were authorised with 
necessary resources to carry out technical modifications on-site. Even for technological problems 
relevant to the product structure or multiple technological segments, changes could also be 
authorised to make by forward teams if they were needed to complete in real time.  
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Figure 7.2 Pattern of learning through interactions with customers 
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In the second place, serving niche markets was a ―have-to-do‖ strategic decision for Group-B 
firms in their early years, since only these places were not penetrated by incumbents. Moreover, 
serving niche markets was also a distinct source of new knowledge creation for Group-B firms. 
Due to the lack of knowledge and human resource, customers in niche markets, such as 
telecom-operators in rural and remote areas, generally required special treatments, which brought 
about their potential requests of in-depth interaction with Group-B firms on equipment system and 
special technical solutions. Group-B firms even had to help their customers in developing 
business models, since their customers might have no idea what they could do with the new 
equipment they were going to buy. The special technical requirements also resided in complex 
working conditions. For example, there would be complex landforms in rural areas. In some cases, 
the charging system of telecom fees was complicated because of the irregular geographical 
boundaries. All these peculiarities induced Group-B firms to deepen their understandings on the 
technical and product systems. 
In order to satisfy the requests of customers, forward teams of Group-B firms usually stayed near 
to the offices of regional telecom-operators for the conveniences to work closely with customers. 
There were many stories in this industry about how close Group-B firms cooperated with their 
customers. A representative one was like that: a new general manager of a county 
telecom-operator could not differentiate two Huawei‘s engineers from his own employees after he 
had already took the post for two months, because these Huawei engineers worked as active, 
positive and excellent as his employees in the machine room, at the counter and in field 
operations.  
The ―forward-foreground-background‖ structure was also utilised in response to the requests of 
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customers in niche markets. Through learning from niche markets, Group-B firms would develop 
some special technologies in answering to some extreme conditions. These technologies might not 
be directly remarkable for common conditions, but their underlying knowledge revealed the 
in-depth internal relations and conflicts within the product systems, which were beneficial to the 
latecomer firms to deepening their understanding.  
Xinwei‘s learning in serving the Daqing area was a typical case. Daqing was an oil-producing 
area in Northeast China. Since the oil plain was underpopulated, the BS (Base Station) systems 
were required to build with low density to save investments. Then, in order to promote the 
covering radius of each BS, the core parts of the BS system was expected to build on tops of high 
towers in general over 20 meters high. It brought about tough working conditions for the BS 
system especially in winter evenings, namely -40°~-60°C with fierce winds, which had not been 
considered by equipment providers normally. Therefore, the original BS systems turned down 
automatically because most IC chips inside worked abnormally under the extreme condit ions; and 
the feeder of smart antenna generated a 10° abnormal angle. In order to handle these problems, 
the local telecom-operator helped to provide full set of climate data for the past decades. Xinwei 
organised most of its elite engineers of all professional units to the site, since before correctly 
identifying the problems, engineers could not image what kinds of technologies would be entailed 
to solve the problems.  
Based on the inter-discipline platform, engineers developed several rounds of solutions. For the 
sake of brevity, we just illustrate the first and the last solutions here. Initially, engineers thought it 
could be solved by promoting the air-conditioning system. However, under the extreme conditions, 
the temperature-adjusting effects were under control only in a very limited neighbourhood of the 
heater. The limits of energy supply were also problematic with this solution. The final solution 
was remarkable different. The air-conditioning just acted a supporting role, whereas the IC 
designers led the plan. The team decided to increase the power supply of the BS system, and 
increase the electric currents through it. But notice the current should be adjustable according to 
the temperature, which was achieved by an add-on module; otherwise, the system would be out of 
control again in summer. Relevantly, some modules were replaced in response to the change in 
rated electric currents. As to fixing the abnormal angle of the feeder, firstly engineers developed a 
simply electro- mechanical device to adjust it manually; Xinwei‘s service engineers did it from 
the machine room of telecom-operators at 2 am – 3 am in early morning. After several rounds‘ 
improvement, it came out with a special module, associated with the one above to control electric 
currents in respond to temperature, which could adjust automatically the feeder in real time. 
We can categorise the knowledge accumulated through interactions with customers into the three 
types. Firstly, engineers could meet known problems, but in different ways or different range 
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away from their previous knowledge. For example, the above case of Xinwei in fixing problems 
caused by extreme working conditions was a typical one. Group-B firms had to organise their 
in-house R&D force to identify the technical problem. If they could identify the technical problem, 
they ought to be able to figure out the solution by efforts to extend and re-organise their existing 
capabilities. The systemic understanding of the firms was critical to develop the problem 
identification and solution. When they were still in their early years and lack of sufficient 
systemic understanding, Group-B firms enhanced the inter-departmental support for forward 
teams to offset the weakness in systemic understanding of individual engineers. 
Secondly, engineers would meet problems that were outside the scope of knowledge they had 
already possessed. For example, Xinwei‘s engineers ever met a particular situation: At the 
boundary of network, when one point of the network got down, namely a BS, the mobile 
terminals under its charge would be led by the system and the smart antenna to rush into 
neighbour BS systems automatically to request registration. It was set by designers as a good 
method under normal situation. However, if the number of requests was high in a very short 
moment, and if the number of neighbouring BS was only one (boundary condition), the requests 
might cause difficulties or even dead-loop of the neighbouring BS. It was a new problem to the 
industrial community. In the face of problems of this kind, to extend the systemic understanding 
of Group-B firms was primarily critical, only by which, problems could be identified correctively, 
and could solutions be developed. Group-B firms had to set up projects and organise in-house and 
forward teams with forces from different specialised units. Laboratory and on-site experiments 
were usually employed as the locus of inter-departmental communication. 
Thirdly, engineers would develop new technical applications from the interactions with customers. 
Potential demands were identified by Group-B firms‘ engineers even when customers had not 
been conscious of them. For example, ZTE‘s experts in charge of the development of equipment 
for videoconference discovered a potential demands for the on-work group calls from their 
customers. Supported by the in-house digital mobile telecom division, they developed a GOTA 
(Global Open Trunking Architecture) system to serve the potential needs. It led the way in this 
segment globally, since at that time all foreign competitive products were still based on analogue 
modes. For such situations, forward engineers identified demands with their knowledge about 
product and technical systems. Relevant specialised forces were mobilised to realise the goal.  
7.3.4.2 Role of organisational learning system 
The role of the organisational learning system of Group-B firms in their learning practices based 
on the interactions with customers has been analysed by the ―forward-foreground-background‖ 
metaphor. Additionally, the knowledge database worked as the physical working platforms of 
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these activities, by which the negative effects caused by geographical distance were reduced and 
the integration of learning was promoted. Certainly, as the learning was based on cross-boundary 
inter-departmental platforms, the organisational learning system also worked as a learning filter, 
by which impractical solutions would be removed. Regarding the case of Xinwei‘s project to 
fixing the problem caused by extreme working conditions, engineers ever put forward a solution 
to add one heating panel to cover the motherboard inside the BS. It was a good idea to solve the 
problem caused by low temperatures. However, such a heating panel would influence the 
electromagnetic field within the system. If more modules were introduced to balance the 
electromagnetic field, the relevant designs would turn to be highly sophisticated. Thus, the idea 
was denied when it went to engineer experts in systemic configuration.  
7.4 Analysis 
By this chapter, we have exhibited that three essential mechanisms of knowledge creation were 
closely buttressed by the organisational systems of Group-B firms. To complete the chapters 
concentrating on the empirical comparison between the two groups of firms, we would like to 
stress two points. First is a classical topic, namely the learning sequence or the trajectory of 
capability-building of DC firms. Second is about the ongoing change of Group-B firms. 
7.4.1 Learning sequence of Group-B firms 
In this thesis, by centring our discussion on organisations and organisational processes of 
technological learning, we get the impression that there is no distinct watershed between different 
stages of capability-building if the stages are defined by real capability-building, such as the 
capability-building of product development, the capability-building of equipment development, 
etc. Although the strategy making and the activities implementation can be executed stage by 
stage in a distinct manner, capability-building is always based on a trade-off between the localised 
learning and the heterogeneous information searching. As the foundation of learning 
implementation, the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms of Group-B firms define that the 
intellectual objects to be learned at the centre stage of collective learning must be understandable 
to relevant participant units. During the learning process, the individual learners of latecomer 
firms, from different but relevant units, have to realise knowledge sharing, mutual understanding 
and consequent adjustments. Then what kind of threads are to be drawn in knowledge creation 
processes, to some extent, is an organisational question rather than a pure technical or 
resource-based question. In other words, as we said, the organisational system and the existing 
in-house knowledge base work as both the platform to facilitate technological learning and the 
platform to filter knowledge creation. Thereby, the knowledge output of their interactive activities 
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would not show up with disruptiveness at micro level, although their embodiment as artefacts (i.e. 
the technologies or products) can demonstrate with disruptive changes. Certainly, from the 
perspective of system, the singular points exist. When the singular points are attained, the 
organisations would experience rapid systemic growth of knowledge as usually we say some are 
inspired. However, the rapid growth of in-house knowledge is still obliged to be grounded on 
gradual organisational learning and interaction, coupling with the hierarchy of knowledge. During 
the course of knowledge growth, the accumulated knowledge is added to the existing knowledge 
base, and becomes part of necessary foundation for further knowledge creation. 
Regarding the ladders in describing the ―capability growth‖ according to major technologies or 
activities that firms implement, we argue that there is not a fixed sequence for all catching-up 
firms. For each firm, there can be different contextual conditions for the starting-up and growth of 
firms. Even only referring to the cases drawn in this thesis, some firms could start from significant 
technical breakthrough (HJD series and the SCDMA of Xinwei) , while many just stayed with 
manufacturing and assembling. If we are asked to illustrate such a ladder for most Group-B firms 
in our investigation only (except for Xinwei), we would stress that, by comparing conventional 
ladders, Group-B firms had not been obliged to establish absolutely sufficient production capacity 
before they entered the stage of development of products and complex product technologies. 
Certainly, such kinds of arguments are reasonable that some capabilities of production had been 
accumulated and embedded in the domestic industrial community before Group-B firms started 
their journeys. However, it is still remarkable that Group-B firms had not figured out all necessary 
processing technologies prior to they launched their inceptive products developed in-house. They 
established inceptive bases of technological capability simultaneously along with building their 
earliest production capacities. In other words, in their early stages, they had already mastered the 
capability to generate and manage technological change. After that, the exploration and 
accumulation of technological capability had never been ceased to date (see the figure below).  
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Figure 7.3 Ladder of technological capability growth  
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Nevertheless, as we stressed, there is no common sequence of capability-building for all 
catching-up firms. Even suppose that the conventional ladders in literature do correctly 
demonstrate the practical capability-building sequences of the objects of corresponding research. 
The difference of our ladder from most conventional ladders reflects the diversification of 
potential emergences in terms of technological catching-up of DC firms, which follows relatively 
simple principles of interactions as the relations between technological hierarchy, resource (and 
business) constraints, individual learning and organisational systems. 
7.4.2 Current changes of Group-B firms 
The priority of specific organisational learning systems is not what we buttress for all stages of 
capability-building during catching-up. Rather, in this thesis, what we present is how Group-B 
firms organised their in-house forces to realise learning tasks identified by them in particular 
stages. Therefore, we imply that, in the face of different tasks, Group-B firms should adjust their 
organisational systems for better learning performances. However, questions would turn to be 
how Group-B firms should change and whether they could change effectively.  
In fact, the leading Group-B firms do have the trend to stress regular patterns of interactions 
between different specialised units, and stress the benefits from professionalization more than 
before. Certainly, the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms are still in the spotlights of the 
process of product and technology development in Group-B firms. However, the responsibilities 
of each participant unit that could be manifested as quantity (e.g. time consuming and scale of 
task) and quality (e.g. technical level, resource consuming and on time) of development get better 
defined. Not every developmental detail is encouraged to place on cross-boundary platforms, such 
as the well-defined duties of specific units. Such a change is driven by the growth of in-house 
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knowledge accumulation in specialised segments. Besides, the increase of collective 
understandings about products or even industrial systems shares at least the equally importance in 
driving the change. In the name of integrative knowledge , such understandings are embodied in 
their organisational structures, their rules of development organising, their databases of 
technological information, the experiences of their leading engineers and the basic cognitions 
borne by active junior members. With these conditions, through stressing the professionalization 
and regular patterns of interaction, Group-B firms can promote the efficiency of developmental 
activities. 
Huawei was the first one among Group-B firms to experiment such a change. Starting from 1998, 
with the assistance of IBM‘s consultant service, Huawei began to construct its IPD (integrated 
product development) system. Chery is an ongoing case to enforce a governance change. From 
2007 on, it aims to confine the irregular personal and material flow between different units. As 
observers, we cannot predict accurately where Group-B firms will finally go after the current 
transitional stage. However, we shall note that the fundamental features we stress of 
organisational learning systems of Group-B firms in this thesis have not been removed from 
centre stage yet. 
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Chapter 8. Discussion: technological learning and changes of 
organisational systems 
8.1 Introduction 
The difference of organisations is an essential feature of firms under competitive environments 
(Nelson, 1991). Certainly, the organisational systems are nominally selected by firms only if they 
have managerial autonomies. However when organisational differences emerge as group-specific 
characteristics among different groups of firms, they cannot be explained as natural features of 
firms. Rather, such a situation implies connections of social conditions to organisational systems 
of firms. In our study, as the practitioners in DCs generally lacked experience to implement 
successful technological capability building at the starting points of their journeys, the DC firms 
we studied in fact were unable to select learning patterns freely from a wide range of choices. 
Their perceptions of neighbouring information constrained the development of their 
understanding about technological learning. So in addition to their original intent, firms could be 
collectively influenced by some external advocacies, or they might forwardly imitate the practices 
of some first-movers if the first-movers were identified as exemplars by them. Moreover, the 
relations among different organisational members within firms were also influenced by the 
relevant societal relations. Then there come the theoretical significance to study the source and 
process of different choices of firms in their journeys to generate better understanding about 
organisational construction and learning. 
Similarly, readers would also feel puzzle. As the organisational learning system is so important, 
why could not be solved by encouraging other firms to copy the experience of successful 
organisations in detailed. The answer to this question is from the same root of social foundation of 
different organisational patterns. Jointly affected by a series of political, economic and culture 
factors, and with its essential inertia, the social cognition is not flexible to change. First-movers 
who bear the risks related to not only the technological dimension but also the organisational 
dimension are necessary to cause significant social changes. 
The social-economic circumstances, which were as backgrounds to the development of the two 
groups of Chinese firms, are discussed in this chapter. After that we also give a revisit to the 
theories we ever noted to frame our study. 
8.2 Historical revisit: organisational revolution in China’s industries  
Any real organisation would have developed a highly elaborated set of understanding about 
control, which could be represented as the informational requirements and social requirements 
(Ouchi, 1979, p837). However, regarding successfully technological catching-up, either the 
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government or firms have to search and establish their knowledge through practices, by which we 
say they are not omniscient. The process that China explored effective patterns for rapid 
development in the past 6 decades proves this point.  
Essentially, in order to achieve the organisational mobilisation and learning integration, front-line 
engineers not only require relevant resources allocated for the appointed tasks, but also require 
resources to be allocated reasonably and implemented according to their understanding and needs 
about the technological aims in process. With Nonaka and Konono‘s term (1998), resources 
should be manipulated within the ―Ba‖ of knowledge creation. Since knowledge creation resides 
in the individuals‘ learning and their integration, the strategic resources obviously should be 
manipulated, at least at tactic level, by communities of engineers who are to share common 
knowledge and to solve the problems. Relevantly, the authority to identify and figure out some 
emergent problems during the practical development process is expected by front-line engineers. 
Certainly, in practices, managers would not definitely agree on this point. Then it leads to a 
question about the social relationship within enterprises, as how the authority (and consequently 
resources) is distributed among people at different levels within the firm.  
In the 1950s, the Chinese industrial community established patterns by imitating those of USSR, 
which were similar to those based on the advocacy of Chinese government after the early 1980s 
with the TMFT framework. Learning activities were heavily framed by the upper-level 
organisation or followed the foreign technical sources (experts or importing blueprints). Even in 
the interval between these two periods, development tasks were also kept away from front-line 
engineers of productive firms largely, and implemented by governmental R&D divisions. 
Therefore, engineers in productive firms were kept far away from the authority distribution for 
specific resources manipulation in most cases. 
However, we must not overlook there were controversies among policy-makers and industrial 
practitioners on this topic in the past decades. From the late 1950s, a movement represented by 
the ―AnGang Constitution” was raised, by which some authorities on resource manipulation were 
distributed to front-line engineers. However, for economic and political reasons, the new pattern 
was kept with debates. Its residues were cleaned up through the erection of TMFT and the 
reformation of SOEs: the TMFT framework induced domestic firms to follow existing external 
technical schemes; the reformation of SOEs imposed more centralisation of authority to the 
factory heads and managers within firms. They deepened the gap between managerial authority 
and front-line personnel as regards the resources manipulation. Later, the emergence of Group-B 
firms presented semi-subversion to the previous pattern. We term it as semi-subversion because 
the changes raised by Group-B firms had not covered the entire organisations (such as the 
workshop in general). But Group-B firms denied the previous Fordist patterns of resource 
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manipulation within the product and technology development division. Engineers were endowed 
with some authorities on resource manipulations, which was the substantial organisational 
foundation for the new organising pattern of learning of Group-B firms. 
Therefore, we open a new perspective. In Chapter 4, we pointed out the pathway choosing of 
policy-makers and industrial leaders regarding the patterns of technological learning and 
catching-up. Here we aim to place them in a broader socio-political process. Sure, to explore the 
social foundations about the evolution of Chinese industrial firms requires in-depth investigation 
relevant to the social, political and economic changes, which is not our goal in this chapter. Here, 
we just present some critical connections of social foundations to the organisational learning 
systems of firms, which would help to enhance our understanding about the couple of 
organisation and technological learning by contrast with any resource-based view. 
8.2.1 Evolution of social relations within China’s industrial enterprises 
8.2.1.1 Before the 1970s: Magnitogorsk Constitution vs. AnGang Constitution 
In the inceptive years of PRC, a quasi craft control system was broadly implemented in industries. 
Front-line workers and technicians were controlled by gangs and foremen. After communists won 
the national power, they carried out reforms to get rid of the vested foremen class, and provided a 
series of welfare to replace the services provided by gangs and foremen (F. Lu, 1999, 2000).  
The new industrialisation of China after 1949 was started with the cooperative projects between 
China and USSR and other communist countries. Thus, the management patterns of industrial 
firms in China were built through the imitation of USSR factories (Kaple, 1994), which could be 
summarized as the ―Magnitogorsk Constitution‖ (the management pattern of Magnitogorsk Steel 
Mill) that was advocated by USSR to spread among communist countries. The Magnitogorsk 
pattern could be regarded as a modified version of Fordism under the socialist environments 
(Beissinger, 1988). The Magnitogorsk Steel Mill itself ―was modelled on the United States Steel 
plant in Gary, Indiana; and the Gorky Automobile Factory was built by engineers and workers from 
Ford and modelled on the River Rouge plant in Detroit, at that time considered the most modern of 
its kind in the world‖ (Josephson, 1995, P528). The “mandatory plan system‖ and the ―single-head 
system‖ were the key features of the Magnitogorsk pattern (Cui, 1996). The mandatory plan 
system framed the basic structure of the economy, and the single-head system was the method 
used to manage each economic units. The single-head system was usually termed as the ―expert 
responsibility system‖ by its advocators, which meant the factories were set in a centralised 
manner ruled by one or just a few industrial experts, not by the front-line proletariat. Most 
members of organisations were expected to act under the frameworks that had been well set. 
These institutions upheld the foundation of USSR‘s industrial system to be rigid, centralised, 
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top-down, politics-based (von Tunzelmann, 1995, p286).  
The Magnitogorsk Constitution was spread in China along with USSR involved cooperative 
projects. Soviet experts, some Chinese policy-makers and industrial leaders obliged Chinese firms 
to duplicate the Soviet experience. USSR provided thousands of books about industrial 
management and planning for Chinese practitioners (Kaple, 1994). For example, FAW, at least its 
truck division, was the ―copy‖ of the Stalin Automotive Factory both in physical and social 
technologies. Even since the Soviet sample did not have a department of product development, 
the FAW had it neither before the late 1970s. 
However, front-line practitioners in some firms witnessed that the rigid duplication of 
well-schemed procedures and management patterns did not lead to performance as good as 
expected. Reasons could be various, but one of them was substantially related to the skill control. 
Although the USSR provided China some equipment, blueprints and experts through the 
cooperative projects, automatic production lines were still not popular even in the national key 
factories of China, and the average degree of automation was low, which contrasted with the 
situations in USSR. In reference to the core equipment in Chinese firms, many of them were 
backward, based on manual operation, and came from different sources so were not standardised 
to each other. Under such circumstances, personal skills and operational habits were critical as to 
promoting the productivities and inducing innovations. Even in the late 1980s, the delegation of 
Volkswagen still noticed that some procedures in Chinese backbone SOEs still relied on personal 
skills, ―…(in the metal casting workshop of FAW) a worker had to stand on a heightened platform, 
caught the containers with liquid steel inside that was carried by the rope gearing instrument 
manufactured by Demag (Germany). He had to hold the switch at the lower end of the rope, which 
was a dangerous acrobat moment of life or death…operated the mental casting… (Hahn, 2005, 
p133-134)‖. So, the critical skills in Chinese industrial firms in practice were not fully controlled 
by upper managers as in the Fordist system. 
Then, back in the 1950s, innovations about the organisational learning system was still developed 
initiatively by some Chinese practitioners. The Anshan Steel Mill (―AnGang‖ in spoken Chinese) 
might not be the first one to do so, but was regarded as the representative in this tide for the 
significance of its innovation, and also for some political reasons. 
AnGang was a factory partly built with the aids of USSR, and was the backbone force of the new 
China in steel making. The management innovation in question was initiated in a bottom-up 
manner by front-line practitioners, with at least three reasons. Firstly, front-line practitioners did 
not agree with the Magnitogorsk Constitution. The equipped machines that AnGang used were 
from divergent sources. For example, as for the bloomer factories, without mentioning the 
supportive machines, there were bloomers provided by Krupp (Germany), which was imported by 
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Japanese invaders during the puppet Manchuria regime; there were also bloomers produced by 
Ural Heavy Industry (i.e. the equipment provider of Magnitogorsk Steel Mill), which were bought 
as advised by Soviet experts. If people wanted to promote the productivity of bloomer mills, a 
series of overpressure experiments were needed for each bloomer respectively as critical 
procedure to gain necessary technical information. However, Soviet experts insisted on existing 
operational manuals brought from USSR rather than allowing on-site experiments. It caused 
conflicts between the local front-line practitioners and people following the Soviet authority. 
Secondly, the institution of single-head system was brought into AnGang by Soviet experts; 
besides, based on the similarity of life habits, a distinct cultural clique was formed by Soviet 
experts, Chinese returnees from USSR and some higher rank cadres. It caused oppositions 
between the upper clique and lower organisation and some ―local-oriented‖ managers. Thirdly, 
most common people were still inspired by the enthusiasm originating from the birth of the new 
China. They were eager to explore new things beneficial to the collective and national interests in 
spite of the office politics. 
Then, a revolution, which in fact was a rebellion against the Magnitogorsk Constitution, occurred 
in AnGang in 1958. With the support of an enlightened head of the No.2 Bloomer Mill, front-line 
practitioners did the experiments by themselves, and made successful improvement. The capacity 
of the Ural bloomer in the No.2 Bloomer Mill was increased from 1,800,000 to 3,200,000 
ton/year (crude steel). It was an amazing achievement that benefited the mill for 3 decades, as the 
capacity had never been successfully increased so remarkably again since then. The ―double ingot 
rolling‖ and the ―7-pair experiences‖ were summarised as outcome of physical technologies from 
the innovation. As the other local practitioners got inspired, relevant innovations, both in terms of 
organisational change and technological change, were carried out in all over 180 mills or equally 
units in AnGang.  
At that time, led by Chairman MAO Zedong, Chinese government partially supported the 
decentralisation of economic control. Up to the end of 1958, the control of 87% MOEs were 
decentralised to regional governments, or even to the administration of streets or communities. 
The decision-making powers of resource allocation and price-making were also decentralised to 
some extent. These changes, as the social cognition change against the previous highly centralised 
mode, inspired the bottom-up reformation within enterprises. Generic revolutions similar to that 
happened in AnGang occurred within SOEs gradually around over China. 
From 1958, the experience about learning organising of AnGang‘s innovation was formulated into 
the ―two-participation, one-modification, and three-integration”. The ―two-participation‖ meant 
managers and cadres should participate in front-line physical works in their spare time; technical 
personnel and workers had rights to participate in management by regular institutional 
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arrangements. The ―one-modification‖ meant to remove the inappropriate institutional 
arrangements, which in fact legalised the organisational innovation against the Magnitogorsk 
Constitution. The ―three-integration‖ obliged integrations among managers, technical personnel 
and workers. In other words, it inspired the economic democracy, by which engineers and workers 
were allowed to advise management changes and had channels to share the authority about 
resource allocation.  
The experience of AnGang was named as AnGang Constitution in 1960 by MAO. In fact, the 
―AnGang Constitution” was in line with MAO‘s thoughts, which were negative regarding the 
emerging privilege class and bureaucracy. Readers should note that the Sino-Soviet split was 
ignited during 1959-1960. MAO praised the AnGang Constitution as an innovation belonging to 
the people not merely in China but in the entire Fareast. It exhibited MAO‘s advocacy of 
―economic democracy‖ against the ―single-head system‖ of the Magnitogorsk Constitution, and 
the Fordism sitting behind them (Cui, 1996, p20). 
The whole country was mobilised to study the AnGang Constitution and relevant experience. 
Associated with it was the ―Great Leap Forward‖ (1958-1960), by which people were encouraged 
to try all kinds of inventions, although some came out to be ineffective. Even though it was 
evaluated by Chinese official today as mistake, ironically, many indigenous product designs held 
by Group-A firms till to the 1980s did originate from this movement. If take the car-making sector 
as an example, we ought to refer to ―most‖ rather than ―many‖, since such a list included the 
RedFlag (inherited from the DongFeng model developed in 1958) of FAW, the JingGangShan, 
the Beijing and the DongFangHong models of Beijing Auto, three Phoenix models (the precursor 
of Shanghai) of Shanghai Auto, and so on. So some domestic industrial practitioners consider the 
year 1958 as the birth of the indigenous car industry (Zhao, 2006).  
Behind the emergence of these product designs was the reform of social relations within 
enterprises in the name of economic democracy. Front-line practitioners were authorised with 
greater access to strategic resources for production procedures, technical exploration and product 
development. The integration of managers, engineers and workers brought about cohesion of their 
organisations for collective goals of development. Therefore, some scholars take it and the 
relevant ideas of MAO as early thoughts of TQM (Thomas, 1994, p209) and Post-Fordism (Cui, 
1995). Koaru Iskikawa, one of the founders of the Japanese TQM system, also said publicly in a 
conference in 1978 that the first TQM group of Japan formed in May of 1962 had benefited much 
from the 1958-version AnGang Constitution (Zhu, 1997). 
However, the AnGang Constitution had not been continuously encouraged officially. In the 
practical operation, the diffusion of AnGang Constitution was bound to the Great Leap Forward. 
The Great Leap Forward went into a remarkable failure. Quite a few factors jointly worked, 
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including the cost-regardless expansion in the steel industry, the inflated exaggeration of the 
governmental system in the agriculture sector, the natural calamities and the pressure to pay 
USSR for the support in Korean War and cooperative projects. These factors finally resulted in a 
well-known famine. Since the Great Leap Forward was taken as a mistake and ended, the 
AnGang Constitution was also criticised by its opponents. For some cases, the application of 
AnGang Constitution did get deviated from its original thoughts: people required upper managers 
to work with workers in front lines regularly, not in their spare time; workers interfered in the 
management directly without strict limitations. In same case, the AnGang Constitution was 
intentionally introduced to drive some change with political reasons, rather than to improve the 
economic performances. 
The central government ceased the Great Leap Forward. A remedy plan termed as ―70 items of 
SOE regulation‖ was launched in 1961 to rectify the economic order, and to cease the industrial 
community from being actively mobilised. DENG Xiaoping played a leading role as an assistant 
to Chairman LIU Shaoqi in the remedy plan and the ―three years of economic adjustment‖ during 
1963-1965
131
. In 1964, articles appeared in Chinese newspapers urging greater product 
specialization. Even though the moderate tone of these articles indicated no forcible return to 
Soviet methods (Schurmann, 1968, p299), the official diffusion of the AnGang Constitution was 
stopped at this time. Deng and his colleagues stressed the piece-wage, time-wage and the post 
responsibility systems against the organisational mobilisation. In other words, the social relations 
within the enterprises were changed back. 
8.2.1.2 After the 1970s: economic reform 
After 1971, the domestic industrial community gradually recovered from the severe turmoil that 
began in 1966, namely the ―Culture Revolution‖, although to appease the political struggle still 
required several years. In 1971, China resumed communications with the United States, followed 
by the ―43 Arrangements‖ and ―78 plan‖ to import foreign technologies. But since equity-based 
cooperation were not included, the management systems of Chinese industrial firms were still 
influenced by domestic force mainly, in fact as mixed, jointly influenced by the tradition of 
Magnitogorsk Constitution and the AnGang Constitution. 
At the end of 1978, DENG was upheld by his comrades to be the actual core of Chinese authority. 
This political change brought about a shift in the patterns of utilising foreign technologies that the 
equity-based method got green light gradually. DENG and his colleagues carried out the economic 
reform from 1978, which was also inherited by his successors. Here, we highlight several points 
                                                 
131 Deng was an opponent to the AnGang Constitution. In a letter DENG wrote to MAO in 1972, he articulated his 
previous deviation from the ‗AnGang Constitution‘ (DENG Xiaoping: the letter to Mao Zedong, 1972-08-02). 
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directly relevant to the social relations within enterprises. 
In 1982, a ―factory director responsibility system‖ was started, by which the heads of SOEs were 
given with autonomies of operational management, particularly those to allocate personnel and 
resources for productive activities. The labour contract system was introduced to take the place of 
the political-based lifetime employment primarily for the lower level organisational members. 
Then, with different treatments, the authority and responsibility on SOEs were primarily entrusted 
to upper managers, not lower level of organisations. In fact, during the reform, upper managers in 
most cases had more ―discourse power‖ by contrast with the lower level. For example, in 1984, 55 
factory heads signed jointly to request further management autonomy as an extension to the 
―factory director responsibility system‖; subsequently in 1985 they did win the autonomy in 
managing the incentive system. By contrast, the lower level organisation was generally regarded 
as the source of the ineffectiveness of managerial control and the unsatisfactory productivity. 
During 1986-1992, the ―enterprise contract management responsibility system‖ was prevalent. Not 
only the SOEs, but also their subordinate units, e.g. workshops, teams and groups, could be 
contracted to particular persons. Contractors had super authority over the operational activities 
within their contracting ranges. It actually recovered the ―single-head system‖ within firms. In 
such a system, as the critical tasks were well defined by the contractors both in directions and in 
details in order to protect their own benefits, the responsibility of the low-level organisation was 
further and heavily depressed. 
In 1993, the shareholding reform of SOEs was started in the name of governance modernisation. 
It actually legalised the control of a few upper managers as in the previous period over the 
relevant firms. In some cases, common employees were offered with options to buy share stocks 
with specific quotas. However, in the face of the fading of previous welfare system that was under 
reform as an accessory of the ―old-fashion‖ central planning system, most common workers did 
not have the purchasing power. Their shares on hand were too small to have real voices over the 
decision-making. Besides in China after 1949, there was no actual workers union in addition to 
the one organised by the government and corporate officials as a decoration. The shares of 
workers, even also small in the aggregate usually, were seldom gathered by effective leadership to 
impose the rights on decision-making of firms. Therefore, the shareholding reform in practice 
enhanced and legalised the power of individuals or cliques with large shares in hand who in many 
cases were leaders of these firms and had purchasing powers. Certainly, there were still some 
public shares held by the government nominally. However, the real executors of the public shares 
were absent at that time. Even in case governmental agents (such as the SASAC system after 2003) 
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did work later
132
, the governmental agents cared only the maintenance and increasing of asset 
values, and let the social relations or even production process within SOEs untouched. Besides, in 
light of optimising the governance of SOEs, further reforms were carried on in the second half of 
1990s, which solidified the absolute authority of major shareholders. During this tide, 
governmental shares receded from SOEs heavily, which was a practical process of privatization.  
Besides, by issuing the laws that favoured FFEs regarding tax treatments, Chinese government 
intentionally encouraged general SOEs in addition to those involved in TMFT framework to 
introduce FDIs as a method to modernise their corporate governance since 1991. Only for the 
Wuhan City in 1994, there were 816 SOEs that carried out equity-based cooperation with MNCs 
(D. Zhang, 2006). We do not mean to deny good aspects that MNCs contributed to Chinese 
industrial community here; but most Sino-foreign productive JVs were only regarded as pure 
manufacturing divisions of MNCs‘ global value networks during 1980s-1990s. Moreover, even 
though many Sino-foreign productive JVs were in the name of adopting advanced patterns such as 
the ―Lean Production‖ and the ―Post-Fordism‖, what they brought for Chinese industrial 
practitioners in most cases were the exhibiting rules as the outcome of these advanced patterns. As 
Thomas (1994, p209) comments, there could be two ways to incorporate ―advanced patterns‖. 
One is consistent with the broad philosophy that the corresponding pattern advocates, and is to 
mobilise the organisation for continuous improvement and learning at both individual and 
collective levels. Meanwhile, the other solidifies the organisation to learn the rules exogenously 
generated by these patterns and prevent changes within the organisations.  
8.2.1.3 Summary 
From the 1950s on, the China‘s authority and its industrial community continually endeavoured to 
develop appropriate patterns to realise rapid industrialisation. Their thoughts and the process were 
full of ambiguities, conflicts and controversies. Policy-makers and industrial practitioners did not 
have clear and confirmed knowledge about what types of patterns were better for Chinese. Rather, 
they had to explore relevant ―social technologies‖ through practices. 
―AnGang Constitution‖ presented the bottom-up efforts of its kind to realise the mobilisation of 
organisation to achieve better quality of technological learning, and was also a movement against 
the emerging bureaucracy and quasi bureaucracy within enterprises that rigidified authority to the 
fixed and a handful of persons in the economic life, which was meaningful especially under the 
configuration of socialism. The economic reform carried out in China since 1978 actually drove 
the mainstream of Chinese industrial sector back to a pattern similar to the Fordism rather than the 
                                                 
132 For example, Qian (2001) argues that the governmental direct control over backbone SOEs was enhanced again after 
1994 by the erection of the precursors of SASAC 
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Post-Fordism, which connects our main story with the emergence of Group-A firms. The 
mobilisation of front-line practitioners was not encouraged by policy-makers or higher authority 
within enterprises. The lower level organisational members had little bargaining power to 
maintain or recover their social status within enterprises as before, such as by the ―AnGang 
Constitution‖. The reform was deepened step by step, and the status of front-line practitioners 
turned to be similar with what described by Piore and Sabel (1984, p113) on the United States 
model of mass production that their job was ―a precisely defined aggregate of well-specified tasks‖. 
They lost the authority, and the responsibility, to deal with the definition and classification of 
tasks, namely to carry out spontaneous technological learning under an organisational framework. 
In the light of adopting advanced patterns, the contents that they were asked to learn might come 
from Post-Fordism patterns, but the contents were just the written rules that had been developed 
exogenously somewhere else, by which they were forbidden rather than being mobilised for 
changes. 
Some scholars might have different views. For example, Chan (1995) adopts the framework of 
Dore (1973; 1987, p29-31), and implies that the Chinese pattern of industrial firms will converge 
with the Japanese model, namely the organisation-oriented system, more than the market-oriented 
system prevalent in Britain and American. He takes the legacy of ―Maoist model‖, such as the 
iron-bowl and the self-identities of workers to underpin his argument. However, he neglects that 
the legacy could not last long without support of practices. In fact, as the lower-level organisation 
seldom had institutional powers to contest for the authority within enterprises, the 
disadvantageous situation of them during the reform was presented by the continuous 
privatisation of SOEs and the mass XiaGang
133
 in the late 1990s. 
The ailing situation of lower level organisation was even maintained after the mass XiaGang. For 
instance, up to 2006, the wage levels of front-line practitioners in the truck division of FAW and 
the FAW Car Co. had not been increased for any since 1998 while during this period the annual 
production output of FAW had increased from 300,000 sets to 1,000,000 sets. Considering that the 
firm implemented the piece-wage, the actual nominal wage levels were in fact demoted even 
without considering the inflation. As contrast, high level and some middle level managers enjoyed 
income growth as 2-8 times than theirs in 1998 (data from 2006). Even though the FAW kept 
efforts to incorporate the Japanese patterns, it was hardly to image how the lower level 
                                                 
133 XiaGang is a special word in China for describing the unemployment situation of employees of SOEs. Literally, 
XiaGang means the person is only off from the working position. He/she would have just little or even none pension for 
such a status. However, in fact, most XiaGang employees could not go back to their previous working positions or their 
previous enterprises as implied by this concept literally. Thus, some scholars regard XiaGang as the status of actually 
unemployed. There is no specific accurate data for the scale of XiaGang in the late 1990s. But the number is broadly 
estimated from 22- 30 million. Through XiaGang, many SOEs were closed, reformed with stock-holding scheme, or sold 
to the private sector. 
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organisation with a continuously demoted status could actively participate in the realisation of 
TQM, JIT and flexible production, as considering their motivations and authority. As for the 
general situation in China, the ratio of labourer remuneration to GDP decreased continuously from 
the 56.5% in 1983 to 36.7% in 2005.
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Only after the emergence of Group-B firms, could a new model be recognised. And such a process 
is still ongoing.  
8.2.2 Change of managerial autonomy and organisational learning system 
In a transition country, the previous institutional settings, which were distinct to those of mature 
market economies, usually contained the sources of its economic and management problems. The 
lack of managerial autonomy of Chinese firms in the previous era, as explained such as by the 
principal-agent theory, is broadly regarded as the source of difficulties of them regarding 
technological learning at that time. Q. Lu (Q. Lu, 2000; Q. Lu, and Lazonick, 2001) focuses on 
the relation between the change in corporate governance and the emergence of Chinese 
indigenous innovative firms, and concludes that the three aspects of corporate governance, 
namely the management autonomy, the commitment to technological learning and the balanced 
incentive system, are requisite conditions for Chinese indigenous innovative firms. 
It is reasonable that without managerial autonomies, firms are difficult to generate innovations 
sustainably as they have to respond to uncertainties associated with developmental activities 
under the competitive circumstance. However, it is necessary to consider whether the three 
aspects are sufficient. The evolution of Chinese industries imposes a negative answer. In 1994 
only, at least 33,000 firms around China had already realised the shareholding-oriented reform, 
and over 4,300 reformed SOEs had updated their registration with the administration according to 
the new ―corporate law‖ that compelled the separation between governmental intervention and 
enterprise governance. However, most of them had not grown up to be innovative, without 
considering the much more followers after 1994. Otherwise, we should suppose that these firms, 
large in number, all suffered from insufficient managerial skills and motivation for innovation; but 
it is apparently unreasonable. For example, the case of Lenovo, namely a firm included in the 
research of Q. Lu (2000) as a representative innovative firm, support our questioning. Around 
1994, its director won a critical controversy over its chief engineer, and guided Lenovo to change 
since 1998 from a technology-oriented firm that stressed the development of ASIC chips to a 
production-oriented firm that stressed the manufacturing of personal computer. Lying behind the 
                                                 
134 According to the spokesperson of All-China Federation of Trade Unions, source: 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-05-12/024420251101.shtml (last accessed date: 2010-06-09) 
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shift of capability-building path was an underlying change of organisational learning system: the 
team of systemic product development was moved from the foreground of business to the 
background, and later was reduced into a small unit for basic research. The management 
autonomy, the financial commitment and the growing financial capacity had not guaranteed of its 
persistence on intensive technological learning as before, even without mentioning the perfect or 
sufficient knowledge about the construction of organisational learning system for building 
innovative capabilities. Otherwise most Group-A firms in our study should have already been 
successful in in-house product development with their initial commitments and well-reformed 
―modernised‖ corporate governance patterns, so should Brilliant Auto before its major change. 
Rather, our empirical study presents us an interesting case that, even with imperfect managerial 
autonomy, HaFei was still able to learn sustainably and efficiently. Because of its quasi-military 
status, its executive managers could hardly handle the incentive system without constraints. 
executives were obliged to keep every member on board, and the performance pay was very 
cautious to utilise. Therefore, in HaFei, the seniority of payment system remained largely at least 
up to recent years. A good-performing product development engineers with big contributions to 
the firm would not certainly get better pay than a front line senior worker did. However, although 
executives had no free choice to improve this, HaFei still progressed steadily for in-house 
learning. 
The studies of F. Lu (1999, 2000) go further as for the relation between the reform of SOEs and 
their competitiveness. He stresses on the cohesive managers, managerial control over production 
process and new social relations within the enterprises. However, we still need to answer: what 
kinds of organisational patterns should be developed based on the social relations within 
enterprises considering their particular learning targets? And how could core members obtain 
relevant knowledge to realise the relevant organisational construction or transition? 
8.2.3 Organisational revolution and bandwagon effects 
In modern industrial economies, especially those undergoing fast development, the large firm 
performs its critical role in the evolution of industries not merely as a unit carrying out 
transactions on the basis of information flows, but, more importantly, as a creator and repository 
of product-specific embedded organisational knowledge (Chandler, Hikino and von Nordenflycht, 
2001, p2). The progress of the SOE reforms and the TMFT framework had caused significant 
influences on the evolution of other domestic firms. Later, as the heterodoxy to Group-A firms, 
the successes of Group-B firms in developing indigenous product platforms and realising 
commercial survival, again, are followed by many domestic firms. 
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8.2.3.1 Emergence of Group-B firms 
Group-B firms were engaged in the tide of reform aiming at corporate modernisation, so the 
managerial control within Group-B firms was assured by the contract-based employment system. 
However, Group-B firms have developed internal social relations different from other domestic 
firms, by which upper managers do not supervise the development activities of front-line 
practitioners by details. Rather, resources are authorised to developers under a set of institutional 
arrangements to deal with detailed knowledge search, generation, accumulation and diffusion. To 
be specific, within some basic management framework, developers are legitimised with the 
―autonomy of learning‖. REN summaries this pattern of recourse authorisation and technological 
learning in Huawei as ―Let the people who can hear the thunder of guns make the decisions (of 
resource distribution)
135
.‖ Only with the authorisation of resource application and learning 
autonomy, can front-line practitioners implement learning according to the endogenous 
technological logics, the associated uncertainties, and the relevant coordination for technological 
and organisational integration. Key features of organisational learning systems of Group-B firms, 
such as the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms, the comprehensive knowledge databases 
and relevant supportive institutions, including intensive interaction and on-site problem solving 
which engage multi-department actors are feasible only based on such kind of social relations. 
So by contrast with other numberless domestic firms that failed in searching for appropriate 
patterns for rapid technological catching-up, Group-B firms were the first-movers that had 
achieved this target. Then how did the pattern emerge as executives share authority with 
subordinate organisational members?  
We cannot disclose the sources of Group-B firms in adopting the new social relations totally here. 
However, associated with our historical retrospect, the diversity among multiple layers and 
subsystems within national industrial system did work for the emergence of such a change 
(Lundvall et al, 2002). The personal engineering skills accumulated before the prevalence of 
TMFT practices, the experience of industrial organising, and especially the memories about 
Magnitogorsk Constitution worked as seeds, waiting for activation by relevant entrepreneurship to 
catalyse changes. We do not mean that the previous patterns were reproduced by Group-B firms; 
but the experiences constructed a wider possibility space, associated with the experiences earned 
from TMFT practices, for the practitioners to develop their own patterns. 
Huawei is a typical case. REN is an enthusiastic Maoist
136
, which could be reflected by his 
strategic thinking about development, such as stressing advantageous force on specific targets. 
                                                 
135 It was said by REN on Huawei‘s award ceremony for the marketing and post-sale service departments, Jan 2009. 
136 REN was exactly a ―pacemaker of studying Maoism‖ in the 1970s when he worked as an engineer in Chinese army. 
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Most importantly, he offers most Huawei‘s stock shares to organisational members as rewards and 
responsibility. As the founder, REN only holds 1.42% while the rest 98.58% are owned by 65% 
internal employees through two unions, which endows organisational members the sense of 
participation and the foundation for being mobilised and integrated. During our investigation, 
some Huawei engineers said, ―our boss has only very small share of this firm – Huawei is not his 
private property. However, he can work so hard, day and night for the collective. Certainly we shall 
also do like this！137‖ Even the non-private ownership, which is broadly accounted as the source of 
principle-agent problem, also presents interesting linkages to the organisational cohesion. HaFei 
and Chery share the similarity to be SOEs. Also there is about 40% share held by SOEs in ZTE. In 
these cases the essence of public property does not impede the in-house technological learning, 
but rather reduces the identity difference among organisational members. For example, Chery‘s 
engineers said, ―Chery is not a private firm of YIN and other top managers. It is ours!138‖ 
Besides, at the inceptive stage of all Group-B firms, the pressures as vital for life or death of their 
firms, the engineer or scientist culture, and the shared strategic intent and memories about 
previous patterns formed up the complexity, which might be called as fellowship, to push 
participants to search for consensus about development. Their disadvantages of resource-based 
endowments and potentials to access external JV partners induced them to rely on the knowledge 
creation of in-house engineers as the most valuable and dependable ―resource‖. As implied by 
Grant (1996, 120), if the primary resource of the firm is knowledge, if knowledge is owned by 
employees, if most of this knowledge can only be exercised by the individuals who possess it – 
then the theoretical foundations of the shareholder value approach should be challenged. Such 
situations increased the possibility for practitioners to select or create patterns by which they 
shared some authorities within a broader scope of organisation, mainly the central part involved in 
knowledge creation. Such configurations attracted the rebels against the TMFT framework, which 
enhanced their inclination again. 
8.2.3.2 Bandwagon effects of organisational evolutions 
Inspired by Schumpeter (1943), bandwagon effects are adopted by scholars to describe the 
emergence of followers upon particular innovation. For example, Perez (2002) stresses a series of 
social-economic conditions of bandwagon effects for critical technological changes. Under the 
transitional circumstance as China, the emergence of new developmental patterns can be regarded 
as significant changes in social technology. Then bandwagon effects refer to the following of 
other domestic firms with regard to learning patterns of first-movers. 
                                                 
137 It is according to the interview with LIU ChunQiang (2003, 2005) and CHE HaiPing (2003).  
138 It is according to the interviews with LU JianHui (2003,2004,2005) 
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(1) Bandwagon effects of TMFT model and SOE reform 
In the early phase of the economic reform, the legalisation of government and the ideology played 
critical roles in mobilising industrial firms to carry out organisational change. The TMFT policy 
was a typical case. The earliest official articulate clauses for the TMFT policy were not issued 
until 1994
139
. However, relevant changes had been achieved since the early 1980s by the informal 
appeals of policy-makers and industrial leaders, and were propelled by the enthusiasm of 
industrial practitioners rather than the real governmental commands. From 1983 on, Sino-foreign 
productive JVs had already been established in a rush. Up to 1995, there had been 15,078 with the 
annual output at 408.8 billion RMB. For many JVs, they were not directly set up or encouraged 
by central government, but were by the regional governments or superior industrial groups. 
Followers took the TMFT framework as an advanced pattern to get rid of their weaknesses in 
management, to promote capability-building, and to increase the profitability. Many SOEs even l 
actively looked for foreign partners on their own. For example, the connection between 
Volkswagen and FAW was set up by themselves.  
Even without any governmental interference, many private enterprises also spontaneously 
followed the trends of SOEs reforms, as they just recognised these advocacies as advanced 
models in the face of the emerging competitive circumstances. For example, in the late 1990s, 
when the contract responsibility system became the mainstream, even some family-controlled 
private enterprises also implemented this system to divide authority and responsibilities of 
different business units among family cycle members
140
. Similar situations happened during late 
1990s - early 2000s. When the MBO (Management Buy Out) was broadly advocated as a new 
pattern of SOE reform, private firms also took it to direct their structure reform, and offered their 
managers large amounts of share stocks or options. Not until the spread of MBO of SOEs got 
stopped by the central government by 2005, did the MBO become popular in the Chinese 
industrial community.  
(2) Bandwagon effects of Group-B firms 
Along with the successes of Group-B firms, the diffusion horizon of their patterns gets gradually 
broadened. Firstly, the development of Group-B firms gradually changes the attitude of the 
government on them. In the telecom-equipment sector, the overwhelming success of leading 
Group-B firms against Group-A firms was the primary cause. Moreover, some MNCs did irritate 
                                                 
139 It can be kept open for the further study. At least, according to all governmental officials and researchers in my 
fieldworks, none could provide an earlier version of official documents. If there had been an earlier version, it was still 
interesting that most of the officials and researchers were not aware.  
140 For example, Fotile, namely today one leading OEM contractor of kitchen utensils and appliances in the world. In 
early years, the founder signed a contract with his WIFE in 1985 to help him supervise the firm since he travelled around 
frequently for marketing.  
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the Chinese industrial administration. They ever tried to construct their monopolistic power with 
first-mover advantage by utilising some exclusive technologies. For example, MNCs stuck to the 
ISDN-PRI (exclusive) technology instead of the No.7 Signalling System (open) technology in 
Chinese PDSS network before the early 1990s; and they kept the ABis socket in the mobile 
network locked by their proprietary technology in the late 1990s. These exclusive technologies 
brought about problems against the interconnection of Chinese telecom networks, and MNCs 
exhibited arrogance and reluctance to cooperate with Chinese. Only with the contribution of 
Group-B firms, Chinese regulator could obtain technical solutions and bargaining powers against 
MNCs. In the car-making sector, the governmental support gradually grow by seeing the 
increasing market reputation of Group-B firms, especially after the great policy controversy 
during 2004-2005. 
Then, after Group-B firms had proven their in-house capabilities, several ministries announced 
some treatments to encourage the development of Group-B firms, including taxation favourable 
treatment, loan from development banks, assistance to promote social reputation and other aids. In 
addition to bringing Group-B firms with benefits, these measures change the social recognition, 
and induce social-economic environments to bring up followers. It is to say, the pathways and the 
patterns of Group-B firms are taken as exemplary advanced models. Domestic firms followed 
them because they were enlightened, or because of their own imperfections of knowledge -- again, 
they acknowledged external good experience only within the subsets they really perceived.  
Certainly, the most important impetus for followers is the business success of Group-B firms; 
otherwise, domestic learners would not pursue losers, even in the name of indigenous 
technological development. For example, in the 1980s, there had been several domestic firms 
insisting on indigenous product development, such as Panda and Westlake in the TV set 
manufacturing industry. They ran technology-oriented strategy and followed the logic of 
―technological breakthrough →new product→ new business‖, depended on in-house R&D 
centres that were far away from the business units as for their central concerns. It was an exact 
inheritance of the command economy, by which S&T divisions were separated from production 
divisions. They were praised as exemplarity models of SOE reform by government at that time, 
but later got failure. No domestic firms imitated them; rather, the mainstream of domestic TV-set 
sector gave up indigenous product development. 
The followers of Group-B firms include new entrants, common SOEs and even Group-A firms. In 
the telecom-equipment sector, UTStarcom (China)
141
 and FiberHome could be regarded as the 
learner of Huawei, ZTE and DTT. Since Huawei is so well known in China now, even domestic 
                                                 
141 According to the structure of UTStarcom, it is an U.S. based. However, its major business, particularly in early phase, 
is located in China to provide the PHS equipment for China Telecom and Unicom.  
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firms in other sectors also aim to follow its pattern. For example, the BYD in the car-making 
sector claims to take Huawei as its model, and put the large amount of local engineers and 
researchers as the centre of its developmental strategy. In the car-making sector, GreatWall, 
ZhongXing and ZhongTai should be included as followers. HaiMa and JAC are two 
automobile-makers that have non-equity cooperation with MNCs, they also aim to reproduce 
Group-B firms‘ pattern. They recruit Group-B firm‘ personnel, visit Group-B firms for experience, 
or even ask for the governmental coordination to urge Group-B firms to open for their learning. In 
the face of social pressures for indigenous innovation, some Group-A firms also aim to imitate the 
―learning through external cooperative projects‖. Guangzhou Auto buys a chassis system from 
Fiat, and establishes cooperation with several specialised technical firms. DongFeng also tries to 
launch its own car models by outsourcing technical services. Beijing Auto even tries to buy car 
platforms from Chery and establish corresponding cooperation. However, we should stress that 
some activities of imitation may just focus on reproducing the trajectory that Group-B firms ever 
took, following the written rules summarised by Group-B firms, such as what the above Group-A 
firms do. It is far away from success in reproduce the organisational foundation of Group-B firms. 
Last but not least, the successes of Group-B firms re-construct the national innovation system. 
The supply chains brought up by them are apparently fortunes to the domestic industries. 
Moreover, their successes highlight the values of specific resources that were underestimated in 
the previous era, such as the values of well educated R&D research personnel and local research 
units. Such a change does help the domestic followers in achieving indigenous technological 
capability building although it sounds contradictory. It is because even though the values and 
prices of domestic research resources are increased, the pattern of integrating local resources for 
developmental targets provides followers a cheaper way to organise product development. It is a 
fundamental quality change, as before the emergence of Group-B firms, to develop indigenous 
systemic products was regarded as ―extremely expensive‖ by domestic community for their 
inability. In fact, because of the market-oriented reform, some public research units had been 
ignored for long. The emergence of Group-B firms is changing the cognition of domestic 
industrial community, and then re-constructing the industrial structures. The bandwagon effects 
induce investments to promote the domestic R&D personnel and research units. 
8.3 Theoretical revisit: learning and organisation in DCs 
Considering conventional literature, a series of implications have emerged through empirical 
studies on China‘s car-marking and telecom-equipment sectors. 
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8.3.1 Divergence of learning of DC firms 
The Chinese domestic firms in the two sectors we study manifested divergence in technological 
learning. The early rapid expansion of production capacities and later the growth of technological 
capabilities were led by different groups of domestic firms, although we do not mean to neglect 
the fast or even faster growth of production capacity of the latter group. This finding is new to the 
classical literature on technological learning in DCs, such as Lall (1987) and Kim (1997). In the 
conventional literature, productive firms are taken as the most important vehicles and creators of 
technological capabilities (Enos and Park, 1987; Katz, 1987; Dahlman, Ross-Lason and Westphal, 
1987; Lall, 1987; Enos, 1991) in countries that really achieve rapid industrialising ex post. 
However, which kinds of productive firms within the same national economic system can bring 
better or significant progress of learning has not been explored deliberatively. In other words, 
academics have not included the divergence of domestic producing firms into their exploration of 
technological learning, except for some of them (Hwang, 1998; Figueiredo, 2001). However, as 
revealed by our study, the difference contains the source of dynamics for the failure or success in 
technological learning. 
Again, this finding denies the definition of ―late development advantage‖ in narrow sense 
(Amsden, 1989) and its localised theory in China (such as Justin Yifu Lin, 2003). Certainly, the 
large volume of well-educated labour allows China to utilise mature technologies transferred from 
somewhere else by establishing manufacturing capacities. However, the in-house capability 
relevant to systemic product and complex technology development has not naturally happened to 
those firms if they only focus on the ―late development advantage‖. The transition task of 
capability upgrade from manufacturing to strategic technological development is achieved by 
another group of firms. Their successes do not rely on the ―copying‖ of foreign technologies, but 
rely on purposive learning associated with relevant organisational development and resource 
allocation.  
The discovery of divergence between these two groups of firms in fact support the view of Bell 
and Pavitt (1993) that the extension of production capacity does not necessarily lead to 
technological capacity in DCs. Moreover, as implied by the Sussex Manifesto (Singer et al., 1970, 
item16) earlier, development means more than a quantitative increase in production. Furthermore, 
as pointing out in our case studies, the ―technological capability‖ side, namely Group-B firms, 
also has good performance of ―production capacity‖ displays not only the difference of 
trajectories that domestic firms follow, but also at least two other important implications.  
Firstly, it obliges a re-consideration of technological capability ladders in terms of catching-up at 
firm level. On the one hand, in conventional literature, the capability-building trajectories are 
usually indicated in the bottom-up model as developing from primary capability base, namely the 
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abilities of assembling or manufacturing, to higher-level capability, namely the technical 
adjustment or improvement. On the other hand, as for the top-down model indicated by some 
literature (Q. Lu, 2000), the S&T knowledge accumulation embedded in the previous national 
innovation system is regarded as the foundation to be utilised in the later phase. However, 
experience of Group-B firms displays a different trajectory. They start building technological 
capabilities related to systemic product development from the very beginning, which means their 
capabilities relevant to product and product technology development are constructed along with 
production capacity from the inceptive stage. Meanwhile they have piped in existing S&T 
knowledge accumulated by the previous R&D division of central planning system. However, they 
did not just rely on the existing expertise system; rather, they built their knowledge core by 
in-house integration, which as we analysed is an organisational process. 
Secondly, the divergence of learning performance draws out the difference in organisational 
learning system of these firms as a better explanation. The influences from organisational systems 
on technological learning are more significant than as marginal factors. Take the relation between 
technological opportunities and latecomers‘ catching-up as an example. During the past 3 decades, 
Chinese industrial practitioners have faced a series of technological opportunities by the ex post 
perspective. For example, in the telecom-equipment sector, there were emergences of 
decentralised models of PDSS, the development of intelligent network, the optical fibre 
technology, and so on. However, every time, it was the Group-B firms who made fast response 
and mobilised their organisations in seizing these opportunities, while Group-A firms just showed 
indifferent or inabilities towards these changes. 
Organisational learning systems are the platforms to implement effective learning, but also the 
constraints against learning that they do not support. In this way, the ―organisational learning 
system‖ is a quasi governance version of Leonard-Barton‘s knowledge-based view of firm in 
explaining the core capability and core rigidity
142
 (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Comparatively, the 
concept of ―organisational learning system‖ stresses more on the resource allocation and 
application, part of which is deep into the source of values and norms of organisations. Certainly, 
as implied by such a couple of contrastive concepts, namely capability and rigidity, it also 
indicates the status of Group-A and Group-B firms could be permeable. We stress not the priority 
of particular organisational system but the correlation between technological learning and 
organisational systems. It means for good performance, the organisational learning system should 
evolve for pursuing their target of learning. Otherwise, rigidity could also destroy the established 
                                                 
142 The four dimensions  of Leonard-Barton‘s Knowledge-based view of firm includes: (1) employee knowledge and skills; 
the knowledge and skills are embedded in (2) technical systems. The processes of knowledge creation and control are 
guided by (3) managerial systems. (4) The values and norms associated with the various  types of embodied and embedded 
knowledge and with the processes of knowledge creation and control (Leonard-Barton, 1992, p113). 
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competitiveness. New targets always approach gradually which would require organisational 
change. For instance, the requirements for Group-B firms in basic research or workshop 
management for better product or processing quality might rise in order to sustain effective 
catching-up. Then the organisational learning systems, including the internal authority distribution, 
the organisational mobilisation and learning integration and the underlying values and norms, 
should respond to new requirements with corresponding evolution. As well, the organisation itself 
would get petrified. By comparison with the trend of professionalization, the organisation also has 
the trend to be petrified to some extent. For example, leading members who steer the 
organisational learning systems would have possibility to degenerate with their knowledge or 
visions, especially for the connections to front-line needs. Therefore, the driver of the 
organisational evolution might be outdated not only for the requirements new in quality, but also 
for the requirements new in quantity. Just note that in the 1950s, most Chinese backbone SOEs 
were also built by a group of innovative and aggressive young engineers, but we have seen most 
of them became laggard incumbents in the 1990s. Therefore, to keep their values or norms 
consistent with the learning requirements for new challenges, and to evolve their organisations 
accordingly are critical.  
In theory, Group-A firms could also have opportunities to catch up in technological capability. 
Especially in the car-making sector, Group-A firms have large production instalment and still 
have the advantage in reputation, marketing network and manufacturing quality. However, it 
would require the change of organisational systems, particularly their cognition and relevant 
authority distribution as primary tasks. 
8.3.2 Technological learning and organisation 
Learning has little significance in the absence of a theory of organisational knowledge (Konut and 
Zander, 1992, p386). If we place the organisation at the centre stage of technological learning 
study, the fundamental organisational problem is achieving purposeful, coordinated action from 
organisations comprising many individuals (Grant, 1996, p117). To those firms in DCs which aim 
to catching up with international frontiers, their developmental targets which ask for ―new-new‖ 
knowledge consistently oblige them to construct a smooth and efficient knowledge-generation 
flow within their organisations. Therefore, the organisational learning systems at least should 
fulfil two functions of learning, firstly to mobilise front-line practitioners to search and obtain new 
and possibly heterogeneous knowledge, and meanwhile to integrate the learning of front-line 
practitioners for collective purposes. 
Readers could think that our stress on organisational learning systems is prejudice, and argue that 
many Chinese firms did not meet difficulties of this kind as to becoming parts of global 
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production networks. That is true that by comparison with Group-B firms in number, more 
domestic firms had adopted the Group-A model. However, their processes of adaption were 
realised also associated with the SOE reform, which meant the reform of organisational learning 
systems did exist. We do not suggest the adaption of organisational systems for Group-A model 
was easy, especially if considering Group-A firms‘ difficult processes to promote the production 
localisation rate in the 1980sn. However, if readers insisted on this point, it might mean the 
organisational learning system for production localisation was comparatively less complicated to 
adopt. The underlying knowledge might be more codified, such as the Taylorism and Fordism, 
and MNCs were willing to spread the relevant knowledge (certainly not all) to China for its own 
benefits. It might also be easier for the leaders of Chinese firms to require subordinate 
organisational members to obey to particular rules, rather than to work out patterns for 
organisational mobilisation, and to generate substantial changes, particularly when considering the 
social conflicts within firms in past decades. 
Through empirical studies, we find that in early phases, Group-B firms maintain the comparative 
fusible structural organisations in realising the product and technology development tasks. This 
finding is dissimilar to common experience of large industrial enterprises in developed countries 
that underlines knowledge specialisation and organisation specialisation (Chandler, 1962, 1990, 
2005; Chandler and Hikino 2001; von Tunzelmann, 1995). By contrast, Group-B firms‘ 
experience shows that they aim to expand their knowledge scope efficiently, and have their own 
organisations mobilised across internal boundaries without sticking to the solidification of 
specialisation. They take the cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms as the major stage for 
knowledge creation and management, in addition to the professionalised units. The 
inter-departmental learning activities are endowed with authorities and resources to realise ―the 
autonomy of learning‖ under the basic organisational framework. As Nonaka and Konono (1998) 
emphasize the importance of ―Ba‖ in the process of knowledge creation, by highlighting its role in 
providing physical, virtual or mental shared spaces, the cross-boundary inter-departmental 
platforms and underlying institutions in Group-B firms exactly provide such shared spaces. With 
the platforms, engineers carry out tight interactions, share the knowledge they individually obtain 
not matter domain-specific knowledge or context-specific knowledge (Iansiti, 1998), and 
implement knowledge search, generation and accumulation from colleagues, cooperative partners 
and customers. 
Chandler (1962, 1977 and 1990) argues, by contrast with enterprises before, that the first movers 
of multi-units enterprises do not stress the direct control over their subordinate units in functions. 
They instead control the financial data, such as the return rate of assets, which is regarded as an 
important transition to realise the economies of speed. If we transplant an analogical comparison 
into the domain of technological learning, similar conclusion could come out. Group-A firms 
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control the technological learning of front-line practitioners by stressing existing technological 
exemplars. They constrain the authority, resource, interactive scope and knowledge access 
channel for the learning of front-line practitioners. By contrast, Group-B firms set free the 
developmental processes for their subordinate professionalised units and cross-boundary teams by 
providing support with resources along practical projects. They concentrate on the growth rate and 
the integration of in-house knowledge accumulation. By this way, the institutions to mobilise the 
organisation, to integrate relevant learning, and to facilitate the accumulation and diffusion of 
knowledge within their firms are at the focus of their concerns. If we consider the knowledge 
accumulation for developing systemic products and complex technologies as uneven processes in 
essence, we can find that decision-makers of Group-B firms mainly allocate their attentions to 
balance and integrate in-house learning in different fields rather than to supervise the details in 
process. By doing so, Group-B firms effectively realise high throughput of knowledge generating.  
By contrast with Group-B firms, the organisational systems of Group-A firms are unable to realise 
the high speed of knowledge creation. For their low efficiencies in knowledge creation both in 
depth and breadth, the practical pathway of Group-A firms in technological capability building is 
―YinJin LuoHou ZaiYinJin ZaiLuoHou (importing ―technologies‖ →  being backward → 
importing again → being backward again, see Liu, 2008)‖. 
The difference between these two groups of firms could be initially solidified from their early 
stages. The cornerstones were laid when they established their cognitions about the effective 
pattern of technological learning, and made the selections of organisational building in 
considering the long-term strategic aims. So considering the argument of Chandler that ―structure 
follows strategy and that the most complex type of structure is the result of the concatenation of 
several basic strategies‖ (Chandler, 1962, p14), two points must be distinguished: firstly, the 
transition of structure, to follow strategy, is not costless. It requires time, human force and other 
resource, and is related to the social and political context within enterprises. Secondly, the 
decision-makers of transitional firms have to know what the appropriate structure is. The 
―structure‖ may not be presented as simply as the implication of ―organisational layout‖ generated 
by this term. The patterns of in-house administration, coordination and cooperation, and 
underlying institutions, which buttress the exhibiting structure to be effective, may be more 
complex, ambiguous, and subtle, and may be partially non-codified regarding its underlying 
knowledge components. If firms does not have developed clear cognition about the appropriate 
structure, and could not pay off the cost of transition, structure would not automatically follow 
strategy effectively. For example, Group-A firms have to get to know the importance of 
organisational mobilisation and learning integration for effective capability-building first, and 
then develop their own knowledge and schemes about building their learning systems. Only after 
that, Group-A firms could have possibility to translate their strategy into appropriate structure. 
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The difference in cognition influences the strategy making. Take the trade-off about technological 
integration or outsourcing as an example. In the face of pressures for indigenous product 
development from the public opinion after 2005, Group-A car-makers began to outsource 
technological services, or existing technical products in the name of developing in-house product 
platforms. They claimed that purchasing the well-packaged car model or chassis systems from 
foreign providers was a better strategy to start from a higher level platform, and to avoid the 
investment in building lower level capability as what Group-B firms did in their early stages. 
However, similar to the classical comments on RBV (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), the capability of 
integration cannot be purchased in any market. Otherwise, Group-A firms should have been 
advanced in capability-building for years as they had imported advanced car models under the 
TMFT framework for long. And the Brilliant Auto should be successful in in-house capability 
building too before 2004.  
Furthermore, different cognitions and organisational learning systems also influence the 
perception about resource pricing. For example, in spite of the sustainable growth of Group-B 
firms, Group-A firms regard carrying out in-house systemic product development based on the 
capability of current domestic industry as an extremely expensive strategy. They declare that large 
production capacities, advanced-equipped laboratories and relevant instruments, large 
development teams and large financial investments are needed. By contrast, they think the way of 
importing product models from foreign partners by paying a lot of money as convenient and 
economical. In comparison to the practice of Group-B firms, different cognitions about 
technological learning leads to different perceptions about the potential costs in realising the same 
targets; or we should say potential costs are realised into de facto costs through practical 
experience, which is close related to their organisational learning systems. 
8.3.3 Historical and social connection to catching-up firms 
So how does successful catching-up of firms come about? According to the historical retrospect, 
the evolution of organisational learning systems cannot be regarded as an automatic output of 
aspirations of entrepreneurs. It is generated through interaction with social contexts. 
Garud and Rappa (1994, p359) argue that the interaction between the individual cognition at 
micro-level and the institutionalisation at macro-level unfolds technical development. 
Institutionalisation, namely the commonly accepted evaluation routines, represents a shared 
reality that strongly shapes the direction of future technological change. A similar interactive 
nexus between commonly accepted organisational patterns and individual cognition also underlies 
the evolution of organisational change, or say, the evolution of social technology. 
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The emergence of Group-A firms presented the resurgence of Fordism in Chinese industrial 
community, which was connected to the previous industrial experience and political preference 
after 1978. Along the economic reform, upper managers were authorized with more power, which 
was realised by institutional reform step by step. It was an outcome of policy-makers‘ search for 
solutions to realise rapid industrialisation. Especially after ceasing the antagonism against the 
capitalism camp, policy-makers looked forward to the productivity growth to ensure the cohesion 
of the whole society. However, the new authority was not positive in mobilising the mass, as the 
social mainstream regarded the mid- and lower-level organisation as an important source of low 
efficiency. Besides, for the actual property right reform, the state-owned assets were indeed in an 
ownerless situation in the early phase of reform. All these reasons had the upper managers of 
SOEs to the position to lead and organise reform within the enterprises. 
As to upper managers, we should not overlook that they were in theory at an opponent position 
over the corporate control against the mid- and lower-level organisation. As argued by Lu (1999) 
on Chinese experience, because the internal relationship of SOEs are highly political-based and 
the SOEs were obliged to provide a series of welfare in spite of working performance, there was 
not effective managerial control within Chinese SOEs and the authority inside was in fact 
decentralised. Granick (1960) also shares this point with the Soviet experience. Therefore, after 
being legalised with more and more authority, it was not reasonable for upper managers to give 
away some authority that they just won back against the mid- and lower-organisation. The 
expansion of upper managers‘ authority did not originate in the successful technological learning 
or interaction with the mid- and lower-level organisations, but instead sprang from the top-down 
institutional reformation. For example, the TMFT framework was a distinct package provided by 
the government with supporting policies to construct favourable environments for reformed SOEs. 
Thus in achieving developmental targets, executors of SOEs did not tend to mobilise  actively 
general organisational members, particularly considering the tension brought about by the 
distribution reform. Rather, they tended to respect resources-based factors and external forces. 
The sequence of SOE reform also strengthened the power of upper managers. Even for every step 
of reform policy-makers called on re-consideration of shortcomings in previous steps. But the 
reform sequence, namely from the command economic system, to the factory director 
responsibility system, to the enterprise contract management responsibility system, to the share- 
holding modernised corporate governance system, and even to the MBO in recent years, in fact 
continuously enhanced the authority of upper managers in depth. For example, the nominal 
―single head system‖ was removed after 1992, however the subsequent shareholding-oriented 
reform legalised the control of upper managers by property-right change. It in fact formed up the 
path dependence of reforms, by which the mid- and lower-level organisation got really attached to 
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the managers rather than the organisation. Thus, the organisation-oriented system (Dore, 1987; 
Chan, 1995) is hardly to form up. 
As for the emergence of Group-B firms, it is one generic among indigenous attempts to build 
technological capabilities when the whole industrial system was gradually placed under reform. 
This was one of organisational innovations carried out in a bottom-up manner by firms rather than 
central planners at that time. The memories about the previous patterns, and the skills 
accumulated previously, which are embedded in the domestic industrial community, associated 
with the uneven economic reform, worked as catalyst for potential heterogeneous changes. 
Bottom-up spontaneous organisational innovations happened by all kinds of means. For example, 
as mentioned, several TV set producers tried to rely on their in-house R&D centres during in the 
late 1980s; the Wuhan Diesel-Engine Factory adopted the German management system by hire 
Germany managers; the establishment of GDT was also one attempt to establish a better learning 
system by incorporating S&T institute and product innovation. However, as we demonstrated, in 
both sectors we study, there were hundreds of failed cases for such attempts. 
Therefore, the emergence of Group-B firms, including their cognition, their selection of learning 
pattern and their building of organisational systems, as one generic of above attempts, should not 
be viewed as the simple implementation of particular strategies or learning pathways in general. 
Latecomer firms are living amidst the marsh other than in the meadow if we discuss the 
knowledge about practical patterns for upward development, without mentioning their collision 
with the evolution of mainstream social cognition. So empirically speaking, the establishment of 
organisational learning patterns of Group-B firms is something innovative under great uncertainty. 
Meanwhile, their emergence also pushed the social change. 
8.3.4 First movers of indigenous capability transition 
(1) Drives of change in domestic industrial systems 
Our finding about the divergence of indigenous firms in technological learning generates a 
challenge to the perspective of global production network or global value chain (Kishimoto, 2004; 
Schmitz, 2007; Altenburg and Schmitz, 2008; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Ernst, 2005, 2007). The local 
leading firms in terms of technological capability building are not those firms engaged in or 
previously engaged as dependent in global production networks or global value chains. In fact, 
Ernst and Naughton (2007) have noticed the different behaviours of Chinese domestic firms and 
developed a three-tier analytical framework. However, they have not continued exploring the 
sources of divergence and the further impacts upon technological learning and industrial 
development. Certainly, these explanations could contingently work since it is possible in theory 
that flagship or other core firms would continuously transfer modular production tasks to 
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manufacturing firms that reside in DCs (maybe not the same country) for sustainable cost 
advantage. However, the perspective of global production networks or the global value chains 
could only interpret some phenomena of the dynamics of China‘s growth, but NOT the main-track 
in terms of quality change. Regarding the indigenous breakthrough in systemic products, complex 
technologies and relevant domestic supporting systems, the first significant moves that elevate the 
domestic capability from the capability category of the production segment to the product 
innovation segment are led and achieved by new indigenous firms. Group-B firms also actively 
employ international resources, but they implement new patterns by contrast with other domestic 
counterparts do, and take the leading position in the international value networks organised by 
them -- they are growing from inexperienced integrators to mature ones. 
More scholars even have not identified the divergence of Chinese industrial development, such as 
Nolan (2001), and many Chinese local researchers (such as Lin, 2002). Nolan stresses much the 
difficulties or even demises of Chinese industrial firms would meet when the China get into the 
tough global competition (such as join the WTO in 2001), which is right especially for SOEs 
(Nolan‘s major objects of observation) dur ing late 1990s - early 2000s. However, he is absolutely 
wrong about the dynamics of Chinese industrial development with his pessimistic prediction. The 
limitation of these scholars‘ insights resides in the neglect of the emerging economic actors in 
breadth, and the organisational and institutional change in depth. Let us consider the 
industrialisation in the 1950s, the oscillation of social relation within enterprises during the late 
1950s to late 1970s, the SOE reform from 1978, and the emergence of Group-B firms. For every 
round of changes, there emerged different major forces (i.e. the aids of USSR, the bottom-up 
efforts of SOEs, the top-down governmental encouragement and the newborn indigenous firms 
respectively). For every round, the change of organisation and underlying institutions primarily 
remodelled the cognition, selection and construction of technological learning patterns, say, the 
organisational and relevant institutional change provided the vehicle for the progress of physical 
technologies, and formed up the distinguished organisational ―revolutions‖. In this way, 
disregarding the emerging new forces and disregarding the underlying organisational and 
institutional changes has these scholars miss a fundamental main-track for understanding the 
dynamics of Chinese industries. 
(2) Role of Government and domestic S&T force 
The government‘s role is also controversial according to the case study presented in this thesis. In 
the conventional literature, it is broadly accepted that environmental factors and/or governmental 
intervention influences purposeful efforts of technological learning in industrial firms (such as 
Dahlman, Ross-Lason and Westphal, 1987). Kim (1997) gives a complex and multifaceted picture 
of the developmental government in supporting indigenous industries. In his works published in 
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2000 (Kim, 2000), he generates a more moderate view, as both positive and negative effects are 
included in his evaluation of the Korean government in promoting indigenous capability building. 
S.R. Kim and von Tunzelmann (1998) advocate the role of government in bridging internal 
networks and external networks of Taiwan‘s IT industries. Amsden and Chu (2003) consider 
Taiwan‘s government as the pump that pipes new technologies to indigenous firms so that the 
government helps firms to overcome the limitations of local networks. In other words, the 
government leads the transition of capability-building. Mathews (2007) also advocates the role of 
public ―technology leverage institutions‖ in identifying technologies and designing strategies for 
developing them locally.  
The role of the government displays a multifaceted picture in our empirical study of China. 
Chinese government plays an aggressive supportive role during in domestic industrial 
development, as distinctly demonstrated by its manipulation in providing the TMFT framework 
and pushing the reformation of SOEs. After perceiving the potentials of Group-B firms, the 
government also gives some aids; and emphasizing on indigenous innovations formally has 
become the new national strategy after 2005. However, we should not neglect that before that, 
Chinese government also did negatively on the growth of newborn indigenous firms, intentionally 
or unintentionally. The legacy of the branch-based industrial administration system and relevant 
regulations in the name for better economic performance impeded the take-off of Group-B firms 
again and again in different industries. Therefore, we should recognise that the role of government 
during the catching-up of DCs is as well a question of its cognition and capability, in addition to 
the question of aspiration and tactics. 
But here, it is clear that during the emergence of Group-B firms, the government was NOT the 
guide to their new pattern. The government did not know the proper pattern for rapid capability 
growth in advance, even though it tried all the time and even though it very possibly do not know 
clear today. In other words, the government is not the first mover to prompt the practical 
transition from production capacity to technological capability of indigenous firms.  
From another perspective, we should say in DCs, the governments are short of knowledge about 
appropriated patterns of technological learning. According to Chinese case, it manifests clear 
proves that the government also learned from the growth of Group-B firms. As we said, in the 
telecom-equipment sector, Chinese government came to realise the force of indigenous firms from 
the conflicts between Chinese regulator and MNC equipment providers on a series of 
interconnection problems. Besides, it is also possibly right that the reason for DTT to be 
transformed into competitive firm much earlier than many governmental industrial research 
institutes in other industries resides in the fact that the government had witnessed the emergence 
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of HJD-04. In the car-making sector, the government began to combine its basic research 
consignments with the practical product and technology development projects of firms. 
Similar discussion can be implemented regarding the role of domestic R&D forces. Before the 
emergence of Group-B firms, Chinese public institutes and universities had existed for decades. 
The reform after 1978 led by government had them gradually rely heavily on market transactions. 
Without any synergy, public research institutes and universities were not welcomed in the 
economy orientating the production capacity only. The intellectual forces of public institutes kept 
shrinking, since they were marginalised by the new economic system. They were the Group-B 
firms who played the roles as integrators of domestic R&D resources and promoted the 
corresponding values. 
Who are the first-movers of important transitions as for the indigenous capability building and for 
levering the corresponding national innovation system? It may not correct to draw conclusions 
from empirical study of just two sectors, as what we see might be contingencies only. However, it 
is apparently that the answer connects to the cognition of learning patterns held by actors and their 
real practices, not only resides in the quantity of resources that particular actors held and invested. 
Government, research institutes, universities, incumbent enterprises and even the flagships of 
global production networks do not have the inborn power to engender effective guidance for the 
domestic industrial community in realising catching-up. Our study on the success and influence of 
Group-B firms, namely the first-movers in the two Chinese sectors we study, directs us to stress 
on the organisational and relevant institutional development.  
8.4 Summary 
The backwardness of DCs lies not only in their physical technologies, but also in their social 
cognitions about learning and relevant translations of cognitions into organisations. Through the 
historical retrospect, we connect the social relations within enterprises to the cognitions and 
selections of Chinese firms about organisational systems. The counter-opinion to the movement of 
organisational change that raised by bottom-up forces during the late 1950s to the early 1960s 
bred the SOE reform starting from 1978, which was also underpinned by a significant political 
change. The sequence of reform, the inducements provided by government, the financial 
constraints and the negative attitudes of foreign collaborators on the building of Chinese 
indigenous technological capability jointly incentivized and framed many domestic firms to adopt 
the Group-A model. The substantial source of the failure of Group-A firms to achieve in-house 
capability building rested on the fact that their internal social relations, enhanced by relevant 
organisational systems and institutions, were incompatible with the rapid and large throughput of 
knowledge creation that was critical for developing systemic products and complex technologies. 
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Group-B firms belonged to various spontaneous organisational innovations in the domestic 
industrial community since the 1980s that aimed at technological catching-up. The previous 
learning patterns and skills embedded in Chinese society, the particular organisational cultures 
carried out by their core members, and the resource- and policy-related inducements along the 
uneven reform process cultivated their organisational development. In order to achieve high 
throughput of knowledge creation, they adopted new internal social relations, based on which 
organisations authorised front-line engineers the autonomy of learning with resource support. 
Acting as the major part of dynamics regarding technological capability building in China , 
Group-B firms were gradually perceived with their business successes by other domestic firms, 
and inspired a new round of organisational revolution.  
By this way, we see that the influence of organisational systems and underlying institutions upon 
technological learning is far beyond the general description as simply the organisational structure, 
the resource investor, the vehicle of human force, or the executor of strategy or tactics. For better 
understanding about the technological capability building process in DCs, there are still a long set 
of logics for us to explore, including the historical and social contexts, the cognitive development 
of domestic practitioners, the relevant social relations within enterprises, the selections and 
constructions of organisations, the resource allocation and application of firms, the 
implementation of learning strategies, etc. What we have shed light on in this thesis are only parts 
of these logics. 
Anyway, consider the organisational and institutional connections to technological learning and 
industrial development in DCs, as Schumpeter (1943, p84) points out, ―the problem that is usually 
being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is 
how it creates and destroys them‖. How the cognitions and organisational systems are generally 
changed should be taken as a key question of development study. Abramovitz (1989, p222), from 
another perspective, throws light on, ―a country's potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is 
backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially 
advanced‖. Social technologies should be promoted alongside physical technologies (Nelson, 
2008). To industrial practitioners, researchers and policy-makers, the dynamic interaction between 
organisational systems and learning strategy should be placed in one part of centre-stage of their 
consideration. The relationship between the social relations within enterprises and the 
organisational learning systems, and their roots in society, also demand studies from 
policy-makers. Chinese should really do this if their want to develop their country beyond the 
―world‘s factory‖. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
Regarding the technological learning of firms, relevant organisations do matter, which has been 
broadly recognised since organisations act as vehicles for learning. Nevertheless, how the 
organisations work during the process of learning, and how significant ly the organisations act in 
the way suggested, remain questionable.  
Particularly when considering the backwardness of DC firms in terms of lacking experience about 
appropriate learning patterns, and considering the requirements of effective catching-up for the 
continual acquisition of new knowledge, the organisational configuration of learners emerges as a 
necessary question to explore.  
Through the empirical study of Chinese car-making and telecom-equipment sectors, we open up 
the process of knowledge search, generation and accumulation of the studied firms, and assess the 
role of the organisational learning system therein. We confirm that the organisational learning 
system plays several important roles in the processes of knowledge creation of firms. The 
differences in terms of organisational learning systems among indigenous firms bring to light the 
differentiated performances of technological learning. 
9.2 Reviewing the research question 
The primary research question of this thesis is ―How can local firms in DCs like China develop 
their organisations to attain product technologies?‖ In terms of developing product technologies, 
we refer to the capabilities of generating and managing technological change related to systemic 
products and relevant complex technologies with strategic significance. Behind the central 
research question, we have a key argument that the organisational systems of industrial firms in 
DCs play fundamental roles for their technological learning. The empirical comparisons between 
the two groups of firms provide us the foundation for theoretical exploration, and we have set up 
two hypotheses to examine. 
Firstly, we suppose there are significant differences in organisations between the Group-A firms 
and the Group-B firms, namely two groups exhibiting dissimilar performances in building their 
technological capabilities. We confirm this hypothesis by studying four major components of their 
organisational learning systems, namely the strategic intent, the authority over resource allocation, 
the patterns of organisational mobilisation and learning integration, and the facilities and 
institutions for knowledge accumulation. Regarding the strategic intent, we cannot develop an 
effective quantitative instrument, particularly when considering that the two groups of firms both 
always shared similar starting configurations of intent to develop indigenous technological 
capabilities. However, based on observation of their long-term activities, we can differentiate the 
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evolution of their strategic intent by qualitative analysis. As for the other three components of 
organisational learning systems, we get striking contrasts between these two groups of firms.  
The second hypothesis is that the organisational differences observed are deeply involved in the 
processes of knowledge creation of firms. We confirm this hypothesis through a detailed study of 
Group-B firms‘ mechanisms of knowledge search, generation and accumulation in their early 
stages. Certainly, we cannot cover all aspects of the knowledge creation processes, but we choose 
to highlight three mechanisms that were essential (according to our investigation) to Group-B 
firms, namely learning through recruitment, learning through external cooperative projects and 
learning through interactions with customers. Our study reveals that in Group-B firms the 
organisational arrangements actually provided practitioners with autonomy of learning, and 
provided relevant platforms to facilitate or filter their learning activities. 
In the following subsections, brief summaries of analyses about the components of an 
organisational learning system are presented. 
9.2.1 Differences in organisational learning systems 
(1) Strategic intent 
Regarding the strategic intent to build up technological capability, all of the indigenous firms we 
study always had such intent. The TMFT framework that in fact brought on the Group-A firms 
had an articulated target to promote indigenous technological capabilities through close learning 
from foreign collaborators. Nevertheless, because of the governmental inducements, the foreign 
partner attitudes and the financial concerns, Group-A firms had not placed the in-house 
technological learning for systemic product and complex technology development at the centre of 
collective learning along with the production localisation. In addition, their organisational systems 
proved to be inconvenient for rapid and large throughput knowledge creation. Thereby, they had 
not actualised this original intent into organisational practices, and were gradually captured by the 
benefits from being manufacturing bases of global production networks. 
By contrast, Group-B firms insisted on their intent to build up in-house technological capability. 
They consistently invested in projects related to the development of systemic products and 
complex product technologies, despite the difficulties associated with tight resources in their early 
phases. In their early stages, Group-B firms took these projects as centres for organising their 
relevant investments and learning activities. 
(2) Authority over resource allocation 
Group-A firms were dominated by managers and engineers who grew up from manufacturing, 
marketing, financial, or even political work divisions. Even though some Group-A firms had 
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experience related to systemic product development before they adapted themselves to the TMFT 
framework, relevant product development engineers had little voice on top committees. Such a 
situation could be attributed to the stresses on production localisation, the historical legacies as 
ever influenced by the USSR factory model and the comparative disadvantage of in-house 
development engineers by comparing their foreign experts, and so on. 
Top management committees of Group-B firms were dominated by people with backgrounds in 
developmental activities, especially the activities of product or product technology development. 
Such a tradition originated from the product-oriented competitive strategy held by Group-B firms, 
and was influenced by the legacies of their founding teams. 
With regard to the distinctive differences on top committees of these two Groups, we can see that 
their strategic resources were allocated in dissimilar ways. In Group-A firms, without effective 
mechanisms to communicate with developmental engineers, it was difficult for top committees to 
understand the requirements related to development of systemic products and complex product 
technologies. However given the growth of production capacity and the cooperation with giant 
MNCs, the committees did think they knew very well about how to develop in-house 
technological capabilities. Consequently, what we can see was not that Group-A firms had never 
invested in R&D. Rather, Group-A firms always invested R&D funds in the places that they 
thought to be right. In Group-B firms, along with the leading role of developmental engineers in 
the authority structure, there were in-depth interactions between top managers and practical 
developers to facilitate the decision-making. The force of developmental engineers led the 
allocation of strategic resources and the scheduling of relevant projects. In fact, supported by the 
patterns of organisational mobilisation and learning integration, some resources for developmental 
projects were entrusted to front-line participant units, by which practitioners could respond to the 
requirements emerging from developmental processes in real time. 
(3) Patterns of organisational mobilisation and le arning integration 
Since the prior target of Group-A firms was to imitate the existing imported technological 
blueprints and relevant methods of implementation, they established highly professional but rigid 
organisational systems. The tasks of production localisation were divided into specialised pieces, 
taken on by different units at different levels. Within such a system, front-line practitioners were 
discouraged to be mobilised or to generate heterodox thinking. Rather, chiefs of units worked as 
gatekeepers of knowledge conversion to regulate the target and ensure efficiency. Except for 
irregular projects, the communication scopes of common engineers were restricted within their 
units, which were applicable to both the production-relevant units and R&D-relevant units. 
Group-B firms had been carrying out complete sets of developmental activities in-house, and had 
placed the development of systemic products and relevant technologies at the centre of resource 
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mobilisation and task scheduling. Significant shares of the learning activities were carried out on 
cross-boundary inter-departmental platforms. The communication scopes of front-line engineers 
were broadened to include general relevant units; the levels of communication had also been 
deepened by which relevant co-operators could interact on in-progress developmental activities on 
each side. With supportive resources, front-line practitioners were encouraged to mobilise relevant 
units and co-operators according to the needs emerging from knowledge creation in real time. The 
processes of knowledge search, generation and accumulation were supervised by a series of basic 
institutional frameworks only, e.g. the scheduling, the intensive interactions, the on-site discussion, 
and the regulation for knowledge submission, etc., which were essentially aiming at supervising 
the speed and the integration of knowledge creation, rather than supervising the detailed contents 
of learning.  
(4) Facilities and underlying institutions for knowledge accumulation 
There was no comprehensive knowledge database in Group-A firms. Group-A firms did not even 
have complete sets of blueprints of imported product models. Knowledge accumulation was 
dominated by chiefs at different levels. The chiefs and professional assistant members worked as 
producers and key-keepers of knowledge databases. The knowledge accumulated was delivered to 
common members in forms such as manuals or regulations for production or development 
operations; these outcomes (i.e. the manuals or regulations) being updated only after periods of 
years. For some cases, the manuals were no more than translated versions of original foreign 
manuals. The lack of active comprehensive knowledge databases restrained the processes of 
knowledge conversion within Group-A firms. 
Group-B firms had established comprehensive knowledge databases in addition to departmental 
databases. Associated with developmental projects, organisational members were regulated and 
encouraged to contribute their learning outcomes to collective databases; Group-B firms also 
raised a series of specific programmes to enhance the speed, the quantity and the quality of 
knowledge accumulation. As for application of the databases, under some basic regulations, 
members in general could access the knowledge databases to consult, revise, upgrade, and apply 
the knowledge accumulated. In fact, as the knowledge databases of Group-B firms were built in a 
highly interactive and active manner of front-line learners, the databases actually acted as 
important physical platforms for developers to carry out projects and technological learning.  
We list the comparisons of organisational learning systems between these two groups of firms in 
Figure 9.1. 
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Figure 9.1: Differences of organisational learning systems 
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9.2.2 Organisational learning systems and knowledge accumulation 
The relations between the organisational learning system and the processes of DC firms in 
carrying out knowledge search, generation, and accumulation have also been examined. The 
hypothesis is confirmed that the knowledge creation processes in Group-B firms were closely 
related to the differences of their organisational learning systems by contrast with those of 
Group-A firms. 
(1) Learning through recruitment 
From existing knowledge carried by individuals, the organisational learning systems of Group-B 
firms provided platforms for individuals to generate mutual understanding of one another along 
with developmental practices. Such processes brought about combinative understandings that 
were new to their firms or even to the domestic industry community. The above platforms, based 
on the intensive interactions of their members, were also important to bring on junior engineers 
who were large in number, and were important for realising the learning strategies of Group-B 
firms. During the learning through recruitment process, the authority over resource allocation 
assured the funding for practical projects which acted as practical vehicles for interactive 
activities; the organisational mobilisation and learning integration provided institutional ties for 
bringing about mutual understanding and further knowledge based on collective efforts; the 
knowledge databases worked as facilities to propel knowledge diffusion which also enhanced 
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interactions. 
Meanwhile, the organisational learning system also worked as the filter to direct collective 
learning. If the contents or mechanisms of knowledgeable advocacies were incompatible to the 
absorptive capacities or the underlying platforms of firms, such advocacies would be excluded by 
the organisational learning system. The failure of ―returnee stars‖ exactly exhibited this point. 
(2) Learning through external cooperative projects 
To transfer knowledge from external knowledge highland inward and to create new knowledge 
through external cooperation purposefully were important for building capabilities in Group-B 
firms. The organisational learning system worked as both propellers and filters during these 
processes. Firstly, the strategic intent and authority armed the involved teams with resource and 
authority support to learn from external co-operators. The organisational system provided support 
as fast responses with multiple technological competences for delegate teams to search and 
develop knowledge on-site. With efficient and in-depth communication, the home base could also 
relay the knowledge search by catching the contingent contexts of knowledgeable threads over 
distance. Knowledge databases were necessary for such a mood of communication and collective 
learning that involved multiple departments and teams. Besides, fast responses and effective 
interactions among participants units were also critical for avoiding the learning activities from 
being directed towards attempts much beyond the in-house absorptive capacities. 
(3) Learning through interactions with customers 
Learning through interactions with customers needed to be accomplished by the integrations of 
three organisational parts: forward customer service teams, home-base product development 
teams and specialised R&D departments. The strategic intent and authority over resource 
allocation of Group-B firms ensured that not only the processing technology development but also 
the product technology development were put into the foreground for serving customers. The 
patterns of organisational mobilisation and learning integration generated fast responses and 
support, which were provided with multiple technological competences by home-based teams and 
departments, for the forward teams to realise problem solving and knowledge creation through 
their interactions with customers on-site. Knowledge databases were obviously important for 
keeping communication and preserving knowledge linkages among different parts of the 
organisation during such processes. 
For all three mechanisms, the social relations within their organisations prompt decision-makers 
to rely on front-line practitioners in the search, generation and accumulation of knowledge, for 
which resources were partly entrusted to the front-line. Therefore, engineers had comparative 
autonomy to cope with the complexities emerging in real time, which might be located in 
interaction with colleagues, in working with external co-operators, or in on-site customer service. 
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9.3 Original contribution of this research 
As mentioned previously, our research is constructed from a critical inheritance of ―assimilation 
theories‖. The contribution of this research then primarily resides in the criticisms and further 
development we have made in this thesis, by comparison with those theories.  
Compared with orthodox assimilation theories, a primary contribution of this research lies in its 
advocacy of emphasizing that organisational change ought to be at the heart of research ino 
technological learning in China. First of all, through the empirical studies of two Chinese sectors, 
we present some new findings. By contrast with the conventional ‗ladders‘ in the literature 
depicting the processes of capability building of DC firms, we emphasize continual progress of 
capability building based on particular organisational systems, as described in Figure 7.3. There 
are differences between firms in terms of capability building, by which different groups of 
Chinese firms can be mapped into different steps of the ‗ladder‘ of the conventional literature. 
However, our study reveals that it is differences of organisational construction other than other 
time-dimension ladders that lead to the notable distinction of capability building. That is to say, 
emergence of in-house technological capability is not certainly the next step of development of 
the Group-A firms, as the Group-B firms had not been obsessed by what the Group-A firms kept 
doing in the past three decades. Furthermore, considering the significance of the organisational 
differences among firms and also how such changes go along with China‘s development over a 
longer span of time, our research implies that, even under a particular techno-social paradigm, the 
process of technological catching-up in DCs can possibly be driven by organisational changes in a 
discontinuous manner. The essential distinctions of technological learning between generations of 
firms are mainly framed by their organisations. 
Therefore, as regards the research community concerning technological learning in DCs, a 
primary contribution of this research is to locate the organisational changes at the centre of 
research. We present an analytical framework of the organisational learning system, examine it by 
a comparative study between the two groups of firms, and attest to its robustness by studying the 
detailed learning processes of Group-B firms. The framework is not the first to explore the 
organisational elements on the topic of competitiveness at firm level, when referring to the works 
of some forerunners (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992). Ours also has not covered every aspect of organisation. However, it is a 
new set for studying organisations in the circumstance of DCs with a purposeful target of 
technological catching-up; particularly it focuses on the continual needs of DC firms to obtain 
new knowledge for realising sustainable capability building.  
Our emphasis on organisational systems of learners challenges the traditional views that mainly 
stress the implementations of learning, resource-centred investments and strategy-making in 
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choosing directions or trajectories, in studying capability building by DC firms. Our discoveries 
also challenge the popular application of ―absorptive capacity‖ based on in-house R&D and 
generic investments. Instead it indicates that, even with intensive governmental support, 
comparatively large resources, and comparatively high absolute amounts of R&D investment, 
Chinese Group-A firms still fail to achieve their original intent to build technological capabilities. 
That is to say, even with purposeful learning plans and strategies, some advantage of resources 
would not definitely bring about efficiency of learning.  
In emphasizing the organisational learning system, we do not mean to demote the significance of 
resources, strategy, learning implementation and global connections of DC firms during their 
catching-up. We also do not deny some firms that have been studied by scholars with 
conventional assimilation theories did succeed through the trajectories described by those scholars, 
e.g. the Korean firms in Kim (1997). Rather, we are questioning the logical robustness between 
the measures developed and the phenomena explained. We severely lack substantial evidence that 
only the quantitative advance of technological expertise could bring about step-phase transitions 
of capability building. Our doubt is strengthened by considering the extent of divergence among 
DC firms. Large numbers of DC firms deviate from sustainable capability growth or fail outright, 
but resource-centred projects for learning are/were popularly implemented by them all along, 
which have/had not secured their learning performances universally. Therefore, we should be 
seriously cautious about the explanation we adopt and the phenomena we interpret, especially if 
we aim to generate beyond contingent or ex post explanations of the phenomena observed. Even 
for interpreting successful cases, being short of insights about qualitative changes, researchers 
usually have to take the discontinuity of product to manifest the discontinuity of technological 
capability (Pavitt, 1998), or equate the discontinuity of equipment implementation or cooperation 
with foreign partners to the upgrading of capability. It is a fundamental limitation of the RBV 
approach that relevant explanations are obsessed by resource-consuming processes, which 
generate the services directly and contribute to their contingent essence of interpretative power. 
But here we do not suggest the priority of particular organisational structures. Rather, industrial 
firms should adjust their organisational systems dynamically according to evolution of learning 
targets and external circumstances. Considering the practical inertia and rigidities of organisations, 
a deduction can be drawn that the processes of technological catching-up by DCs are not likely to 
be achieved continuously by some fixed industrial firms unless the firms are too big to fail, or the 
firms are robust enough in financial capability or market power to survive internal organisational 
transitions, such as the Chaebols in Korea and the Zaibatsus in Japan, possibly.  
The source of potential discontinuities of catching-up processes, whether in terms of the change of 
organisational systems or the change of organisational bodies, originates from the tensions 
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between the complexity involved in capability building and the limited knowledge of DC 
practitioners; besides, organisations of firms have roots in social cognition, which contribute to 
their rigidity in addition to their essential inertia. Therefore, as latecomers, DC firms are not just 
20 metres behind the starting line of counterparts in developed countries, if we compare the 
situation to a running competition; they are standing in a totally different lane. Just quantitative 
change is then insufficient to realise substantial catching-up. Many popular explanations about 
how DC firms acquire specific knowledge from the technological highlands, or how DC firms 
have their employees trained by foreign experts, or how much such firms invest in specific 
technical domains, etc., help with understanding quantitative change of DC firms in their existing 
frameworks of knowledge creation. To study the emergence of practices for building capabilities 
in a new category, qualitative growth, namely the change to learning to organise and of underlying 
institutional elements, should be located at the centre of the research. Research into quantitative 
change could be framed and reinforced by such understanding of qualitative changes. 
But, again, for DC firms, this ‗scarcity‘ is applicable not only to knowledge about appropriate 
organisational patterns, but also to that about changes of organisational systems and underlying 
institutions as processes to realise the appropriate organisational patterns. To explore how they 
develop the cognition or organisational patterns, we are obliged to investigate the social and 
institutional changes, and to open a perspective of the techno-social paradigm. 
Regarding the literature focusing on organisational learning, our empirical study also suggests a 
concept of ―economies of speed in knowledge creation‖, which at this early stage is still a 
rudimentary, theoretical attempt. The speed of knowledge creation is important because the 
contexts relevant to knowledge or threads of knowledge would be comparatively unstable, as they 
embody loci and relationships of factors and participants. These contexts of knowledge creation 
may need to be explored promptly; otherwise, some factors, participants and relations would 
change soon or vanish. Such a feature of technological learning should be highlighted for DC 
firms since they are generally short of experience related to the generic new knowledge that they 
are seeking, including systemic knowledge and specialised knowledge. Such a situation increases 
their difficulties in reproducing the contexts of knowledge creation, and accelerates the vanishing 
speed of knowledge creation contexts for them. So in many cases, to realise the economies of 
speed in knowledge creation requires organisational integration of firms that can construct a 
foundation of multiple disciplinary competences and relevant authority. Moreover, the 
catching-up tasks of DC firms enhance the requirements for them to speed up knowledge creation: 
they not only need to acquire and assimilate the knowledge not new to the global community but 
new to their local contexts in order to close the existing capability gap with the frontiers, but also 
need to create new knowledge to compete against international rivals, gain sustainability and 
close the dynamic capability gap. 
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In response to the speed economies of knowledge creation, we develop a concept of ―autonomy of 
learning‖ based on the practices of Group-B firms. Front-line units for developmental tasks in 
Group-B firms are not supervised by higher authorities for their detailed contents of learning, but 
only for the dimensions of speed, integration, submission, etc. To achieve such autonomy, some 
requisite resources must be entrusted to front-line units, and the front-line practitioners must be 
authorised with the rights to mobilise relevant co-operators and knowledge accumulation 
(databases) according to the challenges emerging from developmental process in real time. Again, 
these preconditions suggest the importance of organisational learning systems. 
As regards the study of sectoral innovation systems, this thesis provides a historical and detailed 
study of two Chinese industries. We demonstrate the historical and organisational sources of the 
divergent development of firms, and explain the special developmental pattern of Group-B firms. 
This enriches the empirical studies of the research community.  
9.4 Implication for policy-makers and industrial practitioners 
As we implied, the government is also a learner during the catching-up of industries of its country, 
and Chinese government has not exhibited satisfactory performances by its policy outcomes as 
Group-A firms had not achieved or even close to the original target of indigenous technological 
capability growth. In various industries, the growth of Group-B firms that causes disruptive 
changes of the domestic industrial systems is mostly, if not all, out of the schemes of policy- 
makers, as policy-makers even tried to hinder Group-B firms when they supported Group-A firms 
with profitable business models. The contradiction between the outcome and the scheme of 
policy-makers indicates the underlying limitation of their cognitions and capabilities. 
If turning back to the linear model of technological learning ever held by the Chinese government , 
it can be seen policy-makers did not realise clearly the distinction between production capacity 
and technological capability for most of time. They thought the indigenous technological 
capability could grow automatically along with the production localisation of components or 
products. The neglect of the relation between the organisational systems and the technological 
learning underlies their linear model, and they took the advocacy of MNCs as advanced models 
for Chinese firms to follow but with aims to be effective product developers rather than 
manufacturing plants only. Besides, the government also gave wrong inducement to its backbone 
SOEs. The business model based on TMFT framework incentivized Group-A firms to stretch their 
production capacity rather than to risk technological development related to systemic products 
and complex technologies. When the TMFT business model continuously generated satisfaction 
for Group-A firms only by the growth of production capacity, Chinese government had not 
adjusted the policy packages in time. Its inertia and underlying lack of relevant depressed the 
potentials of industries to carry out any significant changes to realise the original targets. 
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Therefore, Chinese policy-makers should primarily update their views and knowledge about 
learning. The advancement of capability-building should not be identified by the products 
manufactured or by the quantity of R&D investments only, but should be identified by the 
mainstream organisational activities implemented by domestic firms. Particularly after China 
claimed the new national strategy favouring the indigenous innovations and the quality of growth 
in 2005, the concern about effective organisational learning system should be stressed to avoid 
potential abuses. For example, some domestic firms raised unrealistic targets of technical 
exploration by investing in marginal projects and hid their reluctance in making quality change. 
Some MNCs advised to indentify the capability-building by the products related to high-tech 
activities (such as the debugging for software development). More tricks of this kind d id happen 
after 2005.  
The legacy of previous TMFT inducement should be laid off or should be appropriate revised in 
considering the current production capacities in corresponding industries. Rather, as the progress 
of capability-building requires the evolution of organisational learning systems, which as 
simplified, embodies as the intra-organisational linkages of resource allocation, application, and 
information channels, and so on, relevant successful experiences should be incentivized as 
exemplar by the government in projects it directly involved. If the government has organised 
sufficient competences of analysis, policy-makers could even try to codify the experience of 
exemplary cases. Then the government could enhance its own capabilities to understand of 
technological learning process, and spread to a broader domestic scope. Besides, as for the basic 
or long-term research, the government should not provide incentives to firms and stop carrying 
out nominal ―cooperative‖ projects that indeed heavily reside in participant firms. On the contrary, 
Chinese government should rebuild its governmental R&D division, which would be specialised 
in basic and long-term research but follow the new way of administration: the scope of domain 
involved should mirror the integration of multiple-discipline knowledge as the responding 
industry does. By doing so, the government can accumulate more relevant knowledge about the 
industries, cultivate the reserves for top-level human resources, and help the industries to 
overcome critical technical problems.  
However, the cognitive limitation of government and industrial practitioners does not only come 
from their strategy, but also from the social relation foundation. As pointed out by F. Lu (1999, 
2000), the lack of managerial control for the tight political relations among different level of 
people within Chinese firms under the socialism configuration was the source of low efficiency at 
that time. However, during the economic reform, the social relationship within enterprises was not 
deliberately changed to get rid of the weakness as supposing the reformer knew clearly the 
problem. Rather, the efficiencies, disciplines, subjective initiative and creativities of mid- and 
lower-level organisation were simply blamed and quenched, and the reform of firms in fact relied 
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mostly on upper managers. The control held by managers was rebuilt by depriving the negotiation 
power from the mid- and lower-organisation over the skill, production and development 
processes. 
9.5 Further topics to explore 
In this thesis, it is stressed that organisational learning patterns work a critical role in the 
technological learning of catching-up firms. However, as our framework might miss other critical 
components of organisational learning system, this concept is worth further exploration. Further 
studies, which are based on empirical research in other industries, in other countries and under 
other temporal circumstances, are helpful to criticise and complete the framework. More light 
should be shed on the sources of organisational learning systems of Group-B firms. For example, 
how did the founding members of Group-B firms develop their cognitions about effective 
technological learning which were different from the mainstream at that time, and how did they 
allow the new social relation develop within their organisations?  
Other actors involved in the catching-up processes of DC firms should also be studied by 
analytical frameworks centring their learning mechanisms, such as the government and the 
governmental research units, as we see they are far away from having perfect knowledge about 
learning as well. So during the processes of technological catching-up of related industrial firms, 
how do these actors, such as the central government, obtain information, cause internal cognitive 
shifts and raise in-house organisational changes to cope with the external challenges?  
Certainly, according to our experience, the analytical frameworks for the learning processes of 
these actors should be placed under historical contexts. To explore the historical and social 
connections to their cognitive and organisational changes is another big task to do. 
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Appendix 
Appendix-1 The Neglect of in-house Product Development of Group-A Firms 
Table A-1.1 The neglect of existing in-house product platform of group-A Firms  
Table A-1.2 New systemic products developed by Group-A firms under TMFT policy (-- 2004) 
 
Firm (time of 
1st JV set-up) 
Car model Note 
FAW (1991--) RedFlag 
(1958-1994) 
RedFlag is regarded as the national car for its signif icance of social 
identification. During 1958-1994, there were two generations and 7 models 
developed for mass production, and more models for experiment and special 
use. Since 1994, RedFlag was transplanted onto the platform of Audi 100 
C3-GP for mass market, and onto the Lincoln-TownCar for high-end market. 
DongFeng 
(1992--) 
None DongFeng was the 2nd largest truck provider before setting up relevant JVs.  
SAIC (1985--) Shanghai 
(1958-1991) 
The production of Shanghai was finally stopped in 1991. 
Beijing Auto 
(1983--) 
BJ212 
(1964-2001) 
BJ212 contributed 90% profits to the Beijing-AMC/Chrysler before the mid 
1990s, got an upgrade for the bodywork only in 1993. 
Firm New Model of Product Note 
FAW SanKouLe 
HongTa 
SanKouLe was developed by a group of engineers spontaneously 
without official support of FAW; HongTa was developed by a 
regional branch focusing on truck division. There was no official 
connection to the headquarters of the car division of FAW in 
technology. Neither SanKouLe nor HongTa had been produced 
by large batches. 
DongFeng XiaoWangZi This was developed by a service subsidiary of DongFeng Group 
without any formal connection to the automobile divis ions of 
DongFeng; It had been produced only by small batches. 
SAIC QiLin, Phoenix, KunPeng All the three were developed by PATAC. They were concept cars 
only and were not engineering industrialised for the mass 
production. 
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Appendix-2 “Indigenous” Product Development Projects Claimed by Group-A firms after 
2004 
Table A-2.1 New “Indigenous” Products of Group-A firms after 2004 
Note: *Ricardo2010 was founded by Ricardo in 2005 at Leamington, UK, with 100% of the fees 
provided by SAIC, which aims to recruit experienced engineers from Rover and serve the outsourced 
projects of SAIC only. SAIC set up the SAIC Overseas R&D Centre (Europe) in the same building as 
Ricardo2010 is in. However, except for the duties of the administration staff, all the development tasks 
are carried out by Ricardo2010. In 2007, SAIC officials acquired Ricardo2010 and renamed it as the UK 
Technical Centre Limited, SAIC Motor. There are 200 experienced engineers at this centre. Among the 
engineers, 150 are non-Chinese, 80% of who were former employees of Rover (data from 2006). 
 
Appendix-3 Comparison of developmental activities (car-making sector) 
Car model Contractor & Tech source Notes 
FAW   
C301 
(Besturn) 
Styling & Bodywork: 
Italdesign, Italy;  
Chassis: Mazda (Mazda-6, 
or Ford CD3) 
Launched in market in 2006 
HQ3 
(RedFlag)  
Platform: Toyota 
(Grown-Majesta 2004 v.) 
Launched in market in 2006; based on the 
Grown-Majesta (2004 v.), only a few adjustments of 
bodywork were made. 
HQE 
(RedFlag)  
Whole car development: 
Toyota 
Launched in 2009 for small batch high-end market; the 
development was led by a Japanese firms in Japan. 
SAIC   
SsangYong 
series SUVs  
Whole car: SsangYong, 
Korea 
This series includes the platforms of Rexton II, Kyron, 
Actyon, Rodius etc.; SAIC acquired 48.9% share of 
SsangYong in 2004. 
Roewe-750 
series 
Platform: Rover (Rover-75); 
Adjustment: Ricardo2010* 
Only marginal adjustments of styling and bodywork had 
been made, which were carried out by Ricardo2010.  
SAIC bought the Rover-75, Rover-25 and all Rover 
engine blueprints in 2004; in 2007, SAIC acquired 
Nanjing Auto. Then, it got all rest assets of Rover, 
including the brand and factories in Longbridge, UK.;  
Launched in 2007. 
Roewe-550 Platform: Ricardo2010, 
R&D centre of SAIC in 
Shanghai; 
Styling and bodywork 
(partly): Bertone, Italy 
 
The platform was inherited from the Rover-RDX60 
project, which was started in 2000 by Rover to provide an 
upgraded platform to replace Rover-25, Rover-45 and 
MG series. The project was stopped for bankruptcy of 
Rover and restarted for the takeover of SAIC. 
The development tasks were mainly implemented by 
Ricardo2010; Styling and bodywork designs were 
outsourced from Bertone. SAIC Shanghai R&D Centre 
assisted for the Chinese elements in bodywork design.  
Launch in 2008 
MG series 
(MG-TF, 
MG7 & 
MG3SW) 
Platform: MG-Rover The series were produced by Nanjing Auto.  
Launched in 2007. 
Figure A-3.1 Comparison of developmental activities (car-making sector)  
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Appendix-4 Continuously setting up Sino-foreign JVs by Group-A firms 
Table A-4.1 Continuously setting up Sino-foreign JVs by Group-A firms  
Year 0 engaged by TMFT Year 0 – Year 5 Year 5 – Year 10 Year 10 – Year 20 Year 20 -- 
FAW   The last date of JVs: 2041 
1988 1988-1993 1993-1998 1998-2008 2008 -- 
1988, importing technologies 
of Audi-100; (CKD assembly) 
1991, Setting up JV with 
Volkswagen for 25 years 
1998, setting up 
Sichuan-FAW-Toyota for 30 
years. 
2000, setting up FAW-Toyota  
for 30 years 
2002, extending the JV contract 
with Volkswagen for another 25 
years 
2004, setting up productive 
cooperation with Mazda 
(FAW-Hainan-Mazda) 
2005, setting up another 
productive cooperation with 
Mazda (FAW-Mazda) 
N/A 
SAIC   The last date of JVs: 2030 
1983 1983-1988 1988-1993 1993-2003 2003 -- 
1983, Importing technologies 
of Santana (CKD assembly) 
1985, setting up JV with 
Volkswagen for 25 years 
 1997, setting up JV with GM for 
30 years 
2002, extending the JV contract with 
Volkswagen for another 20 years 
2002, setting up another JV with GM 
(SAIC-GM-WuLing) 
DongFeng   The last date of JVs: 2053 
1992  1992-1997 1997-2002 2002-2012 2012 -- 
1992, setting up JV with 
Citroen 
1997, Setting up JV with Honda 
(Guangzhou-DongFeng-Honda)  
2001, setting up JV with Kia 
(DongFeng-YueDa-Kia) for 30 
2003, setting up another JV with 
Honda (DongFeng-Honda); 
N/A 
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years 
2002, upgrading the JV with 
Citroen to be DongFeng-PSA 
2003, setting up JV with Nissan 
for 50 years 
Beijing Auto   The last date of JVs: 2035 
1984  1984-1989 1989-1994 1994-2004 2004 -- 
1984, setting up JV with AMC 1987, upgrading Beijing-AMC to 
be Beijing-Chrysler (JV) 
 2002, setting up JV with Hyundai 
(Beijing-Hyundai) for 30 years 
2005, ending the Beijing-Chrysler, setting 
up a new JV (Beijing-Benz-Chrysler) for 
30 years 
Guangzhou Auto   The last date of JVs: 2034 
1985  1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2005 2005 -- 
1985, setting up JV with 
Peugeot 
  1997, ending 
Guangzhou-Peugeot; turning into 
a JV with Honda 
(Guangzhou-DongFeng-Honda) 
1998, setting up another JV with 
Honda (Guangzhou Honda) for 
30 years 
2004, setting up JV with Toyota 
(Guangzhou-Toyota) for 30 years 
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Appendix-5: Different stages of product development in Group-B firms 
Figure A-5.1 Planning Stage of product development in Group-B firms  
 
Note: Only the development of styling is highlighted with details in this picture.  
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Figure A-5.2 Technical Development Stage of product development in Group-B firms 
 
Note:* Only the developing of body-engineering is highlighted with details.  
**A-Surfaces mean the exterior faces of bodywork. 
Figure A-5.3 Industrialisation Stage of product development in Group-B firms  
 
Note: Only the developing of body-engineering is highlighted with details 
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List of Interviewees 
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NAME  TITLE ORGANISATION NOTE 
AN Jin Vice Chairman; General Manager JAC  
AN CongHui Director of Board; Vice President; General Manager  Geely Hld.  
BAO QunLi Engineer, CAD Centre Geely Hld.  
CAO XiaoRong Director, General Management Office Chery Auto.  
CAO ShuMin Vice President; Professorial Engineer 
China Academy of 
Telecom Research, MII  
CAO Du 
Director, Exterior & Interior Accessory Tech. Committee; Deputy 
Director, Commercial Vehicle Product Development Institute Chery Auto.  
CAO 
XiangYin
g 
Deputy Chief, Broadband Access Tech. & Product, Central R&D 
Department Huawei Tech.  
CHE HaiPing Senior Vice President; Director, Software Engineering Division  Huawei Tech.  
CHEN Hao Engineer, Commercial Vehicle Product Development Institute Chery Auto.  
CHEN Jesse President ATECH Automotive ATECH is co-invested by Chery 
CHEN Jian 
Professor; Deputy Dean of Mechanical & Automotive Engineering 
School HeFei Univ. of Tech.  
CHEN JinQiao Director, Telecoms Policy Research Institute 
China Academy of 
Telecom Research, MII  
CHEN Lei Vice President in Manufacturing; Director of Management Board  Chery Auto.  
CHEN Wei President Xinwei Telecom  
CHEN WeiNong Professorial Engineer; Secretary of Party Committee CATRC  
CHEN YiLong Professorial Engineer;  SAE of China  
Also Secretary General, Automotive Industry 
S&T Progression Premium Foundation 
CHENG Zheng 
Senior Engineer, Product Department & Car Body Design Section, 
FAW Car FAW 
Chief designer of RedFlag platform from 
1950s to 1990s 
CHI Ye Vice President; General Manager of Sales Company Brilliance Auto  
CUI XueWen President 
HaFei Auto; HaFei 
Aircraft Industrial Group  
DAI MaoFang Senior Engineer; Deputy General Manager JAC  
DING ShiJin Project Assistant, Program Management Department Chery Auto.  
DING Yong Director, Planning & Strategy Department of R&D Centre Brilliance Auto  
DONG SiChun Chief, Claim Section, Purchasing Quality Department Chery Auto.  
DONG Feng Director, Human Resources Department Brilliance Auto  
DONG ChunBo Director, R&D Centre FAW  
FAN ShiWei President of Planning & Design Institute Chery Auto. Ever worked in FAW 
FAN BaoQun Senior Economist DRC  
FAN HongFu Deputy Director, ZTE Tech. Centre ZTE  
FANG YunZhou 
Supervisor of AERI Clean & Efficient Energy Tech. Department, 
Automotive Engineering Research Institute Chery Auto. Ever worked in DongFeng 
FANG WeiYi Vice President Huawei Tech.  
FEI JianFeng Engineer  Shanghai-GM  
FENG WuTang Assitant to President; General Manager of Engine Plant  Chery Auto. Ever worked in FAW 
FENG Ping Deputy General Manager of Chery International Chery Auto. Ever worked in FAW 
FU FuMei Engineer, Intelligence Information Office Chery Auto.  
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YANG Yong  
Engineer; Assistant to Director, Automobile Engineering Research 
Institute Chery Auto.  
YANG YiGang Vice President DTT; CATT  
YANG 
JianZhon
g Special Technical Adviser to CEO; Professorial Engineer  Geely Hld. 
Ever worked as Deputy Director of R&D 
Centre, FAW 
YANG Jian Director of Board; Executive Vice President  Geely Hld.  
YANG ZaiTian Senior Manager, Development Strategy Committee Xinwei Telecom  
YANG BaoQuan Chief, System Office DongAn Engine  
YANG GuiLiang Vice President DTT  
YIN TongYao President; Chairman of Board Chery Auto. 
Ever worked as Executive Vice President in 
FAW; Ever worked as Head of Assembly 
Workshop in FAW 
YIN BoBen General Manager, HQ Automobile Manufacturing Geely Hld.  
YOU Yi Senior Manager/Engineer, Engine Divis ion Brilliance Auto  
YU YaJie Quality engineer, PTEC Market Supporting Department Chery Auto.  
YU Wen  Assistant to Headmaster of Chery Univ. Chery Auto.  
YU Wei Deputy General Manager, HQ Automobile Manufacturing Geely Hld. 
Ever worked as President of HuaLi 
Manufacturing, Tianjin Auto 
YU XueLiang Director, Administration Department Geely Hld.  
YU 
BaoChen
g Senior Engineer; Chery Auto. Ever worked in FAW 
YU YaJie Engineer; Product Improvement Department Chery Auto.  
YU Ting Director of Engine Plant  Geely Hld. Ever worked in Ministry of Railway 
YUAN YongBin Vice President, Automotive Engineering Research Institute Chery Auto.  
YUAN Hong Manager of Haise Model Brilliance Auto  
YUAN Tao Vice President in Purchasing Chery Auto.  
ZENG QingHua Director, Quality Tech. Department, Quality Assurance Department Chery Auto.  
ZENG GuoHua 
Chief, Chassis Department, Passenger Vehicle Product Development 
Institute Chery Auto. Ever worked in Shanghai-Volkswagen 
ZHA jianPing Vice President Brilliance Auto  
ZHAN 
LiangShe
ng Deputy Director, Program Management Department Chery Auto.  
ZHAN WanJin Vice President in Sales  Geely Hld. Ever worked in FAW as Vice President 
ZHAN  XiaLai Mayor; Secretary of Municipal Party Committee WuHu City Ever worked as Chairman of Board, Chery. 
ZHANG Lin General Manager, Chery International Chery Auto.  
ZHANG LiMin Senior Engineer, Technical Equipment Office WFIERI  
ZHANG ZuoYang Senior Engineer; Vice-dean of Automotive Tech. Academy JAC  
ZHANG Ping Executive Vice President; Director of Management Board  Chery Auto.  
ZHANG FaQiang Manager, Human Resources Department Chery Auto.  
ZHANG 
GuoZhon
g Chairman, Labour Union; Director, No.2 Car Plant Chery Auto.  
ZHANG YaFeng Assistant to President; Vice President, Planning & Design Institute Chery Auto.  
ZHANG LinBo 
Deputy Chief, CAE Department, Passenger Vehicle Product 
Development Institute Chery Auto.  
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Note: (1) In this list, only names of interviewees with whom the author ever had more than 2 hours’ conversation are included while other interviewees are not counted in. 
Even for the names of some with over 2 hours’ conversation have been lost. Thanks to them all. 
(2) Chery and Xinwei allowed the author to carry out investigation by the way of participation with their uniforms. Many interviews were carried out as “casual” 
conversations in workshops, conference rooms, dining rooms, sports fields, laboratories, and their dormitories, or happened in their negotiations with customers and 
even the field working. For better interview effects, the author did not disclose his name, and did not have the names of some of these interviewees. Thanks to them. 
(3) Titles of interviewees list here were the positions of them as the time of interviews. For interviewees who I ever had more than one interviews with, their recent 
positions are listed, unless special notes are made. 
(4) The interviews with JiangXing Wu and GuoYing Lu (core leaders of HJD series development) were carried out by Feng Lu in 2003. Feng Lu had a special 
conversation and discussion with me about the interviews, and shared with me his original interview notes, as we were partners in a project at that time. These two 
interviewees are not listed in the table. But I express my special appreciation to Feng Lu for his generous helps. 
(5) Abbreviations in this table: CATRC: China Automotive Technology and Research Centre; CCID: China Centre for Information Industry Development; DRC: 
Development Research Centre of the State Council, China; Geely Hld.: Geely Holding Group; JAC: AnHui JiangHuai Automotive Co., LTD; WFIERI: Wuxi Fuel 
Injection Equipment Research Institute, FAW 
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